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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, I show how promising pragmatic intrusion based on the notion 
of explicature can be in dealing with various topics belonging to epistemology and 
knowledge transmission, such as propositional attitude reports, attitudes ‘de se’, 
Immunity to Error through Misidentification, knowing how, quotation and 
indirect reports. The dissertation is divided into two parts. In the first part, I 
discuss theoretical problems pertaining to the notion of explicatures, the most 
important of which is ‘Are explicatures cancellable?’ . I argue that they are not. I 
support this position further through considerations on modularity of mind. I also 
discuss the picture of inferential pragmatics by pointing out connections between 
Relevance Theory and Default semantics. I apply notions of modularity of mind 
and non-cancellability of explicatures to definite descriptions. I also address basic 
problems pertaining to semantic minimalism and I argue that it is compatible with 
contextualism. In part 2, I deal with attitude reports and explain how to deal with 
failure of substitutivity of identicals  in terms of pragmatic intrusion. I provide 
further evidence showing that pragmatic intrusion must be postulated in 
propositional attitude reports. The discussion on pragmatic intrusion continues 
with attitudes ‘de se’, which are discussed in terms of  semantics and philosophy. 
I explore various cases of inferences in which ‘de se’ attitudes involve an 
explicature based on an Ego concept. I argue that Immunity to Error through 
Misidentification  largely depends on semantico/pragmatic considerations and, in 
particular, on pragmatic intrusion.  In this thesis I also explore analogies between 
propositional attitude reports and indirect reports, from the point of view of 
substitutivity of identicals.  In connection with indirect reports, I expatiate on 
inferential processes that are non-reflective and independent of context and 
inferential processes which heavily depend on context (thus the connection 
between indirect reports and language games). Knowing how is discussed in terms 
of pragmatic intrusion. I show, in fact, that many problems relating to knowing-
how cannot be understood without an application of the notion of explicature.  
Finally, I provide a view of quotation that is essentially pragmatic and radical, on 
the grounds that it is more parsimonious that a view which starts with semantics. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
In this dissertation I tackled various topics which were interconnected in my mind, 
proceeding from topic to topic guided by the need to know more and to have access 
to the mysteries of areas of pragmatics and philosophy of mind which fascinated 
me. I never got tired to write this dissertation and it was only a temporal limit 
which made me stop. I am sure that from here I can proceed to more challenging 
topics, but this will be left for another day. For years, I was fascinated by Gricean 
pragmatics and in this thesis I was able to use the more conservative as well as the 
least conservative and innovative strands of research in pragmatics. In particular, I 
took the notion of (conversational) explicature and from there I moved on to 
explore topics in the philosophy of mind with particular attention to communicative 
intentions. 
 
Gricean pragmatics mainly deals with a speaker’s communicative intentions as 
manifested through her  speech.  Intentions, of course, are in the speaker’s head; 
however, if they were solely in the speaker’s head, they could not come out, they 
could not emerge from her mind and be shared with the co-participants (through 
communication). This sharing of intentions happens when a speaker manages to get 
her message across. Now, clearly this practice is not like putting a message into a 
bottle and putting it to sea in the hope that someone, if anyone at all picks up the 
bottle, will be induced to open it, read the message and then carry out an action. 
Sending a message in daily interaction is to shape the message in such a way that 
the speaker’s intention(s) can be recognized by the hearers. Recognition can be 
aided through contextual cues and clues, consciously used by the speaker and 
known by the speaker to be conducive to an interpretation process allowing 
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speaker’s intentions and hearer’s interpretations (of the message) to match. Cues 
may lead a hearer to detect an interpretation problem (e.g. a mismatch between the 
literal and the non-literal level of meaning) and clues can serve to fill the gaps left 
in the text (Dascal and Weizman 1987). Projection of speaker’s intentions occurs 
through a continuum from a more conscious (and sometimes tactical) process, 
involving a deliberate planning process determining the inferential procedure and 
anticipating partially or completely the interpretation moves of the hearer to a less 
conscious and finally automatic, or even routinized and standardized process.  But 
now it is clear that the pragmatic enterprise is not like bottle throwing in the hope 
that the message in the bottle will be recovered by someone; the message must be 
shaped by taking into account the concrete situation of the utterance and the 
predispositions of the hearers to pick up the cues and clues that direct the 
communication process. We have a hearer whose history we know, we have a 
person in front of us, and we use part of the history we share with her and the 
background assumptions that normally have a bearing on the understanding of a 
message to anticipate the direction which the interpretation work will take. 
Anticipating an inferential process is important for the speaker, as he thereby 
manifests the awareness that his intentions will be most probably interpreted 
correctly, arriving at a match between the speaker’s intentions and the hearer’s 
interpretation. We furthermore use principles of language use (whether we accept 
Gricean pragmatics or a theory à la Sperber and Wilson) to anticipate the direction 
which the interpretation process will take. Without a similarity in the cognitive 
make up of the speaker and the hearer, there would be little chance that what the 
hearer arrives at are the speaker’s intentions. It is the fact that the speaker can rely 
on this (biologically determined) cognitive similarity and on the awareness of 
certain principles of cognition, which are valid both for the speaker and the hearer, 
that guarantees that the inferential path is predictable on an objective basis. So a 
theory of interpretation, to be of genuine interest,  must also be one of the speaker’s 
intentions. Intentions and recovered messages are both the objects of pragmatics, 
since speakers and hearers both shape their codification and interpretation processes 
by taking  into account principles of language use (whether the Gricean maxims or 
a single cognitive/communicative principle). It is the intersubjectivity of the 
interpretation path which Jaszczolt (1999) calls the social path of interpretation. 
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 Is it true that semantics only provides schematic information which is then 
expanded into propositional forms through pragmatic processes? This is clearly one 
of the problems tackled in this thesis, and one which is likely to receive different 
answers (depending on the person who answers this theoretical question). My 
approach is traditional, in accepting that semantics and syntax allow semantic 
compositionality and form the basis for projecting a minimal level of interpretation 
corresponding, in many cases,  to a minimal truth-conditionally evaluable logical 
form, which then enters into a process of expansion or completion. I am aware that 
there are more drastic and radical theories of pragmatic intrusion, but I have my 
own reservations on the idea that a project that does not take into account the 
fundamental tension of semantics and pragmatics is really feasible. What is clear is 
that, whatever our approach to pragmatic intrusion (whether we accept a minimal 
semantics which is fully propositional or a semantic theory which only provides 
interpretative schemas) pragmatic intrusion can be put to use in the understanding 
of philosophical topics if an understanding of the philosophical debate hinges on 
the meaning and the explicatures of a certain construction – to be called an 
intrusive construction.  Which are the topics that can benefit most from pragmatic 
intrusion? These are clearly those of indirect reports, quotation, mixed quotations,  
belief reports,  knowing how, ‘de se’ attitudes, Immunity to Error through 
Misidentification, the attributive/referential distinction,  etc. So we are sure that by 
providing multiple connections between linguistic and philosophical topics, we can 
find out how to fuel the philosophical topics and how to construe them in such a 
way that we can provide constructive answers. 
 Is there any hope that we can find out further topics where pragmatics and 
philosophy interconnect? My answer is positive. At this point we dare say that the 
issue of how to extend these topics is one of method and not of content. Whenever 
we find out that a philosophical question can be reduced to a linguistic one (even if 
partially) and if the linguistic question reduces in one way or another to a pragmatic 
one, we can be sure that pragmatics can be applied to the resolution (or dissolution) 
of a given philosophical problem. But how can a philosophical question reduce to a 
pragma-linguistic question? If a metaphysical or epistemological issue hinges on a 
logical problem and this logical problem has a linguistic structure which uses 
connectives or words  admitting pragmatic intrusion, then the epistemological  issue 
promises to be reducible to a pragmatic issue. 
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 In general, if pragmatics makes progress and demonstrates that a linguistic 
phenomenon evinces partial or drastic pragmatic intrusion and if it turns out that an 
epistemological issue uses that linguistic structure as part of the discussion and the 
essential part of the discussion hinges on that linguistic structure (or part of the 
argumentation is based on that linguistic structure), we know in advance that 
pragmatic intrusion can be applied in a fruitful way to that epistemological 
problem. The question, essentially, is whether a certain epistemological problem is 
also partly a semantic problem and whether that semantic problem turns out to be a 
semantico/pragmatic problem (one allowing or requiring pragmatic intrusion). Of 
course, it is not easy to assess whether an epistemological problem is also partially 
a semantic problem and every attempt must be made to disentangle the 
epistemological from the semantic side of the problem. However, if, despite all 
attempts, the epistemological problem hinges on some semantic categories (say 
pronominals or indexicals or some other linguistic structure), and such categories 
are amenable to pragmatic analysis, then it is clear that applicability of pragmatic 
categories to epistemology must be granted. Is not this a small triumph for 
pragmatics? Is not this evidence for  the view that much of our philosophy hinges 
on linguistic structures? I assume positive answers to these questions. This is not 
surprising since much of our theorizing is done through arguments which are 
crucially advanced through the linguistic resources of our theoretical arsenal.  
These considerations are put to use in my dissertation, where I reflect, first, on 
pragmatic intrusion and the theory of semantics and then on the application of 
pragmatic intrusion of the truth-conditional type to epistemological topics, such as 
belief reports, indirect reports, knowing how, Immunity to error through 
misidentification and also quotation (quotation being part of a theory of how 
knowledge is transmitted). 
The semantics/pragmatics debate has intrigued me for a number of years.  In this 
dissertation, I have reflected on how to make sense of some initial intuitions about 
the cancellability of the pragmatic components of explicatures and how to make 
sense of the issue of propositional attitudes, which surely connects with the issue of 
explicatures. I have also reflected on what kind of connections could be made and I 
have ended up connecting the issue of explicatures with the issue of modularity of 
mind and the issue of propositional attitudes with the issue of indirect reports, ‘de 
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se’ attitudes, knowing-how and quotation. If it is true that the issue of propositional 
attitudes can be dealt with in terms of pragmatic intrusion, then surely these 
considerations can be extended  ‘ipso facto’ to indirect reports, which work 
similarly to propositional attitude ascriptions, to ‘de se’ attitudes and to knowledge 
claims (in particular knowing-how). The next step, obviously, was to extend the 
discussion to knowing how, Immunity to error through misidentification, and 
quotation. 
 
What have these topics in common? I am mainly interested in a theory of how 
we can transmit knowledge of what happens in another person’s mind – whether in 
the forms of belief(s) or knowledge. Belief reports, ‘de se’ belief reports and 
knowing-how are clearly cases of the mental panorama, they represent the contents 
of another person’s mind which we may try to transmit to another person in the 
hope that this flux of information between minds will be of use to the last person in 
the transmission chain.  Indirect reports and quotation crucially belong to a theory 
of how the mind communicates information about another’s person’s mind. When 
we are confronted with an utterance such as ‘Mary said that John is in Paris’ even if 
we are not having direct access to Mary’s mind, we have access to it through 
pragmatic inference. So while, strictly speaking, one need not include indirect 
reports under the rubric of belief reports, if we give full weight to a pragmatic 
theory, through an indirect report we are able to reconstruct what bits of 
information belong to Mary’s mind and we know how to separate these from 
information that belongs to John’s mind. As far as I know, the only obstacle against 
placing indirect reports under the rubric of belief reports is the question of how to 
separate Mary’s from John’s mental contents. However, once we can do so by 
resorting to pragmatic principles and abundant clues and cues, we can be sure that 
the issue of indirect reports and the issue of belief reports intersect and interconnect 
at a deep level, to such an extent that it is necessary to examine the two topics 
together. Since quotation occurs frequently in indirect reports, it goes without 
saying that quotation also intersects with the issue of belief reports. Surely we can 
also have sentences such as ‘Mary believes that John ‘is really crazy’’ where 
quotations are inserted in belief reports and thus the problems of quotation and the 
problems of belief reports intersect in an interesting way. Belief reports and 
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knowing how are issues that also intersect in interesting ways. Opacity, pragmatic 
intrusion, Modularity of Mind, the pragmatics of belief, etc.  seem to be applicable 
to both issues and thus it was useful to apply everything we gained through 
studying belief reports to knowing how. The connection between the issue of belief 
reports, ‘de se’ belief reports and Immunity to error through misidentification must 
also be made explicit. ‘De se’ reports are special types of  utterances reporting 
propositional attitudes (‘believing’ is perhaps the most representative attitude). ‘De 
se’ attitudes are different in that their representation must incorporate a first-
personal component of meaning – which I argued must be supplied through 
pragmatic intrusion.  This first-personal component, I argue, is also responsible for 
Immunity to Error through misidentification. In other words, when we think 
utterances such as ‘I remember I was walking in Oxford’ the question of the 
thinker’s identity (or identification or misidentification) does not arise. 
 
The thesis is divided into two parts. In part one I deal with my considerations on 
Grice’s circle and the cancellability of explicatures, making sense of them in terms 
of the theory of modularity of mind.  The theory of modularity of mind 
interconnects with pragmatics and, in particular, with my considerations on Grice’s 
circle and cancellability of explicatures. My considerations on modularity and 
pragmatics square well with my considerations on Grice’s circle – and this is no 
coincidence. It shows that there must be a grain of truth in my theory.  Given my 
interest in this match of intuitions, I thought it could be important to test my 
predictions on the basis of a discussion of definite descriptions. Readers may be 
surprised to see that I deal with definite descriptions in terms of modularity – but I 
think ultimately my intuitions may be of some importance.   
In part 2,  I deal with propositional attitudes. I claim that belief reports can be 
made sense of through recourse to the theory of explicatures and I use Relevance 
Theory to show how these explicatures can be recovered. I was surprised to find out 
that such considerations could be extended to a theory of indirect reports as well. 
Then I extended my considerations to the thorny issue of ‘de se’ attitudes, knowing 
how and quotation. Parts 1 and parts 2 are connected by the idea that certain types 
of pragmatic intrusion are necessary. The mind is programmed to behave in this 
way, by calculating explicatures automatically in the default case and by providing 
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important elements of compositionality through pragmatic intrusion (at the level of 
Merger Representations (see Jaszczolt 2005)). 
 It is interesting that I adopted Relevance theory in the attempt to explain how 
utterance interpretation proceeds and how we interpret minds (in each chapter, I 
reiterate some Relevance Theoretic notions for the convenience of readers). In my 
thesis, I adopt a modular story in which the brain has a module, with specialized 
processes and taking as input only certain types of data, dedicated to theory of 
Mind. I also adopt the idea that the Principle of Relevance is situated in this theory 
of Mind Module and can explain much of the procedures occurring in such a 
module. There is a chapter, in this dissertation in which I claim that this adoption of 
RT conceptual dowry allows scholars to escape the crucial problems one would 
have in having to explain otherwise – through Gricean principles which apply to 
communication – the ascription of propositional attitudes to other’s minds through 
thought (rather than through assertion). Having thoughts also implies using certain 
modes of presentation of the reference of a certain NP and  Gricean pragmatics can 
explain how modes of presentation are attributed only through more complicates 
stories. It is clear to me that propositional attitudes is the locus where a theory of 
cognition and communication diverge most considerably and where a theory of 
cognition alone is better equipped to handle pragmatic problems. But then I am 
aware that this is a controversial point – and in any case I am open to the idea that 
thoughts about others’ minds can also be communicated, in which case the Gricean 
project has no apparent difficulties. 
 
Pragmatics deals with the reconstruction of communicative intentions on the part 
of hearers and the projection of communicative intentions on the part of speakers.  
Projection and reconstruction of intentions obey the same principles of pragmatics. 
Those who say or think that pragmatics should primarily be a theory of  
understanding and those who say that pragmatics should be a theory of meaning 
projection are both wrong, unless they make these claims together. It is important 
that one who speaks should take into account the exigencies of those who hear the 
message and it is of equal importance that those who hear the message should be 
bound to the duty of reconstructing the speakers’ intentions. The alignment 
between meaning projection and  understanding is guaranteed by the fact that 
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hearers put themselves into the shoes of speakers and speakers put themselves into 
the shoes of hearers. It is also guaranteed presumably by the psychological reality 
of cognitive principles, like the Principle of Relevance, which steers 
communication by balancing cognitive rewards and processing efforts. Obviously, 
cognitive efforts are justified  if they serve to yield appropriate and sufficiently rich 
cognitive effects. This is enough to orient the communication process in its double 
dimension of transmission and reception of information (the communicative 
intention). There should obviously be a sort of correlation between cognitive efforts 
from the point of view of the speaker and  cognitive efforts from the point of view 
of the hearer; and there should also be a correlation between cognitive effects from 
the point of view of the speaker and cognitive effects from the point of view of the 
hearer. In this way, we can recognize the double dimension of  transmission and 
reception of information, justifying the adoption of the same cognitive principles 
for both processes.  
 Why is it that Cognitive Principles figure so prominently in explanations of 
epistemological topics. One reason for this is that epistemology and communication 
intersect in various and important ways.  Epistemology deals with knowledge 
(basically) and the various ramifications of this concept. And knowledge is not only 
stored in someone’s brain, but it is also transmitted, standardly through 
communication. Skepticism about the transmission of knowledge is usually 
unjustified. All we need for believing that we know something  by being at the end 
of an information chain through which knowledge of it has been transmitted is that 
we have good grounds for believing that our informants are reliable and are also 
able to select reliable informants as sources of knowledge further up in the 
transmission chain. So, basically, the agent at the end of a transmission chain will 
not only deem that the person next in the hierarchy of the transmission chain is a 
reliable informant but that every person situated in the same transmission chain is a 
reliable informant and is capable of selecting a reliable informant who himself is 
able to select another reliable informant, and so forth and so on, until every position 
in the transmission chain is filled. 
 
Since  epistemology and communication clearly intersect, the understanding of 
many epistemological topics requires a theory of pragmatic inference based on a 
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general view of cognition and efficiency. We need a theory that explains  why 
inferential processes happen so fast and are often conclusive. Meanings conveyed 
pragmatically are often fast and automatic. I have argued in several places (e.g. in 
Capone 2009a) that intentions, once they are projected, cannot be easily cancelled. I 
have discussed in several places the issue of cancellability of intentions in both 
conversational implicatures and conversational explicatures, and my conclusion has 
been  that intentions, once they are fixed through the numerous clues and cues of 
discourse, cannot be undone: hence particularized implicatures and explicatures are 
not cancellable. This is a bold claim, of course, and it happens that the only ones 
who put forward this claim are Burton-Roberts and myself. My own claims are 
furthermore supported by considerations about modularity of mind. People working 
on modularity of mind (such as Kasher 1991) and pragmatics have long since 
argued that pragmatic inferences are not modular, because they are cancellable, 
hence non-mandatory, being the result of the interaction between various sources of 
information, including beliefs about the world, encyclopedic knowledge, deductive 
inferences, etc. However, if my considerations about the non-cancellability of 
explicatures are on the right track, we need to assess the status of modularity of 
conversational implicatures and explicatures. My own view is that implicatures and 
explicatures are part of a modular picture of the mind, and exemplify the operation 
of cognitive principles working within the theory of mind module. In this thesis I 
argue in favor of the interaction between the Principle of Relevance and 
considerations put forward by Jaszczolt in her default semantics. In particular I 
argue that standardization of pragmatic inferences due to the principle of relevance 
creates links or connections with a default semantics archive. I also discuss, 
however briefly, the notion of modularization which links default semantics and the 
principle of relevance. I am not, however, saying that all pragmatic inferences are 
of the modular type as I concede that at least reflective inferences are of the non-
modular type, following ideas by Cummings (2009). 
 
My considerations on propositional attitudes concern belief attitudes, ‘de se’ 
attitudes and knowing how. In an upshot, my main idea is that pragmatic intrusion 
adds meaning components to propositional attitudes, such meaning components not 
being part of their semantics but pragmatic enrichments. While compositionality 
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cannot be guaranteed for propositional attitudes at the semantic level, it can be 
guaranteed at the pragmatic level (the level of merger representations, following 
Jaszczolt 2005). Hence propositional attitudes, ‘de se’ attitudes and knowing-how 
are probably the most exciting topics within the theory of mind (serving to justify 
the idea that compositionality is best done at the level of Merger Representations). I 
also provide some non-standard considerations concerning Immunity to Error 
through Misidentification and quotation. I consider the issue of quotation, indirect 
reports and propositional attitudes connected, since the main problem that emerges 
from such discussions is how to increment logical forms with modes of presentation 
of the reference which are provided by pragmatic processes. My  point of view is 
philosophical and cognitive. In other words, I will make sure that considerations 
based on the Principle of Relevance will intrude into the semantics of propositional 
attitudes.  
11 
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Pragmatics and Modularity of Mind 
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Chapter 1 
 
Are explicatures cancellable?  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this chapter is to reflect on the necessity of pragmatic development of  
propositional forms and to arrive at a better understanding of the level of meaning which 
Sperber and Wilson and Carston famously call „explicatures‟ (or „explicature‟) and to 
support the claim that (the pragmatically conveyed elements of) explicatures are not 
cancellable – unlike conversational implicatures. While Capone (2003)  addressed the issue 
of the cancellability of explicatures from a merely empirical point of view, here a number of 
important theoretical questions are raised and discussed. In particular I propose  that the 
analysis of the notion of intentionality and of the nature of pragmatic intrusion will settle the 
question of the cancellability of explicatures. An explicature can be considered a two-level 
entity, in that it consists of a logical form and of a pragmatic increment this logical form 
gives rise to (in the context of utterance). However, both the initial logical form and the 
pragmatic increment are the target of pragmatic processes, in that we need a pragmatic 
process to promote the initial logical form to a serious intended interpretation and another 
pragmatic process to derive further increments starting from this initial logical form as 
promoted to a serious utterance interpretation. 
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An explicature is a combination of linguistically 
encoded and contextually inferred conceptual 
features. The smaller the relative contribution 
of the contextual features, the more explicit the 
explicature will be, and inversely. (Sperber and  
Wilson 1986, 182). 
 
 
Introduction 
The boundary between semantics and pragmatics has been the object of much recent 
linguistic theorising and discussions. It is an outcome of dialectical conflicts that 
better theories emerge, in which a number of errors are purged, arguments are refined 
and perspectives are  broadened. The aim of this chapter  is to reflect on the necessity 
of pragmatic development of  propositional forms and to arrive at a better 
understanding of the level of meaning which Sperber and Wilson and Carston 
famously call „explicatures‟ (or „explicature‟) and to support the claim that (the 
pragmatically conveyed elements of) explicatures are not cancellable – unlike 
conversational implicatures
1
. This is not a polemical chapter, in fact it is intended to 
advance the discussion on the semantics/pragmatics debate acknowledging the 
importance of relevance theorists‟  contribution to the issue.  Of course,  the notion 
of explicature is originally Sperber and Wilson‟s (see Sperber and Wilson 1986), but  
Carston in a number of articles and in her book has further refined the notion by 
ample discussion. In fact, this author has written a monumental volume doing  much 
service to the cause of pragmatics, by making it a more rigorous discipline. Yet, if 
my idea that (the pragmatically conveyed elements of) explicatures are not 
cancellable is correct, a number of connected ideas in that book must be changed: 
and it is possible that this theoretical move will precipitate  positive consequences on 
the theory as a whole, as was claimed in Capone (2003; 2006) in a discussion of 
„Grice‟s circle‟. Here, however, for the sake of simplicity of discussion, I propose to 
divorce the issue of „explicatures‟ from that of „Grice‟s circle‟. While Capone (2003)  
addressed the issue of the cancellability of explicatures from a merely empirical 
point of view, here a number of important theoretical questions are raised and 
discussed. In particular I think that the analysis of the notion of intentionality and of 
                                                 
1
 Someone said that, after all, my claim is not original; yet I modestly have to say 
that I put forward this claim in my 2003 paper, revised and  reprinted in 2006.  
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the nature of pragmatic intrusion will settle the question of the cancellability of 
explicatures. An explicature can be considered a two-level entity, in that it consists of 
a logical form and of a pragmatic increment this logical form gives rise to (in the 
context of utterance). However, both the initial logical form and the pragmatic 
increment are the target of pragmatic processes, in that we need a pragmatic process 
to promote the initial logical form to a serious intended interpretation and another 
pragmatic process to derive further increments starting from this initial logical form 
as promoted to a serious utterance interpretation. 
 
1. The cancellability of conversational implicatures. 
I propose to settle the issue of the cancellability of conversational implicatures before 
considering the issue of the cancellability of explicatures, as the two issues are 
connected, due to the fact that through  both implicatures and explicatures a speaker 
intends to have a certain meaning recognized by a recipient. In both cases we are 
faced with intended messages. 
 
That things are not always easy can be shown by using  one of Paul Grice‟s 
celebrated examples (1989, 33). A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a 
candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: “Dear Sir, Mr. X‟s 
command of English is excellent and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. 
Yours etc.”. Surely the philosopher cannot be unable, through ignorance, to say 
more, since the man is his pupil; moreover, he knows  that more information than 
this is needed. He must, therefore, be wishing to impart information that he is 
reluctant to write down. He therefore implicates that he thinks Mr. X is not a  good 
philosopher.  
 Granting that the teacher manages to convey some message above what is literally 
said and that the quantity of what is said  (as well as the cost of  reading all such 
information) is an element in the interception of the communicated message, I am 
not sure how the cancellability test applies here. One may contend that the 
implicature is not cancellable. I doubt that the teacher may write a second letter 
saying “I apologize for that cryptic message; I was in such a haste; Mr X would have 
deserved a longer letter, which I now hasten to provide, as follows. (…) In fact, I 
recommend Mr X for the philosophy job in question”. Implicated messages cannot 
be retracted, in certain official circumstances; intentions cannot be „disintegrated‟ 
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(or unimplicated) by further messages if the circumstances are such that these 
intentions are unequivocally calculated. 
 An objection may be raised to such considerations. Someone may say that the 
interpretation of the philosopher‟s revision is somehow tricky: though the 
philosopher could deny not having supported his student, he certainly could not 
assert his support. Implicature cancellations are connected with  the capacity to deny 
having implicated that Q by asserting P, but not the capacity to assert Q as a possible 
repair to having asserted P. But in a sense, this objection is based on the assumption 
that the implicature is somehow different from the one noted by Grice, that is to say 
that the writer is not supporting Mr X. On this interpretation, it makes sense to deny 
the implicature. But now, assuming that this is a reasonable interpretation, why is it 
that the philosopher‟s revision cannot explicitly support Mr X? Presumably the 
reason is that, in addition to the implicature that the writer was not supporting Mr 
X‟s application, there is another implicature salient, namely that the philosopher 
thinks X is a poor philosopher. This is not an implicature that can be denied. The 
problem of this example, which is surely tricky, lies in the fact that language is 
embedded in a social situation, in which rules of conduct partially determine the 
meanings which words – or their absence  - have. 
  
In the light of the following discussion, it may be useful to distinguish here 
between generalized and particularised conversational implicatures. Generalized 
conversational implicatures are default inferences, to use an expression dear to 
Levinson (2000), that is inferential augmentations that get through in a default 
context, in the absence of  particular clues about what the context is like, and in 
which context solely plays a negative role, in that it can cancel an inference in case a 
conflict arises between propositions already accepted in it and the default 
implicature.  In the neo-Gricean framework advocated by Levinson, the common 
ground is thought of as a bucket, that contains all the facts mutually assumed, in 
virtue of common knowledge or because they have been asserted. The defeasibility 
of implicature generation is explained in this way: we add the content of a new 
assertion in the bucket strictly in  the following order only if each incrementation is 
consistent with the contents of the bucket: 
 
a. Entailments; 
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b. Quantity Generalized Conversational Implicatures 
i. Clausal; 
ii. Scalar; 
c. Manner  Generalised conversational implicature 
d. Generalized conversational I-implicatures (due to the principle of minimization). 
(Levinson 2000, 90). 
 
 Particularised conversational implicatures, instead, are  inferential augmentations in 
which contextual assumptions loom large in determining/fixing a communicative 
intention through reasoning using those assumptions as premises. Of course, there 
may be disagreement as to the level or degree of  conscious reasoning actually 
occurring in the calculation of particularised conversational implicatures. Relevance 
theorists, for example, prefer to see these inferences as occurring at a subconscious 
level. I do not exclude that both modes of inference are available and that we have to 
distinguish, case by case, between conscious pragmatic reasonings and subconscious 
pragmatic interpretative processes guided by some pragmatic principle. 
Some authors, such as Burton-Roberts, believe that particularized conversational 
implicatures, in contrast to generalized conversational implicatures, cannot be 
cancelled, without contradiction of what is intended. This correlates with the 
intuition that  the more evident or manifest  a speaker‟s intention to implicate, the 
less cancellable the implicature will be. (Burton-Roberts 2006, 10)
2
.  
 
 
1.1 Why is the issue of implicature cancellation  relevant to the issue of 
explicature cancellation? 
The issue of implicature cancellation (in the case of particularized implicatures) is 
relevant to the issue of explicature cancellation because the cases – at least the most 
important and delicate ones – of explicatures analysed by Wilson & Sperber (2002)  
and by Carston (2002a) are cases of  inferences in particular contexts. Consider the 
following utterance produced by Mary in reply to an invitation to join us for dinner. 
When she says „I have already eaten‟ at the level of the propositional form we assign 
a constituent involving a temporal concept and we understand her intention of saying 
                                                 
2
 PCI = particularized conversational implicatures; GCI = generalized conversational 
implicatures. 
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that she has eaten some food at a time interval ranging from  couple of hours ago to a 
few minutes ago. We certainly do not  interpret Mary as saying that she ate some 
food three days ago, since this information would no longer count as an explanation 
for her refusal to have  more food. Why is this the case? Intentionality is an 
important factor in our decision and, in particular, since intentionality cannot be 
assessed telepathically (to use an expression from Wedgwood (2007)), we must rely 
on features of the context to point in the direction of the right intention. We discard 
the hypothesis that Mary means that she ate some food some days ago, as this would 
hardly be relevant to our invitation. A move that is relevant to an invitation to eat 
some food is either acceptance or refusal. Since no acceptance has been issued, 
Mary‟s utterance can only count as an explanation (of her decision to have no more 
food) and the explanation, to do the right kind of work, must rely on the assumption 
that she has eaten immediately before the invitation as human beings are such that 
they cannot eat food when their stomach is crammed. Try now  to nullify this 
inferential work. I think you will not be able to do so. The reason for that is that 
inferential  communication is due to pragmatics and pragmatics cannot be overruled 
by pragmatics
3
. If this were done, then there would be no rational way of 
communicating with people. 
 In both the particularised implicatures cases and in the explicature cases, we are 
faced with the same problem. Pragmatics cannot be overruled by pragmatics. Only 
semantics can be overruled by pragmatics. In both cases, we are faced with 
intentionality that is evinced through the pragmatic resources of the language and as 
such cannot be retracted, as pragmatics cannot be overruled by pragmatics. It is not 
just the question of intentionality, as Burton-Roberts puts it, that decides the issue. 
Intentionality, on its own, is  inert. It is in the head of the speaker and is not 
telepathically transmitted to the hearer. It is only through communication that the 
intentionality of the speaker is inferentially relevant to attributions of intentionality 
on the part of the hearer and it is inherent in  the (actual) pragmatic process that  no 
room is left for cancellability of particularised  implicatures or explicatures.  
 The reason why  particularised implicatures cannot be cancelled is the same that 
prevents explicatures from being cancelled.  When a strong intentionality is 
projected, it can no longer be retracted. 
                                                 
3
 I am not, however, saying that a specific pragmatic heuristic principle cannot be 
overruled by manifest contextual assumptions. I am only saying that the ultimate 
pragmatic process cannot be undone. 
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Implicatures, it is generally agreed, only arise if intended and recognised if 
intended. But then it should be impossible to cancel an implicature: how is it 
possible to withdraw/cancel what was intended to be implicated and was 
recognised as intended? An implicature could only be withdrawn/cancelled 
if it were NOT intended. But then it wouldn‟t BE an implicature (since 
implicatures by definition are intended); in other words, there would BE no 
implicature to cancel. This is relevant to the issue of explicature cancellation 
only in this: presumably, explicatures must be intended and must be 
recognised as intended. So the above applies to explicatures as much as to 
implicatures. And this consideration of regarding explicatures as 
uncancellable is IN ADDITION to the other considerations which you and I 
advance for saying that explicatures specifically cannot be cancelled. 
(Burton-Roberts, personal communication). 
 
Perhaps this is too strong. Should we abandon the cancellability test altogether (thus 
avoiding considering cancellability the hallmark of conversational implicature)? It is 
amazing, to say the least, that Grice who seemed happy about coupling his notion of 
conversational implicature with his notion of intentionality did not notice (or 
pretended not to notice?) the kind of impasse the two notions were leading to. The 
only cases of conversational implicatures that are really cancellable are those in 
which the intention to communicate an assumption p is least obvious, evident, and 
recognizable. Presumably these cases, by strict standards, as Burton-Roberts seems 
to imply, should not even be categorised as conversational implicatures. If things are 
so, then it is reasonable to go for the strong hypothesis that conversational 
implicatures are not cancellable (in practice
4
), which carries with it the implication 
that explicatures too are not cancellable. Explicatures too, in fact are inferences 
which must be intended and must be recognised as intended.  
 Things are not so easy though. We should find it useful to limit ourselves to the 
claim that only particularized implicatures are not cancellable, involving the 
recognition of certain  intentions (by the speaker) on the part of the hearer. These are 
                                                 
4
 I remain open to the view that potential implicatures can be cancelled in the sense 
that their potential is not fully developed in real conversation. 
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the cases in which the pragmatic resources of the language point towards an 
unequivocal intention and thus make it awkward or difficult to cancel the intention. 
      One such case is the one of the attribution of a serious intention to a speaker in 
virtue of having proffered „p‟. Deciding whether the speaker seriously intended to 
say (to assert) „p‟ is no minor matter and clearly shows the nexus between pragmatic 
processing and arriving at a non-revisable (non-cancellable) intention. It should be 
noted, following a point made elsewhere by Bach (2001), that the semantic resources 
of a language are not sufficient to project intentionality. This is a point reiterated also 
by Recanati (2007, 37), who says (following Frege) that if a sentence lacks the force 
of a serious assertion, making the content of the sentence more complex by means of 
operators such as „It is true that‟ or „I assert that‟ will not change the situation, since 
whether or not  an utterance is serious is a pragmatic matter – a matter of force and 
not a matter of content. 
 Suppose I say „Bush will be remembered for giving prosperity to USA‟ (here in 
the written text there is no disambiguating intonation and it is good that it should be 
so, because this shows the force of contextual assumptions). Well, although everyone 
will grant that I am using the conventions of English in expressing my thought, it is 
not clear that literal meaning is a firm guide to the speaker‟s intentions. You will not 
just look at the words I used, but you will most certainly embed the sentence in the 
context in which it was produced. Given the mismatch between the semantic content 
of the sentence and the propositions true in context (it is enough to look at the current 
disastrous state of the stock exchange), you will use your reasoning abilities to 
decide that my intention really cannot be that I want to say in a serious way that Bush 
brought prosperity to USA. Now, Bach‟s considerations are nice because they imply 
that no semantic device whatsoever can settle the issue of the seriousness of the 
speaker‟s intentions (this is a point he does not press). Suppose I say: „Look, I am 
seriously telling you that Bush brought prosperity to USA‟. Surely it could be useful 
to use the words „seriously‟ to indicate that I am speaking with serious intentions. 
The hearer will give the speaker another chance and will try to find out again 
whether such intentions are plausible and match with the propositions usually 
accepted in the broad context of the conversation. Yet, after the search has produced 
no context in which the intentions could be serious, the hearer will give up such a 
search and will settle for an interpretation in which the speaker could not be really 
serious. The truth is that if  literal meanings are not sufficient to guarantee that the 
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communicative intention behind the sentence is serious, no use of  literal devices for 
expressing a serious intention will do. They will be undermined by the pragmatic 
resources which augment the semantic resources of a language. If we were zealous 
enough we should be able to describe a great number of inferences of this kind, in 
which the contextual clues are rich enough to allow the hearer to recover an 
unequivocal intention. Suppose that my sister asks me whether I would like to eat  
more chocolates. Yet, I detect from the quality of her voice that she is not sincere. 
Here we are before a case in which the words say one thing and the facial expression 
and the quality  of her voice say quite another. Yet the intention is in the speaker‟s 
head. It is neither in her words nor in my head. This is a case in which it is hard to 
prove what my sister‟s intentions are. Yet, if she uses some conventional resources 
and she uses appropriate contextualization clues we can have access to her professed 
intentions, at least. The analogy with particularized implicatures here is that we have 
a message and we want to recover the intention behind the message (the intention in 
the head of the speaker) on the basis of contextual clues. As in the case of 
particularized implicatures, the speaker could try to deny having had (or not had) a 
certain intention, but she is betrayed by her tone of voice or by contextualization 
clues and, thus, it is possible to fix her intention even if the speaker thinks that she 
could evade the question of what her intention really is. 
 In a sense, it is a good thing that the task of rendering an intention serious (of 
allowing hearers to say that a professed intention is serious) is to be assigned to 
pragmatics (as Bach 2001 says) and not to semantics. Semantics can be overruled by 
pragmatics (as far as the assignment of serious intentions is concerned), but it is not 
the case that (viceversa) pragmatics is overruled by semantics. Furthermore, at least 
in principle it should never be the case that pragmatics overrules pragmatics. It is a 
logical impossibility that pragmatics should be overruled by pragmatics. While it is 
plausible that semantics is overruled by pragmatics, as far as the issue of determining 
the seriousness of the speaker‟s intention is concerned (and it is plausible because 
there is the residual possibility of determining whether a speaker‟s intentions were 
serious or not), it is a logical impossibility that pragmatics should be overruled by 
pragmatics because, having eliminated the possibility that semantics could  
determine whether the speaker‟s intentions were serious or not, now there is no 
further possibility that the seriousness of the speaker‟s intentions be expressed at all. 
By contemplating the possibility that pragmatics be overruled by pragmatics, we are 
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now facing the possibility of living in a world in which everything goes and in which 
chaos and luck prevail. I think everyone should reject the hypothesis that pragmatics 
is overruled by pragmatics – and this leads to the idea that particularized inferences 
are not cancellable. If they were cancellable, then that would amount to accepting 
that pragmatics can be overruled by pragmatics. And this is hardly a palatable view, 
as we have seen. 
 
 Now if these considerations are plausible, it is clear that the matter of  inferring 
the speaker‟s intentions given a context of utterance and the clues which are  used by 
the speaker (knowing that such a use will lead the hearer to infer a message)  is such 
that it is not easy at all to retract intentions. As an example, consider the case of  a 
public person (a famous and important politician) who harasses  his female secretary 
by making an indecent proposal. Suppose he uses a line of defence according to 
which he did not really intend his message. After all, if what Bach says is true and 
we need pragmatic processing in ascertaining whether someone seriously intended to 
assert „p‟, this line of defence would not be totally unreasonable. Here a problem 
opposite to the one noted by Bach arises. The problem is not so much how to prove 
that the speaker‟s intentions were serious, but whether one could, instead,  prove in 
court that one‟s intentions were not serious. Could  not the politician say that he was 
just joking? The problem has to do with what kind of interpretation an utterance is 
given in a context, given that it is clear to the speaker (or at least it should be clear to 
him) that the contextual resources of the language will lead  a hearer to  infer  a 
certain intention and that the context in which the utterance was produced will make 
it impossible to deny having had that intention. Pragmaticians have not given enough 
thought to this kind of problem. They take for granted that conversational 
implicatures (or explicatures) are cancellable, but in fact, in a number of contexts, it 
is not possible to lead the hearer to infer a certain intention allowing her the freedom 
to  cancel that inference. The fact is that, as  was pointed in Capone (2005a), we 
should give attention to a number of linguistic phenomena in which the individual 
intentionality is expressed by resorting to the social intentionality involved in 
performing a certain action. In Capone (2005a) I claimed that a number of inferences 
arise in context and are simply not cancellable. They are not cancellable because 
there are conventions or rules of semantic interpretation that are based on discourse 
practices and on contextual clues. These pragmatic phenomena are inferential 
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contributions on a par with conversational implicatures, yet being based on actual 
aspects of context, they have all the features of particularised imlicatures, and, hence, 
cannot be cancelled (at least we predict that it is not easy to cancel them). Consider  
utterances such as “I saw you” is the classroom. The teacher notices that 
Michelangelo (his favourite student) whispers  the  answer to a question  to  his desk 
mate. The teacher  says “I saw you ”. This is not just an accusation, but an order to 
Michelangelo to stop  what he is doing. How can this speech act be transformed into 
the speech act  “stop prompting”? It is the social situation with the  rules and 
expectations governing  students‟ obligations  and teachers‟  tasks that promote the 
inhibitive interpretation of “I saw you”. In this context, it is out of  the  question 
that the utterance could  count as a compliment – such an  interpretation simply  
cannot occur. In fact, no matter  how highly  the teacher thinks  of Michelangelo 
(maybe even admiring him for wanting to  help  his fellow students), and even 
though  Michelangelo knows that the teacher has this  positive  opinion  about him,  
it is unlikely that he  will choose  the tortuous path of individual interpretation and 
proceed from considerations about his teacher‟s high esteem  for him to the 
interpretation that the speech act counts as a compliment. Michelangelo will almost 
certainly  prefer  the social path of interpretation to  his own individual path 
(Jaszczolt 1999). Thus, he is able to  work out that the teacher,  despite his high 
opinion of  him,  actually wants him to stop whispering  answers to his desk mate. 
This is clearly a case in which, when the communicative intention is fixed, it should 
not be retracted.  
 Consider a case in which the individual intentionality and the social intentionality 
clash. Pippo De Lorenzo wrote a letter to the University Chancellor, protesting 
against a certain number of injustices after imputing them to the Head of the Faculty. 
In this letter he threatened to appeal to the judiciary system. A lot of trouble was 
caused by this letter, as the letter caused strong resentment on the part of the Head of 
Faculty. After a few years, Pippo De Lorenzo, meeting a mutual friend, tells him: 
 
1) If you meet the head of the faculty, please pass him my regards and tell him that I 
sincerely wish him well. 
 
On reflection, there is a clash here between the individual path of interpretation and 
the social path of interpretation (the resulting irony). We do not know whether Pippo 
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De Lorenzo is sincere in expressing his intentions. However, let us suppose that he 
is. In this case, the social intentionality prevails over the individual intentionality and 
no matter how sincere his words can be and how laborious Pippo De Lorenzo‟s 
efforts to emphasise his sincerity by using words such as „sincerely‟, the 
conventional effects of the words are undone by the pragmatic inferences that arise in 
context as a result of the social intentionality. In vain he could add sentences such as 
the following: 
 
(2) Let him be sure that I mean what I say; 
(3) And I really mean what I say. 
 
These could not unimplicate the social intentionality latent in the message in the 
given context.  If he really cares to communicate a serious message of reconciliation, 
the speaker, who must be aware of the social intentionality latent in the effects of his 
words in context, should either abort his intentions or carry out some reparatory 
moves such as the following: 
 
Making peace with the head of the Faculty; 
Ensuring that his apologies are accepted; 
Creating a cordiality context that justifies his sincere expression of the words he 
wants to utter through (1). 
  
I assume that some will take the example above as supporting a view of pragmatics 
based on the hearer‟s reconstruction of communicative intentions. On the contrary, 
the example above supports the idea that there can be no communicative project 
unless the individual and the social intentionality work in tandem. When there is a 
divorce between the individual and the social intentionality, the communicative 
project has to be abandoned. Pippo De Lorenzo should, in fact, either abort his 
communicative project or ensure that the individual and the social intentionality 
work in tandem, by altering the context through the steps I proposed. 
  
2. Explicatures as developed logical forms 
Levinson (1983) opts for a negative definition of pragmatics – pragmatics deals with 
non-truth conditional meaning. This view is tidy and orderly: semantics is the basis 
24 
 
for conversational implicatures (Levinson accepts the slogan pragmatics = meaning – 
truth-conditions). However,  as a final note, Levinson (1983) voices some doubts that 
this tidy and simplistic picture can be maintained, mainly due to the examples 
provided by radical pragmaticists.  
 Although various authors have talked about the role played by pragmatic 
inference in constructing a propositional form (e.g. Bach (1994), Levinson (2000), 
Recanati (2004), Stainton (1994)), in this chapter I shall concentrate on Carston‟s 
thought, as crystallized in her 2002 book. Carston‟s idea of pragmatic contribution to 
the proposition expressed has something distinctive because, unlike Bach, she 
believes that pragmatics contributes to what is said and, unlike Levinson (2000), she 
believes that the inferences that develop logical forms into  propositional forms are 
explicatures, not implicatures
5. Carston‟s ideas are similar to Stainton‟s and 
Recanati‟s, but they differ as to detail. The examples that show the role played by 
pragmatics in fleshing out a propositional form  are roughly of the following type: 
 
(4) I am feeling better today; 
(5) On the top shelf (uttered by a speaker who realizes that the hearer, making his 
breakfast, needs the marmalade); 
(6) He wasn‟t wearing his glasses and mistook his wife for a hat-stand; 
(7) This fruit is green; 
(8) It is raining. 
 
To express a full proposition, (4) must imply a comparison between the present  and 
a previous state (how the speaker was feeling, say, yesterday). (5) is clearly an 
elliptical utterance: it is not grammatically complete and requires the addition of a 
subject and of a verb. (6) is a case in which conjunction contributes a causality 
notion to the full proposition expressed. (7) also needs pragmatic intrusion, as we are 
left in  doubt as to whether the outside of the fruit is green or whether the interior is 
so (by resorting to contextual knowledge, we may settle the issue); (8) also says that 
it is raining here, in the location where both the speaker and the hearer are situated. 
                                                 
5
 It is fair to acknowledge that radical pragmaticists such as Cohen (1971)  also 
discussed the phenomenon of pragmatic intrusion. Yet, I think their contributions 
were only programmatic, while Carston‟s contribution to this issue is systematic and 
fully-developed. 
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 Carston (2002a, 17) believes that examples such as the ones above  demonstrate 
that, in addition to a speaker standardly meaning more or other than she says, the 
„what is said‟ of the utterance may itself involve more than the meaning of the 
linguistic expression used. So she thinks that we have to distinguish two notions: the 
linguistic meaning, the information encoded in the particular lexical-syntactic form 
employed, and the thought or proposition which it is being used to express, that is, 
what is said.   
 
Carston embraces the underdeterminacy thesis, that is the view that the meaning 
encoded in the linguistic expressions used (the relatively stable meanings in a 
linguistic system) underdetermines the proposition expressed (what is said). The 
hearer must resort to pragmatic inference in order to work out the proposition 
expressed by an utterance. 
 Carston gives up the Isomorphism Principle, a recent formulation of which is the 
one in Fodor and Lepore (1998): 
 
If a sentence S expresses the proposition P, then the syntactic constituents  of S 
express the constituents of P. 
 
The approach Carston defends  allows that pragmatic processes can supply 
constituents to what is said solely on communicative grounds, without any linguistic 
pointer, in which case the Isomorphism Principle does not hold. I ought to mention 
here that Wilson and Sperber (2002) hold an approach to semantic 
underdetermination similar to Carston‟s – but in this chapter I mainly discuss 
Carston‟s idea, as she has been more specifically concerned with explicatures. The 
move of abandoning the Isomorphism Principle is welcome, because it allows us to 
assign a proposition constituents which do not appear in the corresponding 
sentence‟s logical form. 
 
 
3. An alternative view (Bach 1994). 
An alternative view of pragmatic intrusion is that by Bach (1994). According to 
Bach, what is said does not correspond to a full proposition determined through 
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pragmatic inference,  but corresponds to a minimal proposition or to a propositional 
radical and is constrained by the following assumption: 
 
The elements of what is said must correspond to elements in the linguistic expression 
(the sentence under consideration). 
 
Bach uses a test for distinguishing what is said; the test is provided by the following 
schema: „S said that…‟. He claims that only those elements of the original utterance 
that can be embedded without infelicity in the schema above are part of what is said. 
 Apart from his conception of what is said, Bach agrees with Relevance Theorists 
that pragmatics is needed to flesh out the proposition a speaker intends to express. He 
calls such pragmatic inferences „implicitures‟. He mainly distinguishes between two 
pragmatic processes involved in the working out of implicitures: completion and 
expansion. Completion is required for those sentences which do not express a full 
proposition. Expansion is required for those cases in which a sentence does express a 
full proposition but this cannot be considered to be the proposition a speaker really 
intends to express. 
 Bach‟s picture is not incoherent, albeit an approach that considers „what is said‟ to 
be a propositional level of thought commends itself to a greater extent. Perhaps a 
testing case for which notion of what is said must be adopted is furnished by ironic 
utterances. Here, in the absence of rich contextual clues (the original context in 
which the words were proffered), it would be misleading to quote the words 
contained in the original utterance, as these may lead to a misrecognition of the 
communicative intention accompanying them. In any case, I accept that the 
expression „what is said‟ may be understood in two senses: what is A-said, the words 
uttered,  and what is B-said, the thought communicated. 
 
3.1. A paradoxical example of explicature 
Some authors such as Cappelen and Lepore (2005) are unpersuaded by the standard  
examples by radical pragmaticists and discuss a specific point on pp. 64-65. They 
believe that if the standard examples  of explicature do not have invariant truth-
conditions,  it could be shown hat no sentence has got invariant truth conditions. 
Consider the sentence: 
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(9)  John went to the gym. 
 
One could argue that this sentence is not truth-evaluable  since one could always go 
on to ask: how did he go to the gym? Did he walk to the vicinity? What did he do in 
the gym? Etc. I think that what the authors want to prove is that if we  think hard 
enough, then every example of language use will exhibit semantic 
underdetermination, simply because we set the standards of truth-evaluability too 
high. 
 Montminy (2006, 14) commenting on Cappelen and Lepore‟s work, writes that  C 
& L‟s treatment of Incompleteness Arguments conflates lack of full specificity with 
incompleteness: it conflates cases in which a sentence is not completely informative 
with cases in which the standing meaning of a sentence does not determine a 
complete, truth-evaluable proposition.  
 
The point Montminy probably misses is that there is such a wide gap between the 
interpretation of (10) as (11) and of (10) as (12) 
 
(10) John went to the gym; 
(11) John went to the vicinity of the gym: 
(12)  John went into (inside) the gym, 
 
that one is tempted to say that this too is a case of semantic underdetermination: the 
full(er) proposition being provided by enriching the propositional radical (to use 
Bach‟s words), which ought to be something like the following (if we accept what 
Cappelen and Lepore say for the sake of argument): 
 
John went (in)to an area vast enough to include the gym and its close vicinity (say 
the perimeter of its courtyard). 
 
Surely, (more) fully determining this proposition requires some narrowing down, that 
is to say the addition of some concept. A move open to Montminy, which he does not 
make, is to take what Cappelen and Lepore say for good and to argue that this is a 
case in which pragmatics intervenes to enrich  a truth-evaluable proposition; and 
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there is nothing bad with it. Yet, this would not be like saying that no proposition at 
all is expressed by (12). 
 An alternative move would be to deny the acceptability of the data provided by 
Cappelen and Lepore. In any case, Montminy does not appreciate the real point of 
Cappelen and Lepore‟s discussion, which is  a refinement of the question: how do we 
know when something is a full proposition? Is not there some latitude in deciding 
whether an interpretation (whether semantically or pragmatically accessed) is a full 
proposition? And could we not  push this latitude further up in our search for 
complete propositions? And, finally, what does the expression „a complete 
proposition‟ mean?6 This final question is important, since all researchers in the 
semantics/pragmatics debate propose the priority of pragmatic inference on the 
grounds that  semantic interpretation does not provide a complete proposition (or a 
full proposition). Presumably, a full proposition is the minimal proposition that is 
truth-evaluable. However, if we are pedantic enough, we could always say that a 
proposition is not truth-evaluable and that we need (further)  pragmatic inference to 
arrive at a truth-evaluable proposition. The problem is: where do we stop? It may be 
worth noting that truth-conditions mean something different for minimalists and for 
contextualists. Minimalists are not interested in what the world would have to be like 
for the sentence/utterance to be true (which they call verification procedure), but 
merely in the formal procedure: “p” is true iff p, even if p is incomplete. Given this 
distinction, it goes without saying that contextualists are more exigent when it comes 
to deciding whether a sentence expresses a full proposition. However, as Lepore 
(personal communication) says, minimalists are not at all surprised to find out that 
many of the propositions we communicate are absurd, illogical, a priori falsehoods 
and they do not think that it is the task of semanticists to account for these uses. 
 The considerations so far are applicable to Carston‟s work as well. Is it possible 
that if one thinks hard enough, every linguistic example requires pragmatic 
development into a proposition? Carston is not scared of this consequence, as she 
professes to be interested in knowing whether the gap between linguistic meaning 
and what is said is a contingent or necessary property of verbal communication 
                                                 
6
 Burton-Roberts finds that talk of full propositions is bizarre. A proposition, by 
definition, cannot be non-truth-evaluable. He also asks: Why should a full 
proposition be the minimal proposition? Well, I agree that something is either a 
proposition or it isn‟t and if it it must be truth-evaluable. Presumably the expression 
„a full proposition‟ is redundant. 
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(Carston 2002a, 15) and she has a chapter in which she discusses whether pragmatic 
intrusion is a necessary feature of human communication. This is not the place for a 
lengthy discussion of Cappelen and Lepore (2005) – I refer the reader to an 
interesting  discussion of the Inter-Contextual Indirect report test by Corazza (2007, 
124; 125). Another place to read about the Radical Contextualist‟s response to C&L 
is the paper by Wedgwood (2007) in which he addresses some apparently thorny 
problems for C & L, mainly the fact that, paradoxically, the semantics advocated by 
Relevance Theory is more minimal than the one advocated by C&L who allow a 
limited amount of pragmatic intrusion as far as pronominals and indexicals are 
concerned; not to mention the fact that the Intercontextual disquotational tests appear 
not to distinguish between homonyms and between use/mention. The discussion of 
these problems would take a paper of its own, so it is better to leave the matter here 
(see also Capone 2008b).  
 
3.2 Explicatures 
Explicatures (assumptions which are required to make a proposition truth-evaluable) 
must be differentiated neatly from implicatures. The notion of „explicature‟ is 
originally due to Sperber and Wilson (1986) according to whom: 
 
(I) An assumption by an utterance U is explicit [hence an „explicature‟]  if and only if 
it is a development of a logical form encoded by U. 
(II) An assumption communicated by U which is not explicit is implicit [hence an 
„implicature‟]. 
 
Carston (2002a, 117) argues that, along with pragmatic processes triggered by 
linguistic expressions, there are „free‟ pragmatic processes that determine certain 
elements of the explicature on a purely contextual/inferential basis. She believes that  
the content of explicatures comes from two distinct sources, the linguistic 
expressions used and the context, and it is derived in two distinct ways depending on 
its source, by linguistic decoding or by pragmatic inference. She claims that  the 
logical form, which is the output of the decoding phase is solely a schema for the 
inferential construction of fully propositional assumptions. 
Burton-Roberts  speculates  that Carston‟s theory  implies that explicatures  are a 
development of the logical form L of the sentence uttered, if and only if P 
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(asymmetrically) entails L
7
. For example, if I say “He shrugged and left” meaning 
(via explicature) “He shrugged and then left”, it must be the case that the latter 
proposition implies the former (the explicature entails the encoded form it is a 
development of). Burton-Roberts (2005), however, contends that “If the encoded 
form can be entailed, it must deliver a truth-evaluable proposition” (p. 397) and this 
could be a problem with the notion of development. In a later section I notice that  
cases of loosening like „Sicily is a triangle‟ cause a problem for the notion that an 
explicature entails the logical form from which it takes input.  
 
4. Are explicatures cancellable? 
Both Burton-Roberts (2006) and Capone (2006) converge towards the idea that 
explicatures cannot be cancelled. In the following sections, I discuss Burton-Roberts 
(2006) and Capone (2006), in the hope to extend that discussion. 
 
4.1  Burton-Roberts (2005) on the non-cancellability of explicatures. 
It is interesting to see what Burton-Roberts (2005, 400-401) has to say on 
cancellability (of explicatures) in his review of Carston (2002a). The author claims 
that  it is not possible, in Carston‟s own terms, that explicatures should be 
cancellable. In fact, Carston says that the implicated assumptions that constitute the 
explicature are part of the proposition expressed and, thus, are truth-conditional in 
nature. On this view, [+ truth-conditional] does imply [ - cancellable]. If none of the 
truth-conditional content of the explicature  can be cancelled, the explicature itself 
should not be cancellable. Cancellable implicature, then, is a logical impossibility 
according to Burton-Roberts
8
.  
 
                                                 
7
 Burton-Roberts (personal communication) says he is just speculating that Carston, 
in fact, thinks of explicatures as definable in terms of entailment (A is a development 
of B iff A entails B). This is a reasonable speculation. Her earlier Principle of 
Functional Independence had it that A cannot be an implicature of B if A entails B. 
Since a communicated assumption is EITHER an explicature OR an implicature (for 
RT), it follows that any communicated assumption that entails the encoded logical 
form must be an explicature. So, with explicature defined in terms of “development”, 
it is reasonable to speculate that development should be defined in terms of 
entailment. 
8
 This reminds us of a worry already expressed in Levinson (2000, 166). 
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 Carston may find the idea that (the pragmatically derived elements of) 
explicatures cannot be cancelled unpalatable because if her notion of explicature is to 
focus on the central role of pragmatics in human communication, freezing the 
implicatures in the notion of non-cancellable explicatures will amount to a non-
insignificant concession to truth-conditional semantics. Readers may notice that 
Burton-Roberts‟ objections (to Carston) come from the perspective of  truth-
conditional semantics. 
 
Burton-Roberts considers an example Carston discusses  on p. 138: 
 
 
(13) She‟s ready but Karen isn‟t ready to leave for the airport. 
 
Carston says that the explicature of „She‟s ready‟ can be cancelled, because the 
sentence (13) is not contradictory. Burton-Roberts, in my view,  correctly argues that 
the sentence (13) cannot possibly be contradictory; it  is statements that are 
contradictory: “contradiction must be assessed at the (propositional) level of 
explicature”. Burton-Roberts‟ position is in line with my own considerations. I also 
think that  the sentence (14) 
 
(14) If the king of France died and France became a republic I would be happy, but if 
France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy, 
 
which „prima facie‟ appears to be  contradictory, is not really so. Here, even though 
we cannot point to any explicit time variables (e.g. in the form of time adverbials), 
the possibility of an interpretative ambiguity (in the sense of Jaszczolt 1999) remains 
open. This is due to the fact that the temporal relations between the constituent 
sentences of each conjoined complex sentence have not been specified. A 
contradiction can arise only when we decide on a particular temporal configuration. 
The evidence of the configuration under which no contradiction arises allows us to 
say that the sentence is not contradictory per se. It might be objected that my view 
that „P and Q‟ is not a full proposition should be true if „P and Q‟ could not receive 
truth-conditions. But the example clearly shows that „P and Q and „Q and P‟ do have 
different propositions and that they are therefore propositions. Fine, but I think we 
32 
 
have to distinguish between the sentential level and the speech act level. At the 
speech act level, a proposition is richer than at the sentential level. When I say that „P 
and Q‟ is not a full proposition (hence there is not contradiction at the sentential level 
in (14)), I am talking about the sentential level.  I could agree in principle that, at the 
speech act level, „P and Q‟ and „Q and P‟ constitute different propositions. 
 
So Burton-Roberts is right in saying that (13) is not evidence in favour of the 
cancellability of explicatures. In particular, he believes that „She is ready‟ in (13) can 
be interpreted in three ways: 
 
(15) Pat is ready at time t to leave for the airport 
(16a) Karen is ready at time t to leave for the airport x; 
(16b) Karen  is ready for something (though we do not know what). 
 
If interpretation (15) holds, the second clause of (13) surely does not contradict it. If 
interpretation (16b) holds, the second clause of (13) does not cancel it either. So  
(16a)  must be the explicature Carston has in mind. But it is precisely (16a) that is 
contradicted by the second clause of (13). 
   
 Burton-Roberts considers another example discussed by Carston on  p. 138: 
 
(17) He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped. 
 
The explicature of (17) is something like (18): 
 
(18) Lionel ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped over the edge of the cliff. 
 
For Carston the explicature (17) can be explicitly cancelled by saying (19) 
 
(19) He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped but stayed on the top of the cliff 
 
 where „jumped‟ is understood as  „jumped up and down‟. 
 According to Burton-Roberts (19) is not an example of explicature cancellation, 
but a clarification that (18) was not the explicature, in that the transitive meaning 
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rather than the directional meaning of „jump‟ is regarded relevant. Apparently, 
Burton-Roberts says that Carston is not allowed  to take an ambiguous verb and then 
use a sentence that denies one of the two meanings of the verb saying that in this way 
an explicature is cancelled (see Burton-Roberts 1994 for an interesting paper on 
ambiguity and explicature; there he argues that ambiguity is not a semantic concept, 
but at most a phenomenon having to do with utterances; whatever the story we 
accept, it goes without saying that pragmatics disambiguates  utterances).  
 Now we are faced with an old problem. Sadock (1978) in an influential article 
showed that cancellation is not a reliable test for conversational implicature, because 
one sense of an ambiguous expression can be explicitly cancelled in a sentence set up 
for this purpose. However, if I am right, Carston‟s example is surely a case in which 
a pragmatic inference gets through despite the ambiguity of a lexeme (in this case 
„jump‟). So, as Burton-Roberts says, what may appear as something that cancels the 
explicature in this case results in a clarification move. What is being clarified is that 
the non-directional meaning of  „jump‟ is promoted through pragmatic inference, 
which then, as Carston says, contributes to an explicature.  
 
4.2 Further considerations  on non-cancellable explicatures 
Burton-Roberts (2006) distinguishes between A-saying and B-saying. A-saying is 
taken to be the literal words expressed in an utterance, which can be reported in 
abstraction from the original context in which they were produced (presumably to fix 
an intention). Roughly, A-saying corresponds to the words actually proffered by a 
speaker in communication (Burton-Roberts 2005 says that to report what a speaker 
has A-said we must (and need only) quote her utterance); B-saying, instead,  involves 
the assessment (the individuation) of the thought the speaker explicitly intended to 
communicate, and this may involve putting together both the words used and 
pragmatic assumptions of the context to arrive at explicatures and to add these to 
what was literally expressed. B-saying involves fixing the speaker‟s communicative 
intention. Burton-Roberts (personal communication) adds: 
 
In fact, to report a B-saying you don‟t have to use any of the actual words that were 
A-said. Thus, to accurately report what you B-said when you A-said “Fa caldo” (It‟s 
warm in here) I can report you as having said that it was hot. Similarly a person who 
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A-says “It‟s  at 12 o clock” can be reported by “She said the meeting was at 
midday”. 
 
 Burton-Roberts says that Carston‟s notion of explicature reconstructs what is B-
said (I construe this as: explicatures correspond to a level of what is B-said). The 
author says that explicatures cannot be cancelled without contradiction of what is A-
said or of what is B-said. They cannot be cancelled without contradiction of what is 
A-said because what is A-said is what is linguistically encoded and does not yield a 
truth-evaluable proposition (if there is no proposition at this stage, no proposition can 
be retracted, or cancelled). Burton-Roberts deduces that „cancellation without 
contradiction‟ must mean „cancellation without contradiction of what is B-said. But 
he says: 
 
Then cancellation of explicature is clearly impossible as well. To allow that an 
explicature is cancellable would be to allow that an explicature can be 
cancelled  without contradicting the explicature (that what is B-said can be 
cancelled without contradicting what is B-said). This looks straightforwardly 
contradictory. Furthermore, assuming a normal understanding of what is to be 
„committed‟ to a proposition, what it is to „overtly endorse‟ it and to „express 
commitment‟ to it, it is clearly impossible for a speaker to cancel what she has 
explicated without contradicting herself (Burton-Roberts 2006, 4). 
 
Furthermore, Burton-Roberts notices that Carston‟s claim that explicatures are 
cancellable shifts emphasis from the speaker‟s intentions to the hearer‟s 
reconstruction of these intentions, a move that is dubious in his opinion, since both 
for Grice and Sperber and Wilson (1986; 2005) pragmatics is all about intention. 
 
 Burton-Roberts‟ insistence on the logical impossibility of cancelling explicatures 
is something that is immediately appealing. Yet, we have to ponder a bit  what it 
means to endorse or commit oneself to an explicature. Carston says that a speaker 
endorses explicatures, and that she commits herself to them – yet what is it to 
endorse a  proposition, what is it to express commitment to it? Much depends on the 
way we define „commitment‟ and „endorsing a proposition‟.  In a sense a speaker 
commits herself and endorses a proposition through conversational implicature as 
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well – and if we go along with what Burton-Roberts says then there is no subtle 
difference between Particularized implicatures and explicatures (actually Burton-
Roberts (personal communication) stresses he only said that with PCI a speaker 
commits herself to having implicated the proposition). If a proposition is actually 
implicated, it cannot be un-implicated, that is cancelled without contradiction of the 
executed intention to implicate).  Particularized implicatures are quite strong 
commitments to a proposition.  
However, if we follow  Bach‟s view  (Bach 2006a) that all messages express a 
speaker‟s commitment through pragmatics, since in any case a hearer must 
distinguish between a serious and an ironic interpretation of an utterance (see also 
Lepore and Ludwig 2005), we are led to the view that  commitment is really a matter 
of „explicature‟ and then Burton-Roberts is right in his claim that when a speaker 
commits herself  to a certain intention, that intention is no longer retractable.  
 
 Burton-Roberts (2006, 5) writes concerning explicature (apparent) cancellation 
that treating the relevant phenomenon as clarification rather than cancellation seems 
an obvious solution to an otherwise serious problem of principle with explicature. If 
one claims that explicatures are cancellable, one must abandon Carston‟s intuitive 
account of explicature in terms of expressing commitment to and endorsement of a 
proposition. 
However Carston may reply by distinguishing  between explicatures* and 
explicatures. Explicatures* are just potential explicatures.  Explicatures (without the 
asterisk) are just actual explicatures. This move would presumably follow an idea by 
Gazdar (1979) for whom potential implicatures‟ are assigned automatically – that is, 
independently of any actual intention-to-implicate – to linguistic expressions on the 
basis of their semantic representation. „Potential implicatures‟ only become actual 
implicatures   when the relevant expressions are uttered. If they are not consistent 
with the assumptions available (mutually manifest) in the context, they are cancelled. 
Inconsistency with the context of  utterance – and thus cancellation – means that they 
cannot have been intended. A potential implicature‟, is then an implicature that arises 
independently of an  intention  occurring in the mind of a speaker.  
 
Using the above ideas, Carston  may want to distinguish between potential 
explicatures and actual explicatures. Explicatures (without the asterisk) are those that 
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a speaker commits herself to and explicitly endorses. Explicatures* are only 
potentially endorsable, things which a speaker potentially commits herself to
9
. Thus 
explicatures* are cancellable (so Carston would say) while explicatures are not. So, 
in a sense both Carston and Burton-Roberts are right. Yet, I do not despair that (only) 
Burton-Roberts is right if explicatures are a more restricted class than what Carston 
takes to be (a move that circumvents some problems noted by Cappelen and Lepore 
2005). Suppose that we confine ourselves to calling „explicatures‟ those inferential 
increments that are meant to supply a full proposition, where none is supplied by 
bare semantics, or to rescue a proposition from contradiction or logical impossibility 
(absurdity). These explicatures are in no obvious way „potential explicatures‟. They 
are necessitated by the contingencies of communication and by the fact that logical 
forms are too fragmentary or present wide lacunae. Since in these cases there are no 
explicatures*, Burton-Roberts is right in saying that explicatures cannot be cancelled. 
 What arguments would support the contention that there are just explicatures 
(actual explicatures) and not explicatures* (potential explicatures)? Burton-Roberts 
might go back to the definition of explicatures: 
 
D1 
An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an „explicature‟ of the 
utterance if and only if it is a DEVELOPMENT of (a) linguistically encoded logical 
form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential sub-part of a logical form.  
 
He may say that the distinction between explicatures and explicatures calls for a 
complication of the definition D1 above, which would have to be changed resulting 
in something like the following: 
 
D2 
An assumption (proposition) (possibly) communicated by an utterance is/would be 
an „explicature*‟/„explicature‟ of the utterance if and only if it is a (possible) 
DEVELOPMENT of (a) linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, or of 
(b) a sentential sub-part of a logical form.  
 
                                                 
9
 I should  make it clear that this is not a position Carston has ever embraced. I think 
that Carston may react to Burton-Roberts in this way, but I have no textual evidence 
that she may be sympathetic to the hypothetical position expressed in this paper. 
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There is  a further problem. Burton-Roberts says that Carston‟s notion of explicature 
reconstructs what is B-said. What is B-said is something that really goes on in the 
conversation and is not to be  described as being potential. If we distinguish between 
explicatures* and explicatures, we must abandon Burton-Roberts‟ tidy picture 
according to which explicatures (unqualified) are a component of what is B-said. 
Explicatures*, in fact, do not seem to be a component of what is B-said. 
 Carston may argue that for definitional purposes we should solely  use 
explicatures (without the asterisk), while explicatures* are just a theoretical construct 
that reminds us of the pragmatic derivation of the inference in question. 
Explicatures* are only  a reminder that some pragmatic processes went on at some 
point in the utterance interpretation. 
 The distinction between explicatures* and explicatures is suspicious on 
independent grounds. Explicatures* have all the properties of Gazdar‟s potential 
implicatures, and none of the properties of explicatures as pragmatically constructed  
propositional forms. To say that explicatures are cancellable amounts to saying that 
(potential) implicatures are cancellable, and that comes as no news. The fact that 
there is a stage of pragmatic communication in which an inference is potential 
(before an explicature proper is calculated in context) is a recognition of the fact that 
the inference is potentially an implicature. But it is an implicature before it is 
calculated. After calculation, it becomes an explicature in the right circumstances, 
being correlated with the speaker‟s communicative intention. And actual explicatures 
are necessarily calculated inferences
10
. Of course, the only way to test a potential 
implicature is to check for its consistency with the mutual cognitive environment (the 
assumptions which are mutually manifest to the participants in the conversation). 
However, one finds out, by checking whether the implicature is cancellable, that the 
implicature does not need to be triggered. This is a problem, because all 
cancellability amounts to in this case is the fact that the implicature is prevented from 
arising. However, one could also consider the case that the hearer temporarily 
considers the conversational implicature, but then due to the assumptions that are 
mutually manifest aborts this implicature. One way to test this intuition is to check 
with speakers what happens when, say, a scalar item like „some‟ is used and then the 
scalar implicature arising from it is cancelled. Should we say that the implicature is 
                                                 
10
 Specific comments by Burton-Roberts persuaded me that „explicatures*‟ cannot 
but  be potential implicatures. 
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cancelled or that it never arose? Relevance theorists consider scalar implicatures in 
context, and thus get rid of the problem, as one context may favour a scalar reading, 
while another may not. However, the problem is what happens when out of the blue 
one says „Some of the students arrived‟? Is it the case that there is a scalar 
implicature or not? I would say that there is. Now, there are two possibilities: a) the 
scalar item is proffered without a context that serves to abort its scalar implicature, 
but then the context is extended by a further proposition proffered linguistically that 
defeats the implicature; this is a straightforward case of implicature cancellation; b) 
the scalar item is uttered in context, where some assumptions that militate against the 
scalar implicature are mutually manifest. In this case, the conversational implicature 
is prevented from arising.  
 
4.3  Capone (2006) on non-cancellable explicatures. 
Capone (2006) considers some examples of pragmatic intrusion such as (20), (21) 
and (22): 
 
(20) If the king of France died and France became a republic, I would be happy, but 
if France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy; 
(21) Take these three plates to those three people over there; 
(22) You will die (said to John who has just cut his arm). 
 
Capone writes that cancelling a causality implicature that allows us to make sense of  
an otherwise contradictory (or at least highly indeterminate) statement results in an 
unacceptable utterance: hence in this case it is not possible, in his view, to build the 
propositional form, while allowing for pragmatic intrusion, and then cancel the 
related explicature without rendering the discourse incoherent. While in ordinary 
cases of implicature cancellation, the speaker can still be considered to have said 
something intelligible, something that is coherent in itself and non-contradictory, in 
cases where pragmatics contributes in a decisive way to the propositional form, such 
a contribution cannot be withdrawn without causing havoc. 
 
It is quite easy to show that the explicatures in (21) and (22) cannot be cancelled. 
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4.4   Further problems for the idea that explicatures are not cancellable 
It may be suggested that a crucial  way of proving that explicatures are not 
cancellable is to point out that they are part of  a speaker‟s intentions. Presumably 
one of Carston‟s  reasons  in claiming that explicatures are cancellable is that she 
thinks  the hearer entertains the proposition conveyed by the speaker with a high 
degree of probability but never with certainty (he can go wrong in the process of 
utterance interpretation). As Saul (2004) and Burton-Roberts (2005) point out, 
relevance theorists focus on utterance interpretation, rather than on utterance 
production, and this may very well lead them away from recognizing the central 
importance of  a speaker‟s communicative intentions, which must be a guide to 
utterance interpretation in so far as  it manifests itself  through semantic clues  and 
pragmatic strategies (see also Bach 1998). Since intentions in some cases are fixed, it 
goes without saying that explicatures which are the correlate of those intentions, 
should be non-cancellable. Saul points out that the speaker‟s intentions (once they 
are manifested in thought) are fixed and that while  the process of interpretation may 
finally provide one or more interpretations which are or are not in line with the 
original intentions, the communicative process started with those intentions and it is 
those which crucially matter. We should not be surprised, therefore, that there are 
loci in conversation where failure to attribute a certain communicative intention 
deprives the utterance of truth-evaluability and it is these  which make the case of 
non-cancellability compelling. 
 
 If Carston replies that some cases of  implicatures too are the correlates of 
intentions (specifically generalized conversational implicatures) but are nevertheless 
cancellable (an indication that correlation with an intention does not prove that an 
explicature cannot be cancelled), one may reply that intentionality comes in various 
degrees and that we have some weaker and stronger forms of intentionality. 
Explicatures correlate with the stronger level of intentionality. If there is such a 
stronger level of intentionality, then explicatures cannot be cancelled, because they 
express intentions of the strongest type. 
 Is it reasonable to assume that there are different degrees of intentionality and 
that, specifically, intentionality comes in the weaker and stronger variety? Although I 
do not see this point discussed in the literature on communicative intentions in great 
detail, I think we could appropriate of ideas by  Castelfranchi & Paglieri (2007) on a 
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constructive theory of intentions. As I said, the intentions they discuss are not 
specifically communicative, they are mainly intentions to act. For example, I may 
form the intention to send a paper to JL for publication or I may form the intention to 
write a book. It may be safely assumed that communicative intentions are a subtype 
of the intentions Castelfranchi & Paglieri discuss, as it is possible for someone to  
form the intention to communicate P to H to inform her of the truth of  P. Telling or 
informing someone of P can be seen as a form of acting. Well, Castelfranchi & 
Paglieri provide a detailed analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing – that is 
in the cognitive transition from a mere desire (what they call a „pro-attitude‟) to a 
proper intention. The main point of the paper is that  goal processing and intention 
revision are largely determined by belief revisions and that, in order to activate, 
promote, drop, or suspend a goal, an intention, or an intentional action, one has to 
provide or modify the appropriate beliefs. Now, surely such a constructive theory of 
intentions presupposes that intentions come in various degrees and concerning the 
action A, one can have stronger or weaker intentions. Stronger intentionality, as the 
authors say, is activated by the provision of beliefs – so the greater the connection 
between an intention and a set of beliefs, the greater the likelihood that such beliefs 
will have an influence on the intention and will modify its degree of intentionality, 
by allowing it to move from the sphere of potential intentionality to the sphere of 
actual intentionality. I assume that as we move from one sphere to the other, one can 
find different degrees of intentionality. Now, on the assumption that communicative 
intentions are a subclass of the intentions Castelfranchi and Paglieri discuss – and 
this assumption is not implausible for a theory in which we stress the connection 
between language and action – we should suppose that beliefs interact with 
intentions not only at the level of intention  formation, but also at the level of 
intention reconstruction by the hearer. A process analogous to the intention 
construction occurs, and the beliefs assumed to be in the head of the speaker, which 
are mutually manifest to the hearer (because as Austin once said, a man speaks!), can 
play a role in allowing the hearer to infer the degree of intentionality involved in the 
communicative action. 
 
Now we return to explicatures. The reason why explicatures correlate with a 
stronger sort of intentionality is that they arise in those circumstances where there 
cannot be an „out‟ for the speaker, where the communicative intention proceeds 
41 
 
along the path of the only intentionality available, outside which all sorts of wild 
grass grows and imputing different  intentions becomes so implausible as to impair 
rational communication. Explicatures  are not there to rescue the utterance from all 
kinds of defective communicative effects, such as lack of informativeness, lack of 
relevance or lack of quality, but are there to furnish an uttered proposition, the 
speaker‟s thought,  in the first place, the condition sine qua non for evaluating all 
other communicative deficiencies. The kind of deficiencies which explicatures have 
to remedy have to do with the lack of a truth-evaluable proposition or with the lack 
of a plausible truth-evaluable proposition, one which is not irremediably 
contaminated   by „a priori‟ contradiction or logical absurdity. It is exactly these 
cases which shape intentionality within the strict mould of the rational assessment of  
the thought the utterance must be taken to express. 
 On the relevance-theoretic view, we should also consider higher-order 
explicatures, which are the processes assigning illocutionary force to an utterance. 
Now, I think that if what we have said about the intentionality of explicatures is true, 
it must be applicable to higher-order explicatures. I have discussed the issue of the 
non-cancellability of inferences in discourse at length in my paper „Pragmemes‟ 
(Capone 2005), where I provided various cases of non-cancellable inferences. I 
would, nevertheless, like to point out, that questions of truth are not at stake in 
higher-order explicatures. In such cases, therefore, we miss the connectedness 
between non-cancellability and pragmatic intrusion. We might also have a somewhat 
different story, considering the fact that utterances can be multi-functional at the 
level of illocutionary force. I do not expect that all my considerations concerning 
pragmatic intrusion are applicable to higher-order explicatures. 
 
5. On the connection between non-cancellability of explicatures and pragmatic 
intrusion. 
Suppose it is accepted that explicatures are cancellable. Then we have problems in 
explaining how it comes about that explicatures are part of the truth-conditional 
content of a sentence. Surely, one of the advantages of claiming that an inference is 
truth-conditional is that it is part of the entailments of a sentence (and, thus, non-
cancellable). If we do not want the content obtained through pragmatic intrusion to 
be part of the entailments of the sentence, why should we make so much fuss about 
pragmatic intrusion at all? After all, we could have a very orderly picture like that of 
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Cappelen & Lepore (2005) in which what is said is mainly associated with linguistic 
semantics and the various contextual phenomena which we claim to be part of the 
truth-conditional content of a sentence could be easily assigned at the level of the 
utterance. Is this what we want? Presumably a radical contextual claim is one that 
assigns constituents derived through pragmatics inside the sentential content (of 
course pragmaticians may differ on specific details of their theories; for example, in 
Capone (2006) I proposed cases of pragmatic intrusion alternative to the standard 
ones, which in my view were easily assailable (and in fact were attacked by 
Cappelen & Lepore 2005; the fact that Lepore who was aware of my examples never 
replied to them is eloquent)). A story like mine, which considers explicatures non-
cancellable is more coherent with the view that pragmatics provides constituents of 
thought that intrude into the sentential level of meaning, since entailments are not 
entailments unless one cannot deny them. One of the classical tests for entailments is 
the one by Strawson: if S entails P, one cannot utter S and say not P. So now my 
question is, do we have enough courage to argue in favour of full pragmatic 
intrusion? If we have, then we should accept that explicatures cannot be cancelled. 
 It may be argued that matters become simpler if we consider the explicature as a 
two-level entity, consisting of the entailments of the sentence uttered and the 
pragmatic increment that goes into the explicature. However, this segregational  
approach will not do, because both the entailments and the pragmatic increments are 
subject to pragmatic processing. The entailments of the sentence uttered are 
promoted to being part of the speaker‟s commitment only after pragmatics rules out, 
e.g. ironic interpretations. The pragmatic increments are combined with the semantic 
entailments of the sentence uttered only after such entailments are promoted through 
pragmatics to intended meaning. At this point, there is no more reason for 
segregating the constituents of the explicature, the semantic entailments deriving 
from the sentence and the pragmatic increments based on them and on contextual 
assumptions. 
 
 
 The objection I expect at this point is the following. But then, if this is the way 
things are, why also accept that conversational implicatures are non-cancellable? 
Well, first of all, I only confined myself to the claim that particularised 
conversational implicatures are not cancellable. Second, the question is not whether 
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it is advantageous to consider conversational implicatures cancellable, but whether it 
is fruitful to consider explicatures non-cancellable. The difference in the 
argumentation in favour of non-cancellable particularised implicatures and of non-
cancellable explicatures is that there are theoretical reasons due to pragmatic 
intrusion for insisting that explicatures are non-cancellable, whereas in the case of  
particularised conversational implicatures we can only resort to arguments based on 
intentionality. Thus there are stronger theoretical reasons in the case of explicatures 
for claiming that they are non-cancellable.  
 
 
6. Refining the notion of explicature further. 
Let us accept the following assumptions by Grundy (2000). 
 
A.   Explicatures  amount to constitutive aspects of what is explicitly said; 
B.  Explicatures are not linguistically encoded but have to be pragmatically 
expressed; 
C.  Speakers are committed to the explicature of an utterance; 
D.  Explicatures are part of what is communicated and, thus, are overtly endorsed by 
a speaker. 
F. Explicatures are motivated by the indeterminacy of language (see also Grundy 
2000). 
 
 
One should at this point, given all the previous discussion, add that explicatures are 
inferences that partially use linguistic meaning and partially use contextualization 
clues in order to fix (determine) the speaker‟s unequivocal intention. An explicature 
is, therefore, the reconstruction of an intention on the basis of what a speaker says in 
communication in response to the need to reach a full proposition. The full 
proposition reconstructed by the hearer is one that cannot be cancelled explicitly and 
one that can be distinguished from implicatures due to the fact that implicatures are 
additional increments on top of explicatures. Explicatures are more fundamental 
increments, as without them the proposition expressed would be either contradictory 
or false or communicatively very inefficient even at the sentential level. Explicatures 
are explicit in that they cannot be denied. 
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  We should distinguish real explicatures from potential explicatures. Potential 
explicatures, like potential implicatures, are not cases of real intentionality (or of real 
intentionality assignment) but are hypothetical cases of intentionality assignment. 
When one deals with potential implicatures and potential explicatures one says 
something like: On the basis of „S‟ (the syntactic and semantic features of S) and on 
the basis of the fact  that the speaker had a reason to use S (and did not use an 
alternative to S), the speaker intends that P, unless F, where F is some proposition to 
be derived from the assumptions manifest in context. The clause UNLESS F focuses 
on the hypothetical nature of potential implicatures and *explicatures. However, as 
far actual explicatures are concerned there can be no „UNLESS F‟ clause. The 
calculation process in actual  explicatures is quickly over and nothing else can be 
done with it. We can no longer think of it and process it further in the light of other 
assumptions. The process leading to explicatures should be finite (both in the sense 
that we usually do not spend a long time in coming to an explicature, i.e. we do not 
ponder on the case of explicature for months, and in the sense that when we acquire 
the propositional elements that are relevant to the case, we process the utterance, 
come up with an explicature and close the interpretation process for good). An 
explicature case is not like a reasoning case where the evidence is sifted and then the 
experts come to a decision and the decision process could be reopened at any 
moment (say a trial in which new evidence is crucial and may determine a 
completely different outcome). An explicature case is closed when the 
communicative exchange moves beyond the next utterance. Thus, the evidence that 
is relevant to the communicative process is the evidence available at t, where t is 
some temporal variable that is indexed to the time of the utterance whose explicature 
we seek to elucidate and is upper-bounded by t‟, where t‟ is indexed to the utterance 
next to it. By the time  u‟ is uttered, the explicature of u is calculated on the basis of 
the evidence available at the moment and the case is not opened further. Now, this 
is important. If we sought further evidence and if u were contextualized say at 
different moments, t‟, t‟‟, t‟‟‟, etc. the explicature could very well be different (given 
that it arises from the interplay of the linguistically expressed assumption and 
assumptions available in the context). So an utterance could, in theory, be associated 
with distinct explicatures. In order to avoid this inconvenience, we have to keep the 
interpretation process finite. And  this is in line with the point that an explicature 
captures a unique intention. If the utterance were considered at different moments, 
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different interpretative possibilities should arise (given the fact that different 
evidence might be available at different moments). But this is not possible since we 
have said that the intention to be assigned must be unique.  
 Now these considerations are compatible with what Sperber & Wilson (1986) say 
about utterance interpretation. They also argue that the interpretation process is finite 
and instantaneous –  in other words, when the best interpretation is obtained the 
process stops. My considerations on the intentionality of explicatures make these 
considerations cogent and provide further justification for them. 
 In this chapter  it will not be accepted  that relevance-theory should  just  be a 
theory about the  hearer‟s interpretations. We have seen that the philosopher Saul 
takes this to be RT‟s most crucial weakness. Wedgwood (2007) also reiterates that 
RT is a theory from the hearer‟s perspective. My considerations presuppose that the 
speaker‟s perspective is a crucial element of RT as well. In any case, the main 
reasons in favour of non-cancellability of explicatures also favour taking RT as a 
theory of speaker‟s and hearer‟s interpretations, a theory which has sufficient power 
to guarantee that the speaker‟s intentions and the intentions inferred by the hearer 
match. They must match because the speaker and the hearer rely on the same 
principles, because their minds are similar in their constitution and because they 
share the same cognitive inputs (perceptual stimuli) as well as a number of 
contextual assumptions that are mutually manifest.  
 The issue of the non-cancellability of explicatures is inherently connected with the 
issue of the match between speaker and hearer‟s (assigned)  intentions. It‟s easy to 
prove this. If there was, say, no speaker-hearer‟s match in intentions, we should 
allow for the possibility that the speaker‟s and the hearer‟s (inferred) intentions could 
go along separate paths. It would thus be possible to cancel at least one type of 
intentions, albeit not both. But the idea that explicatures are not cancellable simply 
denies that either one type or the other type of intention can be denied (or cancelled). 
To accept that explicatures are not cancellable in the sense of accepting that the 
hearer‟s intentions are not cancellable (without saying anything about the speaker‟s 
intentions) leads to nowhere, since one reason why the hearer‟s intentions are not 
cancellable is that they aim to reconstruct the speaker‟s intentions which are not 
cancellable. Once we give up the idea that the hearers‟ intentions aim to reconstruct 
the speaker‟s intentions, there is no reason to stick to the idea that explicatures are 
not cancellable. From the hearer‟s point of view they could very well be cancellable, 
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as in the circumstances in which a hearer evaluates different readings of an utterance 
without being under pressure to uncover the speaker‟s intentions. 
 Going back to the issue whether the relationship between an  explicature and the 
logical form giving input to it is one of entailment, one should consider that an 
explicature consists of both a logical form and of some implicated materials which 
are added to the logical form (let us suppose that logical conjunction is what serves 
to connect the two in the most simple cases; instead,  subtraction is the logical 
operation involved in cases of loosening). Now, if this is the notion of explicature we 
adopt, it clear that it should entail the logical form it is a development of in the cases 
where explicature is an operation based on conjunction, since conjunction is truth-
preserving and a logical form P surely entails itself under conjunction. Of course, an 
explicature under this view should be subject to strong constraints: one such 
constraint is that: 
 
the implicated materials be compatible with the logical form the explicature is a 
development of. 
 
For an explicature to be non-cancellable we need to assume that both the 
implicated part and the explicit logical form to be developed are non-cancellable 
elements of meaning. But in a sense, even the logical form that is being developed is 
subject to pragmatic inference, since it must be mapped to a serious intention and we 
have seen that the assignment of serious intentions is primarily a matter of 
pragmatics. After this is done, on the basis of this pragmatic process of intention 
assignment, some implicated materials are assigned to the explicature and made 
compatible with the logical form that gave input to them. It is inevitable that his 
should be a two stage process, with a double assignment of intentionality. 
 
 However, there are pragmatic processes that contribute to explicatures, such as 
loosening (“Sicily is a triangle”) in which one cannot proceed in this way. Surely one 
cannot map  the logical form „Sicily is a triangle‟ to a serious intention and the 
implicated materials „Sicily has vaguely the shape of a triangle‟ when they are added 
to the logical form that gives input to them  require a loosening of the intentionality 
mapped tentatively to the logical form „Sicily has the shape of a triangle‟. 
Compatibility must be maximized and this is done by loosening one level of 
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intentionality. Now, we must accept that the explicature must have only one level of 
intentionality and that conjunction is, therefore,  not the right logical operation in the 
case of explicature derivation in cases of loosenings. Explicature derivation 
sometimes involves addition, sometimes involves subtraction.  If addition is involved 
(ordinary conjunction) then two levels of intentionality clearly merge into one single 
level of intentionality. If subtraction is the logical operation involved in explicature 
derivation, then we have two levels of intentionality (non-serious; serious), but only 
one of them prevails. The implicated materials prevail over the literally stated logical 
form. In this case, the intentionality of the explicature is inherited from the 
intentionality of the implicated materials. What I am saying is that explicature 
derivation requires some (pragmatic) compositionality at the level of the levels of 
intentionality, due to the assumption (we have accepted) that the two components of 
the explicature must be compatible. (Pragmatic) compositionality means we must 
have some principles determining which level of intentionality prevails. In the case 
of conjunction, compositionality derives from the logical operation „logical 
conjunction‟ and the compatibility assumption. In the case of subtraction, 
compositionality derives from the compatibility assumption plus the assumption that 
at least one level of intentionality must project at the global level and this is strongest 
level. The intentionality „Sicily has roughly the shape of a triangle‟ has a stronger 
level of intentionality than „Sicily is a triangle‟ given that, due to shared knowledge, 
it cannot be the case that Sicily is a perfect canonical triangle. Having decided which 
is the stronger level of intentionality, this will project  at the level of the global 
explicature. The fact that the explicature, broadly speaking, cannot be cancelled 
logically implies that in case the two components of the explicature are constituted 
by two distinct incompatible  levels of intentionality, only one can project: they 
cannot both project as this would jeopardise the notion that the explicature is not 
cancellable. 
 It is an obvious consequence of the discussion so far that cases of explicatures 
based on loosening, in so far as they use the logical operation of subtraction, 
jeopardise the definition that explicatures entail the logical forms they are 
developments of. In fact, a loose triangle does not entail a triangle, that is obvious 
enough. Nevertheless, there should be a logical operation requiring that the 
explicature entails something like the logical form it is a development of. To be 
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more precise, the explicature „Sicily has the rough shape of a triangle‟ requires that 
we look at a triangle to see what the real shape of Sicily is like.  
 
In the light of everything  I have said, an explicature is a process of the following 
kind: 
 
Starting from a logical form S, develop S by bearing the Principle of Relevance into 
account and add the feature Te (truth-evaluability) to u (S) as a consequence of the 
consideration that u(S)/Te has greater contextual effects and fewer cognitive costs 
than u(S)/¬ Te. 
 
The approach so far is minimally distinct from Sperber and Wilson or Carston‟s in 
that they argue that in specific cases the search for relevance leads to the construction 
of explicatures. Instead, I argue on general grounds that explicatures that maximise 
truth-evaluability are preferable on the grounds of the Principle of Relevance. 
 I would like to tie the notion of explicature to that of assertion in communication. 
We will not make much progress in pragmatics unless we recognize that explicatures 
are part of assertions. The considerations so far significantly cohere with what 
Stainton (1994, 280)) says about assertions, revising considerations by Sperber and 
Wilson (1986): 
 
An utterance U is an assertion that P if and only if: 
 
(a) Either P is the propositional form of U (i.e. P results merely by completing the 
Logical Form of U – i.e. by disambiguating it, enriching it and assigning it reference) 
or P could result merely by completing the Logical Form of U and conjoining it with 
another manifest Logical Form of the appropriate semantic type: and 
(b) (b) P is consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance (i.e. U actually 
communicates P). 
 
In other words, Stainton too believes that explicatures form part of the asserted 
proposition and, thus, is implicitly committed to the non-cancellability of 
explicatures. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has assumed that pragmatic intrusion is a rather general phenomenon in 
language use and that Carston‟s notion of „explicature‟ is very important. This notion 
may need refinement, and in this chapter  we have shown what kind of facts have to 
be taken into consideration for this purpose. Cancellability seems to me to be an 
important fact leading to some theoretical revision. Furthermore, the fact that in 
some cases it is difficult to distinguish between implicatures and explicatures if 
merely empirical facts such as cancellation are considered, will inevitably lead us  to 
tighten up the definition of explicatures. 
 Jaszczolt (personal communication) says that Carston  may find the idea of non-
cancellable explicatures problematic in that it goes against the idea of nonce-
inference (context-driven inference) and makes explicatures more akin to unmarked, 
default meanings – not Levinson‟s highly cancellable defaults, but certainly Asher 
and Lascarides (2003) or Jaszczolt‟s (1999) defaults. 
 This is not necessarily an implication of what I have written so far. I think that in 
Capone (2006) I have amply discussed a case of explicature that required some kind 
of contextual inference. Explicatures are uncancellable not because they necessarily 
correspond to a level of default reference, but because the purpose they fulfil  is such 
that it makes them uncancellable. If they were easily cancellable, then it would be 
hard to see what role they could play in establishing the full truth-conditional 
meaning of an utterance. While it makes sense to say that a potential implicature 
leaves an „out‟ for the speaker, it is not very reasonable to say that explicatures give 
the speaker an „out‟. The purpose of committing oneself to a proposition is to leave 
no room for disagreement as to what the speaker actually means.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Default Semantics and the architecture of the mind 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I explore the relationship between Relevance Theory and Jaszczolt‟s 
Default Semantics, framing this debate within the picture of massive modularity 
tempered by the idea of  brain plasticity (Perkins 2007).  While Relevance Theory 
focuses  on processing (see the interplay of cognitive efforts and contextual effects),  
Default Semantics focuses on types of sources from which addressees draw  
information and types of processes that interact in providing it. In particular, I argue 
that Relevance Theory interacts with default semantics by standardizing inferences 
which are ultimately compressed (to use a term  by Kent Bach 1998b) into a default 
semantics. I briefly discuss potential  obstacles to the idea of default semantics 
coming from the experimental pragmatics literature (e.g. Noveck and Sperber 2007, 
Breheny et al. 2005) and I support further the idea of the division of labor between 
Default inferences  and the inferences derivable through the Principle of Relevance. 
In the end, I compare Relevance Theory and Default Semantics, in an attempt to 
come to a more unified picture. 
 
Introduction 
The main topic of this chapter is the relationship between Default Semantics and the 
Principle of Relevance within the modular architecture of the mind. I propose to 
come to a better grasp of the interaction in question by utilizing knowledge of the 
issue of modularity of mind. In particular, I analyze the phenomenon Bach (1998b) 
calls „standardization‟ and propose that once inferences become standardized, they 
are no longer  processed through the Principle of Relevance, given that they can be 
furnished directly by the Default Semantics archive.  I consider potential objections 
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to this idea, based on experimental pragmatics and arrive at the conclusion that 
merger representations, which guarantee compositionality at the level of the 
utterance, take into account both Default inferences  and modulated effects due to 
context. Following Horn (2005), I assume that contextual information may seep into 
the pragmatic interpretation while the default semantics is considered.  
I shall assume the existence of a module called „Mind-reading module‟ within 
which the inferential work related to understanding utterances is carried out. I shall 
argue that the Mind-reading module includes the processes described by Jaszczolt‟s  
(2005) Default Semantics as well as the pragmatic inferential processes for which the  
principle of Relevance is responsible. I shall  argue that  Default Semantics describes 
inferences that make use of inferential shortcuts  stored in an archive and also utilizes 
simple heuristic procedures (fast and frugal procedures in the terms of Gigerenzer 
1999). Default Semantics includes the study of the inferential processes explained 
through  the Principle of  Relevance  and  its basic heuristics (e.g. What is not said 
isn‟t) are specializations of  the Relevance heuristic. Specializations arise in response 
to recurrent environmental problems and consist of heuristics which, though based 
on the principle of relevance, have formed a distinct sub-component of the theory of 
mind, and can be characterized as associative. A certain stimulus will trigger a 
certain output based on these specialized heuristics as a result of semantic 
associations.  
 
In this chapter I will not  advocate a conflation of the mental and the 
neuropsychological levels or advocate reductionism of the mental to the 
neuropsychological level (See Chomsky 2000).  A theory about the mind may surely 
proceed along a separate dimension, resting  on deductions on the basis of what we 
know about language, comprehension and other most important introspection data 
and analyses of those data (see also Feit and Capone, Forthcoming); however, if the 
findings about neuropsychology can independently support our speculative 
considerations about the way language and language use work, this cannot but be a 
welcome result. Neuropsychological data are normally treated as corroborating 
evidence, but  it is possible even to consider the possibility that the 
neuropsychological facts may be at odds with theoretical considerations. It is 
theoretical considerations that matter most. Chomsky is methodologically right: for 
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example we can make sense of certain patterns of electrical activity in the brain by 
the notion of semantic deviance. Surely we could not understand what those patterns 
of electrical activity would signify if we did not have an independent notion of 
syntactic deviance and of its importance for a theory of language and of the mental. 
In this chapter, I do my best to disentangle  the mental from the neuro-psychological, 
even if sometimes the two levels will meet. 
 
 
1. On modularity of  mind 
In this chapter I presuppose a modular picture of the mind. I shall  confine myself to 
only sketching this picture with broad brush strokes. Work on the modularity of the 
mind started with Fodor (1983) and was extended in Fodor (2000). Fodor mainly 
distinguishes between input systems (e.g. perceptual processes) and a central system. 
While modular processes are encapsulated,  domain-specific,  specialized, shallow, 
fast and obligatory, central processes for Fodor are not encapsulated but draw inputs 
from a variety of domains.  
 This strict picture of modularity is being replaced by the massive modularity 
picture, mainly advocated by Carruthers (2006a), Sperber (2005), Wilson (2005), 
Sperber & Wilson (2002) and Carston (1996, 2002),  among others, where the mind 
consists of myriad modules, each correlating with a certain (specialized) function, 
whose input domain is highly restricted (e.g. the visual system is for processing 
visual percepts only, it does not deal with inputs from other organs) and with certain 
transducers. In this picture modules can share resources, especially if they are 
situated in close neural areas and if they do not perform concurrent functions. The 
main advantage of the modularity picture is that it explains how the mind can react in 
such a fast manner to simultaneous inputs coming from different types of transducers 
and how it facilitates learning in cases in which two or more different types of input 
have to be analyzed simultaneously. Another advantage of modularity is that each 
module, in so far as it is to some extent insulated from the remaining architecture, 
can be damaged, without affecting the remaining modules. So, breakdown in a 
module creates limited damage, since other modules are available to  process 
information coming from the outside. People can have their language system 
damaged while  keeping much of the remainder of cognition intact (aphasia); people 
can lack the ability to reason about mental states while still being capable of much 
else (autism); people can lose their ability to recognize just human faces; and so forth 
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and so on. An obvious advantage of massive modularity is that processing of 
information does not create an informational bottleneck, given that various tasks can 
be carried out in parallel. Another advantage is that the modular system allows 
evolution to add new modules or to tinker with existing ones, without affecting the 
remainder of the system. A modular mind is capable of evolving and adding new 
specialized mechanisms in response to environmental challenges. 
 
Unlike  most other authors on modularity, Karmiloff-Smith (2010) puts forward 
the view that the mind is gradually modularized during development, as a result of 
the fact that different areas of the brain are more suitable for dedicated mechanisms 
(more relevant to certain types of processing). So, on this view, starting out with tiny 
differences  across brain regions  in terms of the patterns of connectivity, synaptic 
density, neuronal type, etc., some areas of the brain are  somewhat more suited than 
others to processing of certain types of input. These ideas are interesting, as we may 
be open to the fact that modules emerge, not as a result of genetic endowment, but as 
a result of interaction with the environment and with repeatable patterns of 
experience.  
 
1.1 The mind-reading module. 
In this chapter, I am particularly interested in the mind-reading module.  Theories of 
mind have largely been of two types: the theory-theory of the mind and the 
simulation approach. The theory-theory of the mind sees mind-reading as essentially 
scientific thought that is based on generalizations. To make an example, if you know 
that human beings suffer severely due to the loss of their dear relatives, then by 
seeing a person who has lost her father you  make the prediction that that person is 
severely suffering (of course, like scientific theories, this sort of mind-reading can go 
wrong in circumstances in which people deviate strikingly from certain (near)-
universal dispositions). The most influential theories of this type were worked out by 
Wimmer & Perner (1983), who studied how children‟s minds developmentally 
change in relation to false-belief tasks.   
The simulation approaches see mind reading as running a simulation. You put 
yourself into another person‟s shoes and create certain conditions in imagination 
(suppose I am terminally ill; what would I do?) and then run a simulation on those 
conditions. This would be unlike theory-theory approaches, in that all you do is to 
experience your own reactions in response to simulated conditions. However, you 
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have to quarantine those states of mind which are likely to interfere with the 
simulation, by NOT  letting in states of mind which belong to you and not to the 
person whose behavior you are trying to simulate. 
 
In this chapter, in consonance with Sperber (2005), Wilson (2005), Sperber & 
Wilson (2002) and Carston (1996, 2002), I shall try to explain mind-reading in 
connection with pragmatic inferences (inferences arising from verbal behavior) by 
accepting the existence of the Principle of Relevance that processes inputs in a very 
fast way and provides shallow inferences, that is to say inferences triggered by 
procedures that are designed to provide responses to environmental stimuli in real 
time, without getting bogged down in laborious reasoning. These inferential 
processes are fast, automatic, and schematic – in other words they follow what 
Gigerenzer  et al. (1999) call fast and frugal heuristics. In connection with this 
approach, Carruthers (2006) writes: 
 
Most cognitive scientists now think  that the processing rules deployed in the 
human mind have been designed to be good enough, not to be optimal. Given the 
speed of processing is always one constraint for organisms that may need to think 
and act swiftly in order to survive, evolution will have led to compromises on the 
question of reliability. Indeed, it will favor a satisficing strategy, rather than an 
optimal one. (Carruthers 2006, 54). 
 
I produce   below simple examples of the type of fast-and-frugal heuristics 
proposed by Gigerenzer et al. Suppose you are required to answer the question: 
which of two cities is the larger. A simple heuristic can be useful – you can choose 
the only one of two options  that you recognize.  
 
Another heuristic to be used in response to the same question can be the 
following: you may look first at beliefs about which properties of cities have 
correlated best with size in the past.  If having a top-division team correlated with 
greater size in the past, then you select the town which has a top-division team, while 
neglecting the town which does not have one. If none of the two towns has a top-
division team, you move on to the next best predictor of size. 
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The nice thing about these fast-and-frugal heuristics is that they come with 
stopping rules; you know when you can stop and you do not indefinitely process 
information in order to arrive at an optimal answer. What is good enough will 
suffice, and you stop there.  
 
Before closing this section, I need to remind  readers of the kind of evidence 
generally bearing on the question whether there is (or not) a mind-reading module 
and whether certain mind-reading tasks are executed within it.  The most widely 
cited study showing that there is a  mind-reading module is Baron-Cohen et al.‟s 
(1985) study of autistic children. Autistic children are impaired in mind-reading 
tasks, and they seem to be blind to the notion that other people have minds. Thus, an 
autistic child will drag his father as if he were a toy. Autistic children, however, seem 
to be impaired only in the kind of tasks that involve attributing intentions to others, 
but they need not be impaired in more generic cognitive tasks. 
 That mind-reading activities may involve automatic, fast heuristics is proven by 
patients afflicted with Williams’ syndrome. This disorder results in an average IQ of 
around 50, combined with linguistic abilities and social skills. People with Williams‟ 
syndrome have  good abilities for mind-reading and communication but poor general 
reasoning abilities. This dissociation seems to support the existence, within the mind-
reading module, of  a sub-module (or more sub-modules) dedicated to fast and 
automatic inferences concerning a  speaker‟s intended meaning. (See, however, 
Perkins 2007, for a deeper discussion). 
 The existence of this sub-module dedicated to mind-reading is supported by 
another dissociation. Patients with Asperger’s syndrome have good general 
reasoning abilities but serious impediments in mind-reading. These people can use 
general reasoning to compensate for the lacking special-purpose skills. (See Wilson 
2005 for a deeper treatment of this point). 
 For lack of space I cannot expand on these ideas, but I finally refer the reader to 
Happè, Loth‟s (2002) important  paper on the dissociation between the mind-reading 
module in connection with actions and the mind-reading module in connection with 
communication. This is evidence that the Relevance theory module is a sub-module 
of the more general mind-reading module. 
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2. Default Semantics 
 
Now that I have discussed the issue of modularity of mind, I turn to Default  
Semantics, as my aim in this chapter is to situate Default Semantics in a modular 
view of the mind, which helps explain the relationship with the principle of 
relevance.  
I  discuss the important approach to inferential pragmatics developed by 
Jaszczolt in a series of publications starting from her 1997 seminal paper (Jaszczolt 
1999, 2005, 2009a), which she called „Default Semantics‟. In discussing it, I propose 
crucial modifications of the framework. 
 
A crucial feature of this framework is the centrality of the notion of the speaker’s 
intention. Linguistic actions – like non-linguistic ones – are animated by intentions 
and are successful in so far as hearers recognize  them.  
 
 
The theory elaborated by Jaszczolt is complex and multi-faceted. However, here I 
freely draw on the  central ideas of her theory. Jaszczolt (1999) notes that there is  a 
tension between the individual and the social path of interpretation and she correctly 
remarks that it is the social path of interpretation that must win. The individual path 
of interpretation gives room to a number of idiosyncrasies and allows the hearer to 
manipulate the speaker‟s intentions on the basis of what it is convenient or palatable 
for her to believe. The tension between the individual and the social path of 
intentionality can be best represented as a tension between selfishness and 
altruism/responsibility. 
In the words of Dascal (2003), communication is regulated by the duty to 
understand (on the part of the hearer) and the duty to make oneself understood (on 
the part of the speaker) and the interpretation process is described as a reaching out 
towards the speaker. This terminology is particularly felicitous, because, in 
describing the speaker‟s and the hearer‟s duties in the communication process, it 
emphasizes the notion of responsibility, and the notion of reaching out towards the 
speaker emphasizes the idea of altruism vs. selfishness as being implied in the notion 
of a responsible communicator (the social path of intentionality, as Jaszczolt says). 
As Dascal (2003) says, this reaching toward the other – one might say, this altruistic 
orientation – is inherent in communication qua coordinated action. (Such 
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considerations are dealt with in detail in four maxims underlying communication in 
Capone 2004a). 
 This is part of the picture. The other part of the picture is the attempt to get rid of 
ambiguity whenever possible. Brandishing Occam‟s Modified Razor, à la Grice, 
Jaszczolt proposes that if a lexical item can be interpreted as „a‟ and „b‟ in different 
circumstances, instead of positing ambiguity proper, one can say that one is faced 
with an interpretative ambiguity and one can assign the lexical item a Default 
Semantics in case one of the two interpretative options is chosen in most contexts.  
As Mey says: 
 
In real life, that is, among real language users, there is no such thing as 
ambiguity – excepting  certain, rather special occasions, on which one tries to 
deceive one‟s partner, or „keep a door open‟. (Mey, 2001: 12). 
 
 
Take for example the lexical item „some‟. If you utter (1) 
 
(1) Some of the students arrived 
 
the Default interpretation is that „some but not all of the student arrived‟ (so some did 
not arrive, the class is partially empty). If my interpretation of Jaszczolt is correct, 
her approach is similar but not completely identical to Levinson (2000) on 
presumptive meanings. And her approach is to be differentiated  from the one by 
Relevance theorists (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1986; Carston 2002), despite the fact that 
both approaches can be classified as post-Gricean, intention-based, contextualist 
accounts of utterance processing. As far as one can see, the main difference between 
the two enterprises is that while Relevance Theory focuses on processing (see 
effort/effect), Default Semantics focuses on types of sources from which addressees 
draw information and types of processes which interact in providing it. It appears 
that there is scope for an eclectic account. (More on differences later). 
      Relevance theorists  always describe inferences in context. They are mainly 
concerned with the class of phenomena Grice dubbed „particularised implicatures‟. 
Default inferences, instead, do not arise from particular contexts – in this sense they 
are similar to Levinson‟s presumptive meanings. Jaszczolt‟s approach is distinct 
from Levinson‟s because, while Levinson explicitly ties his inferential 
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augmentations to pragmatic principles (specifically to his neo-Gricean Horn-based 
revision of the Gricean maxims), he considers pragmatic augmentations „local‟. 
Instead Jaszczolt opts for a global inferential approach, in which inferences are 
computed by integrating at the utterance level both semantic and pragmatic 
information.  
 Jaszczolt gives one the impression that she opts for a semantic view of pragmatic 
phenomena by proposing the idea of „Default interpretations‟.  As I wrote in Capone 
(2002), she devises a system in which one stores Default interpretations in an archive 
and such interpretations are automatically activated in a default context, unless there 
are visible clues that militate against the Default interpretation and, thus, favor 
contextual modulation (I do not remember that Jaszczolt makes use of the word 
„archive‟ though). 
 If one wonders how this picture originates, one may probably go back to 
Wittgenstein‟s equation of meaning and use. Alternatively, one may see 
phenomenology as inspiring Jaszczolt‟s perspective – pp. 88-90 of her book 
„Discourse beliefs and intentions‟ are instructive in this respect. She takes both 
Husserl and Brentano to support the idea that the content of  our attitudes are things 
of the world (In Husserl‟s work,  the connection between  perception and belief is 
emphasized). On p. 48 of her „Default Semantics‟ Jaszczolt clarifies the issue: 
 
Now, intentional acts can be about mental objects, real objects, or whole states of 
affairs (eventualities); states, events, or processes. I shall follow the later 
phenomenological tradition and assume that our mental acts are directed at real 
rather than mental objects, and at real eventualities. (Jaszczolt 2005, 48). 
 
 
In this chapter, I would like to give a more distinctively cognitive slant to 
Jaszczolt‟s theory and I would like to claim that there are cognitive principles 
responsible for the assignment of referential interpretations to NPs. If my view is 
correct, we need not use premises from phenomenology to support the Default 
Semantics of NP, nor should we use explanations of Levinsonian or relevance-
theoretic inspiration. I propose that the mind works this way. If you encounter an 
utterance of 
 
(2) Mary thinks that Ortcutt is crazy 
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there are two possible readings: 
a. The de re reading.  
The reporter (of the belief) ascribes  to Mary a belief about  a particular, known 
individual (de re). 
 
2b.  The de dicto reading. 
The reporter of the belief says that Mary believes in the existence of Ortcutt and 
Mary ascribes to him a certain property. 
 
you will be inclined to give a referential interpretation to „Ortcutt‟ and a „de re‟ 
reading of the sentence in (2) (Ortcutt is such that Mary thinks of him that he is 
crazy) not because the referential and „de re‟ reading is  the most informative one 
(the one which has greater contextual effects) but because this is the way the mind 
works. I assume that what Jaszczolt calls the „Default De Re Principle‟ is nothing 
less than an a priori form of our interpretation processes. In the same way in which, 
for Kant, the ideas of space, time and cause are the a priori principles of knowledge, 
the Default De Re principle is an a priori form of interpretation processes. The 
principle is exposed below: 
 
The Default De Re principle: 
 
The de re reading of sentences ascribing beliefs is the Default reading. Other 
readings constitute degrees of departure from the Default, arranged on the scale of 
the strength of intentionality of the corresponding mental state. 
 
(i) The hearer of an expression of belief of the form „B φs‟  normally presumes that 
the speaker holds a belief de re and that the referring term is useful to refer to an 
individual, unless the content of utterance signals otherwise; 
(ii) The hearer of a belief report of the form „A believes that „B φs‟ normally 
interprets the utterance as de re, unless the context signals otherwise. 
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The Default de re principle can be derived through reasoning. Suppose that there 
is no default de re principle in language. Then the child, presented with utterances, 
could very well interpret NPs as not being referential, taking them to refer to abstract 
categories. For example, faced with an utterance such as „The dog is in the garage‟ a 
child could very well take „the dog‟ to refer to the abstract category „dogs‟. This 
means that language would be unlearnable for the child (or learnable with great 
difficulty), as for every concrete object, the linguistic item referring to it would be 
multiply ambiguous, capable of referring either to a concrete object or to an abstract 
category. However, if a child is guided by something like the default „de re‟ 
principle, language acquisition is facilitated, as he will not run the risk of 
misinterpreting concrete categories by applying abstract categories. (Gradually the 
child will move from the sphere of concrete objects to the sphere of abstract ones, 
but it is clear that the Default De Re Principle is a very useful heuristic principle for 
the child who needs to orient himself in otherwise chaotic pieces of language 
behavior). 
That children are guided by cognitive principles in language acquisition comes 
as no surprise, as Carruthers (2006a) claims, following Bloom (2000),  that in 
learning a language children are guided by the innate notion that the speaker‟s 
intention as manifested through gaze or gestures is important; furthermore, he claims 
that a child will not try to apply a new word to an object part, but to the entire object 
(So on hearing „rabbit‟ for the first time, the child will not apply the concept „rabbit‟ 
to a rabbit part (say, the hind leg) but to the entire object. (Goldman 2006, 178, 
discusses the following principle:  Prefer parsing  the world into whole objects rather 
than arbitrary parts of whole objects or arbitrary merelological sums of whole 
objects.) 
It goes without saying that the Default de re principle is responsible both for the 
preferred referential interpretation of belief reports and for the preferred referential 
interpretation of utterances such as: 
 
(3) Smith‟s murderer is insane. 
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Sentences such as (3) are interpretatively ambiguous between a referential and an 
attributive interpretation: however, the hearer normally settles  immediately and 
automatically for the referential interpretation. Examples of this type can be 
multiplied ad libitum. In fact, an autterance such as (4) 
(4) John wants to sell his cello (originally from Heim 1992). 
 
is usually assigned the interpretation that John believes  he has a cello and that such a 
belief is matched by the speaker‟s belief that John has a cello. On this theory, the 
case in which crazy John falsely believes he has a cello, even if (4) is uttered, is a 
marginal one,  a reading that constitutes a „degree of departure from the default‟. 
 
Are there any other interesting cases of default inferences? I would like to list a 
number of inferential phenomena which are not discussed by Jaszczolt, but which 
may support the case for cognitive Defaults. I will freely resort to cases discussed by  
Bach (2001) and  Dascal (2003), adapting them to the purposes of the present 
discussion. (I am responsible for modifications) 
 
Speak seriously! 
 
When a speaker A proffers  her utterance U, there is a presumption that she seriously 
intends to say U, unless some clues from the context clarify that she cannot have a 
serious intention (e.g. she is speaking ironically, humorously, etc.). Could we not 
consider this presumption as part of our cognitive make up – of the way our 
cognition works? Certainly a cognitive universal to the effect that the speaker‟s 
words are taken non-literally or non-seriously unless clues indicate otherwise could 
not be of any help to mankind; that would only disorient communicators. 
 
The reasoning would have to proceed like this. Suppose that there is no default 
procedure for discerning seriousness of intention. Then the child learning a language 
would have no guiding principle available orienting her towards the selection of the 
right lexical items corresponding to appropriate concepts. Language learning would 
have to be an unachievable task, as for each word, there is the possibility that the 
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instructor (say, the mother or the father) is not speaking seriously, in which case the 
motivation for learning a language would decrease. 
 
Only one language! 
 
When a speaker utters more than one utterance, there is a presumption that he would 
use the same language as that of the previous utterance. You do not struggle to guess, 
each time: “Which language is she likely to use next?‟. In a non-bilingual 
community, you are pretty sure that a language will be constant throughout the 
communication process. (In a bilingual community you know in advance that any of 
the two languages, but NOT a third one, will be selected in actual communication). 
 
The reasoning would proceed as follows. Suppose that it is a logical possibility 
that a sequence of utterances can be uttered by using any language whatsoever, at 
random. If such a logical possibility were countenanced by the child, the motivation 
for learning a language would decrease, because, by being exposed to a sequence of 
utterances, she would not know which language she has to learn and which language 
the speaker is likely to speak. Instead, if the child expects the speaker to use a single 
language (or at most a very limited set of alternatives) through a sequence of 
utterances, the motivation for learning a language would increase. 
 
The speaker as principal 
 
There is a presumption that the speaker is also the author and principal of his 
utterance content.  These are notions from Goffman‟s (1981)  Forms of Talk. A 
person can speak without being responsible for the words uttered (e.g. an actor/ an 
ambassador), he simply voices the message. However, in normal speech we do not 
dissociate the role of the speaker as the source of the utterance from his role as the 
means of communication. 
 
The reasoning  for this cognitive principle would have to proceed as follows. 
Suppose that there is no such cognitive principle, then for every utterance  she hears, 
the child would not know whether the speaker speaks in her capacity as animator or 
author or principal. For all the child knows, it is a logical possibility that the speaker 
is just an animator and that everything she says comes from a source different from 
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the animator (or the instructor). If such a logical possibility were contemplated 
seriously by the child, then it would not be possible for her  to associate the language 
spoken by the animator with the principal‟s language (so the chances that he is 
learning a language which is not the one spoken by the animator increase), 
furthermore it would not be possible to associate linguistic items and utterances with 
the speaker‟s intentions. But we saw, given what Carruthers says about gaze and 
gestures, that intentions are important (in fact, indispensable) for learning a language. 
 
These are  ideal cases of preferential interpretations expressible  through Default 
Semantics. You do not rely on particular clues – especially words – to draw these 
inferences. To argue that these are socio-cultural Defaults would imply that these 
aspects of communication are learnable, rather than innate. But this would require 
showing that at least in some societies things are not this way. It would also involve 
explaining how adults/infants communication can occur, since these defaults are 
presuppositions of communication, rather than learnable aspects of communication 
or of culture.  You do not first teach the infant these defaults and then proceed with 
communication with her; on the contrary, these defaults are presupposed in 
communication. 
 
 
We wonder if the cognitive defaults above are reducible to more general 
principles
1
. Now, this question is clearly a question about the link between Default 
Semantics and Relevance Theory. While a cognitive default may work as an 
instruction to interpret a certain fragment of language use in a certain way, it is 
possible that behind it there is a  cognitive principle of basic rationality. This I will 
not deny, albeit I will insist that cognitive defaults are short-circuited inferences, in 
which the mind is not busy calculating inferences on the basis of general principles 
of rationality. We can, however, note  important connections. Each of such defaults 
may arise due to the need of avoiding ambiguities and obscurities which would 
impede not only language processing, but also language acquisition. Since the mind 
works by promoting contextual effects while keeping efforts as low as possible, and 
since without such cognitive defaults language acquisition would be impeded or 
                                                 
1
 An interesting reduction of the speaker‟s „sincerity stance‟ to  a cognitive story is to be 
found in Paglieri & Castelfranchi (2010). For the sake of space I cannot go into this 
discussion. 
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retarded, the mind recruits Sperber & Wilson‟s Principle of Relevance for the 
purpose of creating cognitive defaults which, if implemented as simple instructions, 
are even more frugal and faster  than the application of the principle of relevance 
each time a certain input occurs. We may see the cognitive defaults as 
specializations of the application of the Principle of Relevance. 
 
One may wonder why one should consider these tendencies as best explained as a 
priori, hardwired principles of (linguistic) interpretation when they can typically be 
derived from basic rationality. A possible reply to this question is that, granting the 
connection between these tendencies and the cognitive principle of relevance, which 
originally motivated them, a person  is better off having these tendencies hard-wired, 
because of the possibility that more than one environmental problem of the type 
resolvable through them may present itself at the same time.  The presence of two or 
three environmental problems of this type would put inferential reasoning to great 
costs, since cognition would have to work out responses to two or three or more 
environmental problems simultaneously. Instead, a hardwired, modular account of 
these tendencies  resolves the problem of simultaneity of inference. This problem, as 
shown by Carruthers (2006), is at the basis of modular stories. Surely, one could go 
on arguing that the cognitive principle of relevance can deal with more than one 
problem in parallel (in other words, it can deal with a series of problems by resolving 
them in parallel). Now, even assuming that this is so, one must admit that cognitive 
efforts will increase enormously and there is also a chance that the processor will not 
be able to cope with so much processing because of the cognitive load. Instead, if we 
posit that there are some principles related to, but different from, the principle of 
Relevance that can deal with matters such as „serious speech‟ „author vs. speaker‟, 
„only one language‟, referential interpretations, the cognitive load for the operation 
of the Principle of Relevance is diminished, and this is clearly necessitated by the 
fact that the Principle of relevance is always busy computing the relevance of an 
utterance in a given context. 
 It is also natural that the principle of relevance, being a cognitive principle, should 
be designed to cope with novel problems, leaving problems that are recurrent to 
default heuristics, which are prepared, instead, to deal with problems which have 
repeated themselves in the past and for which „standardised solutions‟ are ready.  (As 
Sherry, Schacter (1987) say,  it seems reasonable to assume that  an efficient habit-
learning  system will preserve those features of an experience  that recur in different 
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episodes, while  a certain  number of contextual details are ignored). We can 
compare the work done by the default semantics heuristics with fast-and-frugal 
heuristics utilized for example by people who invest money in the stock-exchange. 
Someone who has witnessed the recent events in the world stock-exchanges has 
developed a prudential strategy based on experience: if you buy shares when the 
price fall, buy them in two or three installments, so that if the price continues to fall, 
you can still be able to buy the shares at the cheapest possible price. If cognition tells 
you that the best moment to buy shares is when the price falls, experience tells you 
that if the price continues falling you must go on buying shares. Fast-and-frugal 
heuristics are the result of cognitive principles being adapted to experiential data. 
Analogously, I argue that default semantics heuristics are the systematic response to 
environmental problems that have recurred and, because of their recurring quality, 
require dedicated mechanisms and more specialized solutions. Default 
interpretations are also more suited to interpretation problems for which there is little 
doubt or uncertainty, whereas cognitive mechanisms of the inferential type are at 
work when one needs to eliminate uncertainty. As Gallistel  (2002) says, the function 
of learning is to extract from experience properties of the environment likely to be 
useful in the determination of future behavior. We use memory to carry information 
that is useful to responding to environmental problems forward in time. 
 
  
We may go further and claim that there are other cognitive defaults. Suppose that  
Default Semantics includes  fast and frugal heuristics such as: 
 
What is not said isn‟t (Levinson 2000). 
 
Given this fast and frugal heuristics, hearing the utterance (5) 
 
(5) I have three children 
the hearer assigns the interpretation „I have at most three children‟. This fast and 
frugal heuristic could be seen as a specialization of the principle of Relevance by 
Sperber & Wilson: 
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Cognitive principle of Relevance 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance. 
 
Relevance of an input to an individual 
a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by 
processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that 
time. 
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the 
relevance of the input to the individual at that time. 
 
Presumption of optimal relevance 
a. The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the auditor‟s processing 
effort. 
b. It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator‟s abilities and 
preferences. 
 
Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure 
a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretative 
hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of 
accessibility. 
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned). 
 
(From Wilson & Sperber 2004). 
 
Some readers may remain perplexed by the fact that I consider the heuristic „What is 
not said isn‟t‟ as related to the Principle of Relevance, nevertheless as belonging to 
Default Semantics. However, given Carruthers‟s claim that different modules can 
share a number of parts, I also claim that  Default inferences  and the Principle of 
Relevance  share common mechanisms (the relationship between the two being one 
of specialization). The heuristic principle „What is not said isn‟t‟ can be said to 
follow from the principle of Relevance, given that  if the scalar interpretative options 
higher up in the scale obtained, then the speaker would put the hearer to undue 
processing efforts, in that one could never know in principle which of  the two 
interpretation options should be chosen (hence the higher options in a scale are 
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excluded). As Mey (2001, 69) says: when communicating, speakers try to be 
understood correctly, and avoid giving false impressions. 
 
I have reasons for wanting to propose that  the heuristic „What is not said isn‟t‟ is 
part of  Default Semantics: 1) it furnishes pre-contextual processing; 2) it is a more 
frugal principle than the principle of relevance.  
 
 
3. On the compatibility of Relevance theory, Gricean theories,  and Default 
Semantics 
The project of integrating Gricean theories and, in particular, Relevance Theory and 
Default Semantics is not without problems.  There are, in fact, terminological, as 
well as more substantial differences. If Grice‟s original theory is taken into account, 
the most obvious differences between the original Gricean picture and  Relevance 
Theory are as follows.  
The Gricean picture is philosophically motivated, while RT aims at a 
psychological plausible theory in which Relevance is part of a broad picture of the 
way the mind works and of its cognitive architecture. Grice had a view of 
implicatures that had literal meanings as a point of departure, while RT  abandons the 
idea that the literal content gives rise to implicatures, which may be aborted in 
context. Grice had a minimal conception of what is said, while RTs have an 
intrusionistic view of what is said.  RT adopts the idea that semantics 
underdetermines pragmatic interpretation to a greater extent. (See Horn 2005, 
Carston 2005). En passant, I should stress that despite much insistence on the part of 
the current literature on the different emphasis of the Gricean project and RT 
concerning the speaker‟s intentions, Carston (2005) has (as always) said that RT is 
very much concerned with speaker meaning, both what it is and how an addressee 
attempts to recover it. (And I approve of Carston‟s precis).  
 
 We may agree with all this, and say that while we are obviously interested in the 
Gricean notion of speaker‟s meaning, which we hope to inherit for the purpose of our 
current intellectual enterprise, we are less interested in rehabilitating the less 
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tractable parts of the Gricean program. Instead, I am interested in integrating, if 
possible, an offshoot of Gricean pragmatics – Default Semantics – with Relevance 
Theory. Here too compatibility is not to be taken for granted, as there are differences. 
However, one should not think  that these differences  will prevent us from 
contemplating the possibility of a unified picture. In the following I do my best to 
reconcile the two positions. I focus on the differences between the two projects and 
argue that these differences cannot prevent us from trying to reconcile the two 
theories.  
While Relevance Theory focuses  on processing (see effort and effect interplay),  
Default Semantics focuses on types of sources from which addressees draw  
information and types of processes that interact in providing it. In Default Semantics, 
rationality of interloctutors is assumed, on a par with any Gricean approach and 
Relevance Theory. Rational communicative behavior is an assumption integral to the 
theory of Default Semantics. 
Like Relevance Theory, there is a difference between DS and Levinson‟s theory of 
GCI in that Levinson assumes local inferences, often word-based ones, while DS 
professes „methodological globalism‟: it is methodologically prudent to assume 
global, proposition-based inferences (and defaults). 
 
Inferences, according to DS, are NOT fast and instantaneous. DS is a theory in 
which merger representations combine outputs of various processes, some of them 
default and some conscious, costly and inferential. Duration of processing is not a 
problem for DS: GCI will arise in some contexts as defaults, in others as the outcome 
of conscious processing, and yet in others do not arise at all.  Defaults mean in DS 
automatic interpretations, assessed for a particular utterance. We must distinguish 
between Default Semantics as a theory and default interpretations (CD, SCWD) 
which constitute only two out of four types of processes in the theory.  DS is a model 
of utterance interpretation which is self-contained and comprises also those types of 
processes that Relevance Theory postulates (contextual inferences). 
 
Relevance theory is clearly and explicitly related to mental heuristics. The 
framework deals with cognitive processes that tend to reduce the amount of 
information needed and produce effects in a fast and efficient way. If you asked me 
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whether Miland is bigger than Caltanissetta, I may use information that Miland has a 
series A soccer team while Caltanissetta hasn‟t as a predictor of size and if I do not 
have information about soccer then I will move to the next best predictor of size (for 
example, having an airport is a predictor of size).  In the same way, Relevance 
Theory uses cognitive efforts and contextual effects to predict whether an 
interpretation is relevant or not. However, one could say that while the heuristics 
such as using a predictor of size (e.g. knowledge about a soccer team) are intelligent, 
they are nevertheless shortcuts grounded in experience, Relevance Theory 
interpretations are shortcuts grounded in general principles of cognition. If anything 
at all resembles Gigerenzer‟s heuristic shortcuts, this is Default Semantics and not 
relevance theory, since Default interpretations are often derived by default, and often 
include social defaults. They are shortcuts that are grounded on experience and 
associative links, given that sociocultural defaults are created by associative links. 
 
Default Semantics must be related to cognitive architecture because, since it 
provides principles of compositionality for the integration of linguistic semantics and 
pragmatic information, one must explain what features of cognitive architecture 
permit inter-modular communication. As previously said, DS is a theory in which 
merger representations combine outputs of various processes. It is Default Semantics 
that permits the integration of, say, perceptual and linguistic information or of 
syntactico/semantic and pragmatic information. While Relevance theory confines 
itself to adding pragmatic increments to semantic templates, Default Semantics gives 
us the principles whereby such integration can be effected. Carruthers (2006) 
discusses how information coming from different modules can be integrated, and 
mentioning that some scholars prefer the answer that the theory of mind is 
responsible for such integration, he proposes that the language module is responsible 
for this integration.  If we assume, as Jaszczolt does, that Default Semantics is 
responsible for this integration, we must surely articulate mental architecture that 
corresponds to the workings of Default Semantics. Since Default Semantics is said to 
be characterized by combinatorial principles, it is not completely outlandish that the 
workings of Default Semantics should subsume a linguistic competence, but it is also 
obvious that such combinatorial principles  must be different from linguistic 
compositionality. 
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What is clear so far is that an obvious difference between default Semantics and 
Relevance theory is the former‟s insistence on Default inferences. These include 
socio-cultural defaults, which  cannot be easily accommodated by Relevance Theory. 
A clear-cut advantage of Default Semantics is that it can explain inference to 
stereotype (nurse  female nurse; surgeon  male surgeon, etc.) with relative ease. 
Default inferences of a lexical type are also a characteristic of Default Semantics, 
which is in conflict with the assumptions of Relevance Theory. In my opinion, one 
must attempt to integrate DS and RT by  recognizing that much of the burden of 
cognitive processing must be alleviated by the construction of a mental archive 
where Default inferences are stored, ready for use. Even if it is not clear that this 
approach involves faster mechanisms of inference, one thing is certain. Processing 
costs will be minimized, and this is useful especially when the brain is at pains 
locating an utterance in a wide co-text and context. If co-text and context are not at 
odds with Default interpretations, these can be safely added to utterance 
interpretation by following the Default Semantics compositional principles and can 
be integrated in a wider context where it is necessary to compute further contextual 
effects (the effect of adding the utterance to the context in question). Computing 
costs will thus be predicted to be alleviated by Default Interpretations. These 
considerations make sense in the light of Perkins‟s (2007) work on compensatory 
strategies, which clearly involve brain plasticity as well as the natural inclination by 
the human mind to compensate for certain impairments. While in the context of this 
discussion we are not discussing pragmatic impairments, it is natural to extend the 
notion of compensation to those cases in which the summation of inferential 
procedures would ultimately lead to an unbearable or anyway costly cognitive load 
and, thus, brain plasticity, and, in particular, the ability to shift information from the 
cognitive component to a Default Semantics Archive, takes away this cognitive load 
and compensates for it by imposing a burden on the Default Semantics Archive. 
In order to be more persuasive, I will make use of an example which is familiar 
to everyone: the use of the multiplication tables. I choose this example from Ryle 
(1949), since the philosopher used it to make a distinction between an intelligent 
activity (multiplying numbers according to a rule) and an activity which seemed to 
him to be less intelligent (the ability to give by rote  the correct solution to a 
multiplication problem). We do not know what  Ryle would have said of  the strategy 
of shifting the burden of cognitive operations  to a semantic archive in which 
semantic associations replace cognitive operations. Would this be an intelligent 
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activity? If we could show that this activity is governed by the principle of relevance, 
then we could prove that it is intelligent. I will address this issue later on. When we 
were children we found it tedious to commit to memory so much information about 
multiplication, which was independently derivable through a cognitive strategy (e.g. 
counting, or multiplying with the usual multiplication methods). This clearly 
involved a cognitive load on memory. However, once the multiplication tables were 
memorized, it was clear that a lot of effort was saved. Of course, committing 
information to memory is useful only if there is a high likelihood that this 
information will turn out to be useful. Thus, if in our practice (buying and selling 
things, measuring, etc.) there is a high likelihood that the multiplication tables will 
turn out to be useful, it will be felt to be justified to put children to such a memory 
load.  Could we not then arbitrarily extend the capacity of multiplication tables? I 
found out through Wikipedia that while in some society multiplication tables include 
the number 9, in USA multiplication tables include the number 12. However, one 
usually does not find multiplication tables that include the number 19 or 99. Why 
should this be the case? It must be the case because given that it is unlikely to find 
multiplications like 99 x 88 in practical life, then the cost of memorizing such  richer 
multiplication tables is not justified. Even for mathematicians, this is not justified, 
given the use of electronic calculators. However, if a given person found it was very 
useful  to multiply numbers up to 99 in practical life (say in a society of thieves 
where everyone will take an opportunity to steal money from you if you do not have 
suitable mathematical abilities), then it would be justified to learn the multiplication 
tables up to the number 99. 
When we have to choose between a simple associative cognitive strategy, like 
memorizing, and a more complex cognitive strategy, such as having to make 
computations, we compare the costs and benefits involved and then decide  which 
strategy is the best.  We can invoke the basic assumption of relevance theory, that is 
the trade-off between cognitive effects and cognitive  efforts to justify the shift from 
repetitive processing within the module where the principle of relevance is operative 
to systematic storage in a Default Semantics archive of information coming from 
processing based on the Principle of Relevance. Furthermore, if ease of 
memorization is associated with repetition, then it goes without saying that the more 
repetitive a cognitive strategy is, the greater is the likelihood that it will be replaced 
by an associative learning and memorization of its results.  Suppose there is a 
cognitive rule of this  type: after finding that item x is associated with interpretation y 
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for the nth time, commit y to memory by associating y with item x. Then it goes 
without saying that after encountering the association x, y for the nth time, one will 
commit it to memory. However, at this point we could also say that Relevance 
Theory mechanisms have some saying on the fact that the rule „Commit the 
association z,y to memory after encountering it for the n-th time‟ exists, since 
memorization effort is now offset by cognitive rewards. (This is in line with Millikan 
2006, who also stresses the connection between memorization of facts and cognitive 
rewards). All I am suggesting is that the number n involved in the expression „the n-
th time‟, whatever it is, is not arbitrarily determined, by may be the result of a 
combination of factors, including the dispositional qualities of  memory (synaptic 
density in neo-cortical tissues, changes in syntactic conductance (Gallistel 2002)) and  
cognitive rewards that are likely to offset memorization effort. 
 
There is more evidence in favor of the line of thought according to which shifting 
the burden from on the fly cognitive processing to memorized information (the 
Default semantics archive) is liable of functional explanation. I would like to suggest 
an  analogy between the Default semantics Archive /on the fly processing tension 
and the functional considerations by Klein et al. (2002) on episodic memory and 
ascription of character traits. Essentially Klein et al. consider that ascription of 
character traits can be determined in two ways: either through online processing, in 
which one considers episodic memories of the past and ascribes qualities on their 
basis; or through  transformed memories, in which memories are elaborated on and 
abstractions are made on their basis. Such abstractions provide character traits ready 
for use.  The preference for character abstractions is due to the fact that they respond 
efficiently and quickly to situations in which a decision and an action must be taken 
in a fraction of a second. The reasons for this  cognitive default are mainly the 
following: predictability (one can predict another person‟s future action); importance 
(the importance of decisions should justify the costs); economy (the number of 
judgments  supported by derived memories  should be proportionately large with 
respect to its size; urgency (the requirement that such judgments should be made 
quickly). 
 
There is a tension between abstractions based on memory of events and online 
processing based on events, since abstractions have predictive power concerning 
average situations. However, when the question arises how a person should behave  
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in an exceptional situation, it is of use to have a memory store that keeps memory of 
events, particular episodes, to see if such a memory can tell us what to predict about 
future behavior. 
 
The tension between online processing of memories and memory based 
abstractions of character properties parallels the tension between online processing in 
which  a relevance based mechanism is able to compute the effects of context on an 
utterance and the information stored in the default semantics Archive. Default 
inferences are of use when cognitive costs increase due to parallel processing of  
various lexemes and structural configurations. The efficiency of Default Inferences 
should, therefore, justify the costs. Default Inferences have predictive power. They 
tell us how subjects will behave conversationally and use lexical items standardly. 
Default inferences involve a certain economy, because it is presumed that an 
inferential augmentation is routinely used million of times in a person‟s life and, 
thus, cognitive efforts involved in producing the inference are spared; default 
inferences also meet Klein et al.‟s criterion of urgency. If default inferences are 
involved in thought as well as in spoken language, then it is clear that they allow 
speakers/thinkers to act quickly. 
 
To finish this defense of Default inferences, I want to say that when a cognitive 
resource is very fruitful, as in the case of pragmatic inferences, then it will be good to 
make sure that other cognitive resources are allocated to the same function, so that 
this  function will not be lost as a consequence of neurological damage. In the same 
way as our perceptual systems have got a certain redundancy (we have got two 
hands, two  eyes, two ears, a nose and a mouth that can both be used for breathing, 
two legs, two feet), our cognitive resources are best used by creating redundancy and 
by replicating them by shifting away the burden from cognition to  memory. 
 
A further crucial difference between DS and RT is that unlike the other 
contextualist account, DS  does not recognize the level of meaning at which the logical 
form is pragmatically developed/modulated as a real, interesting, and cognitively 
justified construct. To do so would be to assume that syntax plays a privileged role 
among various carriers of information and that the syntax/pragmatics interaction is 
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confined to pragmatic additions, embellishments, or „developments‟ of the output of 
syntactic processing.  
Now, it is possible that this insistence on the idea that semantics is not a cognitively 
justified construct needs to be mitigated. After all, the idea of merger representations is 
that we merge information and linguistic information is clearly one of the sources of 
information that we merge.  What Jaszczolt probably wants to challenge is the 
independence of semantics. Now,  there are reasons for resisting the idea that semantics 
is an autonomous level of meaning, since semantic representations, in order to be 
merged, must have tags that allow for the merging. In other words, linguistic information 
must have appropriate tags  that allow the binding (or merging) with non-linguistic 
information (The simplest example is the use of pronouns or demonstratives). In other 
words, they must have a potential for merging. Seeing things in this light, the insistence 
by Relevance Theorists  on semantics as an autonomous, independent, cognitively 
justified level can be tempered. However, given that Jaszczolt deals with 
compositionality at the level of the utterance, we should remark in passing that having  
the potential for compositionality at the level of merger representations does not prevent 
semantics from being readable as a self-sufficient level of representation. One knows 
what could be meant by saying a given sentence and one also knows in advance what 
increments various and different contexts would add because we know what the 
semantic potential for merger representations is. It is probably this abstract semantic 
potential for combining with contexts that we call sentential semantics and there is no 
doubt that Relevance Theorists do well in  paying attention to this level which may 
require different principles of compositionality from those of Jaszczolt‟s merger 
representations 
 
3.1 Default Semantics and Levinsons’s theory of default implicatures.  
While there is no doubt that Jaszczolt‟s theory of Default semantics seems (prima 
facie) to resemble Levinson‟s (2000) theory of  generalized conversational 
implicatures, in the light of evidence from experimental pragmatics (especially  
Noveck & Sperber 2007), we should make some effort to differentiate the two 
theories. Noveck and Sperber  (2007)  note that  default implicatures à la Levinson 
presuppose the following theoretical picture: 
 
Generalized implicatures are more parsimonious than totally explicit communication; 
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Generalized implicatures are more parsimonious than particularized implicatures (in 
the sense that they are less time-consuming, less effortful). 
Generalized implicatures get through in a default context, but can be cancelled in 
specific contexts; 
The contexts where they are cancelled are fewer than those in which they are not. 
 
Noveck and Sperber (2007) consider that even if generalized implicatures were 
cancelled only in a third of all cases, one would have to sum the effortfulness of 
these cancellations with the effortfulness of having generalized implicatures. The 
criticism leveled against Levinson could be leveled towards Default Semantics. 
Thus, we must excogitate how to answer the objections to Levinson while at the 
same time differentiating Default Semantics further from the Levinsonian picture. 
 
3.2 Taking experimental pragmatics seriously. 
The experimental side of Noveck and Sperber‟s article seems to show „prima facie‟  
that children are more likely to go for literal interpretations of utterances such as 
„There might be a parrot in the  box‟ (which are preferred to interpretations like 
„There might but there must not be a parrot in the box‟ (See also Chierchia et al. 
2001 on this issue). The experiment is not much different in its results when children 
are given explicit instruction concerning the presence of a scalar conversational 
implicature.  Now, Noveck and Sperber agree that these results can be interpreted by 
saying that all they show is that pragmatic competence in children and in adults are 
differentiated (does the theory of mind module undergo  a paced pattern of 
evolution?) and, in fact, the temptation to interpret them as giving support at least to 
a picture of Default Semantics à la Jaszczolt is strong. If my idea is correct  that 
information is gradually shifted to the Default Semantics Archive, after inferences 
become routinized or standardized, say after the nth time they are repeated, then the 
experimental picture so far illustrated need not be inimical to Default Semantics, as 
the Default Semantics Archive  could be considered a component of the theory of 
mind  which partially  emerges with experience. However, the literature on 
experimental pragmatics is not unanimous on the idea that children are not 
pragmatically competent to calculate scalar implicatures. In fact,  Papafragou and 
Tantalou  (2004) argue that the methodology of the previous experiments, in which 
questions were asked of the children concerning the truth of certain statements, was 
wrong and, thus,  use instead a different methodology which does not privilege 
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questions, but  exploits informative statements containing quantifiers to assess 
whether a certain task was completely executed and thus deserved a reward (or not). 
In the light of the new methodology, children were shown to be competent in 
calculating scalar implicatures if enough contextual clues were given. 
 Another important article belonging to experimental pragmatics is the one  by 
Breheny et a. (2006)  in which it is shown that  contextual clues may lead either to  
scalar implicatures or to a literal interpretation respectively in greater or less time. 
Now, this is certainly an important study of inferential processes, but  there are 
things to be said. If understanding a sentence is a question of connecting together its 
various parts, it is clear that syntactic complexity should be taken into account. It 
could be argued that  syntactic complexity of prior segments have an effect on the 
reading time of the last segment, given that, after all, reading in this experiment 
meant understanding and understanding is always a holistic matter.  
 
The problems noted above do not appear to frighten Jaszczolt who distances herself 
from Levinson and claims that: 
 
 
It is much harder to provide experimental evidence for or against salient 
meanings that are so construed that they draw on some contextual information, 
arise late in utterance processing, and are not normally cancellable. The latter 
also seem much more intuitively plausible in that they are nothing less but 
shortcuts through costly pragmatic inference. They are just normal, unmarked 
meanings for the context and it is not improbable that such default, salient 
interpretations will prove to constitute just the polar end of a scale of degrees 
of inference rather than have qualitatively different properties from non-
default, clearly inference-based interpretations. They will occupy the area 
towards the „zero‟ end of the scale of inference but will not trigger the 
dichotomy „default vs. inferential interpretation‟. (Jaszczolt 2006). 
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3.3 Further considerations on the interaction between Relevance Theory and 
Default Semantics. 
One of the ideas of this chapter is that  inferences that start as pragmatic processes 
become standardized (to use Bach‟s term) or routinized. This involves a gradual shift 
of information from pragmatic processes based on fast and frugal heuristics to a 
(lexical)  archive.  This move is not extraneous to Relevance Theory as evinced  
from  Wilson and Carston‟s (2007)  brilliant paper. In that paper, Wilson and Carston 
attempt to unify diverse pragmatic processes such as loosening or narrowing of 
concepts, or metaphorical extensions, hyperbole, etc.  They convincingly argue that 
there is no clear division among them. They can successfully unify such diverse 
phenomena under the idea that Relevance will furnish „ad hoc‟ concepts (an idea 
based on Barsalou 1987 and Glucksberg  2003). In other words, pragmatics will be 
able to modulate in context the concepts provided by  lexical semantics. In that 
paper, they also argue that “However, some of these pragmatically constructed 
senses may catch on in the communicative interactions of a few people or a group, 
and so become regularly and frequently used. In such cases, the pragmatic process of 
concept construction  becomes progressively more routinized, and may ultimately 
spread  through a speech community and stabilize an extra lexical sense”. (Wilson & 
Carston 2007, 15). As Mey says: 
(…) certain apt metaphors (e.g. „sharp‟ for „intelligent‟), due to their „success‟, 
obtain near-lexical status, analogous to certain fixed expressions (compare the 
role of the English modal verbs can and may in indirect speech acts and 
negation) (Mey 2004, 113). 
Now, it is clear that both Default Semantics and Relevance Theory recognize the 
importance of routinized inferences (see also Mey 2004, in addition). One may, thus,  
object to Default Semantics that, after all, if all it does is to create an archive for  the 
new senses that seep into the language, it amounts to no more than something like 
the lexicon as classically conceived of. One can  reply to this by saying that, of 
course, Default Semantics is more than a lexicon. I have already said before that it 
contains some very useful Cognitive  Defaults, in additions to principles for the 
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calculation of merger representations. Relevance Theory provides reasoning 
principles and Default Semantics the mechanism and the algorithm where 
compositionality applies to utterances being a product of interaction of information 
from various sources. So Default Semantics is a set of  cognitive defaults and 
principles determining merger representations, but also has an archive which is very 
specific. While the lexicon, as normally intended,  contains lexical rules that support 
monotonic inferences (If every student passed the exam, then some student passed 
the exam), the Default Semantics Archive contains Default interpretations, 
interpretations which can be defeated in a certain context.  
 Although Default Semantics does not specifically address the issue of metaphors, 
it is clear that this is the area where the interaction between Default Semantics and 
the Principle of  Relevance is more evident. Consider the cases of incandescent 
metaphors used to speak about Berlusconi in the recent political debate. Surely, 
people who utter the following literal translations of Italian sentences  „one must get 
rid of Berlusconi‟,  „one must give a punch to Berlusconi‟,  “one must stop 
Berlusconi”,   etc.  are not speaking loosely, but metaphorically. Such metaphors, 
especially in the Italian translations of these sentences, have become so standardized, 
that one would hardly say that they are incitements to violence, as the right-winged 
politicians immediately argued after the recent physical attack on Berlusconi. 
However, it is also true that in a discourse where many of these metaphors are used, 
the conventional metaphors may be transformed into „ad hoc‟ concepts again through  
Relevance heuristics (a deactivated concept can be reactivated). 
 It is a pity that Jaszczolt does not say much about metaphors, but in principle it is 
possible to shift under the rubric of Default Semantics many of the data on 
metaphors  by Giora (2003). The main idea is that (conventional) metaphors do not 
allow the hearer‟s access to the literal meaning first, but they are cases in which 
literal interpretations take more time than non-literal interpretations. They are, 
therefore, ideal cases for Default Semantics.   
 To defend the idea that conventional metaphors are stored within the Default 
Semantics Archive one needs to argue the case that conventionalized metaphors are 
mid way between genuinely pragmatic processes and lexical inferences. A recent 
debate on the language used by the media and politicians (prior to a violent attack on 
him)  in which Berlusconi was described by (violent) metaphors and the charge that 
such a language was intentionally used to create a climate of violent opposition, 
proves that the idea of storing conventionalized metaphors in the Default Semantics 
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archive is not outlandish, since these metaphors still live in some intermediate 
stadium between what counts as  langue and language use. 
 
4 Modularity and innateness 
I briefly discuss the question whether the Default Semantics Archive  is completely 
innate or, otherwise, developed due to exposure to experience. My answer is of a 
mixed type. On the one hand, heuristics such as the Default De  Re principle seem to 
be a priori principles, hence innately present in the mind, or at least related to the 
cognitive principle of relevance – which is an a priori principle. On the other hand, 
the Default semantics Archive  grows up as a result of exposure to experience. It is 
similar to the mental lexicon, in the sense that experience leads to progressive 
accumulation of information – of course, some ordering principles must be present in 
the archive, and these are presumably innate.  The growing of the Default Semantics 
archive resembles very closely the modularization process involved in skills such as 
driving and reading. According to Barrettt & Kurzban (2005) and Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992) the modularization involved in novel skills such as reading recruits evolved 
modular capacities such as object recognition. The experience of reading would 
influence the development of the reading-module in such a way that the developed 
system, as observed in reading adults, appears to contain a specialization for reading. 
According to Barrettt & Kurzban, it is possible that while the reading module 
recruited the object recognition module to start with, there was a bifurcation of 
modular skills during development. As Barrettt & Kurzban say: 
 
In this case novel tasks such as identifying letters or words, would still be treated  
by the evolved developmental system as a special case (or token) of an evolved  skill 
(object recognition) if they satisfied  its input criteria. However, the development 
system in question could contain  a procedure or mechanism that partitioned off 
certain tasks – shunting them to into a dedicated developmental pathway – under 
certain conditions, for example when the cue structure of repeated instances
2
 of the 
task clustered tightly together, and when it was encountered  repeatedly, as when 
highly practiced (…). (Barrettt &  Kurzban 2006,    639). (Bold mine) 
                                                 
2
 Bold mine, in this case. 
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The considerations above seem to me to be of extraordinary importance. The 
Default Semantics archive could be seen as originally recruiting information from the 
operation of the Principle of Relevance, until the tasks it carried out started to be 
partitioned from the mechanism of Relevance  in such a way as to allow for 
dedicated mechanisms and specializations causing  ease of cognitive load. If the 
ontogenesis of the Default Semantics archive reflects that of the reading module, we 
expect dissociations between  the mechanism of Relevance  and the Default 
Semantics archive  as a result of the bifurcation in cognitive specialization that 
resulted in a new sub-module. In other words, my expectation is that damage to the 
Default Semantics Archive may leave the operation of the Principle of Relevance  
untouched and vice versa. This dissociation is, of course, ultimately very valuable for 
the system: suppose that the Default Semantics Archive, for some reason, ceases to 
exist or to function properly; then its inferential power will have to be replaced by 
the less dedicated Relevance heuristics.  
 
The considerations by Barrettt & Kurzban also support the existence of the 
Default Semantics Archive  as a separate sub-module in that the accumulation of 
Default Semantics information in the dedicated archive is the result of repeated 
practice. We may suppose that there is a mechanism specifying that, if a certain  
inferential procedure is routinely used, and its repeated use distracts cognitive 
resources from the computation of relevance, then the output will be systematically 
stored in the Default Semantics archive exploiting the Principle of Relevance.  
 
Conclusion 
The most important idea of the chapter is to link the interaction between Default 
Semantics and the Principle of relevance to a modular picture of the mind. In fact, I 
have sketched with broad brush strokes a picture that integrates Relevance Theory 
and Default Semantics within the same modular architecture (the mind-reading 
module) and I have advanced the hypothesis that the Default Semantics heuristics  
share mechanisms with the Principle of Relevance,  as, in fact, they originated 
ontogenetically by originally recruiting  cognitive operations  from that mechanism, 
which, once routinized, would turn into  cognitive defaults which would then split off 
from the mechanism of relevance  (the two mechanisms, that originally shared 
resources, subsequently partitioned into two separate and dissociable mechanisms.  
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Chapter 3 
What can  modularity of mind tell us about the 
semantics/pragmatics debate?. 
 
Abstract 
This chapter is mainly about cancellability of explicatures and modularity of mind. 
Cancellability is the property of inferences whereby a certain inferential output, when 
confronted with further evidence coming from a different archive, is aborted.  World 
knowledge, in particular, has the ability to suppress a certain inference. Cancellability is 
taken by Kasher as conflicting with the idea of modularity and showing that pragmatic 
processes (of an inferential, defeasible type) cannot be properly called modular.  Kasher‟s 
view must be reassessed on the basis of my ideas on non-cancellable explicatures, expressed 
in Capone (2006, 2009a). The idea that  explicatures cannot be cancelled ties in very well 
with the idea that  heuristic strategies, such as those which guide inferential processes, are 
satisfycing strategies.  
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall  make connections between two domains of information, 
research on the semantics/pragmatics debate and  on modularity of mind, in the hope 
that establishing connections and parallel structure may  be fruitful in deepening 
knowledge of the interface between semantics and pragmatics. In particular I want to 
inquire if modularity of mind can  help us move towards the resolution  of important 
theoretical problems like Grice‟s circle, the cancellability of 
explicatures/implicatures,  the analogy between perceptual enrichments and 
explicatures due to free enrichments, the routing problem for explicatures (do they 
strictly take input from implicatures?), the distinction between primary and 
secondary pragmatic processes. I hope that something new will emerge out of this 
system of  parallel inquiry, that will, if not provide  definitive answers to our search 
for the truth, at least lead us to more solid landmarks, from  where to advance further. 
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 Before moving on to the core issue of the chapter, I shall make a detour and 
expatiate on the semantics/pragmatics debate and  on modularity of mind.  In 
proceeding so, I shall  give ample space to my papers on Grice‟s circle and on the 
cancellability of explicatures (Capone 2003, 2006, 2009a), as my main hope is that 
this chapter  will be able to provide further corroboration of those ideas – or at least 
to advance that discussion in the right direction. 
 
One of the tenets of modularity is that  the operations of a module are mandatory 
and encapsulated. Thus, if inferential processes are modeled  on the basis of modular 
processes, they are also mandatory and encapsulated.  This means that they are 
triggered automatically by an input and that they cannot have access to the operations 
of other modules. These two properties have been taken by Kasher (1991) to imply 
that pragmatic inferences should  NOT be cancellable. Cancellability, in fact, is the 
property of inferences whereby a certain inferential output, when confronted with 
further evidence coming from a different archive, is aborted.  World knowledge, in 
particular, has the ability to suppress a certain inference. Cancellability is taken by 
Kasher as conflicting with the idea of modularity and showing that pragmatic 
processes (of an inferential, defeasible type) cannot be properly called modular.  
Kasher‟s view must be reassessed on the basis of my ideas on non-cancellable 
explicatures, expressed in Capone (2006, 2009a). The idea that  explicatures cannot 
be cancelled ties in very well with the idea that  heuristic strategies, such as those 
which guide inferential processes, are satisfycing strategies. When one finds an 
optimal solution, one stops the inferential process and does not start it again in the 
light of  further inference. While inferential enrichments are open in principle to 
information coming from  a variety of knowledge archives, the Principle of 
Relevance  bounds the search for information creating a smaller module (I would 
say, a module on the fly
1
) from which interpretative options are chosen and where 
completing information for the  saturation of incomplete radicals is drawn. For 
example, in the case of „John is ready‟ the search for information from which the 
                                                          
1
A module on the fly is  a module that limits the information that can be searched in order to 
arrive at a certain interpretation. For example, consider the case “The surgeon was ready to 
operate John. And he was ready to be operated”. The module on the fly posited by Sperber & 
Wilson restricts the database where  referents can be searched to the entities mentioned in the 
module [The surgeon was ready to operate John] – as conversation proceeds further, further 
modules are built on the fly, which are very local in nature. 
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incomplete radical requires completion is information attending to the main salient 
goal of the discussion – so if the conversationalists are discussing an exam, or the 
goal „John wants to take and pass the exam‟ the search for missing information is 
confined to an on the fly module that takes into account at least a goal partitioning a 
slice of relevant information from the rich structure of the previous conversation).  
This make the inferential process and instantaneous one.  A good idea is to 
distinguish between instantaneous inferences, which are part of modular processes, 
and non-instantaneous inferences, which are modeled after explicit and conscious 
reasoning. 
 Another idea of the chapter is that pragmatic processes often consist of top-down 
effects, which need to be combined with bottom-up effects.  This idea seems to tie in 
very closely with the enzymatic theory of modularity, which abandons the idea that 
inter-modular connections are pipes, allowing only a one way traffic, but voices the 
idea that modules are linked  by enzymatic processes which communicate with a 
common bulletin board. This common bulletin board contains both inputs and 
outputs. The output of a process then becomes the output  of another process.  
Enzymatic processes are processes in which the formal properties of an input 
determine the binding of the input to an enzyme-like element that makes the input 
available for transformation and then delivers it transformed, as output, to the 
bulletin board.  Completion processes involved in the semantic/pragmatics debate are 
clearly bottom-up processes which  must  interact with top-down processes. A model 
based on a one way traffic, through pipes, cannot do justice to this complex 
interaction. Instead, a model based on a common bulletin-board can show how 
completion processes and free enrichment processes (which are characteristically 
top-down) can interact. 
 
1. The semantics/pragmatics debate 
 We may write many pages on the semantics/pragmatics debate, but I will confine 
myself to four  positions: 
 
Relevance theory (as exemplified by Carston); 
Moderate Contextualists (as exemplified by Stanley); 
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Default semantics, as exemplified by Jaszczolt. (For a more comprehensive view of 
the semantics/pragmatics debate see Capone 2006, 2008, 2009a). 
The considerations by Capone on intentionality and cancellability of explicatures. 
 
Carston (1999) develops the views of Relevance Theorists such as Sperber & Wilson 
(1986) and considers cases of free enrichment where the logical form provided by the 
semantics of the sentence is enriched (freely, without the aid of  empty categories 
projected by the syntax or by the semantics)) through pragmatics (also see Hall 
2008). Such enrichments result in the ability to provide the utterance with full truth-
conditional specifications (it is claimed that in many cases without such inferential 
enrichments a fragmentary  or patently false proposition is provided by sentential 
semantics). The following cases exemplify free enrichment: 
 
Completion cases 
(1) Paracetamol is better [than what?] 
(2) It‟s the same  [as what?] 
(3) He is too young [for what?] 
(4) She is leaving [from where] 
(5) It‟s raining [where?] 
 
Expansion/strengthening cases 
 
(6) Everyone went to the party; 
(7) He took off his boots and got into bed; 
(8) Writing an essay will take time; 
(9) He hasn‟t had lunch. 
 
The completion cases above  are resolved by answering the Wh-question in 
parentheses. The expansion cases are resolved by expanding the logical form and 
providing an element which bounds its truth conditions providing reasonable 
interpretations. Thus in (6) the speaker  confines himself to people from a certain 
domain (e.g. colleagues); in (7) temporal relations between the events are fully 
specified; in (8) the trivial literal proposition is turned into a less trivial proposition 
by specifying the lapse of time required; in (9) the obviously false proposition is 
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turned into a possibly true proposition by providing a reasonable specification of the 
time in relation to the question (9) is a reply to. 
 
The position by moderate contextualists like Stanley (2007)  uses the assumption 
that pragmatic interpretations are constrained by elements of the logical forms of 
sentences. Such logical forms posit variables, which are seen as part of syntactic 
structure (empty categories, in other words). I provide below a typical example of  a 
semantic defence of hidden indexicals by Stanley. 
 
 
According to Stanley, a sentence such as: 
 
(10) Every bottle is in the fridge 
 
corresponds to the structure: 
 
(11) Every [bottle f(i)] is in the fridge 
 
where f (i) is a function from a domain of quantification to objects in that domain. In 
context, one specifies specific values of f(i) – say the set of bottles I bought at the 
supermarket, etc. 
 
Stanley supports his analysis through syntactic evidence, most notably from binding: 
 
(12) In every room, every bottle is in the corner 
 
has a structure corresponding to (13) 
 
(13) In every room r, every bottle in r is in the corner. 
 
However, as pointed out by Carston and others, this argument over-generates, as one 
could argue that in the sentence (12) there is also a variable standing for a domain: 
 
(14) Everywhere I go, 2 + 2 = 4 at x  
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Stanley defends his position, by saying that, since it is obvious that there is not a 
variable for a domain in (14) one should not posit one. 
 Concerning Stanley‟s specific analyses, I will merely say that the general idea that 
semantics constrains pragmatic interpretation can be safely adopted, and can be 
reconciled with the spirit of Relevance Theory, which is often called a dual 
pragmatic theory because of  its lavish concessions to semantics (Borg 2004). 
 
 Jaszczolt‟s theory is far more radical. Jaszczolt (2005) posits that merger 
representations integrate semantic and pragmatic information, including socio-
cultural defaults. Jaszczolt‟s merger representations are not obtained by an orderly 
inferential incrementation, implicatures being able to shape explicatures and 
explicatures being able to shape implicatures. Jaszczolt‟s merger representations 
include both bottom-up  and top-down effects. Her merger representations constitute 
the level where the principle of compositionality is met, given that such a principle is 
violated by semantic representations (a typical case is instantiated by belief reports 
(see Jaszczolt 1999; see also Capone 2006, Capone 2008a) This is not the place for a 
deep discussion of these ideas, but I want to stress that the idea of merger 
representations  ties in very closely with a certain perspective on the modularity of 
the mind. 
 
2. On  cancellability of explicatures  
In Capone (2006) and Capone (2009a) I discussed various cases of pragmatic 
intrusions. Pragmatic intrusions are inferences relying on the same processes on 
which conversational implicatures are based and contribute to the proposition 
expressed. (Without a pragmatic process, there would be no proposition to evaluate, 
but only a fragmentary sentential schema). They are usually associated with a certain 
construction, called „intrusive construction‟. For a deep discussion of this issue see 
Huang (2007). The cases of pragmatic intrusion listed there are: reference resolution,  
deixis fixing, disambiguation, ellipsis unpacking, generality narrowing, 
comparatives, disjunctions, because-clauses, but it is clear that the forthcoming 
literature is eroding more and more the terrain of semantics proper in favour of truth-
conditional pragmatics.  In Capone (2009a) I reflected on the necessity of pragmatic 
developments of propositional forms  in order to arrive at a better understanding of 
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the level of meaning which Sperber & Wilson (1986) and Carston (2002) call 
„explicature‟. In this paper I argued  that the pragmatically conveyed elements of 
explicatures are not cancellable – unlike conversational implicatures. While Capone 
(2003, 2006) addressed the issue of the cancellability of explicatures  from a more  
empirical point of view, in this chapter  a number of important theoretical questions 
are raised and discussed. In particular, it is proposed that the analysis of the notion  
of intentionality and the nature of pragmatic intrusion will settle the question of the 
cancellability of explicatures. An explicature can be considered a two-level entity. It 
consists of a logical form and a pragmatic increment that the logical form gives rise 
to in the context of utterance. However, both the initial logical form and the 
pragmatic increment are the target of pragmatic processes. Consequently, we need a 
pragmatic process to promote the initial logical form to an intended interpretation 
and another pragmatic process to derive further increments starting  from the initial 
logical form as promoted to an utterance interpretation. 
 So in Capone (2009a) the main claims rest on 1) intentionality) the nature of 
pragmatic intrusion.  In this resume I will confine myself to these two claims. 
 
2.1  Intentionality. 
The reason why particularized implicatures cannot be cancelled is the same that 
prevents explicatures from being cancelled. When a strong intentionality is projected, 
it can no longer be retracted
2
. Implicature can only arise if intended  and recognized 
as intended. But then it should be impossible to cancel an implicature: how would it 
be possible to withdraw/cancel what was intended to be implicated and was 
recognized as intended? An implicature could only be withdrawn/cancelled if it were 
NOT intended. But then it shouldn‟t BE an implicature (since implicatures by 
definition are intended); in other words there would BE no implicature to cancel. 
This is relevant to the issue of explicature cancellation only in this: presumably, 
explicatures must be intended and must be recognized as intended. So the above 
                                                          
2
 An interesting potential objection is the following. In the case of Grice‟s well-known 
example (A: Has John got a girlfriend? B: He has travelled to London very frequently 
recently) the implicature that  John has got a girlfriend in London can be cancelled by adding 
?I don‟t intend to mean that he has got a girlfriend in London‟. This is surely a case of weak 
commitment of an implicature (not to mention the vagueness of the implicature; a lot more 
could be implied as well, and it is NOT clear here that a certain intention can be pinned 
down uniquely). It is, of course, worth mentioning that there are cases like these, but I want 
to point out that the most compelling cases for explicature  (those that allow one to argue for 
pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional meaning) are not of this type. In connection with 
those cases, I argued in Capone (2006) that they cannot be cancelled.  
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applies to explicatures as much as to implicatures. And this consideration of 
regarding explicatures as uncancellable is IN ADDITION to the other considerations 
which we advance for saying that explicatures specifically cannot be cancelled. 
(From Burton-Roberts, personal communication). (See developments and limitations 
of this argument in Capone 2009a) 
 
2.2  The connection with pragmatic intrusion. 
Suppose it is accepted that explicatures are cancellable. Then we have problems in 
explaining how it comes about that explicatures are part of the truth-conditional 
content of a sentence. Surely, one of the advantages of claiming that an inference is 
truth-conditional is that it is an entailment-like element of meaning  (and, thus, non-
cancellable). If we do not want the content obtained through pragmatic intrusion to 
be entailment-like, why should we make so much fuss about pragmatic intrusion at 
all? (see also Jaszczolt 2009a in support of the idea that explicatures are entailment-
like). After all, we could have a very orderly picture like that of Cappelen & Lepore 
(2005) in which what is said is mainly associated with linguistic semantics and the 
various contextual phenomena which we claim to be part of the truth-conditional 
content of a sentence could be easily assigned at the level of the utterance. Is this 
what we want? Presumably a radical contextual claim is one that assigns constituents 
derived through pragmatics inside the sentential content (of course pragmaticians 
may differ on specific details of their theories; for example, in Capone (2006) I 
proposed cases of pragmatic intrusion alternative to the standard ones, which in my 
view were easily assailable). A story like mine, which considers explicatures non-
cancellable is more coherent with the view that pragmatics provides constituents of 
thought  intruding into the sentential level of meaning, since entailments are not 
entailments unless one cannot deny them. One of the classical tests for entailments is 
the one by Strawson: if S entails P, one cannot utter S and say not P. So now my 
question is, do we have enough courage to argue in favour of full pragmatic 
intrusion? If we have, then we should accept that explicatures cannot be cancelled.
3
 
Of course, the question is rather complex. My opponents may want to insist that 
explicatures are cancellable by providing examples like the  „He took off his boots 
and got into bed‟. In Relevance Theory, the explicature is „He took off his boots first 
                                                          
3
 Responding to an important comment by a commentator, I found it important to say that 
explicatures are entailment-like, even if not exactly entailments.  
89 
 
and then got into bed‟. But this explicature can be cancelled, as in: „He took his boots 
and got into bed, but not necessarily in that order‟. The same can be said of „John and 
Susan are married‟. The explicature is that John and Susan are married to each other, 
but it can also be defeated, as in „John and Susan are married, but not to each other‟. 
While these objections are reasonable, all they show is that  utterance types are 
associated with certain potential implicatures/explicatures, and these potential 
implicatures/explicatures are compatible with a number of contexts, including those 
in which they need to be cancelled (or aborted).  However, my claim is that  in a 
particular context in which certain intentions are fixed, one cannot retract those 
intentions. Consider, for example, a context in which it is understood that my mother 
took off her boots and got into bed. Both the speaker and the hearer know what kind 
of person my mother is, that she would never sin against cleanliness, being the 
typical Italian mother obsessed with cleanliness. Then there is no question of being 
able to retract the explicature that my mother first took her boots off and then got 
into bed. The intentions are  fixed in that context.  In connection with the following 
example,  there are ways to contextualise it in such a way that intentions cannot be 
retracted. Suppose you are in court. You are being asked questions by a judge who 
wants to know whether you knew that John and Susan were married.  Suppose that 
what is at issue is specifically whether John and Susan are married to each other. 
You answer  „Yes of course I knew that they were married‟. And in this context, 
there is no question of being able to retract the inference/explicature, because you 
know what is at issue and your answer is an answer to that particular question, and 
not to another question.  Of course, I am not denying that a certain utterance type is 
associated (by default) with certain potential implicatures/explicatures. And these are 
compatible with contexts in which they can be retracted. However,  if a certain 
explicature is fixed in context, it cannot be undone. (See Capone 2009). 
Before closing this section I want to address a point made by Jaszczolt (2009a)  on 
her paper on cancellability and the primary/secondary meaning distinction. Her idea 
is that a primary meaning (the  speaker‟s strongly intended main message)  is not 
easily cancellable, and, in fact, it is well entrenched. This idea fits in very well with 
my idea that strong intentionality  tends to block cancelability, albeit Jaszczolt  
allows cancelability in the sense of „repair‟ (or correction). Repair, however, seems 
to me to conflict with the idea of cancellability. A repair  is an evident intention to 
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abort a certain unintended message. Secondary meanings (in short, perlocutionary 
effects) also are strongly entrenched and difficult to cancel. Jaszczolt notes that 
explicatures can be cancelled, but  explicatures that are part of primary meanings 
cannot. I suppose I need to modify my ideas in order to allow for a notion of primary 
meanings to be operative in the context of this chapter.   As Jaszczolt says, the 
enrichment or modulation of a logical form may or may not correspond to a primary 
meaning. I am essentially interested in this chapter  in those enrichments which 
correspond to primary meanings. 
3. On modularity of  mind 
In this chapter I adopt a modular picture of the mind. I shall  confine myself to only 
sketching this picture with broad brush strokes. Work on the modularity of  mind 
started with Fodor (1983) and was extended in Fodor (2000). Fodor mainly 
distinguishes between input systems (e.g. perceptual processes) and a central system. 
While modular processes are encapsulated,  domain-specific,  specialized, shallow, 
fast and obligatory, central processes for Fodor are not encapsulated but draw inputs 
from a variety of domains.  
 This strict picture of modularity has been replaced by the massive modularity 
picture, mainly advocated by Carruthers (2006), Sperber (2005), Wilson (2005), 
Sperber & Wilson (2002) and Carston (1996, 2002),  among others, according to 
whom  the mind consists of myriad modules, each correlating with a certain 
(specialized) function, whose input domain is highly restricted (e.g. the visual system 
is for processing visual percepts only, it does not deal with inputs from other 
transducers). In this picture modules can share resources, especially if they are 
situated in close neural areas and if they do not perform concurrent functions. The 
main advantage of the modularity picture is that it explains how the mind can react in 
such a fast manner to simultaneous inputs coming from different types of transducers 
and how it facilitates learning in cases in which two or more different types of inputs 
have to be analyzed simultaneously. Another advantage of modularity is that each 
module, in so far as it is to some extent insulated from the remaining architecture, 
can be damaged, without affecting the remaining modules. So, breakdown in a 
module creates limited damage, since other modules are available to  process 
information coming from the outside. People can have their language system 
(language module) damaged while  keeping much of the remainder of cognition 
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intact (aphasia); people can lack the ability to reason about mental states (theory of 
mind module) while still being capable of much else (autism); people can lose their 
ability to recognize just human faces (face recognition module); and so forth and so 
on. An obvious advantage of massive modularity is that processing of information 
does not create an informational bottleneck, given that various tasks can be carried 
out in parallel. Another advantage is that the modular system allows evolution to add 
new modules or to tinker with existing ones, without affecting the remainder of the 
system. A modular mind is therefore capable of evolving and adding new specialized 
mechanisms in response to environmental challenges. 
 Unlike  most other authors on modularity, Karmiloff-Smith (2010) puts forwards 
the view that the mind is gradually modularized during development, as a result of 
the fact that different areas of the brain are more suitable for dedicated mechanisms 
(more relevant to certain types of processing). So, on this view, starting out with tiny 
differences  across brain regions  in terms of the patterns of connectivity, synaptic 
density, neuronal type, etc., some areas of the brain are  somewhat more suited than 
others to processing of certain types of input. These ideas are interesting, as we may 
be open to the fact that modules emerge, not as a result of genetic endowment, but as 
a result of interaction with the environment and with repeatable patterns of 
experience.  
 
 
3.1 Modularity and the mind-reading module 
Research on pragmatics and modularity of mind has generally focused on the mind-
reading module, which has been held responsible for pragmatic inferences. The 
mechanisms involved in the operation of the principle of Relevance are usually 
associated with the mind-reading module.  I need to remind  readers of the kind of 
evidence generally bearing on the question whether there is (or not) a mind-reading 
module and whether certain mind-reading tasks are executed within it.  The most 
widely cited study showing that there is a  mind-reading module is Baron-Cohen et 
al.‟s (1985) study of autistic children. Autistic children are impaired in mind-
reading tasks, and they seem to be blind to the notion that other people have minds. 
Thus, an autistic child will drag his father as if he were a toy. Autistic children, 
however, seem to be impaired only in the kind of tasks that involve attributing 
intentions to others, but they need not be impaired in more generic cognitive tasks. 
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 That mind-reading activities may involve automatic, fast heuristics is proven by 
patients afflicted with Williams’ syndrome. This disorder results in an average IQ of 
around 50, combined with linguistic abilities and social skills. People with Williams‟ 
syndrome have  good abilities for mind-reading and communication but poor general 
reasoning abilities. This dissociation seems to support the existence, within the mind-
reading module, of  a sub-module (or more sub-modules) dedicated to fast and 
automatic inferences concerning a  speaker‟s intended meaning. (See, however, 
Perkins 2007, for a deeper discussion). 
 The existence of this sub-module dedicated to mind-reading is supported by 
another dissociation. Patients with Asperger’s syndrome have good general 
reasoning abilities but serious impediments in mind-reading. These people can use 
general reasoning to compensate for the lacking special-purpose skills. (See Wilson 
2005 for a deeper treatment of this point). 
 For lack of space I cannot expand on these ideas, but I finally refer the reader to 
Happè, Loth‟s (2002) important  paper on the dissociation between the mind-reading 
module in connection with actions and the mind-reading module in connection with 
communication. This is evidence that the Relevance theory module is a sub-module 
of the more general mind-reading module. 
 
3.2 The Mind-reading Module and fast-and-frugal heuristics 
In this chapter, in consonance with Sperber (2005), Wilson (2005), Sperber & 
Wilson (2002) and Carston (1996, 2002), I shall try to explain mind-reading in 
connection with pragmatic inferences (inferences arising from verbal behavior) by 
positing  a heuristic principle working in  the Mind-reading module that processes 
inputs in a very fast way and provide shallow inferences, that is to say inferences 
triggered by procedures that are designed to provide responses to environmental 
stimuli in real time, without getting bogged down in laborious reasoning. These 
inferential processes are fast, automatic, and schematic – in other words they follow 
what Gigerenzer  et al. (1999) call fast and frugal heuristics. In connection with this 
approach, Carruthers (2006) writes: 
 
Most cognitive scientists now think  that the processing rules deployed in the 
human mind have been designed to be good enough, not to be optimal. Given 
the speed of processing is always one constraint for organisms that may need to 
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think and act swiftly in order to survive, evolution will have led to 
compromises on the question of reliability. Indeed, it will favor a satisfycing 
strategy, rather than an optimal one. (Carruthers 2006, 54). 
 
I produce  some simple examples of the type of fast-and-frugal heuristics proposed 
by Gigerenzer et al. Suppose you are required to answer the question: which of two 
cities is the larger. A simple heuristic can be useful – you can choose the only one of 
two options  that you recognize.  
 Another heuristic to be used in response to the same question can be the 
following: you may look first at beliefs about which properties of cities have 
correlated best with size in the past.  If having a top-division team correlated in the 
past with greater size, then you select the town which has a top-division team, while 
neglecting the town which does not have one. If none of the two towns has a top-
division team, you move on to the next best predictor of size. It has been shown tha 
fast and frugal heuristics are often successful and are not much below the level of 
success of more complicate Bayesian algorithms. 
 The nice thing about these fast-and-frugal heuristics is that they come with 
stopping rules; you know when you can stop and you do not indefinitely process 
information in order to arrive at an optimal answer. What is good enough will 
suffice, and you stop there.  
 
3.3  Kasher (1991) on pragmatics and modularity of mind. 
Kasher (1991) is to be considered a seminal paper on pragmatics and modularity of 
mind. In fact, much of the discussions in this paper has been driven by those initial 
considerations. Kasher distinguishes two types of pragmatics: 
 
Modular pragmatics; Non-modular pragmatics. 
 
Modular Pragmatics is essentially part of the Language Faculty, and  is responsible 
for the understanding and production of basic speech acts, such as assertions, 
commands, questions. Non-basic speech acts are derivable from these essential 
speech acts through the integration of information dealt with by central processes. 
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Non-modular pragmatics deals with conversational implicatures, institutional 
speech acts,  and indirect speech acts. Central processes are responsible for  non-
modular pragmatics. Both in the case of indirect speech acts/institutional speech acts 
and of conversational implicatures the speaker and the hearer must have access to 
information stored in the central system, information pertaining to institutional facts 
but also to general knowledge. In general, Kasher takes pragmatic interpretation to 
be a consequence of  Kasher‟s Principle of Effective Means: „Given an end, one is to 
choose the action which most effectively, and at least cost, attains that end, ceteris 
paribus‟. (Kasher 1982, 32).  In Kasher (1991), he writes: 
 
(…) a cognitive system which derives  conversational implicatures involves the 
application, to the output of some linguistic system, of some general central 
principles of rationality in intentional action. Hence, to the extent that it seems 
plausible to assume that rationality principles belong to a central cognitive 
system, it would be implausible to assume that some domain-specific cognitive 
system produces conversational implicatures. (Kasher 1991, 387). 
 
Of course, Kasher‟s considerations are conclusive only if it is demonstrated that a 
principle of rationality is embodied only in central processes; could it not be the case 
that there is a dedicated specialized module, like the „Theory of Mind‟ module, 
which embodies some principles of rationality (e.g. the principle of Relevance) 
implementing them at a sub-personal level, that is to say not in the form of a 
consciously accessible reasoning? 
 Aware that the discussion has become very abstract, Kasher decides to use a more 
empirical method to settle it and uses the notion of cancellability. Conversational 
implicatures are cancellable, hence  he deduces that pragmatic processes are NOT 
mandatory. The discussion of cancellability, as pursued by Carston‟s  (1997)  paper, 
bifurcates into a discussion of mandatory and of encapsulated processes. So Kasher‟s 
considerations could be taken  to militate against the modularity of pragmatic 
processes in that cancellability of conversational implicatures shows not only that 
pragmatic processes are not mandatory but also that they are NOT encapsulated 
(thanks to Robyn Carston for noting this important point).  
 But at this point Kasher‟s paper reveals obvious limitations. At the time when the 
paper was written,  all pragmaticians – with the exception of Sadock (1978) and, 
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ironically, Grice himself  – showed unlimited faith in cancellability as the hall-mark 
of conversational implicatures (and, in general, of  genuine non-truth-conditional 
pragmatic processes). Kasher seems to be adamant that his considerations on 
modularity are correct because they rest on this almost-universally accepted aspect of 
pragmatic analysis.  
 But if my considerations in Capone (2003), (2006) and (2009a) contain some 
grains of truth,  cancellability or lack of cancellability must lead towards a different 
picture than the one painted by Kasher, namely a picture which is more coherent with 
recent writings by Relevance Theorists on modularity of mind and pragmatics. Both 
Carston and  Sperber & Wilson, in fact, in recent writings have pushed a modular 
view of pragmatics, the principle of Relevance being part of the Theory of Mind 
module, a module with its proprietary heuristics. The spirit of relevance theory, 
which bounds the search of information and makes use of modules on the fly, seems 
to tie in very closely with my considerations in Capone (2003), (2006), (2009a) and 
in this chapter. 
 
3.4  Relevance Theorists on modularity of mind. 
The main contributions by Relevance Theorists on modularity of mind are Carston 
(1996,  1997), Wilson (2005), Sperber (2005)  and Sperber & Wilson (2002).  These 
positions move away from the position originally held by Sperber and Wilson 
(1986), roughly in harmony with the position of Fodor (1983) according to whom  
the language faculty was modular, whereas pragmatics was roughly constituted by 
central intelligence processes.  
Now Relevance Theorists endorse a massive modularity picture of the mind where 
the principle of relevance is operative within the „Theory of Mind‟ module. This 
picture is different from the one by Borg (2004), since the latter is persuaded that 
pragmatic processes are not encapsulated and, thus, are similar to theory-formation, 
such processes being open to information coming from all possible stores of 
information. 
 A module, according to the massive modularity hypothesis, is a dissociable 
component of the mind, with an associated data-base and proprietary  cognitive 
operations. Since modules are dissociable and are characterized by  specific 
functions, it is clear that the operations of different functionally characterized 
modules must be different. As Sherry & Schacter (1987) say, there is a functional 
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incompatibility between the operations of different modules, since the operations 
involved in dealing with a certain function (in resolving a certain type of problems) 
must be very different from those involved in resolving a different kind of problem. 
There may be an incompatibility between the solutions to distinct problems. The 
processes of the „Theory of Mind‟ module conform to fast and frugal heuristics 
(Gigerenzer et al. 1999) and are characterized by satisficing strategies aimed at 
drawing  inferences that are good enough (for the purpose at hand) rather than being 
optimal (in the sense that one reaches a guarantee that they are fool-proof 
inferences). They are characterized by stopping rules (like fast and frugal heuristics 
in general) – when a good enough solution to a problem is reached, the heuristic 
principle of relevance stops  the search for inferences. An interpretation is relevant if 
it achieves enough contextual effects for the least possible cognitive efforts. 
Relevance is, thus, a negative function of  cognitive efforts and a positive function of  
positive contextual effects.  The principle of Relevance is a heuristic principle, in that 
it provides effects that are good enough, and thus must be distinguished from an 
algorithm which automatically produces fool-proof  inferences. One way in which 
Relevance Theory can advance a view of pragmatics that does not depend on central 
processes (with its characteristic slow processes, associated revisability of 
hypotheses and unlimited access to a vast knowledge database) is to claim that the 
relevance theory inferences are 
 
a. Fast; 
b. Circumscribed (the search for information is bound); 
c. Mandatory; 
d. Underpinned by  a module with fixed neural architecture; 
e. Characterized by a typical developmental/ maturation pattern. 
 
From the point of view of this discussion, the most important characteristics are the 
first three. The inferences associated with  RT heuristics  are fast, they usually take 
fractions of seconds; they are circumscribed, since the context the RT principle 
searches is not unlimited but is bound by the very Principle of Relevance; they are 
mandatory. It is simply impossible  to refrain from having access to a pragmatic 
inferential augmentation due to the Principle of relevance. While a person may fail to 
„see‟ an inference which is triggered by personal-level reasoning (à la Grice), a 
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Relevance Theory-dictated inference is mandatory and occurs at a sub-personal 
level.  
To see the difference consider my usual example of a conversational  
implicature supported by a personal level reasoning. A student of mine talks about 
the fact that his scholarship is coming to an end. He is reluctant to ask for an 
extension of the scholarship or for a recommendation for a new one. However, I infer 
that he wants me to write a reference for him or that he wants me to give suggestions 
on scholarships for which he can apply. Surely, in order to have access to the right 
implicature I must have access to some general script: students in need want 
scholarships; if the student mentioned the fact that his scholarship is  expiring, he 
may have mentioned that with a purpose; thus, in the hope to reconstruct that 
purpose, I attribute him the tacit intention of asking me for a reference or for advice. 
HOWEVER, suppose I already know that the student has just obtained another 
scholarship for the next year, I wonder what his goal may be in uttering his speech 
and thus I access another script:  when a scholarship expires, one usually needs a 
letter certifying that the money is well spent (of course scripts may vary quite a lot 
depending on socio-cultural information; but at least one of the scholarships I 
benefitted from when I was in Oxford had this requirement).  So this is the case of an 
inference in which the search for information can be extended „ad libitum‟. Instead, 
an example of a mandatory inference, determined by the Relevance Theory heuristic 
is the following: 
 
(15) 
 
A: Why don‟t you join us for breakfast? 
B: I have  had breakfast. 
 
In order to find out whether the utterance counts as a way of declining the invitation, 
A must enrich B‟s utterance  in a mandatory way, by adding the time specification 
(this morning); obviously, it is trivially true that one has had breakfast at least once 
in one‟s  life! 
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Carston (1996) discusses an example drawn from a lecture by Wilson (1996) that 
supports the idea that Relevance Theory processes are encapsulated. The example is 
the following: 
 
(16) No head injury is too trivial to ignore. 
 
The sentence literally says: 
 
We won‟t  find  a head injury whose degree of trivialness calls for any response  
other than ignoring it. 
 
However, the interpretation we immediately access is: 
 
(17) No head injury is too trivial to attend to.  This case seems to show that 
encapsulation is a property of  Relevance Theory‟s inferential processes.  
 
3.5  Capone on modularity of mind. 
In Capone (2010f), I discussed  the relationship between Default Semantics and the 
Principle of Relevance within the modular architecture of the mind. I proposed to 
come to a better grasp of the interaction in question by utilizing knowledge of the 
issue of modularity of mind. In particular, I analyzed the phenomenon Bach (1998) 
calls „standardization‟ and proposed that once inferences become standardized, they 
are no longer  processed through the Principle of Relevance, given that they can be 
furnished directly by the Default Semantics archive.  I considerd potential objections 
to this idea, based on experimental pragmatics and arrived at the conclusion that 
merger representations, which guarantee compositionality at the level of the 
utterance, take into account both Default inferences  and modulated effects due to 
context. Following Horn (2005), I assumed that contextual information may seep into 
the pragmatic interpretation while the default semantics is considered.  I  assumed 
the existence of a module called „Mind-reading module‟ within which the inferential 
work related to understanding utterances is carried out. I  argued that the Mind-
reading module includes the processes described by Jaszczolt‟s Default Semantics as 
well as the pragmatic inferential processes for which the  principle of Relevance is 
responsible. I   argued that  Default Semantics describes inferences that make use of 
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inferential shortcuts  stored in an archive and also utilizes simple heuristic 
procedures (fast and frugal procedures in the terms of Gigerenzer 1999). Default 
Semantics includes the study of the inferential processes explained through  the 
Principle of  Relevance  and  its basic heuristics (e.g. What is not said isn‟t) are 
specializations of  the Relevance heuristic. Specializations arise in response to 
recurrent environmental problems and consist of heuristics which, though based on 
the principle of relevance, have formed a distinct sub-component of the theory of 
mind, and can be characterized as associative. A certain stimulus will trigger a 
certain output based on these specialized heuristics as a result of semantic 
associations.  
 
PART II 
 
4. Applications 
In this part of the chapter,  my aim is to apply the theory of modularity to specific 
problems connected with the semantics/pragmatics debate, in the hope that a system 
of connected analyses will throw light on specific issues.  Needless to say, the 
considerations in the following sections will be  theoretical. They are not specifically 
substantiated through empirical investigation; but of course, in a number of papers,  I  
provided  empirical analytic considerations through which I induced a number of  
theoretical considerations. It would be nice if such considerations could be 
strengthened by theoretical considerations on modularity through the simple method 
of letting  the issue of modularity of mind interact with the issue of the 
semantics/pragmatics debate. It is clear that there are some  common phenomena in  
need for an explanation. For example, the raw data of  the retina  are further enriched 
through the part (module) of the brain specialized for vision.  The data of the retina 
are two-dimensional, whereas vision has a three-dimensional output obtained 
through a system of (automatic) calculations on the basis of  the respective position 
of objects. (Marr  1982) (see also Recanati  (2002, 121) on the analogy between 
perception and primary pragmatic processes). Analogously, the input from the 
Language Faculty is  raw;  as Carston  (2002) says,  the output of the language 
faculty is very often underdetermined – in other words it will not suffice to provide a 
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fully truth-evaluable proposition. The contribution of the language faculty is sub-
propositional and needs pragmatic enrichment to be able to be utilized. The analogy 
can be pushed further: in the same way in which  an action would not be possible on 
the basis of a two-dimension visual output (imagine what it is like to throw a stone at 
a target (e.g. a bird in a tree) in a two-dimensional perception in which depth cannot 
be calculated), a linguistic action would not be possible if one could only resort to 
un-enriched logical forms (in a sense strictly speaking one should not count them as 
utterances but as attempts at communication).  Consider the following: 
(18) 
A: Go to the  shop in Trafalgar Square in Oxford and buy some wine. 
The hearer (suppose it is the case of a foreign student who has just arrived at Oxford) 
cannot execute the action unless he is able to discern that the action of buying wine  
must be carried out subsequent to the action of going to Trafalgar Square. The action 
can be executed ONLY if the hearer realizes the order of the actions and from such 
an order deduces the location where the wine must be bought.  Both in the linguistic 
and non-linguistic action, the enrichment of visual/linguistic stimuli is a prerequisite 
for action; and this involves some modular capacity. In the following I provide a 
number of considerations that seem to show that the modular approach to 
semantics/pragmatics is particularly fruitful. 
 
4.1 What can modularity of mind tell us about the cancellability of explicatures/ 
conversational implicatures. Modules on the fly. 
Followers of Fodor (1983)  are against a  modular vision of pragmatics because they 
claim that pragmatic processes are not encapsulated. They usually take (see Kasher 
1991)  conversational implicatures to show that pragmatic processes are NOT 
mandatory (hence they are NOT encapsulated).  Since  conversational implicatures 
are cancellable, this means that whatever reasoning may be responsible for an 
implicature, it can interact with vast slices of knowledge and can find a piece of 
knowledge that can cancel the implicature. (Hence the implicature is not mandatory). 
The picture of pragmatics which the followers of Fodor had in mind, when resorting 
to data such as the cancellability of conversational implicatures,  is an outdated one. 
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In two papers, in fact, I claimed that explicatures are not cancellable. If such a claim 
is correct, then it clearly shows that at least some pragmatic processes are modular in 
that the search for information is bounded by the principle of Relevance. The two 
main reasons why I thought that explicatures are not cancellable are that in context  
strong intentions are not retractable and that the non-cancellability of explicatures 
seems to tie in with the idea that primary pragmatic processes deliver truth-
conditional meaning.  (See also Horn 2005). Explicatures must have the 
characteristics of entailments – it is not possible to claim P and NOT P at the same 
time. Making explicatures cancellable would presumably violate this principle of 
non-contradiction of entailments. The considerations on strong intentionality 
obviously interact with the issue of modularity. Explicatures are (usually) processed 
by  the RT heuristics, which are embedded in the Theory of Mind module. Thus an 
explicature  is embedded in a representation of an intentional stance by default. I 
assume that intentional stance is attributed by default in the Theory of Mind module 
and from this it follows that explicatures are embedded in an intentional stance 
representation (hence correlate with strong intentions).  
The principle of non-contradiction also seems to operate in the Theory of Mind 
module, given that the possibility of contradiction correlates with strong intentional 
stance representations. Without intentional stance representations, there can be no 
principle of  non-contradiction. I assume that explicatures are non-cancellable 
entailment-like elements because, if we allowed the level of what is said to consist of 
cancellable elements of meaning, the Principle of non-contradiction would have to be 
abandoned.  The Principle of non-contradiction must be stated at the level of what is 
said, given that sub-sentential semantics cannot deliver truth-evaluable entities, 
entities that, in other words, can be contradicted or not. Consider: 
(19) John said that P and that NOT P. 
There is clearly a contradiction here. However, contradiction can be assessed only 
at the level of what is said, not at the level of sub-sentential semantics (the crucial 
cases are examples where P is replaced by a conjunctive sentence, as in the basic 
cases of pragmatic intrusion by Carston). It follows that UNLESS we abandon the 
principle of non-contradiction we had better accept that explicatures cannot be 
cancelled. (See also considerations in Capone 2006, about the Principle of 
Contradiction and what is said) 
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 A reason why pragmaticians moved back from a modularity view of pragmatics is 
that pragmatics seems to involve unlimited access to context – hence the ever present 
possibility of revisability (hence cancellability).  Pragmatic inferences look  very 
much like scientific theorizing, for some proponents of pragmatics qua central 
processes (à la Fodor 1983), and must have unlimited  access to a huge database 
(furthermore one that is continually updated). This seems a conclusive reason for 
holding the view that pragmatics cannot consist of modular processes.  
 However, some linguists, most notably  Wilson (1996) (see also Carruthers 2006) 
have insisted on the idea of modules on the fly – modules that limit the information 
that can be searched in order to arrive at a certain interpretation. For example, 
consider the case of anaphora: 
(20) The surgeon was ready to operate  on John. And he was ready to be operated. 
The module on the fly posited by Sperber & Wilson restricts the database where  
referents can be searched to the entities mentioned in the module [The surgeon was 
ready to operate on  John] – as conversation proceeds further, further modules are 
built on the fly, which are very local in nature. This is also compatible with what 
Levinson (2000) and Huang (2000a,b) say about anaphora. Referents for 
pronominals are preferably provided by searching for the values of  names already 
introduced in a local domain (the previous sentence, usually) rather than from a wide 
domain like extra-linguistic discourse.  
 
4.2 What can modularity of mind tell us about top-down effects  - an enzymatic 
theory of modularity  
In this section, I want to dwell on the relationship between top-down inferential 
processes and modularity of mind (Recanati 2002, 2004).  A top-down inferential 
process is one whereby global contextual considerations project a certain 
interpretation onto a certain sentence. One of the most influential top-down effects is 
the resolution of ambiguities in context.  In the case of an ambiguous sentence, it is 
possible to associate two different logical forms with the same phonological  string. 
In fact we have two sentences hidden behind the same phonological representation 
and, strictly speaking it might even be wrong to say that we have one sentence with 
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two different meanings. The force of context, however, is so strong that we do not 
really bother to consider two different syntactic structures, but we immediately 
assign the sentence its most natural representation.  This is a typical top-down effect. 
You do not bother to consider the meanings of the sentence and then decide which 
one you want to choose.  
An example of a bottom-up pragmatic inferential process is, without doubt, the  case 
of  a sentence which contains variables that must be saturated in context. A typical 
example is a sentence such as: 
(21) Look at that. 
You cannot know in advance what the value of „that‟ is but you must first consider 
the semantics (or the character of the indexical) and then look for referents that are 
suited to it (perhaps creating a module on  the fly, that is to say restricting the search 
for information to a context that surrounds the thing pointed at; e.g. you do not look 
for objects behind the speaker‟s back). The contextual influence is not top-down 
because the understanding of the salient elements of the context of utterance do not 
guide you towards the right interpretation; some sentential elements (e.g. a deictic) 
function as intermediaries and guide the interpretation process constraining the 
number of entities that could be selected as referents and also selecting some  from 
the visual field where one  is authorized to search for referents (gestures typically 
helping to pick out the right objects).  Jaszczolt (2005)  leaves it open whether 
merger representations are obtained through top-down or bottom-up effects. She is 
clearly right to leave options open.  However, the choice to leave things open is not 
without theoretical cost. Suppose we assume that a certain sentence interpretation is 
affected by  both   top-down and bottom-up pragmatic processes. Then we must 
assume that  there are  features that allow the sentence to keep its  structure (and 
basic context-invariant meaning) unaltered.  This is clearly useful especially if  
bottom-up effects are applicable immediately after top-down effects. Unless there is 
the possibility that a certain basic structure remains unaltered after the application of 
top-down effects, it is not clear how to proceed further towards the saturation of 
certain variables. 
 Now it clear that once we accept that merger representations à la Jaszczolt can be 
obtained through both types of effects, we are already committed to a certain type of 
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cognitive architecture. We discard immediately an architecture in which modules are 
connected through pipes, and instead we adopt  the bulletin-board architecture of 
Barrett (2005).   According to Barrett we have a bulletin board and inputs travel 
towards a certain module and switch it on in case they satisfy certain templates (in a 
lock and key manner). Once an input is accepted by a certain module, the module 
provides an output, but the input returns back to the bulletin-board where it can travel 
towards a different module.  This architecture is compatible with the idea that  
practical reasoning takes inputs from different domains, e.g. desires and beliefs; but 
it is also compatible with the kind of inferential processes we have described as  
delivering merger representations.  An input can be accepted, say, by the Principle of 
relevance in the „Theory of Mind‟ module, then it goes back to the bulletin board and 
is available for another modular process.  It is important that  the input be essentially 
the same throughout all processes.  In this architecture, all representations can be 
scrutinized by all devices. When a representation fails to meet the input criteria of a 
device, it is returned to the pool unaltered.  When a representation does meet the 
input criteria of a device, it is processed and then re-posted to the same bulletin board 
for further scrutiny by other devices. Barrett‟s proposed  architecture is interesting.  
What this implies for the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes is that a 
certain representation travels towards a certain device (say a RT device), is 
incremented, and then sent back to the bulletin board where it becomes available for 
a different (or the same) device for a bottom-up process. In an architecture where 
representations travel through pipes, it is difficult to see how a representation can 
travel back through a pipe and then be  sent to a different (or the same) device for a 
different type of process. 
 The enzymatic treatment of modularity supports the idea by Jaszczolt (2005) but 
also by relevance theorists (e.g. Carston 2002) that  there is an interplay between 
explicatures and implicatures such that it is not necessary to postulate a rigid order 
(what takes input from what). However, it is also possible to adopt a view similar to 
that by Clark Barrett (2005) according to which once a representation is assigned a 
tag, this tag is also used to decide what takes input from what. Suppose that  
explicatures are assigned a certain tag, then it is possible that conversational 
implicatures  have received an instruction to take input only from explicatures. 
However, the real problem is whether explicatures can also take input from 
implicatures. According to Jaszczolt and Relevance Theorists they can. Strictly 
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speaking, it might be possible to have a system in which conversational implicatures 
take input from explicatures but explicatures can in turn take input from 
conversational implicatures. What is important is that implicatures can take input 
only from explicatures (and not from implicatures).  However, for all this to be 
possible it must be the case that an  implicature is calculable even without first 
calculating the explicature; in such a case, the  implicature can have an influence on 
the explicature. A simple case would be the following: Calculate the implicature 
even without assigning referents to variables (e.g. pronominals, deictic elements); 
then use information from the implicature to calculate the explicature.  A more 
complicated case would be:  calculate the implicature  even if  a portion of the 
sentential structure is missing before calculating the explicature; then use the 
implicature  in order to calculate the explicature.   
Let us contrive an example to illustrate this. John and Mary are talking  about  
Dickens. Mary is saying bad things about Dickens (he has not accepted her paper 
because she is the student of  Higgins and Dickens is in the habit of  rejecting   
Higgins‟s students‟ papers) (I have contrived the example, these things surely never 
occur in academic reality!). Dickens is approaching them and is behind Mary, almost 
within reach of her words, and there is the risk that he might overhear Mary‟s 
unflattering remarks.  Then John says: „A linguistics & Philosophy editor‟ (to borrow 
one of Stainton‟s (1994) favourite examples). At this point – even before actually 
reconstructing the explicature, it is possible in theory for Mary to recognize that what 
John is saying has nothing to do with the conversation and to interpret this (unilateral 
and unnegotiated) topic shift as an advice to change topic immediately. At this point, 
after having recovered the conversational implicature, Mary is able (and has all 
necessary time) to reconstruct the explicature. The explicature could either be “There 
is a Linguistics & Philosophy editor over there” or “There is a Linguistics & 
Philosophy editor just behind your back). It would not be possible to decide which 
explicature is intended unless there is a clear demonstrative gesture (which is not the 
case here, while it was possibly the case in Stainton‟s original examples) or some 
other kind of information that can advert to the actual message intended. At this point 
Mary can make use of the conversational implicature to calibrate (give a more 
specific content to) the explicature and arrive at the message intended by the speaker. 
Since John made a unilateral and abrupt topic shift, he wants to warn her of an 
impending danger. Surely there would be no danger if  Dickens was over there in a 
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far corner of the crowded seminar room; therefore, Mary understands that John 
means that there is a  Linguistics & Philosophy editor behind her back. 
 Now, surely this is a contrived cases and I assume  that in normal circumstances 
implicatures take input from explicatures and not the other way round. Therefore, the 
generalization must be that implicatures can calibrate explicatures ONLY if it is 
possible to understand the implicature  without the explicature. Cases where this is 
possible must be rather limited. So,  following Capone (2006), I believe that the 
generalization  that  implicatures take input from explicatures is fixed is quite robust, 
while exceptions must be allowed. At the same time we must concede  that 
implicatures can influence explicatures ONLY  if there is a non-circular 
interpretative process and it is possible to understand the implicature even without 
fixing the referents of variables or without recovering some unarticulated constituent  
of the utterance (the information  that completes the otherwise incomplete 
propositional radical (to use terminology by Bach  1994)). 
 
4.3  Explicatures as finite inferential processes – satisficing inferential strategies 
In this section I want to connect non-cancellability of explicatures with satisficing 
strategies à la Gigerenzer et. Al. (1999). I thus discuss the idea that a stopping rule is 
needed for the calculation of explicatures, and this stopping rule goes hand in hand 
with the notion that explicatures project a strong notion of intentionality. It is 
convenient to  distinguish real explicatures from potential explicatures. Potential 
explicatures, like potential implicatures, are not cases of real intentionality 
assignment but are hypothetical cases of intentionality assignment. When one deals 
with potential implicatures and potential explicatures one says something like: On 
the basis of „S‟ (the syntactic and semantic features of S) and on the basis of the fact  
that the speaker had a reason to use S (and did not use an alternative to S), the 
speaker intends that P, unless F, where F is some proposition to be derived from the 
assumptions manifest in context. The clause UNLESS F focuses on the hypothetical 
nature of potential implicatures and *explicatures. However, as far as actual 
explicatures are concerned there can be no „UNLESS F‟ clause. The calculation 
process in actual  explicatures is quickly over and nothing else can be done with it. 
We can no longer think of it and process it further in the light of other assumptions. 
The process leading to explicatures should be finite (both in the sense that we usually 
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do not spend a long time in coming to an explicature, i.e. we do not ponder on the 
case of explicature for months, and in the sense that when we acquire the 
propositional elements that are relevant to the case, we process the utterance, come 
up with an explicature and close the interpretation process for good). An explicature 
case is not like a reasoning case where the evidence is sifted and then the experts 
come to a decision and the decision process could be reopened at any moment (say a 
trial in which new evidence is crucial and may determine a completely different 
outcome). An explicature case is closed when the communicative exchange moves 
beyond the next utterance. Thus, the evidence that is relevant to the communicative 
process is the evidence available at t, where t is some temporal variable that is 
indexed to the time of the utterance whose explicature we seek to elucidate and is 
upper-bounded by t‟, where t‟ is indexed to the utterance next to it. By the time  u‟ is 
uttered, the explicature of u is calculated on the basis of the evidence available at the 
moment and the case is not opened further. Now, this is important. If we sought 
further evidence and if u were contextualized say at different moments, t‟, t‟‟, t‟‟‟, 
etc. the explicature could very well be different (given that it arises from the 
interplay of the linguistically expressed assumption and assumptions available in the 
context). So an utterance could, in theory, be associated with distinct explicatures. In 
order to avoid this inconvenience, we have to keep the interpretation process finite. 
And  this is in line with the point that an explicature captures a unique intention. If 
the utterance were considered at different moments, different interpretative 
possibilities should arise (given the fact that different evidence might be available at 
different moments). But this is not possible since we have said that the intention to 
be assigned must be unique.  
 Now these considerations are compatible with what Sperber & Wilson (1986) say 
about utterance interpretation. They also argue that the interpretation process is finite 
and instantaneous –  in other words, when the best interpretation is obtained the 
process stops. My considerations on the intentionality of explicatures make these 
considerations cogent and provide further justification for them.  The considerations 
so far fit in very well with Gigerenzer et al.‟s (1999) satisficing strategies. A 
heuristic procedure needs to provide results that are good enough, not the best 
possible results (optimal results). It is clear that satisficing  heuristics imply very fast 
processing as well as a stopping rule. When a result that is good enough is found, 
one sticks to it and there is no way back. Satisficing strategies fit in well with the 
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idea that explicatures are not cancellable. Cancellability, in fact, implies revisability, 
which has an extra cost (Jaszczolt 2005) and also seems to be at odds with the very 
notion of satisficing strategies. 
 
 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have put many threads together, partly utilizing my previous 
research and showing that those results make sense if considered from the 
perspective of a theory of massive modularity.  In particular, I have tested  
cancellability of explicatures, top-down pragmatic inferential effects and Stanley‟s 
assumption that primary pragmatic processes must respect grammar in the light of 
independent considerations  from the theory of massive modularity.  The most 
compelling conclusion of this chapter is that a distinction that makes sense, one that 
is advocated by relevance theorists, is the distinction between sub-personal pragmatic 
processes (which are fast, mandatory and of which the speaker/hearer is unaware) 
and personal level pragmatic processes, which are not mandatory, are not necessarily 
fast, and of which the hearer is aware, given that he plays an active role in reasoning 
which is similar to that played by the scientist in scientific reasoning. Of course, 
while sub-personal processes are constrained and operate on modules on the fly 
(databases restricted for the purpose by the Principle of relevance), personal level 
pragmatic processes have a freer access to knowledge databases, encyclopedic 
information, scientific theories, etc. In future work, I may be able to show that even  
personal level pragmatic reasoning may be constrained by the principle of relevance; 
however, we may need to investigate a module for scientific theorizing in which the 
principle of relevance plays a role, albeit a module that is not necessarily innate but 
may be the result of modularization à la Karmiloff-Smith (2010).  This chapter opens 
this new research avenue. 
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Chapter 4 
The attributive/referential distinction, pragmatics, modularity of 
mind and modularization. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
  
In this chapter  I deal with the attributive/referential distinction. After reviewing the 
literature on the issue, I adopt Jaszczolt's view based on default semantics. I relate 
her view to Sperber & Wilson's principle of Relevance. I argue in favor of the 
modularity hypothesis in connection with pragmatic interpretations. I also discuss the 
issue of modularization à la Karmiloff-Smith in connection with default inferences 
and, in particular, referential readings of NPs. I then reply to  some considerations by 
Cummings and use data from referential/attributive uses of NPs to show that the 
modularity hypothesis is defensible. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I intend to discuss the issue of pragmatics and modularity of mind 
through an investigation of the attributive/referential distinction.
1
 In particular, I 
want to reply to Cummings‟ (2009) recently expressed view that the processes 
involved in conversational inferences are not modular, in that they have unrestricted 
access to a knowledge data base and deductive inferences. She thinks that general 
intelligence is responsible for pragmatic increments, whether conversational 
                                                          
1
 Bezuidenhout (1997) too considers that the attributive/referential distinction has a 
bearing on the issue of modularity of mind and pragmatics, even if her conclusions 
are  different from mine. 
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implicatures or conversational explicatures. In replying to Cummings, I reiterate my 
views expressed in Capone (2010c) and I further produce  evidence coming from the 
investigation of the pragmatics of the attributive/referential distinction. Intuitively, 
default referential meanings of definite descriptions seem to be  ideal candidates for 
modular inferential processes, because they are instantaneous, they arise by default, 
and are relatively encapsulated. I argue that such default interpretations may interact 
with contextual clues and that, in limited ways, the defaults can be overridden. But 
even in such cases, inferential processes are pretty encapsulated.  We presumably 
need a notion of encapsulation that is particularly suited and calibrated in view of the 
special inferential processes that constitute pragmatic interpretations. Encapsulation à 
la Fodor will not do; yet, there are alternatives to Fodor‟s view of encapsulation 
which do justice to the idea that pragmatic interpretations are not like scientific 
theories, capable of being revolutionalized an indefinite number of times; instead, 
they are finite, heavily constrained  processes which utilize information which has 
been previously been  made pertinent (or relevant) through cognitive nets (unlike 
Cummings, I believe that  modular processes throw a net on what information can be 
processed and utilized; I call this sort of modular encapsulation net-throwing, 
following a use by Cummings (2009)). 
 
In this chapter I argue that referential interpretations of NPs (and in general 
default inferences) is the result of modularization. I expatiate on the interaction 
between Karmiloff-Smith‟s (1992) theory of modularization and the theory of 
definite descriptions and argue that the inferences available through the default 
semantics archive are nothing but re-descriptions of  inferences originally available 
though the Principle of Relevance. 
 
 
 
1. Keith Donnellan (1966): Reference and Definite Descriptions. 
Donnellan discusses definite descriptions such as: 
 
(1) Smith‟s murderer is insane 
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and points out, correctly,  that there can be two uses of definite descriptions: a) the 
attributive use and b) the referential one. In the attributive use, (1) can be used to say 
that whoever is Smith‟s murderer is insane (the definite description denotes an x, 
such that x is Smith‟s murderer and for all y, if y is Smith‟s murderer, then y = x 
(Russell‟s uniqueness condition)); in the referential usage, „Smith‟s murderer‟ is used 
to refer to what the speaker wants to talk about, what he has in mind, a particular 
referent. 
 
According to Donnellan, the attributive use is „essential‟ and, presumably, the 
referential use is derivative (this is my inference, given Donnellan‟s use of „essential‟ 
for the attributive use). In both uses, the definite description has a denotative 
function.  
 Donnellan takes denotation to be distinct from reference (or denoting from 
referring). He provides the following example to illustrate the difference: 
 
(2) The republican candidate for president in 1964 will be a conservative. 
 
Uttered before the elections, it is very improbable that the speaker was speaking 
about Mr  Goldwater, or that he was referring to Mr Goldwater; even if it could be 
said that the definite description in (2) denoted Mr Goldwater (since he happened to 
be the republican candidate for President in 1964). 
 
The attributive/referential distinction is not only observed in assertions, but also in 
questions and in orders. If one were to ask: 
 
(3) Who is the man drinking a martini? 
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one could, thereby, ask a question about a particular person, who is drinking a 
martini (Who is that man drinking a martini) or about whoever is drinking a martini 
(I know someone is drinking a martini: who is he?). 
 
According to Donnellan one can have not only a bifurcation between attributive 
and referential uses, but one can also have referential uses coupled with attributive 
ones. The case discussed by Donnellan is the following. Suppose I am talking about 
Jones, whom I believe to be Smith‟s murderer and I say: 
 
(4) Smith‟s murderer is crazy. 
 
By „Smith‟s murderer‟ I intend to refer to Jones; however, I am not  using Jones‟ 
behavior in the docks to justify my belief that Smith‟s murderer is crazy; I simply 
rely on the belief that whoever murdered Smith must be crazy to justify my assertion. 
In this case, we have a basic referential  plus  attributive usage.  
 
Donnellan, in his paper, claims that the attributive/referential distinction serves to 
point out some weaknesses  in both Russell‟s and Strawson‟s views of definite 
descriptions. Russell‟s views must be complemented, according to Donnellan, by the 
idea that  a definite description does not only have a denotative use, but also has a 
referential one. According to him, Strawson‟s view is wrong on two accounts: 
 
a) He believes that if a definite description fails to refer because nothing fits it, then 
one cannot have made a true or false assertion (the question of its truth or falsity does 
not arise); 
b) He believes that a definite expression can have attributive or referential uses in 
different sentential frames, but he does not allow for the possibility that the same 
sentence can be (pragmatically) ambiguous. Instead, according to Donnellan,  the 
same sentence containing a definite description can have either an attributive or a 
referential interpretation (it is pragmatically ambiguous).  
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Donnellan likens definite descriptions to Proper Names in that, like them, they can 
have referential uses.  
Now how does Donnellan refute claim a)? His famous example is the following. 
Suppose that I say: 
 
(5) The man drinking a martini is intelligent, 
 
even if it turns out that he is drinking water, and NOT a martini, I may have 
succeeded in identifying the man, I have referred to a particular man, and of that man 
I have said that he is intelligent. And this claim turns out to be true, NOT false.  
While Strawon would say that  in this case we are not confronted with  a false or a 
true statement, according to Donnellan, the speaker has said something which counts 
as true. 
 Donnellan also discusses Linksy (1971) who considers the following example: 
 
Said of a spinster, her husband is kind to her, the speaker may well refer to someone. 
Still the statement is neither true nor false. 
 
Donnellan agrees with Linksy that in case the definite description does not fit the 
referent, but nevertheless succeeds in referring to it (hence  a presupposition of 
existence is not satisfied), the speaker cannot refer to  someone in particular. 
However, he finds the claim that the statement, made saying  „Her husband is kind to 
her‟,  is neither true nor false more controversial. Donnellan claims that in this case 
what the speaker said is true, however we are reluctant to agree with the statement 
that „Her husband is kind to her‟ because there is a convention of use prescribing 
that if someone uses a definite description to speak about a referent, then he should 
use one that fits the referent. So, the problem we have in saying that the statement 
that „Her husband is kind to her‟ is true is not a question of content, but a question of 
form. However, we may be ready to say that the speaker said something true about 
the intended referent. 
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 The last thing to mention about Donnellan‟s discussion is that the uses of definite 
descriptions have possibly two presuppositions: a general presupposition that 
someone or the other is C (where C is the denotation of the definite description); a 
presupposition that someone in particular is C (only the case of the referential use). 
These presuppositions are added to the common ground, even if the speaker does not 
really believe them  (Referential use without the belief that the referent fits the 
description). 
 
1.1 Searle on the attributive/referential distinction 
Searle (1979) discusses Donnellan‟s attributive/referential distinction at length in the 
light of his own views about speech acts and about referring as a speech act.  Searle 
strongly assimilates the cases discussed by Donnellan to his considerations on speech 
acts, especially on indirect speech acts.  In the same way as, for an indirect speech 
act, he distinguishes between a primary and a secondary speech act (or illocutionary 
force) here, in the case of the attributive/referential distinction, he distinguishes 
between a primary and a secondary reference. The primary reference is the act of 
referring to an entity through some aspect which may not coincide with the aspect 
explicitly expressed by the definite description. Thus if, by saying „Smith‟s 
murderer‟ I am referring to Jones,  my statement „Smith‟s murderer is insane‟ is true 
just in case  the predication „insane‟ correctly applies to the reference. If a definite 
description expresses some aspect which is different from the one actually used in 
referring to an entity,  then the aspect encoded by the definite description is  
secondary.   
 Searle does not admit that there is a genuine pragmatic ambiguity 
(attributive/referential). What happens in the attributive use, according to him, is that 
the aspect under which the definite description refers is primary, rather than 
secondary, whereas in the case of referential uses, the aspect under which the 
reference is established is the primary one, not the secondary one (and the linguistic 
aspect used in the definite description is a secondary aspect). Furthermore, there is, 
according to Searle, no interesting attributive/referential pragmatic ambiguity 
because the attributive uses, according to him, are also used to refer. Searle discusses 
the case used by Donnellan at length to show that attributive uses denote, but do not 
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refer, and that denotation must be distinguished from reference. The case in question 
is the following: 
A speaker who has uttered: 
 
(6) The  republican candidate for President in 1964 will be  a conservative 
 
did not intend to refer to Mr Goldwater, even if it happened to be the case that the 
republican candidate for President in 1964 was Mr Goldwater. 
 
Searle deals with this cogent example saying that, in fact, in a sense, it would be true 
to say that the speaker referred to Mr Goldwater, even if, due to principles of 
pragmatics, one does not freely substitute an NP with another in an intensional 
context. The only reason why we cannot make this substitution has to do with 
communicative principles, rather than with semantics. Searle shows that in some 
cases one does feel free to make  similar substitutions in intensional contexts, but in 
others one does not due to facts about context and practical interests. 
 
Searle‟s account of the  referential/attributive distinction seems to have several 
faults. First of all, he semanticises  some facts which, in Donnellans‟ intentions,  
were intended to be pragmatic. While Donnellan never explicitly says that, in case a 
definite description does not fit the referent, but a reference is nevertheless 
successfully established, the statement is true (he simply confines himself to the 
more modest claim that what the speaker has said is true), Searle explicitly writes 
about a statement which is true despite the fact that the definite description does not 
fit the referent (under the secondary aspect), because the definite description satisfies 
the referent under a primary aspect. One further problem is that he seems to have 
drawn analogies from his theory of indirect speech acts, and thus seems to 
overemphasize the cases in which a definite description does not fit the referent. He 
seems to make this case standard, whereas he seems to  relegate the case in which a 
definite description identifies a referent in virtue of its semantics „secondary‟ (he 
explicitly writes about a secondary aspect being associated with the linguistic 
expression (the NP)). The most controversial idea, in my opinion, is that attributive 
uses are used to refer as well and that there is no distinction between denoting and 
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referring. Searle apparently takes issue with all those who believe that referring 
means having something in mind, and these are a great many (see Wettstein on 
having in mind). Furthermore, he extrapolates facts from indirect speech acts to give 
the impression that, in using a definite description, such as „Smith‟s murderer‟ one 
means something like  „Jones‟, one has a primary aspect in mind which is, let us say, 
an inferential augmentation and is part of the statement made. Thus one when one 
says „Smith‟s murderer‟, this amounts to saying „The man over there‟ and he makes 
it appear that „The man over there‟ is some kind of unarticulated constituent. (Searle 
talks about a definite expression‟s expressing a primary aspect on various occasions, 
in the paper, and this gives the impression that the primary aspect is part of the 
statement made, a sort of unarticulated constituent). 
 
All in all, it seems to me that Searle‟s discussion of the attributive/referential 
distinction is not  a considerable  advancement with respect to Donnellan‟s views, 
although it certainly points in the direction of inferential theories of the 
attributive/referential distinction. Crucial to all such pragmatic theories is the fact 
that there is a distinction between attributive and referential uses, a point which 
Searle wants to refute. 
 
1.2 Wettstein (1981) on the attributive/referential distinction. 
Wettstein  also believes that the distinction between attributive and referential uses 
(of definite) descriptions can be supported. However, he objects to Donnellan‟s idea 
that one can support such a distinction with considerations on what happens when the 
definite description fails to fit the referent. He thinks that while it is  clear that in 
cases of attributive readings,  a statement  is false (alternatively neither true nor 
false), it is controversial that in the case of  referential uses, the statement (made) is 
nevertheless true. 
 Leaving aside the controversial aspects, Wettstein argues that the case of 
referential uses  is supported by considerations about indefinite definite descriptions. 
He argues that Kripke (1977)  is wrong in thinking that the truth-conditions of the 
referential reading is captured by Russellian semantics, because the Russellian 
semantics cannot account for what is being communicated in context through a 
definite description. Since Strawson‟s influential critique, it has been known that the 
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Russellian truth-conditions for definite descriptions are NOT sufficient to account for 
communicative uses, since the uniqueness condition notoriously fails in most cases 
of ordinary uses. When we say „The book is on the table‟ there is nothing in the 
sentence that can allow us to pick out a unique table.  Defenses of Russell along the 
lines of elliptical completions of the definite expression, according to Wettstein, fail 
because on each use many completions are available and one does not know how to 
choose them; neither is it clear that the speaker must have a completion in mind (he 
may simply have a demonstrative reference in mind). Wettstein, thus, believes that in 
most uses of definite descriptions the speakers‟ intentions in referring to a certain 
entity are settled by contextual clues (usually a demonstrative gesture). Wettstein 
notes that Donnellan‟s account of referential uses of definite descriptions is very 
much in line with this contextual perspective, in which reference is established 
demonstratively or, in any case, given the rich clues of the context.  Furthermore, 
Wettstein goes on to argue that even attributive uses, which can be accounted for, 
apparently, through the Russellian truth-conditions, show problems similar to 
referential uses, in that very often definite descriptions are incomplete and one must 
resort to demonstrative  reference in order to fully specify the attributive reading 
(The murderer - Smith‟s murder). 
 Summing up, Wettstein is able to provide a very cogent and reasonable  defense 
of the attributive/referential distinction.  
 
1.3 Nathan Salmon’s reply 
Salmon (1982) takes issue with Wettstein‟s treatment in that, according to him, 
Wettstein‟ approach amounts to a defense of the (semantic) ambiguity thesis.   
Salmon proposes to distinguish between the speaker‟ s  meaning and the sentence  
meaning. He claims that referential uses  are nothing but cases of utterer‟s meaning 
and that both the utterer‟s meaning and the sentence meaning should converge  and 
have a common logical form. Salmon reminds us of the fact that it is not uncommon 
to find cases in which the sentential meaning and the utterer‟s meaning diverge, even 
if one predicts that the utterer‟s meaning is a development of the sentential meaning. 
In particular, Salmon claims that in both referential and attributive uses, the 
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attributive reading, to be expressed semantically along the lines of Russellian truth-
conditions for definite descriptions, is  the  common denominator.   
 Now, while Salmon‟s claims are clearly motivated,  it seems to me that 
Wettstein‟s view cannot be the real aim of his attack, simply because even if 
Wettstein says that the referential/attributive distinction is of semantic significance, 
this does not amount „ipso facto‟ to embracing a semantic ambiguity view. It is clear 
that the view which Wettstein defends is an underspecification or underdetermination 
view, something along the lines of ideas which became fully explicit thanks to the 
work of   Wilson & Sperber (2002), Levinson (2000), Carston (2002), among others. 
Wettstein‟s view is simply that, in most cases, definite descriptions do not uniquely 
identify a referent and, thus, the Russellian uniqueness condition would not be 
satisfied UNLESS pragmatic intrusion is allowed. In this sense only, the 
attributive/referential distinction is of semantic significance. What is meant by that 
(or what should be meant by that) is that no Fregean proposition can be expressed 
unless pragmatic intrusion is granted at the level of the interpretation of the definite 
description, which often happens to be referential. 
 Summing up, it should be clear that, up to some point, there should be agreement 
between Salmon and Wettstein, and Salmon‟s position at least serves to clarify 
Wettstein‟s position as to what is the meaning of the statement “The 
attributive/referential distinction is of semantic significance”. 
 There is a point, which is not without theoretical interest, expressed in Salmon‟s 
paper. He claims that while Wettstein easily jumps to the conclusion that even 
attributive readings  have (partially) a referential interpretation, when a complex NP 
includes tacit or implicit material such as a pronoun, which must be interpreted by 
reference to contextual information or a demonstration, this conclusion can be 
avoided along the following lines: 
 
The semantic content of a sentence such as „His murderer is crazy‟ is some general 
proposition  to the effect that the murderer relevant to a certain situation as 
delineated in the context is crazy. I see no compelling arguments against this 
position. 
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A more controversial example, discussed by Salmon is the following. Consider the 
utterance: 
 
(7) The murderer is Jones: Jones is the baby-sitter; the murderer and the babysitter are 
one and the same person. 
 
Salmon considers that if  Wettstein‟s ideas about the referential uses are accepted, 
then on the referential interpretation the attributive reading would not be relevant or 
applicable. But then (7) would have to mean  that Jones is Jones. There are problems 
also on the attributive reading, since on this reading ( 7) would mean that whoever is 
the murderer is whoever is the babysitter. But this cannot be the intended meaning. 
The problem which Salmon does not recognize is that (7) is actually a good case for 
defending Wettstein‟s views. Wettstein‟s view is essentially that a definite 
description often requires completion (the completion being provided through 
contextual clues).  What is the intended meaning of  „The murderer and the babysitter 
are one and the same person‟? Obviously it cannot be „Jones is Jones‟ and it cannot 
mean „Whoever is the murderer is the babysitter‟. However it can mean „Whoever 
happens to be the murderer at t happens to be babysitter at t‟. This is a contingent 
truth; NOT a necessary truth. This is more than enough to support Wettstein‟s under-
determination hypothesis. 
 
1.4 Kent Bach and the attributive/referential distinction. 
Bach (1981) paves the way for a pragmatic treatment of referential interpretations of  
definite descriptions. He assumes that referential interpretations too, like attributive 
ones, have a Russellian semantics, but adds that in addition to this basic semantic 
interpretation, one further layer of interpretation accrues because of the contextual 
determinations of the speech act. He accepts a position similar to Wettstein and 
claims that referential uses are akin to demonstrative reference. In uttering  a 
referential use of „The F‟, a speaker, according to Bach, will think of the referent 
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under some aspect or mode of presentation which may or may not coincide with „The 
F‟ and expect the reader to think of the referent d, which the speaker intends to refer 
to, regardless of the mode of presentation through which the hearer thinks of the 
referent. Bach‟s considerations are a consequence of his distinguishing between the 
sentential meaning and the speaker‟s meaning. Bach considers that one should not be 
surprised if the speaker‟s meaning substantially (and systematically) diverges from 
the sentence meaning. His considerations about referential uses of definite 
descriptions simply mirror his considerations about the pragmatics of indirect speech 
acts. His considerations about indefinite definite descriptions are similar to 
Wettstein‟s, as he also thinks that Russell‟s uniqueness condition can be satisfied 
only if  incomplete definite descriptions are  somehow completed  through contextual 
clues.  Bach does not provide a detailed analysis of the detour from sentential 
meaning to the speaker‟s meaning in terms of Gricean pragmatics.  I suspect that his 
way of thinking of this detour is to expect that contextual clues will direct the hearer 
towards the right interpretation of the definite description as referring to the referent 
the speaker intends to refer to. Interestingly, Bach does not think that having a 
referent in mind can explain referential uses. 
 Bach is not the only one to accept a pragmatic view of  definite descriptions. 
Other eminent authors are  Neale (1990) and Soames (1994). Recanati (1989a) unlike 
them proceeds in the direction of  inferential increments called „primary processes‟ 
that contribute to propositional forms. I cannot discuss their views due to space 
limitations, even if I return to Recanati‟s ideas in the last section.  
 
2.  The semantic turn: Devitt and his critic. 
Devitt (2007) develops an anti-inferential or conventionalist account of referential 
readings of definite descriptions. Unlike Neale (1990) and  Bach (2004b),  he does 
not accept that the transition from a quantificational reading to a referential reading is 
necessary. Instead, he proposes that there is a convention  (of use), whereby, by the 
use of a definite description, the speaker intends to establish a causal/perceptual link 
to an object. Devitt opposes the particularized implicature view (of referential uses 
definite descriptions) on the grounds that, according to him, it has no psychological 
plausibility, given that the preferred standard reading of definite descriptions is the 
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referential one. He also opposes a standard, generalized implicature view of definite 
descriptions because he thinks it is simpler to posit a convention  for the referential 
interpretation of definite descriptions. The main reason why he opposes the standard 
implicature view is that, according to him, in this case the implicature, if there is one, 
has become frozen, conventionalized. A further reason  for opposing the generalized 
implicature view is that it  presumably rests on the assumption that the 
quantificational reading of the definite description is a route towards the referential 
interpretation (it should play a role in the calculation of the implicature, even if this 
role has no psychological plausibility). In addition to this,  Devitt argues 
convincingly that the uniqueness condition  can also obtain through his convention 
for referential usage.  Furthermore, Devitt argues that a crucial problem for the 
quantificational reading is that the uniqueness implication can be applied only 
through recourse to contextual clues (see Wettstein). A further problem for 
inferential views like Bach‟s or Neale‟s is that they  do not make explicit the 
inferential transition from the quantificational to the referential reading. 
 
In short, Devitt opts for a conventional interpretation of referential uses, which 
paves the way for a semantic ambiguity, which must be resolved somehow. And 
how? It appears that pragmatics must be involved somehow in resolving this 
pragmatic ambiguity. A view that promotes the referential reading by default is  
preferable. Devitt‟s view makes some way towards  a theory of default interpretation 
of definite descriptions but does  NOT go all the  way up  this road. 
 
Bontly (2005) replies to the various points made by Devitt. His counterarguments 
are quite interesting and can be shared to a large extent. From this discussion, I 
extrapolate a point which can be used to advance the main ideas of this chapter 
further. While Devitt argues that  referential interpretations of  definite descriptions 
are grasped (by the hearers) intuitively, without the hearer having access to a 
complex reasoning taking into account the Cooperative Principle and the fact that q 
is required to show how the sentence uttered P follows the cooperative principle. The 
fact that the hearer has direct access to the referential interpretation, for Devitt, is 
quite suspect and seems to militate in favor of the idea that there is a convention of 
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use, a regularity of use, whereby by using a definite  description one is actually 
making reference to an entity (available in context).  The reply by Bontly to this 
argument is that  standard implicatures are, in fact, cases in which one does not have 
access to a conscious argument, to a complex reasoning invoking the Cooperative 
Principle and the fact that q is needed to make P adhere to the expectations about the 
Cooperative Principle. These are, in fact, cases in which one has direct access to the 
inference because the inference has become routinized, it has become standardized. 
Habit takes over and the implicature becomes intuitively grasped, the inferential 
process is short-circuited by weight of precedent. Bontly says “Crucially …the 
default interpretation remains a conversational implicature; the interpretative habit 
stems  from one‟s having calculated  such implicatures in the past …” (p. 8). This is 
an idea which turns out to be quite useful and which is in  line with my 
considerations in Capone (2010e). 
Now, while surely, as a critique of Devitt, the paper is quite persuasive, overall, its 
most evident weakness is the lack of a clear and reasonable explanation of how the 
conversational implicature is calculated. Bontley‟s main explanation seems to be that 
in a context in which it is evident that both the speaker and the hearer know that the 
denotation singles out a particular referent, then that referent is what is intended to be 
talked about, that referent is what receives a predicate attribution. While surely there 
is the possibility that the speaker and the hearer, who are capable of identifying the 
referent through a descriptive condition (the one expressed in the definite 
description) do so in the course of conversation,  it is not obvious to me that this is 
the right kind of explanation for a standard, generalized implicature. We would 
expect that a generalized implicature is in general  calculable independently of the 
rich contextual clues. But in this case  rich contextual clues are relied on, with the 
difference that one draws generalizations about what happens or should happen in a 
context in which the speaker and the hearer are able to identify the referent through 
the descriptive condition of the definite description.  If I am right, the generalization 
seems to be that in all contexts in which the speaker and the hearer can proceed from 
an attributive use to an identification of the referent of the definite description, then 
the description is interpreted  as being associated with a referential use. But for me 
the explanation must be the other way round. If one knows that this use of the 
definite description is referential, then one will go on to identify the referent. In fact, 
even in a context in which the speaker and the hearer can easily identify the referent, 
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it is possible or probable that they will not opt for a referential reading, given that the 
attributive reading is what they have in mind or is more salient. Suppose I see the 
corpse and my hearer sees it too, and we both think we  know that Jones is the 
murderer, because he is our only strange neighbor,  nevertheless I could exclaim in a 
raged tone: „Smith‟s murderer is crazy; look at how the body was mutilated” and my 
tone of voice will advertise my intention of talking about whoever is capable of  
mutilating the body of poor  Smith. (See also Donnellan‟s case of a mixed 
referential/attributive usage). Surely here the choice is hard between a referential and 
an attributive use, but there are inferential steps which may make the attributive 
reading more likely (such as consideration of the modality of the crime, which plays 
the argumentative role of support in connection with the attributive reading. That 
could not play the same argumentative role in connection with the referential 
reading, because we know Jones to be crazy anyway, we do not need to support this 
belief about him, since it is the strongest possible belief (by hypothesis). 
 
3. Relevance theory approaches to the attributive/referential distinction 
The first author to address the issue of the attributive/referential description within 
the framework of Relevance Theory is Rouchota  (1992). For Rouchota,  attributive 
and referential interpretations form part of the  explicature developed on the basis of 
partial and fragmentary linguistic input, semantic meaning being largely 
underdetermined.  Thus we have a radical departure from previous pragmatic 
approaches, which were closely related to Grice‟s views about conversational 
implicatures. It is true that Grice considered questions of reference and of ambiguity 
resolution as part of the proposition expressed, but he relegated other important 
phenomena which are of  significance for propositional content to the status of 
conversational implicatures, things  implicated above the content expressed (or said).  
Referential and  attributive uses of definite descriptions are clearly part of the 
propositional content of the utterance. However, while Rouchota recognizes that the 
referential and attributive readings are part of an  explicature, it is not clear that she 
provides a pragmatic derivation similar to that of conversational implicatures. 
Instead, she treats definite descriptions as if they were similar to pronominals in the 
referential usage and, like pronominals, capable of being saturated by information 
derivable through contextual clues.  The attributive reading is similarly obtained 
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through rich contextual clues. In short, there are contexts promoting the referential 
reading or the attributive reading. This is a heavily contextualist view, which does 
not take into account the possibility of generalized implicatures. While I and several 
other authors (e.g. Jaszczolt and Devitt) believe that the referential interpretation is 
standardly preferred, Relevance Theorists make nothing of this strong intuition.  
 An advantage of this approach is to show that the length of the definite description 
may be connected with further implicatures. For example, a speaker who says “The 
notoriously moody tennis player  gave signs of his bad temper when he threw his 
racquet at his opponent‟s head” may implicate that he disapproves of the intended 
referent, McEnroe, or a speaker who says „The fat customer is sitting in his usual 
chair” mat well convey  sarcasm. Consider now Rouchota‟s example „The man 
drinking the martini looks miserable‟. She considers that the choice of the 
considerably longer definite expression instead of, say, a demonstrative, must have  
large cognitive effects, in order to justify the cognitive costs incurred. Thus an 
implicature may get through that the man is drinking a martini because he is 
miserable. I think this is a contorted explanation, although it has a grain of truth. If a 
definite description was preferred to a demonstrative, there must be a reason. This 
might have to do with politeness, given the precept that one should not point to 
people especially if they can notice that one is pointing to them. It is simply impolite 
to point to people, because it is an obvious way of showing that one is talking about 
them and that one does not care whether other people notice that one is calling 
attention on  them. Another interesting case discussed by Rouchota is „Napoleon is in 
bed‟ where one uses a proper name which does not apply to the referent meaning 
something like „The man who believes he is Napoleon is in bed‟. This is an inverted 
commas interpretation. There are interesting remarks in this paper, one of these being 
that there must be heavy contextual clues to justify an attributive reading. A man 
who shows surprise at the way Smith was murdered and mutilated, may well say 
„Smith‟s murderer is crazy‟ without having someone in mind, meaning that the 
predicate applies to whoever is the murderer. Since he does not know who 
committed the crime, he cannot have someone in mind. Even if he had someone in 
mind, yet heavy contextual clues would militate in favor of an attributive reading. 
Suppose, in fact, that a further contextual effect is to strengthen the proposition that 
all murderers are crazy. Then such a strengthening would justify the attributive 
reading. 
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 As I said, despite the interesting things Rouchota says, she does not address the 
important issue of default interpretations. 
 
Bezuidenhout  (1997) makes the interpretation of definite descriptions heavily 
context-dependent. She explicitly says that while the level of logical form is obtained 
through (interpretative) processes which are modular in nature (operations pertaining 
to what Chomsky and his followers called the „language‟ module, the pragmatic 
interpretation of definite descriptions is obtained through non-modular processes 
which have access to encyclopedic knowledge and to various types of information 
coming from the context. She almost makes it appear that the interpretation of 
definite descriptions is like the saturation process involved in the pragmatic 
interpretation of pronouns. While surely there may be differences, Bezuidenhout 
stresses the analogies.  Bezuidenhout opts for the underdetermination view of the 
meaning of definite descriptions and claims that pragmatic information will 
determine a referential reading in one context and an attributive reading in another. 
Her semantic view is based on Kempson‟s view that definite descriptions activate 
procedural meaning and that the definite article signals a procedure whose final 
phase is the recovery of a referent which is accessible in context. The underspecified 
semantics which Bezuidenhout provides for „Smith‟s murderer is crazy‟ is the 
following: 
 
MDD: Feature G is instantiated uniquely/accessibly by an x, which is F. 
 
Bezuidenhout interestingly  points out that cases which are apparently cases of 
referential interpretations can also lead to attributive interpretations, as in  
 
(8) Sign: You are entering the Grand Canyon; 
 
(9) Bill Clinton: The Founding Fathers invested me with the power to appoint 
supreme Court justices; 
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(10) Encountering  a huge footprint in the sand: He must be a giant. 
 
According to Bezuidenhout „You‟ means „Whoever is entering this place‟, by „me‟ 
Bill Clinton intends to say „whoever is the president‟ and  „He‟ means „whoever 
made the footprint‟. The reader is reminded that similar cases were pointed out in 
Donnellan‟s paper. 
 
Bezuidenhout‟s view is based on Relevance Theory because she too believes that 
meaning is largely underdetermined and that pragmatics serves to make the 
proposition intended explicit and she also believes that context plays a pervasive role 
in interpretation, given that the speaker must always make assumptions coming from 
background information relevant to the interpretation process. 
 
What is not clear is to what extent Bezuidenhout‟s view is different from Neale‟s 
quantificational analysis. Neale‟s view of the semantics of definite descriptions  is 
that the quantificational reading is at the basis of the referential reading. But it seems 
to me that MDD is nothing but a different way of saying that a definite description is 
assigned a semantic interpretation which is that of a quantifier and which also 
includes a uniqueness condition and a procedure pertaining to accessibility. The only 
difference I can see is that Bezuidenhout adds a procedure pertaining to accessibility 
and that she writes about explicatures, rather than  implicatures. 
 
Powell (2001) is another interesting article written in the framework of Relevance 
Theory. Powell discusses the literature on the attributive/referential distinction and  
claims that the issue of whether the attributive and referential interpretations 
constitute different propositions (having different truth conditions) must be 
disentangled from the issue of whether a definite description like „The murderer‟ is 
semantically ambiguous. Furthermore, Powell neatly distinguishes inferential 
approaches like the one by Neale (1990) or Kripke (1977), according to which one 
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must distinguish between what is said and what is conversationally implicated, the 
latter being different from what is said, and inferential approaches aiming at the 
notion of explicature, a proposition to which both literal meaning and pragmatic 
inference contribute. The main difference between Powell and the previous theorists 
is that he relies on the notion of procedural meaning, a notion he derives from 
Blakemore (2000),  in order to  account for attributive/referential uses of definite 
descriptions. According to him, definite descriptions encode procedures for 
determining either a referent or a descriptive content. Like other relevance theorists, 
Powell assumes that whether a definite description has an attributive or a referential 
reading must be settled in context. He says that in a context in which the referent that 
satisfies the description is known, then the referential interpretation comes for free 
without  extra processing efforts. It appears that processing efforts will be essential to 
the calculation of referential interpretations, assuming that the referential 
interpretation has greater contextual effects in such contexts. The derivation of the 
attributive interpretation seems to require for Powell a calculation on the basis of 
possible alternatives. Given that a directly referential expressions could be used but 
was not used, then the referential interpretation is automatically eliminated and the 
attributive interpretation is the one which has most contextual effects. This argument, 
however, does not stand, because even in the case of referential interpretations one 
could consider alternatives in which a directly referential interpretation is used and 
one, could,  therefore eliminate the referential interpretation on the grounds that 
greater processing efforts are involved. But even the argument pertaining to the 
referential interpretation does not persuade me, because even in a context in which a 
referent could be clearly intended, an attributive interpretation could have  greater 
contextual effects in case certain argumentative relationships are established between 
the utterance and further utterances or implicit assumptions. 
 
4.  Jaszczolt on default semantics 
While Relevance Theorists opt for a theory which is heavily contextual, in that it 
takes into account the contexts in which the utterances are made, Jaszczolt (1999, 
2005) does justice to the idea that the preferred reading of definite descriptions is the 
referential one. Her theory of  definite descriptions derives from a more general 
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outlook on the interpretation of NPs, whether in normal contexts or embedded in 
intentional contexts. As Jaszczolt says: 
 
Although  definite descriptions exhibit an ambiguity of use between the 
referential reading and the attributive one, these two readings are not on a par 
in processing; the referential reading is more salient than the attributive one. 
(Jaszczolt 2005, 108). 
 
Jaszczolt discusses the example (11) 
 
(11) The best architect designed this church. 
 
 
According to Jaszczolt, the referential reading corresponds to the utterance that is 
accompanied  by the mental state with the default, strong, „undispersed‟ 
intentionality. In the case in which the hearer mistakenly thinks that Sagrada Familia 
was designed  say by Christopher Wrem, the intentionality is dispersed  as it reaches 
the object that was not intended by the speaker; likewise, if the speaker  falsely 
believes that Simon Guggenheim designed the Sagrada Familia, the intentionality is 
dispersed between the intended person and the object recovered by the hearer. 
 
In general, Jaszczolt thinks that NPs strongly correlate with referential 
interpretations, as shown by her considerations on belief reports, for which she states 
that the default interpretation is „de re‟: the believer is taken to believe a proposition 
about a certain referent. 
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PART II 
 
5. Modularity of mind 
In this chapter, I will not adopt modularity à la Fodor, but the notion of massive 
modularity (Carruthers 2006), which is, however, connected with Fodor‟s 
modularity. The basic idea of modularity is that the brain has a modular organization 
and that each component of the brain is a module, which is related to other modules 
in the sense that it can take input from other modules or can give input to other 
modules. We should not think of modules as specific regions of the brain, even if a 
module corresponds to a certain neural structure. Since modules can share parts, 
especially if they are placed at interfaces, it would be wrong to locate  a module in a 
certain area of the brain, as this would not do justice to interconnectedness. Modules 
are dissociable – and this is perhaps their most important characteristic. 
Dissociability means that if a certain module is damaged (completely or in part), then 
the remaining modules can still work autonomously and it is even possible that some 
other module will try to replicate the processes which were going on in the damaged 
module. So we shall accept the idea of dissociability, but at the same time we shall 
admit that the human brain is also characterized by plasticity and that even if certain 
cognitive processes are best implemented in a certain module, one could nevertheless 
try to replicate them in a different module (albeit the degree of specialization will be 
lost). Consider what happens when, due to a stroke, a person loses her ability to read 
or write. Some authors have agreed that the reading/writing module is the result of 
modularization (Carruthers 2006; Karmiloff-Smith 1992), rather than being an innate 
module, and that repeated practice has served to shape the reading/writing module, 
which has then  been partitioned off from the module for object recognition. In other 
words, the reading/writing module is more specialized than the perception module, 
and although it may certainly share parts with it, it  has been partitioned off from that 
module, forming an autonomous module. When the reading/writing module is 
damaged, then the patient can still make use of other modules and replicate the 
processes which were operative in the reading/writing module. Nevertheless, the 
reading/writing competence will never be totally recuperated, because the processes 
occurring in these modules can never become highly specialized as required. They 
can be a shadow of the previous know-how, but never perfectly suited to the specific 
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task. So now we are encountering another reason for positing modularity. Modules 
proliferate in order to adapt to the world‟s complexity and to develop processes that 
are perfectly suited to the cognitive needs of a human being. The reader will not be 
surprised to hear that we, humans, are endowed with a double vision system. One 
system is suited to identifying objects (and surely it also works for referring), while 
the other system is more specialized for the navigational needs Carrtuthers 2006, 
Perconti 2008). We orient ourselves in motion through the other vision system. The 
two systems are complementary. One is more suited for  object detection, color 
detection, the grasping of particulars, etc. The other is less sensitive to detail, but can 
provide data more quickly and is thus more suitable for navigation, an activity for 
which colors and small detail matter little, and where it is more important to avoid 
objects  in a very quick time. 
 The output of modules must be fast, because functional specialization has as its 
aim providing data very quickly for the various purposes involved in an activity. The 
output must also be mandatory. In other words, given an input, a module will 
obligatorily provide an output. This is especially useful in a  world in which we and 
other animals must defend ourselves from predators. We need fast and, also, 
obligatory reactions. My parrot, however affectionate, has no control over impulses 
such as: 
 
Fly when a bigger animal tries to catch you. 
 
Even if I just wanted to caress my parrot, his modular processes and the hierarchies 
of its operations will determine its flight, despite the fact that he knows well that I 
love him and he loves me, despite the fact that he devotes most of his time to convey 
his affection (singing, extending his right wing to salute me, turning in circles on one 
leg, dancing with a right-left and left-right movement every time he sees me). He 
would fly away from me nevertheless, when I try to catch him, because  his brain has 
been programmed in this way and there is some modular activity which tells him to 
fly away when a bigger animal approaches him, whoever he is. It is the „whoever he 
is‟ clause that will prevent him from making exceptions. Flying away from dangers 
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is more important than recognizing who is who, and this is the reason why my parrot 
has been programmed  in this way.  
 Another characteristic of modular processes is that they are encapsulated. A lot 
has been written on encapsulation. Massive modularity theorists have weakened 
Fodor‟s encapsulation constraint considerably. Encapsulation does not mean (should 
NOT mean) that a  module has no access to another module, but that it has NO 
access to the operations of another module. It cannot see what is happening in 
another module, but it can see the result of modular operations, in the form of input 
(the input of a module is the output of another module). Modules are interconnected 
and, thus, take inputs from other modules and send inputs to other modules.  It is 
instructive to think of modular interconnectedness through the metaphor of  
enzymatic processes. According to Barrett (2005), modules communicate through a 
common bulletin board, where the output of a module is made available to become 
the input for another module. Every time an operation is made, something is added to 
the input, but nevertheless, the original input  is labeled as having at least  the same  
characteristics as it had  before. This is particularly useful when we deal with the 
relationship between literal meaning and explicatures. We need the assumption that 
literal meaning receives inferential augmentations, but is nevertheless available for 
other parallel inferences (we need at the same time to assign referents to pronominals 
through the perception module and to assign explicatures and implicatures; in order 
to have all these parallel processes, we need processes which preserve structure, 
rather than radically transformed. Every transformation is effected in such a way that 
structure is preserved). 
 
6. Encapsulation,  default meanings and referential interpretations of NPs. 
I have previously said that  the preferred interpretation of  definite descriptions is 
referential. This is clearly the default reading. The notion of default reading deserves 
investigation in terms of the theory of modularity of mind. A default interpretation, 
in fact, seems to have many of the characteristics of modular processes: it is fast; it is 
mandatory (unless there are heavy contextual clues militating against this 
interpretation, one cannot but have access to it (for example, the attributive 
interpretation  of definite descriptions is unlikely to be selected UNLESS there are 
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heavy contextual clues that favor it)); and it is encapsulated, in a sense which I will 
make more precise. Encapsulation in pragmatics will be of two different types: 1) 
activation of the inference in a pre-contextual phase; 2) net-throwing on the 
contextual information available. I will call these two forms of encapsulation 
Encapsulation* and Encapsulation**. Encapsulation* basically means that you will 
go for the default interpretation unless there are contextual clues that militate against 
it. Even if there are contextual clues that militate against it, the presumption in favor 
of default meanings is so strong that one tends to ignore context to start with,  one 
takes it into account when the default interpretation really cannot fit into that context. 
Encapsulation* is a sort of  isolation of the information available, a recognition that 
pragmatic interpretation must start with something and that default meanings are the 
basic  building bricks of  pragmatic interpretation. One has access to default 
meanings, in isolation from contextual information. Of course, contextual 
information is there, before our eyes, but one pretends that it is not there and 
proceeds in an orderly way. This is the kind of isolation which a scholar imposes on 
oneself when one chooses to read, say, what specifically deals with the 
attributive/referential distinction, setting aside say books on anaphora, however 
interesting they are. Even if one makes connections, one needs encapsulation of 
some sort, and needs to rank the possible connections: thus I will make groups of 
books which I intend to read in a certain order. First I will read book on the 
attributive/referential description, then I will read books on reference, then I will read 
books on anaphora, then I will read books on propositional attitudes. Each of these 
processes of reading a type of books is an encapsulation process. One deliberately 
ignores information which might be relevant but not as relevant as the information 
one is now considering.  
 This account of default readings is quite compatible with what relevance theorists 
say about experimental pragmatics. When a certain default inference is made, it must 
be made compatible with the context. In other words, a phase of  situating the 
inference in context and of overriding it in case it does not fit the context certainly 
occurs and we must take this into account. 
 
The inference from definite descriptions to referential readings, I said, is quite 
standard. Following Jaszczolt (1999, 2005), I accept that there is a strong 
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presumption in favor of referential readings. This is a more general phenomenon of 
NPs. In fact, Jaszczolt notices that  NPs embedded in belief reports (inside the scope 
of the belief operator) tend to have „de re‟ interpretations, rather that „de dicto‟ 
interpretations. Surely there is a connection between „de re‟ interpretations and 
referential interpretations, since what is understood de re, must also be understood 
referentially (although things are not the other way round). 
 
Now we are at a fork. Should we say that there are cognitive principles of a 
specialized nature applying to NPs, such that determine the referential interpretation 
of an NP in a default context? Or should we say that such default interpretations, 
which are real, objective enough, can explained by adopting a more general 
Relevance Theory perspective? If there are default principles dealing with the 
referential interpretations of NPs, then we must simply expose these principles. 
However, if there are general mechanisms of inference, we must explain in what 
ways the default inferences (in particular the referential readings) are obtained. 
 
I have said before that the RT approaches to definite descriptions were quite „ad 
hoc‟ and did not explain the general case, although they could perhaps explain how 
inferences are operative in particular contexts. We thus need a general treatment of 
definite descriptions which will produce a default interpretation which is referential. 
 Things stand in this way, I assume. The human mind is geared toward maximizing  
contextual effects, while minimizing processing efforts. Referential interpretations 
are standardly more informative, because they serve to eliminate a greater number of 
states of the world. If an interpretation is referential, we know what the speaker is 
talking about and we understand what the speaker predicates of a subject as applying 
to a particular person. Levinson (2000) and Huang (2000) explain anaphoric 
processes in a similar way. Pronominals tend to develop co-referential 
interpretations, since these interpretations eliminate a greater number of states of the 
world. They reduce cognitive uncertainty, if we want to use a more pretentious term.  
Now, if this explanation is accepted, the assumptions vocalized in Jaszczolt‟s default 
semantics  could be said to follow from it. They are special cases of a more general 
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case. But then why should we bother with defaults? The same parsimony principle 
(Occam‟s Modified Razor) which Jaszczolt invokes many times could be used to say 
that we do not any longer need her more specialized principles (in particular her 
Default De Re Principle: 
 
The Default De Re principle: 
 
The de re reading of sentences ascribing beliefs is the Default reading. Other 
readings constitute degrees of departure from the Default, arranged on the scale of 
the strength of intentionality of the corresponding mental state). 
 
Now, there are two ways to respond to such a criticism. One could be to say that the 
principle whereby an NP is assigned a referential meaning by default  originally 
derived from more general principles of cognition, but has now become a shortcut 
for  the interpretation of NPs. One could even claim that we need a Reference 
module and that Jaszczolt‟s principles are part of that innate  module. 
 
 This idea is interesting of course, instantiating the general idea that when the mind 
needs specialized principles to deal more efficiently with certain types of 
information, it develops a module that can deal with that type of information.  
 
A more modest idea is that of modularization. We posit modules or archives that 
store information derivable from pragmatic processes as routinely implemented and 
transform it into generalizations. Jaszczolt‟s Default De Re principle could be such a 
generalization. 
 
Is there evidence that the mind can work in this way? Certainly There is. I 
mentioned  beforehand the case of modularization in connection with the 
writing/reading systems. The writing/reading systems may derive originally from the 
perception module, but then while these processes became specialized, and were 
dedicated to a special problem (how to write  or read), the specialized information 
that connected with this ability (the know-how) became modularized and a new  
module developed. This is not to say that the module dedicated to writing and 
reading is innate. What is innate is the predisposition to develop such a module, the 
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neural structures which give hospitality  to the module, the principles for partitioning 
an existing module from a module that is being developed thanks to information 
coming from the environment. The possibility of connections between the original 
module and the new partitioned module must also be innate.  
 
What I am saying is that, by learning how to write and read from the environment 
(our teachers, our parents, etc.), we store this specialized information in a module 
that is specialized to receiving and string this type of information. 
 
Could this work for referential readings too? Is it possible that they become 
standardized and that, when this happens, a module for reference is generated 
through modularization, the interaction between innate resources and data coming 
from the environment? 
 
I favor the idea that there must be a module for  reference which is the result of 
modularization and that Jaszczolt‟s Default De Re principle and the principle relating 
to referential interpretations of NPs (definite descriptions  in particular) must reside 
in this module. This module is not innately built, but is the result of interaction with 
the environment. 
 
 
7. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) on modularization: the case of default semantics 
I assume that the issue of default inferences and of definite descriptions ties in very 
closely  with Karmiloff-Smith‟s discussion of modularization.  
Karmiloff-Smith substantially alters the picture of modularity à la Fodor. While 
Fodor believes that there are input systems (e.g. vision) which are modular and 
which provide input to central intelligence, Karmiloff-Smith argues that development 
is the key to understanding the human mind. She says: 
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Fodor takes as demonstrated that modules for spoken language and visual 
perception are innately  specified. By contrast, I wish to draw a distinction 
between  the notion of pre-specified modules and that of a process of 
modularization  (which, I speculate, occurs repeatedly as a product of 
development).  Here I differ from  Fodor‟s strict nativist conception. I 
hypothesize that if the human mind ends up with any modular structure, then, 
even in the case of language, the mind becomes modularized as development 
proceeds. My position takes into account the plasticity of early brain 
development … (1992, 4). 
The modularization thesis allows us to speculate that, although there  are 
maturationally constrained attention biases and domain-specific predispositions 
that channel the infant‟s  early development, this endowment interacts richly 
with, and is in return affected by, the environmental input. (1992, 5). 
Karmiloff-Smith‟s theory is a bridge between theories of innatism and theories like 
the one by Piaget, who argues that the human mind of the infant is a „tabula rasa‟ and 
grants only some domain-general processes like assimilation, accommodation and 
equilibration. Karmillof-Smith hopes to salvage aspects of Piaget‟s epistemology by 
arguing that there is far more to cognitive development than the unfolding of a 
genetically specified program (p. 11) Crucial to Karmilloff-Smith‟s program is the 
idea of  Representation Re-description  which involves  a “cyclical process by which 
information already present in the organism‟s  independently functioning special 
prupose  representations, is made  progressively available,  via re-descriptive 
processes, to other parts  of the cognitive system” (p. 18). Conceptual re-descriptions 
are what allow the human minds to make connections between domains of 
experience which,  before the re-descriptive process, were unconnected. Karmiloff-
Smith provides the example of the re-description of the concept „zebra‟ as „striped 
animal‟ which allows the child to make a connection between the animal „zebra‟ and 
the road sign for a zebra crossing. Re-descriptions are of three types: E1 are not 
available to conscious access and  to verbal report; E2 are only available to conscious 
access; E3 are available both to conscious access and to verbal report.  
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Karmiloff-Smith applies her ideas to various domains. However, I propose to focus 
on her chapter entitled „The child as a notator‟ since these ideas connect closely with 
what I said before as the reading/writing module, which appears to be a model for 
my idea of modularization as I intend to apply it to inferential processes of the 
default type. Karmiloff-Smith‟s main idea is that reading/writing and drawing belong 
to different modules, as they imply different ideas about what should be done. Even 
small children are able to distinguish between a drawing and an instantiation of 
writing. Surely the products may not be neatly differentiated, but they would, 
nevertheless, clearly insist that this is a drawing and that is an instance of writing. So 
they have clear in their minds what the constraints on writing and drawing must be. 
They know that writing involves sequentiality, directionality and  „spatial frequency 
or periodicity‟ (p. 143). 
As Karmiloff-smith says: 
Indeed, preliterate  children differentiate between drawing  and writing even if  
their “drawings” are not much more than circular scribbles and their “writing” 
wiggly horizontal lines. But they are adamant about the distinction: “That‟s a 
dog” (a circular  scribble unrecognizable to anyone but the budding artist) “and 
that says “Fido”” (equally unrecognizable, but a horizontal squiggly line). (…) 
Moreover, video tapes show that preliterate toddlers lift the pen much more 
frequently when pretending to write that when pretending to draw. The toddler 
goes about in the process of writing and  drawing differently, even if the end 
products sometimes turn out similar. It is essential to distinguish product and 
process, because the toddler‟s notational  products may at times appear 
domain-general to the observer, whereas their intentions and hand movements 
bear witness to a clear differentiation that they have established between the 
two systems (p. 143). 
Children who have been asked to distinguish between writing and drawing do not 
confound drawing with notation as they make clear-cut distinctions  between the two 
notational domains. Drawings are rejected for written language and single elements 
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are accepted for number, but rejected for writing, linkage between elements is 
accepted for writing but not for number notation. 
Karmiloff-Smith rejects the idea that these constraints are innate, while she 
accepts the idea that there are such constraints and that they are organized in modules 
(she furthermore says that the modules for writing/reading and drawing are in 
different hemispheres). Her reason for rejecting innatism and embracing 
modularization, in the case of the reading/writing module is that reading/writing, 
unlike verbal production, are relatively recent in terms of evolutionary time. She says 
that hundreds of thousands of years  of evolution were needed  for spoken language  
to become biologically constrained, but the use of cultural tools for writing  bates 
back only 5000 or 6000 years. So it is implausible to invoke an innately specified  
bias for writing. (p. 147). Karmiloff-Smith argues that they are due to a process of 
modularization that is the product of learning  during childhood. 
My necessarily brief treatment of Karmiloff-Smith‟s ideas on modularization 
paves the way for my ideas about modularization of inferential processes. In my 
previous paper on Default Semantics and the architecture of mind (Capone 2010c) I 
proposed that a default semantics archive is built to store regularities of inferential 
results. Jaszczolt‟s Default De Re Principle and the tendency to interpret definite 
descriptions as referential expressions may be due specifically to the standardization 
process which short-circuits an inferential process to a cell in a memory system (a 
default semantics archive) which produces directly the result of the inferential 
process. We may propose that cells in the default semantics archive do not simply 
supply the results of inferential processes one by one, but may be organized in 
principles of a more general nature, such as the following: 
For any NP, go  a referential interpretation first. 
Such principles are the result of modularization, of learning, even if, obviously, they 
interact with more general principles of cognition such as Sperber & Wilson‟s 
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Principle of Relevance, according to which relevance is a positive function of  
contextual effects and a negative function of processing efforts. I argue that 
referential interpretations of NPs are default because they obey the Principle of 
Relevance. In fact, a referential interpretation eliminates a greater number of states of 
the world, while an attributive interpretation is compatible with a certain number of 
referents (The President of USA: Clinton, Obama, kennedy, …). In my view, fully  
identifying information is to be preferred to descriptive information (only) and, thus, 
the referential interpretation prevails at least in those cases in which the hearer is 
interested in knowing specifically who did the thing in question, who acted in such 
and such a way. 
Furthermore, modularization, according to Karmiloff-Smith, involves re-
description and, in particular, re-descriptions of the type E1, E2, E3. In the case of 
modularization involved in the creation of a default semantics archive, we certainly 
have the phase of re-descriptions E2, E3, since the default semantics archive  allows 
access both to consciousness and to verbal report. Re-description is clearly involved 
in the modularization process of referential interpretations of NPs. Before 
modularization, in fact, an NP must be considered as a semantic structure allowing 
interpretative ambiguities. Instead, after re-description, interpretative ambiguities are 
eliminated. Something has occurred to change linguistic knowledge. The NP has 
been marked as + referential after re-description. 
8. Capone (2010c) on pragmatics and modularity of mind 
Capone (2010c) is a discussion of modularity of mind as applied to pragmatics. 
Capone‟s belief is that a critical discussion of modularity of mind can improve our 
understanding of the semantics/pragmatics debate. The main points addressed by 
Capone are the following: 1) merger representations and enzymatic modular 
processes; 2) fast and frugal heuristics and satisficing strategies; 3) cancellability and  
4) modularity; pragmatics and encapsulation. 
 Concerning the first point, Capone argues that  Jaszczolt‟s theory of merger 
representations (Jaszczolt 2005) provides the principles of compositionality for acts 
of communication. Capone accepts that compositionality is best instantiated at the 
level of merger representations – representations that combine information coming 
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from different sources (1) semantics; 2) lexical defaults; 3) socio-cultural defaults; 
encyclopedic knowledge). Capone argues that, since merger representations combine 
outputs of  both top-down and bottom-up inferential processes, a modular view 
according to which  modular connections are NOT pipes  must be accepted. Instead, 
modular connections must be conceived of as enzymatic processes taking input from 
a common bulletin board and providing output to this very bulletin board. Enzymatic 
processes explain how outputs of a process can become input to another type of 
process. Concerning point 2) (satisficing strategies), Capone  considers inferential 
processes (of the unreflective type)  as instances of fast-and-frugal heuristics whose 
aim is NOT obtaining an optimal result, but only a result that is good enough. As 
soon as a good enough inferential process is instantiated, the search for pragmatic 
interpretation stops.  Relevance Theorists have drawn attention to these inferential 
processes.  These processes interact with our view of modularity because modular 
processes are also fast, automatic and finite. 
 Concerning point 3 (Cancellability), Capone argues that one of the main obstacles 
to a modular view of inferential processes  is removed once it is recognized  that 
explicatures are NOT cancellable (a point discussed at length in Capone 2006, 
Capone 2009; see also Burton-Roberts‟ 2005 splendid paper). The convergence 
between Capone‟s previous work on lack of cancellability of explicatures and 
modularity of mind is not a mere coincidence. Lack of cancellability supports the 
view that inferential processes  are modular in nature, given that they are not 
optional, but they are mandatory (cancellability of explicatures  threatening the idea 
that inferential processes are mandatory). 
 Concerning point 4 (encapsulation), Capone argues that pragmatic processes are 
unlike theory-formation (whereby a theory is continuously revised). They have 
access to limited information, which is encapsulated through the Principle of 
relevance (see the discussion by Capone of modules on the fly). Capone concentrates 
on inferences which are automatic and belong to the non-reflective type. Much else 
must be said about non-automatic, reflective inferences,  about which  Cummings 
(200) has much to say. We shall now consider Cummings‟  views in the next section. 
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9. Louise Cummings, modularity and pragmatics 
Cummings (2009) discusses the same issues discussed by Capone (2010c), but 
arrives at different conclusions. I assume that the main difference between 
Cummings and Capone‟s ideas is based on a different focus. Cummings uses 
examples of reflective inferences, in which a speaker  embarks on a reflective task 
which uses explicit arguments and reasoning in order to calculate the intended point 
of an utterance.  Capone, instead, focuses on unreflective inferences, which are fast 
and automatic and in which the calculation of the implicature is not available for 
conscious access. It is not surprising, therefore, that they should arrive at different 
conclusions. Yet, intuitively both types  of inferential processes are operative in non-
logical inference, and thus „prima facie‟ both authors say something important. 
Surely, in discussing implicatures, we must take into account both non-reflective and 
reflective inferences; yet, it should be clear that unreflective inferences have a 
privileged status, since they are those which enter into primary pragmatic processes 
in so far as they contribute to the explicatures, to the explicit contents of utterances 
and thoughts. Considerations about reflective pragmatic processes surely are 
important, and yet they cannot be used in isolation to prove Cummings‟ main point: 
that is, that pragmatic processes are NOT modular. 
 Cummings discusses two views of modularity: she approves of the former and she 
criticizes the latter. Cummings accepts Kasher‟s (1991) idea that there is a pragmatic 
module which processes speech acts and determines the illocutionary force of an act 
of communication on the basis of some presumptions which are usually triggered by 
the syntactic form of the utterance. There are rough correlations between declarative 
form and the force of an assertion; between imperative form and the force of an order 
or command; between an interrogative form and the force of a question. These 
correlations are standardly used to calculate the force of an utterance, but they can be 
overridden and, thus, in context, the force of an utterance can be quite different from 
the presumptions calculated in the pragmatic module. A central system receives input 
from the pragmatic module and determines in context the particular illocutionary 
forces of utterances. 
 This view is contrasted with the view of Theory of Mind (ToM) theorists, for 
whom the demarcation of  the Theory of Mind module is obtained  by certain 
restrictions on the flow  information between the psychology faculty and other 
cognitive domains. Segal‟s (1996) is the most representative voice in the ToM camp: 
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In particular there may be a one- or two-way filter to information. In Jerry 
Fodor‟s (1983) terminology, intentional modules may be „informationally 
encapsulated‟: some of the information of the subject‟s mind outside a given 
module may be  unavailable to it…And going the other way, intentional 
modules  may exhibit „limited accessibility‟; some of the information  within a 
module may be unavailable to consciousness…I suggest that if a set of  
appropriately related psychological states  exhibits either informational 
encapsulation or limited accessibility, then they constitute an intentional 
module (Segal 1996, 143). 
 
Cummings dismisses this important theoretical step by a complex reasoning: 
 
However, for our present purposes, a modular approach to ToM is only 
interesting  to the extent that it can explain  certain features of pragmatic 
interpretations. For example, a ToM module must be able to capture the 
relative ease with which a listener is able to recover the implicature of an 
utterance. We will see that these beliefs are not  domain specific or established 
in advance of interpretation, as they  would have to be  if they were mediated 
by the processes of a cognitive module. In fact, many of the beliefs that are 
integral to utterance interpretations are not even beliefs  about our 
interlocutor‟s mental state (although, of course, many others are). We will also 
see that beliefs are revised, rejected and reinforced by a whole range of 
contingencies in the listener‟s environment and by other beliefs that are stored 
in memory or that are the product  of more general  inferential processes (…). 
It is difficult to see how these various contingencies and other beliefs can even 
get access to a ToM module, given its informational encapsulation. In the 
absence of such access,  one cannot begin to imagine how a ToM module can 
capture the cancellability of implicatures and the defeasibility of 
presuppositions, for example. (Cummings 2009, 161). 
 
The good point that Cummings is making is that a ToM module must integrate 
different sources of information, some of these pertaining to encyclopedic 
knowledge, the beliefs of the hearers, and also the logical inferences made online by 
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the hearers. It is clear that the final result of pragmatic inference must be able to 
combine different sources of information. The term merger representations invented 
by Jaszczolt (2005) does justice to this idea that pragmatic inference combines 
different sources of information. For pragmatic purposes, the main sources of 
information which must be integrated or merged with others are the results of default 
inferences and the result of genuine pragmatic inference based on rationality 
principles. But given that a global pragmatic process must incorporate a less global 
pragmatic process, is it impossible that at some stage of the pragmatic process some 
sort of encapsulation to be defined not along the lines of Fodor (1981) but along the 
lines of theorists of massive modularity (Carruthers   2006) can be posited?  At some 
point in her most interesting discussion, Cummings says that it is not the case that 
one throws a net on the information that is accessible to pragmatic processes.  She 
thinks that pragmatic processes are permeable to a whole range of knowledge and 
deductive inferences. In my discussion I will use the terms net-throwing and 
permeability as key terms of the discussion of genuine pragmatic processes. Net-
throwing is important, because there must be ways to limit the information that must 
be considered in calculating a conversational inference. Net-throwing mainly 
consists in obeying the Principle of Relevance which applies not only to the 
calculation of inferences, but also to the provision of contextual information to the 
inferential process. Context does not provide an unrestricted flow of information, but 
provides a restricted flow of information. The only information that goes through the 
net is relevant information, information which has a promise to interact with 
linguistic information in interesting and fruitful ways, by incrementing it and making 
is meaning potential optimal. Furthermore, contrary to what Cummings and Kasher 
accept, the processing of pragmatic inference is UNLIKE theory-formation. In theory 
formation, theories are developed, challenged, revised, and the  process is possibly 
infinite. Instead, utterance processing must occur in real time, and is usually over 
when the next utterance occurs and the conversation flows in the direction of what is 
said next. There is no time, usually, to go back and revise interpretations, following 
the procedure of theory-formation. If theorists use the notion of cancellability to 
prove their point that pragmatic processes are permeable to different sources of 
information, one would have to reply that, yes, pragmatic processes are permeable to 
different sources of information, but under the constraint that the pragmatic process 
is finite, fast, circumscribed to the present. Furthermore, while potential implicatures 
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and explicatures are usually cancellable, once intentions are fixed in context it will 
not do to cancel them. This is an idea which I expressed in Capone (2006, 2009, 
2010c) (but also see  Burton-Roberts‟s 2005 important work) and which has been 
supported by Burton-Roberts (personal communication). So, I agree that the 
pragmatic process is permeable, but it is instantaneously permeable, and thus it is 
completely different from theory formation, which occurs without any time 
constraints. While theory formation is a collaborative process which involves many 
scientists, utterance interpretation generally involves two speakers (or a limited set of 
speakers who are located in space relative to one another). So, the main difference 
between theory formation and utterance interpretation is that the environment of the 
conversation provides fundamentally crucial (perceptual) input to the pragmatic 
processes. Such a constraint is obviously not in place in theory formation, where 
scientists are usually situated in various parts of the worlds, and the setting does not 
have a crucial role in anchoring utterances in time and place. Te inferential process in 
ordinary conversation is necessarily circumscribed and encapsulated and the most 
crucial sort of net-throwing occurring is that due to place and time. 
 What about the constraint that when optimal relevance is achieved, the 
interpretation process stops? Is not this a sort of encapsulation? Cummings, in her 
discussion of schizophrenia, mentions a notion of praeter-relevance as advanced by 
important work by Cram & Hedley (2005). A problem which schizophrenic patients 
experience is that they process utterances without stopping when the first 
interpretation that satisfies the Principle of Relevance is obtained, but they go on 
making further inferences. If Cummings mentions such a  problem, then surely it 
must be the case that the inferential process is finite and has stopping rules. And this 
means it is circumscribed and this is surely a limit to permeability. Permeability 
occurs to some extent, but is not unconstrained. I will thus talk of circumscribed 
permeability, which is still a modular notion. 
 As I said, Cummings provides an interesting example of reflective inference, in 
which a number of  pieces of information flow into the interpretation process. The 
example is the following: 
 
(12) Sam: Do you come here often for a walk? 
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Tom: I hold down two jobs, so what do you think? It‟s not as nice as it used to be. 
Owners are letting their dogs foul the pavements and there is litter everywhere. It 
was local teenagers who vandalized the benches. 
 
Cummings is clearly right in saying that a number of pieces of information flow 
into the inferential process, as we surely  need to take into account  certain beliefs 
such as „People who have two jobs have little leisure time‟. There is no doubt that a 
number of beliefs must be involved. Yet, it is the principle of Relevance which 
circumscribes the process and prevents one from resorting to unnecessary beliefs. 
Furthermore, her example is clearly a case of reflective inference, while I said that 
in order to investigate the issue of modularity it would be best to examine cases of 
non-reflective, instantaneous inferences. 
 
10. Further considerations on modularity and  definite descriptions. 
 
 I propose to use the issue of definite descriptions to throw light on the issue of 
modularity of mind, given that cases of referential uses of definite descriptions are 
cases of non-reflective, instantaneous, automatic inferences. My view runs counter to 
what Bezuidenhout (1997) says about the non-modularity  of pragmatic processes 
involved in interpreting definite descriptions. As I said before, default inference is in 
itself a case of encapsulation, since it requires that for an infinitesimal period of time 
the inference is encapsulated and processed in isolation from contextual information. 
Contextual information flows in at a second stage, when the speaker or the hearer 
needs to assess whether it fits the context or whether it should be replaced with a 
more tailored inference. Both default inference triggering and contextual tailoring are 
processes which involve encapsulation. Contextual tailoring involves encapsulation 
in that the context considered is circumscribed  by the Principle of Relevance. 
Suppose you hear: 
 
(13) The President of the United States arrived in Italy today. 
 
 
If the sentence was uttered in 2010, you will tend to think of Obama that he arrived 
in Italy today. There is a default interpretation which presses to become an actual 
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implicature and the features of the context are such that filter this implicature in. In 
general, the feature PAST Tense reinforces the default interpretation because it is 
unlikely that the speaker wants to talk of a past event without having an actor for that 
event (see Higginbotham 2009). And the actor cannot be whoever is the President, 
but someone in particular. (13) says that there is  a president of the USA, which is 
uniquely identifiable, and Obama, who is the President, arrived in Italy. We could go 
on to say that, if there is an actor, then the actor fills the denotation of the definite 
description, and this will give us the referential interpretation by default. But if this is 
the case, then the case must be extended to progressive as well: 
 
(14) The President of the USA is flying to Italy today. 
 
Not only does the definite description trigger a referential interpretation by default, 
but the sentential frame favors this referential interpretation. The sentential frame, by 
default, can be said to play a role in promoting a default inference. Things are not 
very  different in the future, provided that the time is specified: 
 
(15) The President of the USA will fly to Italy tomorrow. 
The hearer is unlikely to interpret the sentence as meaning that whoever is the 
President of the USA will fly to Italy tomorrow, since „tomorrow‟ specifies the time 
at which the event is located, and if an event is located at a certain time, there must 
be an actor at a certain time. 
 Consider now an important example discussed by Powell (2001): 
(16) The President of the United States changes every five years. 
Powell thinks that uses of (16) are meta-representational, because we cannot clearly 
intend a referential interpretation, nor can we intend that whoever is the President of 
the United States changes every five years. According to him, (19) expresses a 
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proposition to the effect that the denotation of the descriptive  individual concept 
corresponding to „the President of the United States‟ changes every five years. 
Powell writes: 
This interpretation is accessed, as ever, via considerations of relevance: 
neither the straightforward de re or descriptive interpretations achieve 
optimal relevance, since, for both the construction of a context in which the 
interpretation yields  sufficient contextual effects  puts the hearer to too 
much processing effort. The proposed interpretation, however, yields 
sufficient contextual effects… (p. 122). 
Something along the lines of what Powell proposes must be true. However, it should 
be clear that the reason why the meta-representational interpretation occurs here is 
that the sentential frame is different from (15) and (14). We are not confronted with 
an action located at some point in time, but with a generic sentence. Since a generic 
sentence has generic validity, which is not limited to a certain period of history, we 
understand that the sentence cannot talk about a particular president, since it is 
necessary that Presidents will be different at different periods, and the possible 
interpretation „Whoever is the President changes every five years‟ cannot be the right 
one, because it would presumably say  that whoever is President changes clothes 
every five years‟ (pretty implausible, isn‟t it?). The meta-representational 
interpretation goes through because, as Powell says it yields sufficient contextual 
effects. Given that we arrive at the explicature in order to avoid implausible literal 
meanings, it is clear that it is not easy at all to defeat the inference, intentionality 
being fixed by the search for plausibility 
 Now, in the picture I am proposing,  default interpretations are tried first, but if 
they do not yield sufficient contextual effects, they must be replaced with 
interpretations that are more tailored to the context. Sentential frames signal, in 
general, when default interpretations get through or not. 
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It may be claimed that certain sentential frames promote, instead, attributive 
readings. Consider, in fact, (17), (18) and (19): 
(17) John wants to become the  President; 
(18) John wants to be the President; 
(19) John wants to be appointed professor of Linguistics. 
 
 
Clearly, these are NOT referential uses, but they are attributive ones.  In (17) John 
wants to have the attribute „The President‟ (and wants the transition from not being 
the President to being the President); in (18) John wants to have the attribute „the 
President‟ , but no mention is made to wanting the transition from not being the 
President to being the President. In (19) too John want to have an attributive  
„Professor of Linguistics‟. 
 In none of (17), (18), (19) do we have the interpretation „John wants to become 
Obama‟. The referential interpretation which, as we have seen,  usually arises as a 
default, in this case will be aborted because of  the  general belief that it is impossible 
to try and be another person, however hard one may try. Even if I wanted to, I could 
never be Obama. Would it be reasonable to say that in these cases the default is 
cancelled? Is it not preferable to say that sentential frames like „become NP‟ also 
have default interpretations, and these are different from the referential 
interpretations? This issue would not be, clearly, otiose. However, I cannot settle it 
here. Consider now the following cases, the first of which is discussed in 
Higginbotham (2009): 
 
(20) Heimson believes he is  Hume; 
(21) Heimson believes he is the President of the USA. 
 
(20) has a „de se‟ interpretation and Heimson can believe he is  Hume only if he does 
not believe that he is  Heimson (Heimson being different from Hume). It makes 
sense to utter (20) if we know that Heimson does not think of himself under the 
mode of presentation „Heimson‟ but only under a first-personal mode of presentation 
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(see also Capone 2010 a)
2
. If we replace the proper name with a definite description, 
we obtain a sentence like (21) whose preferred interpretation is not the referential 
reading, but the attributive one. In other words, we are charitable enough to use a 
minimal departure from rationality, and, thus, even on the assumption that Heimson 
is crazy and believes extravagant things about himself, we assign him the least 
extravagant belief. Believing  oneself to be the President of the United States 
involves a smaller departure from rationality than believing oneself to be another 
person (to be Obama, for example). Thus, in interpreting sentences like (21), by 
default,  we adopt  the minimal possible departure from rationality and we prefer one 
of two interpretations, if it is the least extravagant thing to believe. This charitable 
interpretation will be preferred over the least charitable interpretation.  We may 
assume that more charitable interpretations get through  by default. So, in 
interpreting (21), we first of all try the referential interpretation, but then by default 
opt for the more charitable interpretation. In calculating the explicature we go for 
plausibility and this is why we are reluctant to give up the explicature and to cancel 
it. 
 
Now, we have seen that there are departures from default interpretations. This 
means that default interpretations interact with sentential frames or other contextual 
assumptions. Does this imply that we must give up the modularity hypothesis? My 
reply is: in no way! All that the modularity hypothesis compels us to accept is that 
pragmatic processes are fast, mandatory, encapsulated. In case (21), it is clear that we 
do not consider different hypotheses and chose one and then are open to the 
possibility that the hypothesis is revised.  The interpretation process is finite and we 
utilize for this process only information that is relevant. In particular, we utilize 
information to the effect that people who believe they are the President of the United 
States are more normal than people who believe that they are Obama. And why do 
we utilize this piece of information? We do so because it helps us choose between 
the referential and the attributive interpretation. Given that our interpretative problem 
is how to choose the referential or the attributive interpretation, we bring into the 
process extra information, only on condition that it helps us resolve our original 
problem. So the basic constraint to follow in bringing in additional information is the 
                                                          
2
 Even this is the result of pragmatic interpretation, since believing to be one person  
involves a smaller departure from rationality than believing  oneself  to be two 
(different) persons  at the same time). 
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principle of Relevance which induces us to maximize information, to look for 
interpretations which maximize contextual effects, with minimal processing efforts. 
 
 We have seen that definite descriptions usually involve referential interpretations. 
However, Bezuidenhout (1997) has shown that the question of the 
attributive/referential distinction arises with pronominals too. Bezuidenhout 
considers cases like the following: 
 
(22) Sign: You are entering the Grand Canyon; 
 
(23) Bill Clinton: The Founding Fathers invested me with the power to appoint 
supreme Court justices; 
 
(24) Encountering  a huge footprint in the sand: He must be a giant. 
 
Bezuidenhout takes (22) to plausibly mean that the visitors are entering the Grand 
Canyon; (23) plausibly means that The Founding Fathers invested the American 
President with the power to appoint supreme Court Justices; (24) plausibly means 
that whoever left the footprint in the sand must be a giant.  
 These examples are of interest because they instantiate cases in which a 
pronominal, despite the fact that it has a referential interpretation by default,  is 
assigned an attributive interpretation  due to contextual assumptions. But this means 
that we must assume that pronominals have referential interpretations by default. In 
some cases, however, these default interpretations are overridden by contextual 
information. Since we know that it is not the case that the Founding Fathers invested 
Clinton with the power to appoint supreme Court Justices, we assume that what is 
meant (the m-intended point) is that the President, whoever he might be,  was given 
such powers by the Founding Fathers. Cummings leads us to believe that the 
informational increments due to contextual processing which enter into the 
interpretation are cancellable. Cancellability, according to Kasher (1991)  and to 
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Cummings (2009), attests to the fact that pragmatic inference is a truly global 
inferential process, like theory-formation. Yet, is it not clear that, when we settle on 
the reasonable interpretation of  (24), the other alternative has to be abandoned and 
the inference is hard to cancel?  So, while inferential augmentations seemed to prove 
Cummings‟ point, in fact they prove to be the most thorny cases for the claim that 
explicatures are cancellable (they also prove to be thorny for Bezuidenhout (1997) 
who claims that the processes involved in  interpreting NPs are not modular). We 
often resort to explicatures to show that an implausible interpretation is replaced by a 
plausible one. But it is this need for plausibility which militates against easy 
cancellation of the inference. And if an inference is not cancellable, then a case can 
be made for the view  that the inferential process which produced it was modular in 
nature. 
 
Before ending this chapter I would like to call attention to an example discussed 
by Allan (2010) in an important paper in which he considers reference an act of 
communication. The gist of Allan‟s view is that reference is  an act of 
communication that exploits contextual clues utilized by the hearers to  establish the 
intended referent. Being immersed in the theory of Pragmemes broached by Mey 
(2001) and  discussed further by Capone (2005), it is not surprising that Allan should 
make us see reference as a process that heavily relies on contextual clues. While 
discussing Jaszczolt‟s view that “intentionality cannot be called a process, it is an 
instantaneous „firing at‟, „targeting‟ objects, it is not an object of passing from sense 
to the referent (Jaszczolt 1999, 112) and that definite descriptions trigger, by default, 
referential interpretations,  Allan considers a counterexample. Consider: 
 
(25) The best architect designed this church. 
According to Jaszczolt this sentence in context means that Antoni Gaudì designed la 
Sagrada Familia because socio-cultural defaults are immediately activated on hearing 
the sentence. According to Allan, instead,  the preferred interpretation in this case is 
the attributive reading, while he concedes that conversational implicatures are 
responsible for identifying the referent with Antoni Gaudì. According to Allan, the 
default interpretation is attributive. The speaker means (something like): „X designed 
this church, and he is the best architect‟. What should we make of Allan‟s critical 
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position? Does it seriously militate against Jaszczolt‟s view that NPs are referential 
by default? And does this view militate against my modular view of pragmatics, 
according to which pragmatic interpretations are fast, automatic, mandatory and 
encapsulated, at least in the case of non-reflective inferences? An easy answer to this 
question would be to say that even fast, mandatory, encapsulated inferences are 
sensitive to contextual information and can evaporate if there are contextual clues 
that militate against them. However, this is NOT the point of Allan‟s objection to 
Jaszczolt. He claims that in this case the default interpretation is attributive. We 
should go along with Allan if we recognize that various examples are like (25): 
(26) The worst murderer killed Jones; 
(27) The best butcher sold us the meat for the evening dinner; 
(28) The most beautiful actress was chosen for the party; 
(29) The singer who had the best voice was asked to sing at my wedding. 
The use of superlative constructions points to a use of the definite description which 
is not referential but argumentative. By default  the utterance is given an 
argumentative role (support of another statement) and the hearer is driven to a search 
for the argumentative relation which serves as the glue for the utterances under 
consideration. Is this a case in which a default overrides another default? It is not 
impossible to argue that different sentential frames are associated with different 
defaults. Another possibility must be considered. The more materials we add to a 
definite description the more likely it is that it will be interpreted attributively. While 
we predict  referential interpretations for definite descriptions on the assumption that 
the referential interpretation is more informative, adding descriptive  materials makes 
the dimension of cognitive efforts having a greater weight and, in order to 
counterbalance this weight, the attributive interpretation prevails with the 
understanding that it has a function in determining the argumentative role of the 
utterance.  It seems to me that the considerations triggered by Allan‟s ideas on 
definite descriptions lead us to a position which is very different from the one 
embraced by Recanati  (1989). According to Recanati, in fact, referential 
interpretations require heavy contextual processing, while  attributive interpretations 
do not (and this is line with his view that definite descriptions are unmarked  with 
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respect to the feature + referential, while directly referring expressions (e.g. proper 
names, pronominals, demonstratives) are marked with respect to the feature + 
referential). In my view, following Jaszczolt, Devitt, and also Allan to some extent, 
definite descriptions  associated with certain sentential frames are marked as + 
referential by default, while other sentential frames are marked as – referential by 
default, depending on the amount of processing effort involved by the presence of 
extra linguistic materials. It is also possible to see things differently, the issue being  
not a matter of  having different defaults, but of showing that the addition of further 
descriptive materials changes the default. The role played by the Principle of 
Relevance in triggering the search for argumentative relations seems to attest to the 
fact that the default interpretation of definite descriptions is determinable through the 
principle of Relevance and, thus, the inferential process is encapsulated, as predicted 
by the modularity hypothesis. 
Conclusion 
It is not unusual to end a chapter  by voicing further questions which the discussion 
have  served to  raise. Why is it that the human mind is programmed to store and use 
„default interpretations‟?. I think this has to do with the number of simplification 
principles which the mind uses in order to reduce the complexity of the reality with 
which it  is ordinarily confronted. Default interpretations can be seen as an attempt to 
model reality in a more simplified way. Contextual augmentations have the potential 
to calibrate inferences, to make them suited to particular contexts, to add richness to 
the schematic nature of basic pragmatic  inference. 
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Chapter 5 
Further reflections on Semantic  Minimalism: Reply to Wedgwood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss a paper by Wedgwood in which he considers the possibility that Relevance 
Theory and  Semantic Minimalism share at least some common resources. I maintain that the two 
theories have different aims and different orientations and that it might be fruitful to understand why 
Cappelen and Lepore stick to Semantic Minimalism despite the various objections levelled to their 
theory. I explore certain minimalist solutions along the lines of considerations by Michel Seymour, 
adopting Jaszczolt‟s  considerations on parsimony of levels of interpretation.  I assume that logical 
forms contain certain variables which can be filled (or saturated) in context. As a final proposal, I  
broach the idea that pragmatic enrichment at the level of the predication can be avoided by resorting 
to a more complex enrichment at the level of the subject. I resort to ideas by Jaszczolt (specifically 
POL), to argue that parsimony considerations require that enrichments be operated at the level of 
subjects, if possible, thus avoiding a less parsimonious view according to which both subject and 
predicates should be enriched.  
 
 
Introduction
1
. 
In this chapter, I reply to an important and also intellectually stimulating paper by 
Wedgwood (2007). Wedgwood‟s paper is of importance because it throws light on 
certain structural similarities between theories which belong to different conceptual 
domains, philosophical semantics and cognitive pragmatics. It creates undoubtedly 
important bridges between the two theoretical constructions and provides a very 
                                                 
1
 Abbreviations are explained in Appendix 1. 
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intelligent critique of Cappelen & Lepore‟s (2005) book. My difference with 
Wedgwood is one of point of view and of emphasis. Also, in some cases I point out  
what I take to be the weakest parts of his paper. I am sure he will find a way to refine 
those points and to answer them from his point of view, which is different from 
mine. 
 
 
The three main threads of the chapter are as follows: 
 
I disagree with Wedgwood‟s conclusion that there is more common ground between 
C & L and RT then there initially appears to be; 
I disagree with Wedgwood‟s contention that RT‟s semantics is more minimal than C 
& L. 
I hold that C & L‟s tests for context-sensitivity are robust, and thus that „ready‟ and 
certain other apparently context-sensitive expressions have an abstract, context-
insensitive semantics, which needs to be coupled with null prepositional phrases, 
which, in turn, require saturation. 
 
 Semantic minimalism, as proposed by C & L (2005), has met vigorous opposition 
on the part of Radical Contextualists. Semantic minimalism is the view that the 
semantic content of a sentence S is the content that all utterances of S share in virtue 
of what is contributed by their words and the syntactic relations among constituents
2
. 
„It is the content that all utterances of S express no matter how different their 
contexts of utterance are. It is also the content that can be grasped and reported by 
someone who is ignorant about the relevant characteristics of the context in which an 
utterance of S took place‟ (C & L 2005, 143). Semantic Minimalism claims that 
semantic content is pragmatically affected only with respect to standard indexicals, 
                                                 
2
 The addition of „in virtue of what is contributed ....‟ serves to overcome the 
objection that – unless such a modification is added –  one could hold that all 
utterances of a sentence S shared content p but that p was pragmatically enriched in 
ways not traceable to standard indexicals. 
 
Wayne Davis (personal communication) considers that this definition must be 
conjoined with another definition which Cappelen & Lepore provide:  Semantic 
Minimalism holds  that “the semantic content of a sentence S is the proposition that 
all utterances of S express (when we adjust or keep stable the semantic values of the 
obvious context sensitive expressions)” (Cappelen & Lepore 2005: 2). 
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and that semantic content is propositional
3
. In his review of  C & L, Recanati (2006) 
writes: 
 Like most philosophers of language, C & L are minimalists, but they defend a 
fairly radical version of minimalism, close to the literalist ideal. Instead of 
multiplying indexical variables, as other minimalists do, they maintain that there is 
only a short list of context-sensitive expressions and that sentences not including any 
of them are such that their meaning is their truth-conditional content (Recanati 2006: 
21).  
 Recanati finds it strange that the authors should say that sentences such as „John is 
ready‟ express complete propositions, while refusing to say what these propositions 
are (in detail), apart from saying things such as that e.g. „John is ready‟ expresses the 
proposition that John is ready. 
 I agree that C & L should provide more than their mysterious story. At least one 
should try and provide some elucidations of the meaning of words such as „ready‟. 
 The main argument against contextualism is that, once we fall into the trap of 
contextualism, the kind of argument used to show that the literal meaning of an 
expression is not sufficient to provide a full proposition will also show that the truth-
conditional meaning arrived at through contextual augmentations will not be enough, 
as more stringent truth-conditions are required. Presumably this regress should be 
extended ad libitum. This is also another mysterious point. Even if we grant that the 
contextualist‟s claims generalize too much (as the authors say), this does not amount 
to saying that an infinite regress is generated.
4
  
                                                 
3
 One should note that the shared content assumption is not shared by all versions of 
minimalism (for instance, it is rejected in Borg (2004)). 
4
 One could  cast doubt on my idea that  there is a limit to what contextualist claims 
can say about meaning. Consider, for example, one of Cappelen & Lepore‟s 
examples: „John went to the gym‟. Did he go to the vicinity of the gym? Did he enter 
the gym? Or suppose we grant that the example is so heavily context dependent and 
that we resolve for this type of context-dependence, by saying that on a plausible 
interpretation the speaker meant that John entered the gym. Is not there a limit to 
what context-dependence could say about this example? Should we continue the 
context-dependent claims and say that underdetermination is there because  we are 
still able to articulate the purpose of getting into the gym? Ok. Let us suppose that we 
also provide a purpose constituent: „John went to the gym to keep fit‟. Let us suppose 
that we can go on providing implicit constituents until our imagination allows us to 
do so; is not there a limit to the number of constituents we can provide by free 
enrichment? My intuition is that it is not possible to add implicit constituents ad 
libitum, for one thing: the intentions of the speaker are finite and, thus, going on to 
add implicit constituents will not realistically model finite speaker‟s intentions. 
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Despite various shortcomings, my view is that we should very carefully  
consider what C & L say and we should at least accept the various tests they propose 
which will enable us to detect context-sensitivity or, alternatively, context-
invariance. This is not to say that the discussion of such tests should be uncritical and 
it is possible that such tests will be refined considerably in the years to come.  In this 
chapter , I try to assess the validity of some criticism levelled to C & L on the part of 
Wedgwood (2007). 
 
1. Some background. 
In this section I shall mainly outline the main arguments of the paper by Wedgwood. 
The main aim is to create the context for the discussion of very specific and technical 
points later on in subsequent sections. In this way, it will not be possible to say that I 
have extrapolated excerpts from the general discussion by focusing on parts of the 
discussion which are not particularly crucial to the general line of the discussion.  
 Wedgwood sees RT and C & L‟s positions as being compatible. If this is right, 
Wedgwood takes this to be an important result as it represents the convergence of 
two major distinct approaches: a philosophical perspective on semantics; a cognitive 
perspective on pragmatics. 
 For Cappelen & Lepore, context sharing is the very foundation of communication.  
RT has a similar concern with content-sharing, even if this is fundamentally the 
result of the combination of encoded meaning and inferential processes. 
 In general, Wedwood argues that C & L‟s outlook is essentially very similar to 
that of RT, despite C & L‟s persuasion that they differ substantially from RT. 
 According to Wedgwood, there is a difference between the two approaches. This 
is constituted by C & L‟s notion of minimal content. Nevertheless, Wedgwood 
argues that this is largely equivalent in function to RT‟s encoded meaning. For C & 
L, minimal content is propositional, while encoded meaning is not necessarily 
propositional. The key property of minimal semantic content is that it should be 
conveyed consistently across all contexts. According to Wedgwood, RT‟s encoded 
meaning does the same job. 
 Wedgwood  agrees that RT is an example of what C & L calls radical 
contextualism in so far as it accepts that the influence of context on propositional 
meaning is pervasive and ubiquitous.  According to RT, the intrinsic content of a 
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linguistic form is  systematically sub-propositional (it must be complemented by 
pragmatic inferences to achieve full propositionality). 
 Wedgwood expatiates on the basic assumptions of RT, its character as a theory 
that studies „mind-reading‟ processes in which a hearer must attempt to  infer the 
speaker‟s communicative intentions on the basis of knowing that the speaker relies 
on knowledge of the language and on propositions that are mutually manifest to both 
the speaker and the hearer. 
 Wedgwood stresses that RT considers that what is understood to be 
communicated  by any utterance is heavily context-dependent and that, despite this, 
people succeed in communicating with each other without any special problem. This 
is ensured because communication is governed by some set of principles enabling 
people to recognize the intended meanings. 
 Wedgwood considers that despite the emphasis on context, RT admits that some 
meaning is encoded in linguistic forms. The meaning encoded in a given linguistic 
form is sometimes called its „logical form‟ or, as Wedgwood prefers, „encoded 
meaning‟. 
 According to Wedgwood, RT  assumes that a speaker relies on assumptions which 
he takes to be mutually manifest in his expectation that the hearer will recover the 
intended meaning.  
 According to RT, interpretation proceeds according to a presumption of optimal 
relevance, where relevance is conceived of  as a ratio of communicative rewards to 
processing efforts. These rewards are what RTs call „cognitive effects‟ (such as 
strengthening or weakening/eliminating existing assumptions or providing new 
assumptions that interact with existing assumptions to allow new deductions). 
 Words and structures of a given language can be taken to convey a variety of 
things in different contexts, depending on the assumptions which are brought to bear  
on the interpretation process. This means that linguistically encoded forms constrain 
but do not (fully) determine what is conveyed on a given occasion. 
 According to Wedgwood, RT accepts that there are two distinct notions of 
content: the inputs and outputs of the communication process, that is to say encoded 
and inferred meanings. 
 These two levels are sufficiently similar to C & L‟s position, which they call 
semantic minimalism which combines with speech act pluralism, the idea that the 
same sentence can be used to make a variety of (different) speech acts in different 
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contexts. C & L too recognize two important levels of meaning: minimal semantic 
content and speech act content. 
 A point of divergence between C & L and RT is that the former take content 
sharing to be guaranteed by the conventional means of language. RT, instead, does 
not agree that communication involves the sharing of (identical) thoughts, but only 
similarity of thoughts.  Wedgwood takes RT to be a more realistic and 
psychologically plausible theory  as it reflects our daily experience quite accurately. 
In RT the goal of communication is to enlarge  the interlocutor‟s mutual  cognitive 
environment; that is, communication is successful  if two people can tell that they 
have some more assumptions in common than they had before. This does not require 
the exact reproduction of thoughts. 
 
 
2. Discussion of Wedgwood’s response to  C & L: general considerations on 
semantic minimalism. 
The paper  gives the impression that Wedgwood is more favourable to RT than to C 
& L while he attempts to establish the basic tenets on which the 
semantics/pragmatics debate ought to rest. In the attempt to reconcile the two 
theories, Wedgwood claims that moderate contextualism is opposed to  both   
Semantic Minimalism and   RT. It is doubtful that by creating a common enemy one 
can reconcile  two radically different theories. For one thing, moderate contextualism 
is opposed to  Semantic Minimalism only in so far (as proven by C & L) one slides 
from there into Radical Contextualism. It might be legitimate to hold the view that C 
& L are against all forms of contextualism and, in particular, they go to some length 
to distance themselves from moderate contextualists. Even if MC did not always 
slide into RC, MC already goes beyond their belief that one should  limit contextual 
influence to basic indexicals (or anyway, to elements of the Basic Set of context-
sensitive expressions). However, given that C & L accept pragmatic intrusion at the 
level of pronominals and deictic elements, in principle they should accept moderate 
forms of contextualism provided that they are reducible to usage of pronominals
5
. It 
                                                 
5
 Someone might say   that this is something that C & L explicitly reject. Yet, as my 
quotation of Seymour makes clear, it is reasonable to suppose that Cappelen & 
Lepore are compelled to accept that when linguistic structure mandates a gap, such a 
gap must be filled by saturation. Of course, it is possible to have different views of 
the various examples discussed here or by Stanley. However, in principle  Cappelen 
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is the sliding from MC to RC that crucially scares them. This assertion should be 
properly evaluated in the background of important considerations by Seymour 
(2010): 
 
In more controversial cases like “Mary has had enough” and “John is ready,” it 
could be argued that their incomplete character may be explained by the 
implicit presence of a demonstrative expression like „this‟, so that the sentences 
should read “Mary has had enough of this” and “John is ready for this.” Here I 
follow Capone‟s minimalist explanation of the nature of such incomplete 
propositions. (Capone 2008). If they could be interpreted as implicitly 
containing empty slots that can be interpreted as demonstratives or discourse-
deictic anaphoric expressions, sentences expressing incomplete propositions 
would indeed be harmless for minimalism. The reason is that they would be 
analysed as implicitly involving expressions belonging to the basic set. “John is 
tall” and “Mary is rich” would also contain implicit semantic empty slots 
calling for completion by a particular reference class. These sentences should 
perhaps be analyzed as “John is tall (relatively to this reference class),” and 
“Mary is rich (relatively to this reference class).”  Quantified statements like 
“All came for breakfast” would be an elliptical form for “All of them came for 
breakfast” (or “They all came for breakfast”), and would thus also be implicitly 
containing expressions belonging to the basic set of indexical expressions. 
(Seymour 2010: 2872). 
 
Now, it appears to me that the cases above are reducible to semantic items having 
invariant semantics combinable with implicit (or null) elements that appear to belong 
to the Basic Set as formulated by C & L. We do not need to extend the basic set and 
the assumption that sometimes expressions of the basic set are null from a phonetic 
point of view is needed independently of  the specific issue we are confronted with 
here. Nobody disputes that we have null elements such as PRO or pro in English or 
in Italian. But even in abstraction from grammatically stipulated null categories, we 
have free recourse to null categories as in „Look‟ (look at that) or as in implicit 
                                                                                                                                                                  
& Lepore cannot deny that, when there is a gap, it must be saturated; in the same way 
they cannot deny that a deictic requires saturation; a pronominal requires saturation: 
pro and PRO require semantic values, either assigned by the grammar or by the 
linguistic co-text (Rizzi 1982). 
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arguments (The ship was sunk to collect the insurance). We may use a technical term 
for such null categories. One characteristic of these silent PPs is that they are 
elements present in semantic interpretation that are recoverable from context  and 
without which semantic interpretation cannot arrive at a full proposition. 
 One might argue that  my claim that we do not need to extend the Basic Set as 
formulated by C & L is confusing, as the implicit demonstratives that I am 
advocating to account for the context-sensitivity of „ready‟, „enough‟, comparative 
adjectives, etc. must be encoded in the meanings of these expressions (thus, I must be 
suggesting that the basic Set be extended to include these expressions).  
 Now we are at a fork. Either we say that, e.g., „ready‟ is a context-sensitive 
expression, and extend the Basic Set, or we say, as I propose, that „John is ready‟ has 
a meaning equivalent to  „John is ready for that‟.6 The semantics needs to say that 
„ready‟ subcategorises for a PP (prepositional phrase), which can be explicit as in 
„John is ready for the exam‟ or left inexplicit as in „John is ready‟. Is this kind of  
uses rare in language? I would say not. I can reply „I am coming‟ to my mother who 
says I should go to lunch. When a constituent is left out, it is reconstructed on the 
basis of context and of the grammatical patterns of the expressions which are actually 
present in the utterance (Thus I say „I am coming (to the kitchen)‟ but not „I am 
coming (under the kitchen)‟). Implicit arguments are not that rare in the language, as 
there are examples such as „The ship was sunk to collect the insurance‟. (See Roeper 
1987). 
 In other words, we need no special resources other than implicit arguments, that is 
null PPs, which are recognised as a grammatical category anyway. So we do not 
                                                 
6
 Wayne Davis (personal communication) considers that we have two uses of „John 
is ready‟. In one use, „John is ready‟ is elliptical for „John is ready to go to dinner‟. In 
this case, it is not plausible to think that „John is ready‟ is elliptical for „John is ready 
for that‟. Davis thinks that the sentence is elliptical for „I am ready for dinner‟. He 
thinks we need to distinguish two views: (i)  „ready‟ is elliptical for  phrases of the 
form „ready for NP‟; (ii) „ready‟ means „ready for that‟. On (ii) „ready‟ is indexical; 
on (i), it is not indexical and does not have a meaning although it is elliptical for 
phrases that do have a meaning. According to Davis, there would not be any 
independent meaning  that „ready‟ contributes to the meaning of „ready for dinner‟ or 
„ready for that‟. 
 
My reply is that considerations of parsimony militate against Davis‟s story.  His 
story amounts to positing an ambiguity. At most we can grant an interpretative 
ambiguity. A common denominator could be „X is ready for x‟ and allow that in 
some contexts x has the force of a demonstrative. 
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need to list, as the commentator implies, „ready‟, „happy‟, „enough‟ etc. as part of the 
Basic Set. All we need to ensure is that null PPs are part of the Basic Set. 
 It could be argued that my proposal, in fact, amounts to accepting  indexical 
elements at LF, in which case it  would amount to accepting a position analogous to 
that put forward by Stanley. But SM is not a thesis according to which some 
contextual effects on propositional content are due to indexical elements at LF, but 
rather a thesis according to which propositional content is fully determined by the 
semantics of the overt material. Such contents are admittedly impoverished and 
skeletal, but they are the basics of a theory of meaning. 
 My reply to this objection is the following. Hidden indexicals as well as PRO and 
pro are present in the structure of the sentence. So there may be a minimalist  story 
according to which some minimal propositions are calculable on their basis. There 
may be another story according to which the full proposition is fleshed out by 
assigning values to variables. This story which involves saturating variables is not in 
conflict with the minimalist account. Even assuming that minimalists can account for 
problematic adjectives like „ready‟ in some other way, they would have to cope with 
the interpretation of pro and PRO. Such a story would involve variables at LF. What 
I think would characterize semantic minimalists as opposed to people like Stanley is 
the desire to keep truth-conditions minimal and to accept that things like „John is 
ready for that‟ have minimal truth conditions even if no saturation has yet occurred. 
   
3. RT and C & L on shared content. 
 Wedgwood goes on to write: 
 
I identify two key points of confusion in C & L‟s arguments. The first, dealt 
with in section 3.1, is the failure to distinguish  two kinds of assessment of the 
content of utterance: one from the addressee‟s subjective point of view and the 
other from the point of view of an omniscient third party (such as a philosopher 
or a linguist). The former plays a key role in RT, while crucial parts of C & L‟s 
arguments erroneously appeal to the latter. The second point of confusion 
concerns different kinds of content. As I discuss in section 4, the phenomena 
that C & L invoke as evidence against RT involve a kind of content that is not 
guaranteed to be shared  under any theoretical approach. Indeed, their own 
position on this kind of content – in so far as it is made explicit anywhere – is 
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shown to be equivalent to that of RT in all crucial respects. As such, it is just as 
well for C & L that their „shared content‟ arguments  against RT fail, as any 
arguments of this kind that succeeded in undermining RT would also 
undermine their own position (Wedgwood 2007:   649). 
 
The passage above is fairly problematic. It presents two points. Let us start with the 
first point.  
Let us assume that this position can be summed up as follows: 
 The difference between RT and SM is that the former claims that propositional 
content ensues from inferential processes that take place in the hearer‟s mind, 
whereas the latter maintains that such content ensues  from  meanings conventionally 
encoded in words and, hence, propositional content  persists independently of 
particular  instances of interpretation. 
 Now, it should be born in mind that  an explicature is what is taken to express the 
propositional content and that, according to Carston (2002), at least, an explicature 
has two components: a semantically encoded component and a pragmatically derived 
component. Now, if things  stand as Carston says, it is simply not true that 
propositional content ensues from inferential processes that take place in the hearer‟s 
mind. At least part of this content is provided by the semantics. The difference 
between the two positions, as I see it, is that Semantic Minimialism stresses the 
conventional layer of meaning, while Relevance theorists stress the non-conventional 
layer of meaning. It should be conceded that in some cases at least propositional 
meaning is exhausted by the conventional meaning of a sentence; in some other 
cases, propositional meaning is not exhausted by conventional meaning. 
 There is a further complication in this picture. Carston is ready to accept that 
explicatures are developments of conventional meaning, even if she insists that 
usually conventional meaning under-determines semantic interpretation (and 
pragmatics must intervene to provide full propositional forms). However, there are 
cases in which one must decide whether the contribution of the semantics must be 
discarded or modulated – ironic utterances are cases in which literal meanings do not 
reach the level of propositionality. Cases of modulation à la Recanati (2010) also 
show that pragmatic interpretation may reach the level of compositionality. 
 So, it is not necessary that the conventional meanings of words will make up the 
linguistic component of the explicature. Both the conventional and the pragmatic 
 164 
component of the explicature are subject to pre-semantic interpretation. However, it 
could be said that the conventional meaning of a sentence is where the pragmatic 
interpretation originated and that the human mind must be able to have access to the 
meanings  from which the pragmatic interpretation originated. It is also plausible that 
the human mind, in constructing the propositional form, does not throw away those 
bits of language which served to arrive at the propositional form. To make an 
example, a hearer who encounters the utterance „The lion stood in the middle of the 
square‟ will proceed from its literal meaning to its modulated meaning „The statue of 
the lion stood in the middle of the square‟. However, the sentence „The lion stood in 
the middle of the square‟ does not completely disappear from the hearer‟s mind, 
since the effect of surprise crucially hinges on that linguistic construct. Poetic 
interpretation of metaphors, likewise, does not throw away bits of linguistic 
structure, as these contribute to poetic effects. Furthermore, a person who uses a 
sentence in its modulated sense and a hearer who understands it should be able to 
keep in mind not only the final product of interpretation, but the process as well and 
the linguistic sentence from which it originated. If this is the case, then one can argue 
that it is methodologically sound to keep the semantic and the pragmatic component 
of the explicature separate, while surely one must be able to merge them (at some 
stage). 
 Wedgwood, in his paper,  characterizes RT as a theory of the hearer‟s 
interpretation. It is not clear to me whether this is a point that is crucial to 
Wedgwood‟s paper or not. It is possible that not much in the main argumentative line 
of that paper changed if this point was dropped. It is worthwhile discussing it 
nevertheless. Wedgwood‟s insistence on the hearer‟s perspective does more harm 
than good to RT. If I were challenged to provide arguments for this position, I should 
quote from Capone (2010a) on indirect reports. In this paper I arguee that the process 
of interpreting indirect reports usually (albeit not always, as interpretation process 
must adapt to special contexts) prevents the speaker (the reporter)  from using an NP 
(coextensive with the NP actually used in the original utterance) that would 
transform (and distort) the original speech act, as such a move would place excessive 
processing efforts on the hearer. Now, my understanding of indirect reports is that 
pragmatic principles constrain both the speaker‟s behaviour and the hearer‟s 
behaviour. Emphasis on the hearer would surely provide only half of the explanation 
required, perhaps the half which we need least, as after all it is legitimate to try and 
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explain the speaker‟s behaviour as well, and such a behaviour clearly incorporates 
expectations about the hearer‟s behaviour. 
 
Wilson & Sperber (2004) write: 
 
The central claim of RT is that the expectations of relevance raised by an 
utterance are precise and predictable enough to guide the hearer toward the 
speaker‟s meaning (Wilson & Sperber 2004:  607). 
 
Since an utterance creates expectations of relevance, it is licit to deduce that the 
speaker‟s linguistic behaviour is what creates such expectations. Thus, both the 
speaker and the hearer must be taken into account in an explanation of how relevance 
works. After all, when the authors say that human cognition tends to be geared to the 
maximization of relevance, „maximization‟ is best understood as maximization by 
both the speaker and the hearer. Someone might take issue  with this, by saying  that 
after all, when I  say that human cognition is geared to the maximization of 
relevance, „maximization‟ is best understood as maximization by both the speaker 
and the hearer, this is confused. Cognition does not involve a speaker and a hearer 
(only communication does).  Despite my difference of point of view, I find this 
suggestion useful. Since I am obviously writing about cognition in the context of 
communication (I admit it is not my intention to write a paper about the hearer‟s 
cognitive powers in isolation from the speaker‟s cognitive powers), it is probably 
useful to distinguish the speaker‟s cognitive processes from the hearer‟s cognitive 
processes. However, I claim that cognitive processes follow a social path of 
intentionality, which means that the speaker in uttering a sentence is busy predicting 
what is going on to happen in the hearer‟s mind, while the hearer is busy 
understanding what the speaker meant in virtue of predicting the direction of the 
hearer‟s cognitive processes. It is correct to say that communication can be 
guaranteed by the fact that both the speaker and the hearer share the same 
psychological make-up (Recanati 2010). If Recanati‟s intuition must be respected, it 
is useful to see that cognition involves a mirroring  relation between the speaker and 
the hearer.  
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 If further evidence is needed, consider the following case, from Blommaert (2005). 
Blommaert considers a misunderstanding between himself and a research associate. 
They were at a conference together and they had rooms in the same hotel. They were 
speaking Dutch. Blommaert wanted to say that his associate  had a nice balcony by a 
Dutch utterance equivalent in meaning to „You have a balcony too‟. The word for 
„balcony‟ in Dutch is ambiguous between „balcony and „breasts‟. It happened that when 
he used this utterance, there was a woman walking in the opposite direction who was 
wearing a deeply cut summer top exposing parts of her breasts. Blommaert writes:  
 
Unfortunately, my young female research associate had noticed the woman – she 
had picked up a contextualization clue – and the term „balcony‟ suddenly acquired 
a very suggestive, sexually offensive, meaning, which called for extensive 
explanation and damage repair afterwards. My words had been placed in (or made 
to point to) a context which had altered their meaning, triggering a shift from a 
descriptive, neutral meaning for „balcony‟ to an implicit, male sexist slang 
meaning (Blommaert 2005, 42).  
 
This is clearly a situation where the speaker‟s meanings (or interpretations) and the 
hearer‟s meanings (or interpretations) diverge. This is a situation that perfectly models 
Wedgwood‟s considerations on inferential work (on interpretation of utterances). Yet, I 
would like to claim that RT, like any other pragmatic theory, must not typically model 
situations in which there is a discrepancy between the hearer‟s and the speaker‟s 
interpretation. There are ways of expanding the discussion of Blommaert‟s example that 
point to the fact that the addressee somehow goes wrong in interpreting intentions. In 
fact, she follows an individual path of interpretation preferring it to the social path of 
interpretation (see Jaszczolt 1999)7. Since Blommaert never pointed or looked at the 
woman with the deeply cut top, the hearer made reference to a contextual clue which 
was only (unilaterally) presumed. The context which she brought to bear on the utterance 
was her unilateral version of the context, as she had no evidence that the context was 
                                                 
7
 Intentionality  is a notion that makes sense  of the content of speaker‟s mind during 
the process of uttering a certain sentence as correlated to the utterance.  Intentionality 
that follows the social path of interpretation is undispersed intentionality, according 
to Jaszczolt (2005). From Jaszczolt‟s picture, we understand that the hearer is 
allowed to reconstruct the speaker‟s intentions on the basis of conventions 
correlating sentences and meanings and conventions of use correlating utterances in 
context with interpretations. Speakers‟ intentions and hearers‟ reconstructed 
intentions should converge if both speaker and hearers follow the social path of 
intentionality. 
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shared. She also followed an individual path of interpretation by choosing the pejorative 
meaning, when she had a choice between a meaning which was in line with the 
intentions compatible with the public role assumed by the speaker (a professor speaking 
in the context of a conference) and a meaning which could implausibly relate to sexual 
matters. Presumably most Dutch people who use the word for „balcony‟ are in 
Blommaert‟s position; however, ordinary usage is never as ambiguous as Blommaert 
really wants to let us accept. In context, ambiguities are easily settled. One should 
always go for the social path of interpretation (as Jaszczolt 1999 says), as this is the only 
path of interpretation that can ensure that the speaker‟s and the hearer‟s meanings 
coincide. Since following the social path of interpretation involves the speaker‟s duty to 
project meaning  on the basis of conventions of language and of use and the hearer‟s 
duty to interpret intentions on the basis of the same conventions of language and of use, 
convergence is guaranteed if both the speaker and the hearer abide by their duties. 
Presumably, there are also norms of interpretation besides the Gricean maxims, like the 
ones I tentatively put forward in Capone (2004a). The most basic ones of which are the 
following:  
 
Show goodwill  
Contextualise an action in such a way that it can be interpreted positively; if you do not 
find a context in which it can be interpreted positively, then at least allow for the 
possibility of finding a context in which the action can be interpreted positively.  
 
Be constructive  
Repair your coparticipant‟s mistakes by attributing positive interpretations to her actions; 
in particular, adjust any interpretations of her actions by taking into consideration the 
intentions that can be plausibly attributed to her. 
 
There is nothing „ad hoc‟ about these norms for interpretations. The other day I 
happened to make a blatant mistake and I said „Hello‟ to a woman in the street that 
looked like an acquaintance of mine. When I realized I had greeted the wrong 
person, I apologised. What followed was a mini interaction in which the woman 
intended to play down the event – categorizing it as a thing that can happen to 
everyone. If one wonders why such lengthy elaborations follow these incidents, the 
reason is clear. People want to be seen as showing goodwill – they will let errors pass 
and they will discard pejorative interpretations when it is possible. In the light of this, 
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what is striking about Blommaert‟s example is that it may serve to model a theory of 
language which is utterly different from RT – in fact, RT too needs a mechanism to 
ensure that in the standard case the speaker‟s and the hearer‟s interpretations 
coincide (or at least do not differ vastly). Wedgwood‟s picture of RT makes it appear 
suitable to modeling situations like Blommaert‟s, while, in fact, it is suitable to 
giving us a model of Blommaert‟s situation that tells us why the hearer went wrong, 
what was wrong in the interpretation process and why the speaker was perfectly 
entitled to receive an interpretation in line with his original intentions. 
A possible objection to my approach based on good will is that a principle such 
as „Show good will‟  is surely liable to change with context.  In RT terms, the 
attitude of one‟s interlocutors is as contingent factor that may be mutually manifest 
or may be made so as a result of their behavior. Such attitude cannot therefore be 
constitutive of any general conversational principle.  
 
My reply would be the following. Although I have not said anything about 
whether the principle „Show good will‟ could be reduced to the principle of 
relevance (arguably it could be so reduced, given that such a principle would tend to 
maximize positive effects in the face of the same cognitive efforts; something to the 
same effect was argued for by Paglieri and Castelfranchi 2010 in connection with the 
maxim of Quality which could be subsumed, arguably, under the maxim of Good 
will), there are reasons to believe that „Good will‟ is rooted in our culture and has 
roots in social practices. Just to give you an example, consider the example by 
Dummett, describing the evil teacher who asks a question expecting/desiring that the 
pupil will not answer it. In Capone (2010f), I argued that this a bad teacher, one who 
does not conform to the standards of benevolent teachers, who are the norm in 
society. He does not conform to the standard because he does not conform to the 
maxim of Good Will. 
 The second point by Wedgwood  is more difficult. Wedgwood says that RT, 
despite what C & L claim, has an approach similar to C & L on content-sharing. 
Wedgwood accepts that the level of linguistic meaning due to the conventional 
meanings of words and grammar is what is common to both semantic minimalism 
and RT. Yet, the assumption that linguistic meaning is largely underdetermined 
makes the two theories sufficiently differentiated. 
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4. RT and C & L on the equation of semantic content with intuitions about 
speech act content. 
Wedgwood (2007) discusses the (so called)  Mistaken Assumption (by C & L): 
 
[The mistaken Assumption] A theory of semantic content is adequate just in 
case it accounts  for all or most of the intuitions speakers have about speech act 
content, i.e. intuitions about what speakers say, assert,  claim and state by 
uttering sentences. (C & L 2005, 53). 
 
What C & L apparently fail to recognize is that RT quite explicitly rejects this 
too (see further section 5.1). It may be that relevance theorists tend to express 
the idea in rather different terms – for example, „linguistically encoded 
semantics falls short of truth-conditionality‟ – but since truth conditions are 
conventionally identified with what the speaker is taken to be committed to 
(i.e. to have asserted, claimed or stated) by uttering some sentence, this is in 
fact just another way of expressing the very same point (Wedgwood 2007:   
654). 
 
There are interpretative complications. What does „this‟ refer to? Presumably it 
refers to The mistaken Assumption. „The same point‟ also requires disambiguation: 
does the expression refer to „the same point as The mistaken Assumption‟? Or does it 
refer to „RT quite explicitly rejects this too‟? Even after such a disambiguation, there 
is very little sense in what is said. In any case, let us see if it is true that RT too 
rejects the equation of semantic content with speech act content. Carston (1991) says 
that a sentence  such as: 
 
(1) If the king of France dies and France becomes a republic, I will be happy, but if 
France becomes a republic and the king of France dies I will not be happy 
 
has contradictory truth-conditional import  and this defect is remedied by resorting to 
inferential pragmatics. In other words, truth-conditional import is calculated by 
trying to find out what kind of assertion the speaker made, what his intentions were 
in making this assertion. It is implicit in her view that the truth-conditional content of 
(the whole of) sentence (1) is not merely based on the truth-conditional content of 
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each of the conjuncts in each conditional, but there is a truth-conditional content at 
the level of the speech act that is (globally) pragmatically conveyed. Now, while 
surely both Carston and C & L agree that the semantics of „and‟ is basically truth-
conditional, it is not clear that for Carston the truth-conditional content of  (the 
whole) of utterance (1) and the truth-conditional import based on sentential 
semantics do not come apart. Consider what Carston (1991) says about (1). 
 
As Cohen (1971) has pointed out, if and is simply truth-functional and the 
temporal and causal connotations are captured by implicatures, then (22a) and 
(22b) should be contradictory at the level of explicit content (instantiating „If P 
then Q but if P then not Q‟, and „Not P; P‟ respectively) (…). However, these 
examples are not understood as contradictory or redundant. Those who wish to 
maintain an alleged implicature analysis have to say that the alleged temporal 
and causal implicatures contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in 
which they occur (…). 
 
So a clear difference emerges between, e.g. C & L and Carston. C & L would have to 
hold the view that there is a contradiction in (1) (which is then resolved at the level 
of the speech act). Carston, instead, holds the radical view that the pragmatics of 
conjunction is integrated into truth-conditional semantics. (I discuss this problem in 
Capone 2006).  
 I understand that Wedgwood would say, at this point, that Carston, like C & L, 
differentiates between sentential meaning and the level of the speech act. For 
Carston, the sentence would have to be contradictory at the level of the sentence, but 
not at the level of the speech act. But the question now arises, how is this possible? 
Do intentions have the magivcal powers to make a sentence that is contradictory non-
contradictory? How can this be? It can be argued that the sentence is not 
contradictory in the first place. At this point, it is clear that Carston‟s account and 
NOT Cappelen & Lepore‟s account is confused. Cappelen & Lepore can argue that 
the sentence is not contradictory because it has temporal variables that can be filled 
and they are filled only at the level of the speech act. Carston, instead, projects the 
categories of the speech act to the level of the sentence.  The problem does indeed 
arise from the habit of confusing speech act categories with sentential categories. 
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 Now there is the further  question of  how we should use „semantic content‟. If we 
use semantic content in the way Wedgwood presumably does, this comes to (boils 
down to)  semantic import. If we use it the way C & L do, this comes to 
propositional import. What Wedgwood commits himself to is a rhetorical fallacy 
(called „equivocation‟; see Stati 2002, 122): he attempts to defeat C & L by shifting 
the semantic import of their words. For RT  „semantic content‟ is linguistically 
encoded content, which may fall short of a proposition (a proposition being 
recovered only once rich pragmatic processing takes place). This distinguishes it 
from semantic minimalism which claims that linguistically encoded content will be 
propositional. Thus it is clear that „semantic import‟ is understood differently by RT 
and by C & L, the former being committed by its use only to the underdetermined 
logical forms of semantics, while C & L allow a modest  dose of pragmatic intrusion. 
 Of course, on both views, it should be granted that semantics should not be 
equated with the level of speech act content, since this invariably involves recourse 
to pragmatics. But the question whether  a speech act can be associated, at least in 
some cases, with a minimal propositional content is undoubtedly important. The fact 
that we can communicate some messages in virtue of language in a non-miraculous 
way is of some concern for the theorist of language. The very notion of 
conventionality relies on the idea that we can express messages by using language. 
There should be some tough correlations between sentences and utterances – 
otherwise it would be absurd to create a sophisticated language system. Despite  
contextualists‟ attempts to place the onus of signification on contextual assumptions 
and pragmatic strategies, there is a reason why we do not have a magic word which 
in different contexts can express all the possible speech acts of the language. The fact 
that a language consists of (usually at least) fifty thousand words serves to illustrate 
that we pay a price for the possibility of expressing a potentially high quantity of 
meanings and that these meanings are structured on the basis of  words – 
conventional tools at the basis of the semiotic process.  
 Words and syntax offered us an obvious way to escape the limitations of gestures, 
acts of pointing, pragmatic resources of all types, and to do so had to be based on the 
notion that language has at least some independence  from contextual and pragmatic 
effects. This does not  mean that language cannot be modulated in context, but that in 
principle it must be possible to interpret sentences on the basis of what they 
conventionally say in virtue of conventional meanings. This independence is what  
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guarantees that human beings follow a social path of interpretation when they proffer 
utterances. This independence is, furthermore, a model on which rules of language 
use are based. Pragmatics is not chaotic but essentially follows some rules or 
principles of language use and these are available to all users of the language and 
must be followed by all. It is only through the independence of language from 
pragmatics that language users could break out of the otherwise necessary lack of 
communication. The relative independence of semantics from pragmatics, 
furthermore, is what guarantees that pragmatics can have orderly effects on top of 
semantics, what guarantees that inputs and outputs are correlated through something 
which cannot alter completely the nature of the input. If  it was possible to deform 
and freely alter the input, then nothing would prevent pragmatic effects from 
resulting into a chaotic magma in which the individual path of  intentionality could 
prevail over the social path of intentionality, thus rendering communication 
impossible.
8
 
 
5. On the equivalence of minimal semantics and encoded meaning in RT. 
 Wedgwood (2007) criticises C & L saying that, despite their attacks on RT, C & 
L‟s notion of semantic content is entirely equivalent to the notion of encoded 
meaning in RT. For the reader‟s convenience, I report an extract: 
 
When C & L speak of truth conditions, they do not refer to the common 
(moderate contextualist) conception of „what makes the proposition intuitively 
expressed by a given utterance true‟, but rather something that is indeed 
considerably more minimal. (1) is an example: 
 
(1) „Steel isn‟t strong enough‟ expresses the proposition that steel isn‟t strong 
enough (C & L 2005: 61). 
 
Though this kind of statements appears less than dazzlingly enlightening, C & 
L insist that this is the level at which truth conditions should be stated, arguing 
                                                 
8
 If am asked „What did you mean  by saying S in context C?‟, the set of my answers 
should be  heavily restricted by the rules of language  and the rules of use (the rules 
valid for the language game I am playing). I cannot reply by  saying what might be 
convenient to me at that point of the interaction. The latitude  in possible answers is 
severely restricted by the severe judgments of those  who could reconstruct the 
meaning on the basis of what I said and the context in which I said that. 
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that it is the business of metaphysics, not semantics, to determine  conditions 
on truth more precisely. The point for current purposes is that (1) shows how C 
& L‟s strict semantic argumentation – in common with their essentially 
communication-based „shared  content‟ arguments – is committed to the idea 
that the semantic content of a given sentence is just whatever remains common 
to its meaning across all contexts of utterance. There is no other way to 
interpret statements like (1). 
 By this definition, C & L‟s minimal semantic content is entirely equivalent 
to the notion of encoded meaning in RT. This is necessarily the case, since 
encoded meaning is by definition just that which is conveyed by a given 
linguistic form, irrespective of context. (Wedgwood 2007:  664). 
 
According to Wedgwood, to say that some meaning is encoded is entirely neutral 
with respect to questions such as whether it has other properties, such as being 
propositional. All logical considerations militate against the equation of sentential 
levels of meaning with propositional meanings.                                                                                                                            
 If we take what Wedgwood says seriously, we should concede that 
 
(2) The sentence „She is happy‟   ↔ It is true that Mary Thornton is happy9     
 
The sentence „She is happy‟ is equivalent to the proposition that Mary Thornton is 
happy. Presumably we have to assign the words „entirely equivalent‟, as used by 
Wedgwood, a meaning which is radically different from what the words mean, say a 
speaker‟s meaning. Would this still be correct? I  think it is not. There is no question 
that a sentence and a proposition can be equivalent. A sentence can serve to express a 
proposition in a given context, but, as pointed out by Strawson and by Frege (see 
Capone 2006), a sentence can be neither true nor false in itself, while a proposition is 
something that can be true or false. Sentences can be said to be equivalent in 
meaning only if they contain no indexical parts: alternatively we can say that two 
sentences are equivalent in meaning if, in case the indexical parts are saturated in 
exactly the same way by providing the same contextual value, uttering of one or the 
other sentence constitutes the same statement. The operation done by Wedgwood is 
                                                 
9
 It was pointed out to me that there is no way to make this equivalence statement 
syntactically correct. But this is exactly the point of the example, there can be no 
equivalence statement of this sort. 
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very curious: the author subtracts important features from the programs of C & L and 
of Sperber & Wilson, and then says that by the phrase „semantic content‟ they refer 
to more or less the same thing. The element substracted from C & L‟s program is 
partial, local intrusion, at the level of deictic terms; the one subtracted from Sperber 
& Wilson is radical intrusion, at the level of enrichment of predicate meaning. After 
these elements are subtracted, he shows that the programs are similar. What is not 
captured is the spirit of Sperber & Wilson‟s program, which is to argue in favour of 
modulation, denying that verbs like, for example, „open‟ can be assigned uniform 
truth-conditions. There is no denying that Sperber & Wilson‟s program is more 
radical. 
 One could argue that I misrepresented Wedgwood‟s point, which is that minimal 
content and encoded meaning are both assigned  the role of being the content that is 
common across contexts, and that this means that SM will need to rely on similar 
processes as RT does when it comes to explaining  how intuitive contents are arrived 
at in particular contexts. Wedgwood is not arguing that minimal content  and 
encoded meanings are logically equivalent – but rather that the roles they are 
assigned by the two theories are structurally similar. 
 Now, acceptance of the above considerations, whether or not they represent 
Wedgwood‟s stance, would surely be easier than accepting the text a fragment of 
which I quoted.  Of course, one would wonder what role structural similarity would 
play in stressing the compatibility of the two theories being compared, if, as one 
should concede, full propositionality of the minimal level of meaning is an obstacle 
in the way of reconciling the two theories. 
 The types of arguments I presented above might be replied to by saying that it is 
true that RT sees the predicate of an utterance as generally underdetermining the 
property it is used to express, but RT denies that the „completion‟ of the predicate 
contributes to semantic content. To justify my position I should argue why the 
minimal proposition should be considered the semantic content. 
 If semantic content is used as expressing the idea of the skeletal semantic 
representations of linguistic meaning, then I agree that Relevance Theorists do not 
claim that completion processes contribute to semantics. The challenge to justify the 
position that the minimal proposition should be the semantic content,  is a challenge 
for C & L, as I am simply imagining how they might defend themselves.  
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 We should start with making connections between semantics and the idea that 
semantics deals with communication and transmission of factual information. On this 
idea, two statements have the same content, not if they have roughly the same 
semantic meaning, but if they report the same situations, if they connect with the 
world in such a way that both statements are about the same situation. While surely 
we can use two different sentences to express the same situation, and we could also 
use the same sentence to express different situations, one point is clear: if two 
statements consist of the same sentences and they are proffered in the same context 
(say in replicas of the same context) and  with the same intentions, the two sentences 
will be taken to make a report on a certain state of the world. If reporting on the 
world is the basic point of communication, we should be able to choose between a 
semantics which more directly connects with the transmission of information about 
the world and a semantics in which this connection is less direct. Suppose we choose 
an indirect connection between semantics and the  purpose of transmitting factual 
knowledge. This means that semantics mainly deals with schematic information, 
which produces factual information only when coupled with contextual information. 
Is such a view plausible? And which view is more basic? The one in which semantics 
has a direct connection with the purpose of transmitting information, or the one in 
which semantics is only indirectly connected with the purpose of transmitting factual 
information? Choosing the indirect connection is a way of committing oneself to a 
view in which semantics is directly connected with some  purpose, other than 
communicating factual information. But what purpose could this be? The alternative 
that language serves merely or primarily to construct relationships does not surmount 
these difficulties, as constructing relationships somehow relates to the expression of 
information about the world (about the way we feel about others). 
 
 And why should a looser relationship between semantics and communication of 
factual information be privileged? It is as if the theorist were to accept that language 
serves the purpose of providing information, but not information about the world, 
and that information about the world must be reconstructed on the basis of 
schematic, fragmentary information. But if this is the case, we must accept that this is 
the case even for prototypical utterances. A request for water as expressed by „I am 
thirsty‟ provides or should provide bits of information, from which I reconstruct the 
puzzle of an intentional entity, the proposition that the speaker is thirsty.  
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 The idea of a possible  indirect link between language and communication makes 
it difficult to understand, for example, how the first intentional linguistic acts in the 
history of mankind were interpreted. If one starts with the idea of fragments of 
information being conveyed in semantic acts, one never really reconstructs the point 
of the utterance, as the utterance could be about ideas in general, rather than about 
facts. And yet, the intentional dimension of communication, as pointed out by 
Jaszczolt (1999) is a basis for all communication, a default principle of 
communication even. The very primitive acts of communication were interpreted as 
being about the world, and not about abstract ideas (and this made it possible for the 
hearers to utilize contextual clues for interpretation), but this could be possible only 
if  there was perhaps an a priori principle, working in language (that is to say 
operative in the minds of language users) like the one produced by Jaszczolt, in 
favour of the intentionality of linguistic acts. It is true that in another book  Jaszczolt 
(2009a) opts for merger representations in which linguistic and non-linguistic 
representations merge, to form a propositional dimension, but this is not to deny that 
prototypical, or primitive linguistic acts were devoid of intentionality or that in no 
cases the semantic representation corresponds to a proposition. I think it is clear that 
Jaszczolt is more interested in the complicated cases, but this is not like denying that 
there are simple cases. 
 
6. A problem for semantic Minimalism: indexicals. 
Wedgwood (2007) writes: 
 
C & L‟s self-imposed commitment to the propositionality of minimal semantic 
content forces them to make this content less minimal than it could be (…). It 
also introduces a difference between their conception of minimal semantic 
content and RT‟s encoded meaning, as Carston (2007) stresses.  In order to 
stick to what they recognize to be propositional meanings, C & L have to 
assume that minimal semantic content contains no unsaturated indexicals or 
ambiguities. The problem is that this immediately makes minimal semantic 
content  something other than that which is shared across different contexts: the 
saturation of indexicals is a context-dependent process. (Wedgwood 2007:  
666). 
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Let us see how this works in practice. Consider the following utterance: 
 
(3) She is happy. 
 
((3) is uttered by Mary who points to Ann when she says „she‟). 
According to C & L we could report Mary‟s utterance by saying (4): 
 
(4) Mary said that she is happy. 
 
Such reports can be uttered on the basis  of  the identity of the referent of the 
pronominal. Suppose this is a rule constraining indirect reports. The main question is 
whether there is identity of content between (3) and the reported part of (4), 
assuming identity of the referents of „she‟ in the two utterances. If there is such an 
identity (and we suppose the answer is positive), then C & L‟s theory is a theory of 
abstract semantic content. The fact that semantic content is propositional is no 
impediment to having a view of content that is context-invariant. Propositionality 
simply means that we keep fixed certain elements which are tied to context while we 
use the tests for context-invariance. If, by keeping fixed the contextual contribution 
of pronominals, we obtain an invariant interpretation of the sentence, the results of 
this analysis will contribute to semantics and not to pragmatics. The fact that the 
semantic content of the sentence is propositional (in that it incorporates the semantic 
interpretation of indexicals and pronouns) is hardly a reason for thinking that C & L 
reject minimal semantics or for thinking that RT is a more minimal theory of 
semantic content. Since the contribution of context at the level of pronominals is 
factored out in the attempt to show that the reported utterance in an indirect report 
has the same content as in the original utterance, the theory has the level of 
abstraction required. Furthermore, it is simply not true that RT is a more minimal 
semantic theory simply because it factors out the contextual interpretations of 
pronominals, given the radical claim that the predication in an utterance  is largely 
underdetermined (e.g. „The car is red‟). We do not grant that RT is more minimal at 
the level of pronominal interpretation, but even if we granted that, given that the 
predication act is largely underdetermined under RT, Wedgwood should be 
discouraged from arguing that RT is a more minimal semantic theory than C & L. 
 At this point the following objection should be answered: 
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 But why couldn‟t RT just argue in parallel that the contextual contribution 
required by „red‟ is „factored out‟ – you get an invariant interpretation of „that is red‟ 
so long as you fix both the referent of „that‟ and the way in which the object satisfies 
„red‟. The point is that RT holds both pragmatic enrichments together, indexical 
saturation and predicate  explicature). The question Wedgewood is pressing is why C 
& L treat the former as part of minimal semantics and the latter as part of pragmatic 
communication. 
 The answer to this question is very simple. C & L grant that pragmatic intrusion is 
indispensable when it comes to pronominals and similar expressions drawn from the 
„Basic Set of genuinely context-sensitive expressions‟, while they do not grant that 
pragmatic intrusion occurs at the level of predicates such as, e.g., „red‟. Given the 
asymmetric status of pronominals and predicates, it does not come as a surprise that 
the pragmatics of pronominals is somehow incorporated into minimal semantics, 
while the pragmatics of predicates is relegated to the level of speech act 
interpretation. Presumably, the reasoning implicit in this asymmetric treatment is that 
pronominals and other deictic expressions do not contribute much to the thought 
expressed without pragmatic intervention, that is without relating the sentence to the 
context in which it is uttered. There is no thought at all, as Frege would say, without 
anchoring deictic elements to a given context. So, presumably in this conception 
there is an implicit equation between knowing the semantics of a sentence and 
knowing the thought it would express. A good question to ask is whether there could 
be genuine thoughts without anchoring deictic elements and pronominals to a 
context. The thought expressed by (5) 
 
(5) She went to the cinema 
 
cannot be the thought that a female person went to the cinema, since that would be 
expressible through (6) as well: 
 
(6) A woman went to the cinema. 
 
And (5) is different from (6). 
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A minimal semantics without provision of referents for pronominals would not 
describe thoughts, but would simply provide skeletal elements for the provision of 
thoughts. Instead, if my understanding of C & L is correct, they want to equate 
semantics with the vehicle for expressing thoughts, not just fragments of thoughts.  
 
 
Wedgwood writes: 
 
It is particularly strange that C & L should include the referents of overt 
indexicals in that meaning that is infallibly shared, since this is one of the most 
obvious sources of misinterpretations in language use (given an utterance of 
He’s ready, surely a response like Who? Mark or Paul? is at least as likely as 
Ready for what?; yet, according to C & L‟s position, the former question 
should be pre-empted by „shared content‟ while the latter is not). (Wedgewood 
2007:  666). 
 
The point is exactly the opposite of the one made above. C & L admit that there is a 
tightly restricted class of genuine context-sensitive expressions, such as pronominals, 
which have variable interpretation in relation to the actual context of use and 
linguistic expressions that are not context-sensitive. They deny that „ready‟ is a 
context-sensitive expression.  
Yet, one might insist that Wedgwood is exploiting C & L‟s claim that „ready‟ is 
not context sensitive but that „he‟ is. Given C & L‟s view, the referent of „he‟ makes 
it into the shared semantic content while the determination of „ready‟ doesn‟t, yet as 
Wedgwood points out hearers often don‟t know who is being referred to by an 
utterance of „he‟ (just as they may not know „ready for what‟) – but C & L‟s position 
should rule this out – if we grasp shared content for C & L we should know who the 
referent is.  
There is no doubt that some hearers may be in a position not to know the 
referent of a pronominal. Suppose I am persuaded that behind me there is a picture of 
George Washington. It has been there for twenty years, and I expect it to be there 
while I am speaking. However, Mr Wedgwood to prove that C & L‟s theory is wrong 
suddenly removes the painting, while  I say to my guests: „He has a beautiful jacket‟. 
When I turn round to point to the painting, I find out that George Washington is no 
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longer there. My referential intention, as Wedgwood would want to say, cannot be 
understood correctly by my interlocutor. Is this situation the norm? Is this the way 
we ordinarily use pronominals and deictic expressions? I would say it is not. It is 
possible that the addition of a semantic clause restricting the use of pronominals to 
accompanying demonstrative gestures is too strong. However, surely there is a norm 
preventing speakers from using pronominals unless the hearer can identify the 
intended referent of the pronominal through contextual clues that are unambiguous. 
Suppose I am a general reviewing an army. There are thousands of soldiers before 
me. Could I legitimately use: „He is clever‟, unless there are contextual clues that 
enable the hearer to identify the referent? Presumably I could not. 
So, while I agree that unlike predicates, pronominals do not have a content that 
can be grasped without recourse to a context, there must at least be some basic 
agreement with C & L that pronominals belong to shared meanings, in the sense that 
given the semantic resources available to speakers/hearers and knowledge of rich 
contextual clues, one is able to understand the meaning of linguistic expressions in 
context.  Presumably to work perfectly, C & L „s view would have to be allied with a 
view of pronominals and indexical expressions in which semantics strictly regiments 
the content of a linguistic expression through a rule to the effect that pronominals 
and indexicals should be accompanied with unambiguous demonstrative gestures. 
Whether such a theory is desirable or terribly problematic is a topic for a different 
paper. 
 There is, obviously,  the problem of how a context-sensitive expression can 
contribute a context-invariant meaning. But is this a real problem for semantics? 
While it is certainly true, as Wedgwood says, that the referent of  a pronominal is 
provided by context, this is not to say that the semantics of pronominals cannot be 
furnished in a context-free manner. A very straightforward method is to let the 
pronominal refer to a thing x and to provide the semantics of the pronominal 
expression through a conditional: 
 
(7) He is happy 
 
is given the following semantics: 
 
(8) If „he‟ refers to x, then „He is happy is true‟ just in case x is happy. 
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Following this reasoning, we can now understand how C & L can answer 
Wedgwood. The minimal semantics of a sentence includes the referents of 
pronominals and still remains context-invariant. To furnish the referent of a 
pronominal is just to furnish a specific value to „x‟. Replacing this value for x in (8), 
we obtain: 
 
(9) If „he‟ refers to John, then „He is happy‟ is true just in case John is happy. „He‟ 
refers to John.  
 
The second clause of (9) is provided through pragmatics, but this does not destroy 
the context-invariance of the minimal semantics of  (8), since this is perfectly 
represented in the fist clause in (9). All C & L should do is  use context-invariant 
semantics and  couple it with a specification of the value of the variable involved in 
the logical form of the minimal semantics. 
 
7. Indirect reports as a test. 
 
 Wedgwood discusses „Indirect reports‟ as a way of testing intuitions about 
context-sensitivity. According to C & L indirect reports are a good test for context-
sensitivity, as genuinely context-sensitive expressions, such as indexicals, as used in 
the original utterance, simply cannot be preserved in the indirect report. Here is an 
example: 
 
(10) John: I am happy; 
(11)  John said that I was happy. 
 
The sentence (11) cannot be a correct indirect report of (10), but something like (12) 
is required: 
 
(12) John said that he was happy. 
 
On the contrary, if  a lexical item (say one in the predication) is not context-sensitive, 
it can figure both in the original utterance and in the indirect report, as the new 
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context of the indirect report does not change its interpretation. Here is an example 
from C & L (not a good one, actually): 
 
(13) John: Mary is ready. 
(14) John said that Mary was ready. 
 
Furthermore, suppose that „ready‟ was used in two (completely) different contexts, as 
in (15), (16), then it would still be correct to make the report as in (17): 
 
(15) John: Mary is ready (for the exam); 
(16) Ted: Mary is ready (to catch  the train). 
(17) Both John and Ted said that Mary was ready. 
 
This, however, should be understood as a quotational usage. The indirect reports 
promotes some common denominator interpretation, even if the two sentences were 
interpreted quite differently. I will return on the equivocation that allows C & L to 
obtain the wrong effects with the test in the case of „ready‟. 
 
However, Wedgwood (2007) writes: 
 
C & L‟s reasoning here rests on a crucial empirical question that they do not 
investigate: do indirect speech reports work consistently in this way?  In 
particular, can we really make reliable judgements of truth and falsity about 
such reports? Note that this consistency is crucial to C & L‟s arguments; if the 
answer to the question is no, we can no longer assume that the complement of 
„said‟ in such cases is necessarily propositional. In that case, being the 
complement of „said‟  simply is not a test for propositionality – with the 
consequence that indirect speech reports cannot be used to argue for the 
propositionality of encoded meaning that putatively distinguishes semantic 
minimalism from RT.  
 There are various ways in which indirect reports of the kind that C & L 
rely on can fail to report a single proposition. For example, being the 
complement of „said‟ does not force disambiguation of homonyms. I can 
truthfully utter the sentence  „In C1 and C2, Nina said that John went to the 
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bank‟  even if I know that Nina was referring in C1 to the financial bank and in 
C2 to the watercourse bank. (…) Significantly, one may easily do this with 
regard to C & L‟s example also: In C1 and C2, Nina said that John is  ready – 
but in C1 she meant that he is prepared for the exam, while in C2 she meant he 
has his raincoat on. (Wedgwood 2007:  669). 
 
It is legitimate to raise such doubts. In fact, if indirect reports merely allowed 
quotational interpretations, then their efficacy would be destroyed. As Wedgwood 
says, they would no longer be efficient tests for propositionality. However, the very 
examples he uses persuade us that indirect reports like (18) 
 
(18) In both C1 and C2, Nina said that John went to the bank 
 
made on the basis of utterances such as (19), (20) 
 
(19) Nina: John went to the bank1 (financial institution) 
(20) Nina: John went to the bank2 (river course bank) 
 
are not licit. I think everyone agrees that (18) should be different from (21): 
 
(21) In both C1 and C2 Nina uttered the words: „John‟ „went‟ „to‟ „the‟ „bank‟ 
in this order. 
 
It would not even be licit to utter (22): 
 
(22) In both C1 and C2 Nina uttered the sentence „John went to the bank‟. 
 
In fact, given the homonyms „bank1‟ and „bank2‟ there is not a single sentence, but 
there are two different sentences having distinct meanings. 
 
Wedgwood (2007) also writes: 
 
Similarly, C & L‟s test fails to disambiguate use/mention ambiguities.  
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My intuitions are completely different. So called use/mention ambiguities are not 
really cases of ambiguity in the written language, where inverted commas are 
conventionally used to make reference to mentions of a lexical item. Oral language 
uses different ways of marking inverted commas (...). Given these facts, it would 
simply be absurd to use indirect reports in ways that ignore the use/mention 
distinction. (Wedgwood 2007, 669). 
 
The attack on indirect reports as a test for a common meaning denominator is 
vaguely reminiscent of another attack on Cappelen &  Lepore by Stanley (2005a). 
Stanley‟s position is misguided, because it focuses on a specific problem in C & L‟s 
approach and draws generalizations about a more general point. Stanley, after noting 
C & L‟s position according to which 
 
The semantic content of a sentence S is the content of all utterances of share (p. 143) 
 
moves on to ponder on the consequences of this statement.  He writes: 
 
This passage is rather unclear. Is it the content that all assertions of S express, 
no matter how different their contexts of utterance? If so, “every bottle is in the 
fridge” has no semantic content relative to any context, since there is no one 
proposition that is asserted by every utterance of the sentence (and certainly 
not, as we have seen, the proposition that every bottle in the universe is in the 
fridge, since this is never asserted). If the common content of all utterances of a 
certain sentence is not the content of any genuine speech act, what is the 
motivation for thinking that common contents are always genuine propositions, 
rather than just Recanati‟s “semantic schemata”? (Stanley 2005: 143). 
 
However, this scepticism is simply defeated if one notices that C & L may well be 
wrong about quantifier domain restriction (a story like  Stanley‟s  being more 
palatable), while being right in the general claim that the semantic content of a 
sentence is the content that all utterances of S share (Perhaps the addition is required 
that we should confine ourselves to serious, rather than non serious uses). 
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 To go back to Wedgwood, one of the merits of C & L is to say that we should 
extrapolate some common denominator meanings from the various and disparate 
uses of  some linguistic (sentential) expression. It is essential for this virtue of the 
theory to survive that both Wedgwood‟s and Stanley‟s contentions be silenced. 
 We should now reflect on the meaning  of „ready‟. Contextualists assume that 
„ready‟ is more or less interpreted as „ready for that‟. This would explain why in a 
context „John is ready‟ means that he is ready for the exam, while in another context 
it means  that John is ready for the tennis match. I claim that contextualism along 
these lines does not seriously jeopardise C & L‟s work, as they, after all, admit that 
there is a restricted class of context-sensitive expressions, which they call „The Basic 
Set‟.  Pronominals belong to this class. But are there ways to make sense of C & L‟s 
claim that „ready‟ is not context-sensitive? It should at least be possible to discover 
that „ready‟ is, semantically, not context-sensitive as contextualists say. I think it is 
useful to consult the Longman Dictionary of the English Language. The dictionary 
lists a number of senses, some of which appear to be more context-sensitive than the 
others. Let us start from the least context-sensitive: 
 
„spontaneously prompt‟ (always has an answer); 
„Notably dexterous or skilled‟ (he is very ready craftsman); 
„Immediately available‟ (had little ready cash) 
„prepared for immediate use‟ (dinner is ready‟) 
 
Then we have some context-sensitive senses: 
 
„forward or presumptuously eager‟ (he is very ready with his criticism) 
„prepared mentally or physically for some experience or action‟. 
 
The real problem is to do with „ready‟ what one should do with „open‟, that is to say 
account for the various distinct uses of this word. Suppose we choose a sense such as 
„prompt‟ („disposed to act as occasion demands‟) as the basic sense from the others 
can be derived pragmatically. At this point, we can easily explain how  
Intercontextual Disquotational Indirect Reports make this  basic sense emerge as a 
context-invariant one.  
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I should clarify that I am not saying that „John is ready‟ is context-independent, 
but I am arguing that there is a meaning of „ready‟ which allows C & L to obtain the 
wrong results from the test of indirect reports. 
 Someone might criticise my views suggesting that by treating „ready‟ and 
„enough‟ as having hidden indexical components, I am actually rejecting the results 
of C & L‟s tests. This suggestion is too quick, and to some extent resembles 
Stanley‟s tactic to generalise from a local problem to a general problem. It should be 
admitted in principle that even if there is a reliable testing procedure, the person 
effecting the test may be wrong in executing it. We should remember that tests 
should be used judiciously, as they depend, after all, on intuitive judgements. In the 
case of „ready‟, C & L strain their tests of context invariance. When we say that Julia 
and Mary are both ready, given that Julia is ready for her English exam and Mary is 
ready for her maths exams, we are certainly right on the interpretation that they are 
both well prepared for their respective exams, but saying that they are both ready in 
the sense that they are both ready for x, x being the (specific) thing each intends to 
do is surely false. It may very well be that there is an equivocation of meanings in the 
way C & L use  this test, but this does not mean that all users of the test should be led 
away by things such as equivocation (of meaning).
10
 
 
 
8. Justification for Semantic Minimalism. 
Last, I want to discuss Wedgwood‟s following assertion: 
 
Consider again the kinds of observation that C & L claim make shared context 
indispensable: co-ordinated action, collective deliberation, linguistic 
communication justifying beliefs, holding people responsible for what they 
                                                 
10
 As Zwicky & Sadock (1975: 14) say, “If the semantic representation of certain 
sentences lack specification of some piece of meaning, then the applicability of 
transformation to them cannot possibly depend on whether or not this piece of 
meaning is present. If a sentence is unspecified with respect to some distinction, this 
lack of specification must be preserved by every transformational operation. But if a 
sentence is ambiguous, then it is possible  for a transformation to apply in some but 
not all, of the cases, so that the effect of the transformation is to eliminate one or 
more understandings of the sentence”. In our case, the crossed reading can be 
obtained because the underspecified interpretations are preserved by the 
transformation of conjunction reduction. Since under-specification is preserved, the 
crossed readings can obtain. 
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say, and so on. Is minimal semantic content capable of supporting such things? 
If so, then an engineer who says „Steel is strong enough‟ is held responsible 
just for that proposition (if we call it that) which is expressed by any and every 
utterance of this sentence. If the roof collapses, it should be considered 
reasonable of the engineer to point out that I just said steel is strong enough; I 
never said strong enough to support the roof. Such utterances would usually be 
described  using words other than „reasonable‟. (Wedgewood 2007: 670) 
 
While in principle we could agree with Wedgwood that more than minimal 
semantics is required for language to stimulate coordinated action, two things ought 
to be noted here: 
C & L might reply that minimal semantics is like the pillars and beams of a 
house; the house can‟t exist without them. So communication is not possible without 
minimal semantics. Coordinated action as triggered by language implies a shared 
understanding of at least the basics of the utterances: that is to say their minimal 
semantics.  
Second, in replying specifically to the point about the falling roof, an engineer 
who says „Steel is strong enough‟ presumably means that „steel satisfies  one‟s 
needs. Then the pragmatics of his utterance will intervene in securing the 
interpretation that steel is strong enough for the roof. However, even if pragmatics 
did not intervene to secure such a specific interpretation, the engineer cannot be 
accused of incompetence or of having said something irrelevant. 
 
9. On the compatibility between Radical Contextualism and Semantic 
Minimalism 
Jaszczolt (forthcoming) claims that there is compatibility between Semantic 
Minimalism and Radical Contextualism. The compatibility in question mainly stems 
from the fact that (or as a consequence from the fact that) she abandons the syntactic 
direction principle, that is to say the assumption that the enriched propositions 
obtained through radical pragmatics should be considered developments of logical 
forms provided by sentential semantics. In other words, if I understand Jaszczolt 
well, in many cases, arriving at an enriched proposition is not a matter of taking a 
logical form as a point of departure and arriving at an enriched logical form, but it is 
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a matter of going beyond what the initial logical form says, of bypassing that logical 
form. Consider the examples 
 
(23) You are not going to die 
(24) Child: Can I go punting? 
Mother: You are too small 
 
It seems implausible that the hearer goes from the literal logical from „You are not 
going to die at t‟ to the non-literal „You are not going to die from that cut‟ or that  in 
(24) the hearer first recovers „You are too small‟, whatever its context-invariant 
meaning ought to be, and then moves on to the contextualised meaning „You are too 
small to go punting‟. 
 There are also many other examples, from Capone (2009), where recovering an 
explicature is not just a question of developing a logical form, but is a question of 
bypassing it altogether: 
 
(25) Sicily is a triangle 
 
is one such case.  In this case the enrichment is not of an augmentative type, but of a 
subtractive type, as it is implausible that Sicily is a literal triangle. So, it appears that 
the assumption that an explicature should be a development of a logical form in the 
sense that the logical form it starts with appears intact in the explicature must be 
abandoned. 
 I am aware that more than one approach will be available to this example, so I 
propose to use other examples, to show that the logical form of a sentence can be 
bypassed altogether in semantic interpretation. Cases of irony  can prove that what is 
literally said need not be literally expressed and that, therefore, all cases in which a 
literal meaning is projected, heavy pragmatic processing is required. 
 The point by Jaszczolt that implicatures and explicatures can be calculated at the 
same time in the same merger representation is a bit more contentious. One of her 
best examples is the following: 
 
(26) Everybody is going to Egypt this spring. 
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She claims that the main point of the assertion (the primary meaning) is that the 
interlocutors should consider going to Egypt this spring. She argues that primary 
meanings should be allocated a prominent place in a contextualist theory of meaning. 
That preoccupation, for Jaszczolt, seems to be incompatible with the syntactic 
direction principle. This point seems to me to be less well established, UNLESS we 
take her claim to be that a merger representation merges information deriving from 
explicatures and implicatures and that in many cases the literal interpretation is 
overridden by contextual considerations. 
 Let us return to the compatibility between semantic minimalism and radical 
contextualism. Once we agree with Jaszczolt that minimal semantics lacks 
psychological plausibility, a point that I think is conceded by C & L (2005), there are 
no problems in understanding how contextual considerations can override minimal 
semantics and how minimal semantics is absorbed and transformed into richer and 
often radically different propositional forms. 
 According to Jaszczolt, Semantic Minimalism is a project which is busy with 
truth-conditions at the sentential level, while radical pragmatics is busy with truth-
conditions at the utterance level. In the same way in which semantic minimalism 
adheres to a compositionality principle, radical pragmatics adheres to a 
compositionality principle at a different level, given that the enriched propositions 
contain constituents which are not present at the level of logical form. It goes without 
saying that the compositionality principle employed in radical pragmatics is not a 
level of syntactic combination that belongs to surface structure (or to the logical form 
of the sentential semantics), but presupposes a level of syntactic combination that is 
(in principle) usable at the level of surface structure (or of the logical form of the 
sentential semantics). 
 According to Jaszczolt (2005), merger representations have the character of 
compositionality. This is to be accepted, as some implicit constituents, hence 
structure,  is imposed on merger representations; we should suppose that the 
combination of certain semantic interpretations with certain pragmatically supplied 
constituents should follow compositionality. Consider the following example: 
(27) That piano is better. 
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In (27) there is a missing  constituent, and this one must combine with „That piano is 
better‟. Now, in examples like (27) the kind of compositionality which the merger 
representation displays is exactly the same which the full sentence would exhibit. 
(There are, of course, infinite discussions on whether (27) is a complete sentence or 
not; what is incontrovertible is that the full alternative to (27) has the same 
compositional structure as an utterance of (27)). However, Jaszczolt claims that in 
some cases there are some mismatches between the sentence and the utterance, and 
that while compositionality cannot be held at the level of the sentence, it can be held 
at the level of the merger representation. The best examples of this mismatch are 
belief reports. Jaszczolt‟s ideas derive from Frege. Compositionality, at the level of 
the sentence, in the case of (28) breaks down. 
(28) John believes that Mary is happy. 
It breaks down because, by the compositional picture, when one replaces „Mary‟ 
with a coreferential NP, one obtains (or may obtain) a false statement. So, a picture 
in which we compositionally build up the meaning of the sentence/statement by 
replacing each constituent with the appropriate value it has in context breaks down 
because such a compositional picture would require the possibility of substitution of 
identicals in slots associated with, say, proper names. At the level of the merger 
representation, further structure is provided, that quickly shows how it comes about 
that substitution of identicals is not always licit in intensional contexts. (Implicit 
modes of presentations are provided and integrated into the semantics, say as 
appositives, following Capone (2008)). Belief reports are ideal candidates for the 
task of showing that compositionality obtains at the level of merger representations. I 
would add that „de se‟ beliefs are even better for this purpose11. Although my views 
on belief reports do not exactly coincide with Jaszczolt‟s, we agree that the so called 
scope ambiguities do not resolve the problem of compositionality.  In fact, assuming 
                                                 
11
 My paper on „de se‟ attitudes (Capone 2010b) shows that „de se‟ constructions are 
cases of intrusive constructions à la Levinson. „De se beliefs‟ like „John remembers 
being in Oxford‟ are beliefs about the self – they  have first-personal readings which 
are truth-conditionally different from „de re‟ readings. In my paper I argued that the 
mode of presentation „I‟ is implicit in de se attitudes and furnished through pragmatic 
intrusion. Pragmatic Intrusion is also instantiated in  the internal dimension of PRO 
in „de se‟ constructions. See also Lewis 1979. 
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scope ambiguities, it is possible to differentiate the „de re‟ and the „de dicto‟ reading 
of a belief report  
(„de re‟ reading: John is such that Mary believes of him that he is clever) 
(„de dicto‟ reading: Mary believes that John is clever). 
However, a problem to be noted is that the „de re‟ reading entails the „de dicto‟ 
reading, and thus scope ambiguities do not explain at all the problem of opacity 
(there would be some kind of circularity). It is best to accept, as Jaszczolt does, that 
compositionality is at the level of merger representation, where an implicit mode of 
presentation motivates opacity in the case where intentionality is dispersed (the 
strongest level of intentionality correlating with „de re‟ readings, according to 
Jaszczolt).  Does this amount to saying that the compositionality principle applies 
only at the level of merger representations? Should we reject the compositionality 
principle at the level of sentential semantics? (However, it should be born in mind 
that sentential semantics often consists of logical forms that do not match with the 
veneer of sentence structure). There is a sense in which the reply to this question is 
positive. If we do semantics in the merger representation, compositionality in the 
merger representation is all that is required (Jaszczolt 2005, p. 72).  However, I also 
sympathize with more traditional semanticists, who claim that compositionality is an 
important characteristic of semantics. I can comfort them by saying that, after all, 
their semantics is done at a level of abstraction, thus it is methodologically correct to 
attribute compositionality to sentence structure, even if it  has  been abstracted away 
from the merger representation, for methodological reasons. The compositionality we 
find in the sentential semantics percolates to the semantics from the merger 
representation. However, since semantics is done, for methodological reasons, in 
abstraction from the merger representation, it appears as if the compositionality is 
there in the semantics. And in a sense, perhaps not the one by Jaszczolt, it is in the 
semantics. 
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10. A final note 
In this section I will sketch a solution to some of the problems discussed, while I 
cannot go into the details of such a solution. It appears to me that semantic 
Minimalism seeks to establish an asymmetry between subject and predicate 
positions. Subject positions are invariably subject to pragmatic intrusion, and there is 
nothing one can do about it. Furthermore, pragmatic intrusion provides a constituent 
of the proposition, whether minimal or at the level of speech act theory. Without 
such a constituent there can be no minimal proposition, so Cappelen & Lepore 
cannot really provide minimal semantics without such constituents. Since subject 
positions are usually positions for reference assignment and reference assignment is 
pragmatic (having to resort to a number of contextual clues), there is no expectation 
that the subject position can provide a constituent of thought without referential 
resolution; and there is no expectation that there can be a minimal thought without 
referential resolution and the assignment of a constituent to the subject position. The 
predicate position, instead, has got a different status. It is true that a predicate is not 
immune to pragmatic enrichment; but it is not as dependent on pragmatic intrusion as 
the subject. Many cases have been provided to try to show that predicates cannot 
really furnish minimal truth-conditions. However, I am not persuaded that these 
cases are really against Cappelen and Lepore. Consider the case of  „The lemon is 
yellow‟. This may well require pragmatic intrusion, but only at the level of the 
subject. We may enrich the proposition up to „The lemon‟s peel is yellow‟. Since the 
pragmatic intrusion is required at the level of the subject, the predicate is not 
affected. Could we extend a similar treatment to „John is ready‟? Presumably, we 
need to transfer the pragmatic intrusion from the predicate to the subject. One way to 
do so is through an implicit apposition constituent: „John [who must take the exam] 
is ready‟.  We could extend this position further by positing a null prepositional 
phrase as sub-categorized by „ready‟. We thus obtain „John [who must take the 
exam] is ready [for it]. And now we have obtained a considerable advantage. While I 
previously thought that „ready‟ subcategorizes the constituent „for that‟, which is 
fundamentally deictic,  the prepositional phrase „for it‟ is anaphoric. This means that 
the constituent [who must take the exam] is to all effects part of what is said, given 
that it is indispensible for anaphoric resolution. This could explain, presumably, why 
„Mary is ready‟ cannot really mean Mary is ready for that, for that and for that. The 
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enrichment process is constrained and part of its constraints is that one should make 
sense of a sentence by enriching the subject first and one can enrich the predicate by 
anaphoric resolution through materials provided as apposition in the subject. 
Furthermore, one cannot say „Mary is ready and not ready‟ meaning „Mary is ready 
for that and not ready for that‟. This presumably follows from the fact that the 
prepositional phrase „For it‟ is anaphoric and thus it would be a contradiction if the 
first occurrence of „it‟ and the second occurrence of it both referred back to the same 
constituent. „Mary [who must take an exam] is both ready [for it] and not ready [for 
it]. 
If I am right about these data, then we have bumped into the deep question of 
constraints to pragmatic enrichment and where they come from. But now we must 
ask the following questions. Do all predicates follow the same pattern as „ready‟?  
Why is it that predicates can be enriched only through anaphoric resolution, while 
subjects can be enriched through provision of apposition constituents (that is to say 
in a really free way)? Why is it  that indexicality  cannot occur in predicates (unless 
use is made of explicit deictic pronominals), while anaphoric pronominals are 
tolerated?  In reply to the first question, it appears that things are very much the same 
with „happy‟. We cannot easily say „Mary was happy but unhappy‟, meaning „Mary 
was happy about this but unhappy about that‟, as we have the same anaphoric pattern 
as before: „Mary [who found her jewel] was happy about it but unhappy about it. It is 
also clear that somehow the anaphoric pronominal incorporates a reference to the 
event of finding Mary‟s jewel, which compels the semanticist to incorporate the 
event in the apposition close through a device such as „Mary, who was such that 
there was an event of finding her jewel…‟. Now I address the question of why 
pragmatic intrusion in the predicate appears to be subordinate to pragmatic intrusion 
in the subject and why it can occur through anaphora and not through deixis. A 
tentative answer has to do with a principle which has been brought to my attention by 
Jaszczolt (1999): Do not multiply levels of interpretation. This seems to correspond 
precisely with Cappelen and Lepore‟s notion of semantic minimalism, in which 
intrusion is granted for subjects but not or only minimally for predicates. In other 
words, POL (Parsimony of levels of interpretation) compels us to minimize the loci 
of pragmatic intrusion and to utilize an already existing and necessary locus. Since 
the subject is a necessary locus of pragmatic intrusion, reference being necessarily a 
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pragmatic process and the subject being the locus for an NP that is also a referential 
position, pragmatic intrusion must occur primarily in the subject and if pragmatic 
intrusion occurs in a predicate, then this process must be subordinated syntactically 
to the subject position. Subordination allows us to keep the level of pragmatic 
intrusion in the predicate to a minimum (anaphoric resolution), while the pragmatic 
intrusion occurring in the subject is more radical. 
Nelson Morales (personal communication) has thought of ways of falsifying my 
considerations. He thinks that loosening is such a case. He thinks that, in certain 
circumstances, a statement such as „Mary is ready and not ready‟ is not contradictory 
(consider the interpretation „Mary [who must take the exam] is [physically] ready but 
[emotionally] not ready‟). His  remarks are certainly useful, even if his  example 
does not necessarily require loosening. As should be clear to anyone, contradiction is 
a property of statements and NOT of sentences. Someone who says 'Mary [who must 
take the exam] is [physically] ready and not [emotionally] ready [for it]' introduces 
some modifiers and this kind of modifier introduction is one of the various 
manifestations of pragmatic intrusion, not necessarily loosening. Notice that the 
anaphoric phrase [for it] stays there all the time and even in his example, one is 
prohibited from interpreting: Mary [who must take an exam] is physically ready for 
this [the exam] and emotionally not ready for that [getting married]. 
 His example is very interesting and useful, as I said. Loosening applies to 
predicates like 'a triangle', when one says things such as 'Sicily is a triangle'. 
However, these cases are different because what is involved is a modification of the 
predicate to make the predicate fit the subject: Sicily has the rough shape of a 
triangle. Alternatively: Sicily's shape resembles a triangle. Strictly speaking, it would 
not be true to say that Sicily is a triangle. And again, one could contrive the case in 
such a way, that the pragmatic intrusion is at the level of the subject and not of the 
predicate. One, in fact, could have the following result: 
Sicily's rough shape is a triangle. 
This would very much be compatible with Jaszczolt‟s POL. 
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Let us now consider the following objection by an opponent: 
 
The first point I would make is this: in the rest of the chapter  you contrast indexicals 
(including pronominals) and predicates However, in the final section you advert to a 
different notion of 'predicate'.  Here 'predicate'  identifies a sentence constituent 
('THE predicate')  in contrast to the sentence constituent you refer to as 'the subject'. 
 On this latter use  it corresponds to VP, assuming S-> NP+ VP. It is this that leads 
you to refer to an asymmetry  in C&L's  treatment of subjects and predicates and, on 
that assumption, to your proposal. 
    
    But this (VP) sense of predicate  is not the sense of 'predicate' appealed to in the 
rest of the chapter which I'll call "pred-1". Pred-1's can and do occur in the subject 
(and indeed all over the place, it covers common nouns, verbs, adjectives and 
adverbs).  Any *descriptive* subject expression includes a pred-1.     So I don't think 
C&L's position can be said  to result in an asymmetry between subject and predicate 
- and that perhaps you need to look again at your proposal in the light of that.  
Answer: it is true that Cappelen & Lepore speak of sub-constituent predicates, and 
of them they say that they are not to be modulated (their meanings are stable and are 
not in need of modulation). On the contrary for more readical treatments, predicates 
(at the sub-constituent level) require free enrichment because they cannot contribute 
to a full proposition; in other words, the contribution of the predicate to the 
proposition is sub-propositional. But then if my predicate roughly corresponds to a 
VP constituent, it is clear that the VP which contains as a sub-constituent a Predicate 
1 also contributes a sub-propositional contribution; in other words, by applying that 
VP to the subject assuming that the subject can be used to identify a referent, one still 
obtains a sub-propositional element, that is to say an element which is not fully truth-
evaluable. Since subjects are referential elements and reference always needs 
pragmatics means for being secured, it may be useful to transfer pragmatic intrusion 
from the level of the Predicate 1 and, subsequently, from  the level of the next 
projection, VP to the subject, which, as I have already said, needs to secure its 
referent through pragmatic means. 
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Let us consider the next objection by an opponent: 
I don't think you CAN "transfer the pragmatic intrusion to the subject" from the 
predicate, as you suggest, i.e. by interpolating a non restrictive  (NR, appositive) 
relative clause. [1] Interpolating an NR relative does not actually enrich/modulate the 
referential semantics of the subject (unlike restrictive rel clauses); indeed, it has been 
argued that  NR relative clauses aren't true sentence constituents anyway; [2] there is 
no limit  to the range of the content of such NR clauses you might add (anything you 
might happen to know the referent of the subject); [3] as I understand it, you want to 
restrict the content of the relative clause in a way that might be relevant  to the 
modulation of the predicate but that could be argued to be circular, either empirically 
or methodologically: first you have to identify the subject in order to know what 
modulation of the predicate might be relevant but you are arguing that the subject 
must be modulated in  a way relevant to how the predicate is modulated.  
  Answer: why should we secure modulation in the subject by taking into account 
possible ways of enriching the predicate? The predicate does not require any 
enrichment if we are ready to enrich the subject in the proper way. When I said that 
„Sicily is a triangle‟ may correspond to the proposition „Sicily‟s rough shape is a 
triangle‟ I gave up completely the idea that the predicate or VP needed enrichment. I 
said that I transferred enrichment from the predicate to the subject as a way of 
speaking, as a way of contrasting my analysis with those of radical contextualists, but 
the transferral of the enrichment from predicate to subject, in fact, may never occur 
(otherwise, it would be correct to say that it would be circular). All we need is to 
enrich the subject. 
 The Obstinate Opponent argues that Non-restrictive relative clauses may not be 
relevant to pragmatic enrichment. Yet, if one makes use of them in the context of a 
sentence such as „Mary is ready‟, which contextualists argue to be context-sensitive, 
and it can be demonstrated that they play a role in modulating the meanings of such 
sentences, it goes without saying that they must ancillary to pragmatic enrichment, 
whether or not, by themselves, they constitute cases of pragmatic intrusion. 
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Conclusion 
I confined myself to the discussion of Wedgwood‟s points from the perspective of  C 
& L.  In general, we should be taught some salutary lessons by C & L concerning 
minimal semantics. This is not to say that we should abandon a contextualist 
approach to language. But perhaps it is convenient to make such an approach as 
compatible as possible with C & L‟s assumption that the Basic Set of context-
sensitive expressions should be maximally restricted. There are some interesting 
context-sensitive expressions mentioned by C & L, such as „enemy‟, „friend‟, 
„foreigner‟, „outsider‟ etc. (C & L p. 1), but these are almost never discussed in the  
literature. I think we should concentrate on cases such as these or such as those dealt 
with in Capone (2006), and Capone (2008a).  
The ideas on the semantics/pragmatics debate are quite fluid for the time being, 
but I have a propensity to follow Jaszczolt in her radical pragmatic perspective on 
language, trying to make her picture compatible with more classical theories on 
semantics. The idea that semantic minimalism and contextualism should not be 
enemies has recently been voiced by Recanati (2010). Of course, to enhance this 
compatibility one would have to accept that at least in many cases, but not in all 
cases, the meanings of sentences are truth-conditional and that at least in basic cases 
knowledge of the language will allow one to say what must be true for an utterance 
of a given sentence to be true. Contextualism, in such a hybrid theory, would be 
considered as a tool for enhancing the semantic potential of a language, rather than 
for arguing that language in itself is value-less. I remember distinctly 
Higginbotham‟s (personal communication)  words in this respect – pragmatics is a 
path that makes truth-conditional semantics work. I is very useful to  think of 
semantics and pragmatics in this way: as  a path and a vehicle. You cannot use your 
car unless you have a road; the road is what makes your car useful. The road without 
the car is useless. Nevertheless, you can use your car in as many roads as you want 
to. This invariably involves a certain degree of autonomy. 
 
Appendix 1: 
 
Abbreviations 
In this chapter, I make use of the following abbreviations: 
SM = Semantic Minimalism 
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RT = RT 
RC = Radical Contextualism 
MC = Moderate Contextualism 
C & L = Cappelen and Lepore 
 
Appendix 2. 
 
Wedgwood, in replying to my ideas, was bothered by the fact that Cappelen & 
Lepore allow pragmatic intrusion for indexicals but not for predicates. However, on 
my view that at least in some cases, predicates subcategorize for null prepositional 
phrases a limited form of pragmatic intrusion could be allowed for predicates as well. 
On my view, the asymmetry could be dissolved. Of course, this approach may be 
suitable for some cases; I am not saying that it should be suitable for all predicates. 
In fact, it is plausible that some forms of modulation à la Recanati should be 
accepted. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Belief  reports and pragmatic intrusion. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this chapter, I explore Bach‟s idea (Bach, 2000) that null appositives, intended as expanded 
qua-clauses, can resolve the puzzles of belief reports. These puzzles are crucial in understanding 
the semantics and pragmatics of belief reports and are presented in a section. I propose that 
Bach‟s strategy is not only a way of dealing with puzzles, but also an ideal way of dealing with 
belief reports. I argue that even simple unproblematic cases of belief reports are cases of 
pragmatic intrusion, involving null appositives, or to use the words of Bach, „qua-clauses‟. The 
main difference between my pragmatic approach and the one by Salmon (1986) is that this 
author uses the notion of conversational implicature, whereas I use the notion of pragmatic 
intrusion and explicature. From my point of view, statements such as „„John believes that Cicero 
is clever‟‟ and „„John believes that Tully is clever‟‟ have got distinct truth-values. In other 
words, I claim that belief reports in the default case illuminate the hearer on the mental life of 
the believer, that includes specific modes of presentation of the referents talked about. 
Furthermore, while in the other pragmatic approaches, it is mysterious how a mode of 
presentation is assumed to be the main filter of the believer‟s mental life, here I provide an 
explanatory account in terms of relevance, cognitive effects, and processing efforts. The most 
important part of the chapter is devoted to showing that null appositives are required, in the case 
of belief reports, to explain certain anaphoric effects, which would otherwise be mysterious. My 
examples show that null appositives are not necessitated at logical form, but only at the level of 
the explicature, in line with the standard assumptions by Carston and Recanati on pragmatic 
intrusion. I develop a potentially useful analysis of belief reports by exploiting syntactic and 
semantic considerations on presuppositional clitics in Romance. 
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Introduction. 
 
As   Mey (2001) says: 
 
Pragmatics admonishes the linguistic scientists that they should take the users 
of language more seriously, as they, after all, provide the bread and butter of 
linguistic theorizing (…) (Mey 2001, 289). 
 
It is in the spirit of this view that I write a chapter on belief reports and pragmatic 
intrusion
1
. In this chapter, I  discuss the issue of belief reports and propose to 
integrate it with the recent idea (mainly propounded  by relevance theorists such as 
Carston 2002 and Sperber and Wilson 2002, but also, in different form,  by Bach 
1994,   Levinson 2000, and Mey 2001) that the proposition expressed by an utterance 
(in a context C) is ultimately fleshed out (supplied on the basis of a skeletal semantic 
template, to use words by Carston) by recourse to pragmatics, which constructs 
missing constituents or expands  the bare semantics of  a sentence to resolve 
potential inconsistencies or absurdities. In particular, I propose that belief reports are 
cases of “intrusive constructions” (to use a term by Levinson 2000, 213), in that the 
truth-conditions of the whole depend on a pragmatic process of interpretation. In this 
chapter, I accept  Sperber & Wilson‟s view that as the gap between sentence  
meaning and speaker‟s meaning widens, it increasingly brings into question a basic 
assumption of much philosophy of language, that the semantics of sentences 
provides straightforward, direct access to the structure of human thoughts (Sperber & 
Wilson 2004).  
 First of all, I discuss the hidden-indexical theory of belief reports  by Schiffer 
(1995). Then I consider certain problems raised by Schiffer (2000) and Recanati 
(1993). I argue that these theories can be improved and that pragmatic intrusion can 
resolve the puzzles raised by the semantics of belief reports (see also Jaszczolt 2005, 
                                                 
1
 I was told that  the term „pragmatic intrusion‟ has  negative connotations in the 
context of a theory in which the meanings of sentences are in general 
underdetermined. I do not take the view that a language, in order to be perfect, must 
match logical forms and propositions and thus I do not take intrusion as a sign of 
imperfection. It is true that that better terminology could be used, e.g. pragmatic 
inserts; but I am persuaded that the use of novel terminology may confuse readers 
who are used to books like Levinson (2000) or Carston (2002). So, I hope to be 
allowed to retain the term „intrusion‟, imperfect though it may be. 
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126). I offer some views of pragmatic intrusion (mainly Carston‟s 1999 and  Sperber 
& Wilson‟s 2002 views). Then I work out the details of the pragmatic analysis of 
belief reports. In particular, I offer an alternative to Salmon‟s (1986) view that 
conversational implicatures can explain away apparent cases of lack of substitutivity 
in belief reports, proposing that a communicative act  triggers the expectation that it 
will be maximally relevant in that it will produce a high level of positive effects  
worth the hearer‟s processing efforts, compatibly with the speaker‟s preferences and 
abilities (Sperber & Wilson 1995; Blakemore 2000). It appears that the relevance 
theory approach best handles the cases of belief sentences used  in thought (rather 
than in assertions), while Salmon‟s treatment, as Green (1998) points out, makes use 
of a Gricean explanation in terms of  „assertions‟ in conversational settings. 
Furthermore,  unlike Devitt (1996), I propose that belief reports essentially illuminate 
the hearer on the cognitive state of the believer. The most important part of the  
chapter is devoted to showing that the presence of null appositives to NPs (within 
belief sentences) is required at the level of the explicature of a belief report. I mainly 
investigate cases of anaphora, control, and ellipsis and I extend the discussion to 
modal verbs such as „ought‟ and to reflexive belief. 
 
1. The hidden-indexical theory of belief reports. 
Schiffer (1995) presents his hidden-indexical theory of belief reports. According to 
him, a sentence such as (1) 
 
(1) A believes that S 
 
expresses a three-place relation B (x, p, m), holding among a believer x, a mode-of-
presentation-less proposition p and a mode of presentation m under which x believes 
p. According to Schiffer (1995), 
 
it is possible  for x to believe p under one mode of presentation  m while 
believing not-p under a second mode of presentation m‟, and while suspending 
judgement altogether under a third mode of presentation m‟‟ (Schiffer 1995,  
248). 
 
  As Schiffer says: 
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This propositional mode of presentation is determined by modes of 
presentation of the objects and properties the proposition is about (Schiffer 
1995,  249). 
 
Schiffer admits the difficulties inherent in explaining what a mode of presentation (of 
a proposition)  is and suggests that modes of presentations are mental representations 
that play certain functional roles. 
 Schiffer writes: 
 
This theory is aptly called the hidden-indexical theory because the reference to 
the mode-of-presentation type is not carried by any expression in the belief 
ascription. In this sense, it is like the reference to a place at which it is raining 
which occurs in an utterance of “It‟s raining”. And the theory is aptly called the 
hidden-indexical theory, because  the mode-of-presentation type to which 
reference is made in the utterance of a belief sentence can vary from one 
utterance of the sentence to another (Schiffer 1995,  250). 
 
Schiffer acknowledges that the reference to a mode of presentation is similar to the 
reference to a place in an utterance of (8): 
 
(2) It is raining. 
 
Endless discussions have been made on whether the place is or is not an implicit 
argument of the verb „rain‟ in sentences such as (2), but I think that Carston‟s view 
that  „rain‟ is not associated with a location variable is reasonable (being more 
parsimonious; see also Cappelen  & Lepore 2006 on unarticulated constituents) The 
parallel between sentences such as (2) and sentences such (3) 
 
(3) John believes that Mary is pretty 
 
induces us to think that the mode of presentation associated with the embedded 
proposition of (3) is furnished through  pragmatics (specifically  through pragmatic 
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intrusion and explicature). Schiffer‟s statement that the mode of presentation type 
varies from context to context also points to its pragmatic nature. 
  
2. A problem in the hidden-indexical theory. 
Schiffer (2000) discusses a major problem for the hidden-indexical theory. The 
hidden-indexical theory entails that believing is a three-place relation, B (x, p, m), 
holding among a believer x, a proposition p, and a mode of presentation m under 
which x believes p. The ordinary-language way of representing this open sentence is 
evidently „x believes p under (mode of presentation) m‟. 
 
(…) and from this it follows that  a singular term replacing „m‟ in a true  
substitution instance  of (3) [Ralph believes that Fido is a dog
 
under mode of 
presentation m] would be the specification of an argument of the three-place 
relation expressed by the open sentence. (…) The intuitive point is that (3) 
clearly does not look like it contains a three-place verb with the specification of 
a third argument. Rather, it looks to be on all fours with a sentence like  
 
(4) Louise hit Ralph under the influence of crack. 
 
which is  paradigmatically a sentence in which the singular term „the influence 
of crack‟ is not the specification of the third argument in an instance of the 
three-place hitting relation (…) but rather merely part of the adverbial phrase 
„under the influence of crack‟ (Schiffer 2000,   19). 
 
Schiffer uses a Chomskyan diagnosis to check that  „under mode of presentation m‟ 
is an adverbial, and not an argument of the verb (believe). Consider the sentence (4): 
 
(4) Mary gave the house to her husband. 
 
We know that „to her husband‟ is an argument of the verb „give‟  because one can 
give the answer „to her husband‟ to the question (5): 
 
(5) To whom did you wonder whether Mary gave the house? 
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Now, Schiffer thinks that the answer “Under mode of presentation m” to the question 
(6) 
 
(6) Under what mode of presentation did you wonder whether Ralph believes that 
Fido is a dog? 
 
does not show that  „under mode mode of presentation m‟  is an argument of 
„believe‟ but shows that it is  an adjunct of „wonder‟. It would, in fact, be an elliptical 
answer for: 
 
(7) I wonder under mode of presentation m whether Ralph believes that Fido is a 
dog. 
 
Schiffer is aware that some scholars have disputed this syntactic test, yet he still 
maintains that there is a problem for those  holding the hidden-indexical view. 
 Schiffer hopes to find a way out of this problem by following Recanati‟s (1993) 
proposal. Recanati thinks that  „believe‟ expresses a two-place relation between a 
believer and a quasi-singular proposition. The quasi singular proposition is 
something along the following lines: 
 
<<m‟, Fido>, <m‟‟, doghood>> 
 
As we can see, the directly-referential singular terms of this quasi-singular 
proposition are each associated with a mode of presentation. However, modes of 
presentation do not  contribute to truth-conditions. Schiffer modifies Recanati‟s 
proposal by introducing the requirement that the modes of presentation m‟ and m‟‟ 
be not specific modes of presentation but types of mode of presentation. Thus, where 
T ranges over modes of presentation types: 
 
B (x, <<T, Fido>, <T‟, doghood>>) iff 
 m  m‟ (T m & T‟ m‟ & B ( x, <<m, Fido>, <m‟, doghood>>)). 
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In other words, the treatment above makes it clear that the modes of presentation 
associated with „Fido‟ and „doghood‟ are not specific modes of presentation, but 
types of modes of presentation. 
 According to Schiffer the treatment  above violates Recanati‟s availability 
hypothesis: ordinary speakers ought to have some awareness of referring to such 
modes of presentation types. He writes: 
 
Yet, I submit, it seems clear that the belief reporter has no such awareness. If 
asked what she was referring to in her use of „Fido‟, she would not give any 
restatement that indicated that she was referring to a mode-of-presentation type 
(Schiffer 2000,  29). 
 
As Schiffer is aware, this is not just a problem for Recanati‟s analysis, but for the 
hidden-indexical theory as well.  
 The most crucial problem, though, is the following: where do the modes of 
presentation come from in an analysis such as: 
 
<<m‟, Fido>, <m‟‟, doghood>>? 
 
Recanati and Schiffer appear to believe that the modes of presentation are in the that-
clause complement of „believe‟ independently of the semantics of the verb „believe‟. 
Yet, we all agree that verbs such as „believe‟ or „know‟ create opacity, a problem 
which the hidden-indexical theory was contrived to deal with in the first place. In a 
sense, they are making it appear that it is the semantics of the that-clause that is 
responsible for a structure such as  
 
<<m‟, Fido>, <m‟‟, doghood>>. 
 
Yet, they ought to be aware of examples such as (8) 
 
(8) The judge decided that John Rigotti should die. 
 
It seems reasonable to suppose that in this example the judge‟s decision applies to 
the referent of „John Rigotti‟ under any mode of presentation whatsoever. Yet, as  
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Williamson (2006) notes, it must be granted that if John Rigotti = The XYZ, then 
when John Rigotti dies so does the XYZ. But it does not follow that the judge 
decided that  the XYZ should die. This shows that that-clauses, on their own, cannot 
be held responsible for opacity effects. The opacity comes from the verb e.g. 
„decided‟. It seems to me that a more fruitful tack is to suggest that modes of 
presentation or modes of presentation types are built up locally within the NPs and 
VPs or APs contained in a  that-clause embedded in a belief verb as pragmatic 
increments. They subsequently interact with semantic aspects of the verb of the 
main clause to create opacity effects. They also interact locally to incorporate aspects 
of the NPs, VPs, and APs of the that-clause. In fact, normally opacity effects are 
explained away under the assumption that the modes of presentation within the that-
clause incorporate certain names. The proposal I articulate in this chapter assumes 
that verbs like „believe‟ (attitudinatives, to use a term by Green  1998)) are 
semantically univocal and not ambiguous. It appears to me that by placing the burden 
of providing modes of presentation on pragmatics we can abide by Modifed Occam‟s 
Razor, which advises us not to multiply senses without necessity. 
 Salmon must be quite right in saying that modes of presentation are part of the 
pragmatics of belief reports: 
 
(…) there is an established practice of using belief attributions to convey not 
only the proposition agreed to (which is specified by the belief attribution) but 
also the way the subject of the attribution takes the proposition in agreeing to it 
(which is no part of the semantic content of the belief attribution) (Salmon 
1990, 233-234). 
 
3. Pragmatic intrusion 
Many authors have dealt with the semantics/pragmatics debate, but here I shall 
mainly expose ideas by Carston (1999) and  Wilson  & Sperber (2002). The reader 
will find an overview of other theories in Capone (2006). It is a pity that I cannot 
deal adequately with the views of  Bach (1994),  Levinson (2000) (see my review), 
Recanati (2004) (see my review) and of  Stainton (2004a;b) which are also  
important. 
 Carston opposes the view that decoding utterances is merely a matter of  coupling 
logical forms with pragmatic information: 
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A different view of pragmatic inference was suggested in the previous 
section, according to which this sort of inferential activity is an automatic 
response of receivers of  (attention pre-empting) ostensive stimuli; it is but a 
particular instance of our general propensity to interpret human behaviour in 
terms of the mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) of the behaver, which, 
in turn, is to be located within a bigger picture of general relevance-seeking 
information processing. According to this view, pragmatic inference is 
fundamental and the employment of a code (linguistic system) as an ostensive 
stimulus is a useful addition; it would not be reasonable to expect, nor would 
it be particularly desirable, that the forms supplied by the code should be 
eternal or even fully propositional (Carston 1999,  106). 
 
No doubt, pragmatic information is useful in constructing  fully truth-evaluable 
propositional forms, but compositional semantics  plays a crucial role in the 
interpretation of sentences/utterances combining   lexical  with grammatical 
information. Even if Carston‟s claims are correct, and human communication  
reserves a large role for pragmatic interpretation in the construction of propositional 
forms, it is methodologically important to stress the role played by linguistic 
semantics and, in particular, by the lexicon and syntactico/semantic compositionality 
(Capone, forthcoming; Stanley, 2005). Carston tempers her view somewhat on p. 
114: 
 
The semantics/pragmatics interface is a representational level described as 
logical form or the linguistic semantic representation; it is standardly not fully 
propositional but rather a schema for the construction of fully propositional 
representations. Exactly what this looks like is, of course, an important 
question and not one that can be answered with any great conviction. A 
reasonable construal is of a structured string of concepts, configured along the 
lines of Chomskyan LF, perhaps indicating relative scope of quantifiers and 
negation, and with open slots marking constituents that must be contextually 
filled, as in the case of indexicals, quantifier domain, and many other elements 
(Carston 1991, 114). 
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 Below are some of  the examples relevance theorists use in support of  the case for 
pragmatic intrusion: 
 
(9)           The steak is raw; 
(10) Holland is flat; 
(11) Jane is a bulldozer; 
(12) He took off his boots and got into bed; 
(13) Writing an essay will take time; 
(14) Everyone went to the party. 
 
(9) is true even if the steak is not completely raw, but only partially cooked; (10) is 
true even if Holland‟s surface is not, strictly speaking, completely flat but is flatter 
than most other European countries; (11) is obviously false, and thus a metaphoric 
interpretation must be accessed to consider it true; (12) is true  in case the action of 
taking the boots off precedes the action of going into bed; (13) does not express the 
trivial proposition that writing an essay takes some time, but that it takes a 
considerable amount of time (and attention); (14) obviously does not mean that all 
human beings went to the party, but that all members of a certain domain went to the 
party; thus the domain of the quantifier must be suitably restricted by means of 
contextual knowledge.  
 
4.  Puzzles arising from belief reports. 
If we abandon the hidden-indexical theory, there is no easy way to handle the puzzles 
of belief reports. I start to discuss Kripke‟s puzzle. The author presents the case of 
Pierre, a French speaker, who, on the basis of what he hears about London, says 
“Londres est jolie”, leading us to conclude that he believes that London is pretty. 
However, one day Pierre moves to London and goes to live in a rather ugly area of 
the city. He learns English without resorting to translation and is now willing to 
assent to the sentence “London is not pretty”.  He is not in a position to equate what 
he thought of under the name „Londres‟ with what he now thinks of under the name 
„London‟ (Kripke  1979,   891-892). Kripke rejects the idea that Pierre has got 
contradictory beliefs; He says that Pierre lacks information, no logical acumen, and 
thus he is not able to connect his notion of „Londres‟ with his notion of „London‟. 
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The notion of „connection‟ used here is one of referential identity: coming to know 
that the thing x referred to as „MoP*‟ is the same thing x referred to by „MoP**‟. 
 There is another puzzle, which according to Kripke (1979), arises without 
substitution. Consider the following utterances: 
 
(15) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent. 
(16) Peter disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent. 
 
Peter uses the name „Paderewski‟ for what he takes to be two different individuals. 
The problem is  to explain, given that Peter does not realize that Paderewski the 
statesman is Paderewski the pianist, how both of (15) and (16) can be true. It may 
appear that Peter has contradictory beliefs, but this is not the case. Peter is not 
illogical, he is merely ignorant. 
 Crimmins & Perry (1989) resolve problems of this kind by  noting that the same 
referent can be associated with two different notions and that failure to connect these 
notions leads a person  to be in two distinct belief states. The most important idea of 
this chapter is that a belief report is about an unarticulated constituent, a 
propositional constituent that is not linguistically articulated. Context is what leads to 
the specification of this constituent: 
 
We shall say in such cases that the notions that the belief report is about are provided 
by the utterance and its context (Crimmins & Perry 1989,  975). 
 
5. Bach’s view of belief reports. 
Let us now return to the issue of belief reports, armed  with the notion that pragmatic 
intrusion  furnishes a fully truth-evaluable proposition. Given that it is implausible 
that the mode of presentation is furnished by the semantics of the belief report, we 
conclude that it must be supplied by recourse to pragmatics. Now we must proceed in 
the direction of a pragmatic theory of belief reports. 
  Bach‟s view of belief reports is  one such theory. Bach says: 
 
(…) „that‟-clauses are not content clauses. The specification assumption is 
false: even though „that‟-clauses express propositions, belief reports do not in 
general specify things that people believe  (or disbelieve) – they merely 
 211 
describe or characterize them. A „that‟-clause is not a specifier (much less a 
proper name, as is sometimes casually suggested) of the thing believed, but 
merely a descriptor of it. A belief report can be true even if what the believer 
believes is more specific than the proposition expressed by the „that‟-clause 
used to characterize what he believes (Bach 2000, 121). 
 
This quotation is important because it stresses the  role played by pragmatic 
intrusion in fleshing out the proposition believed on the basis of the surface elements 
appearing in the „that‟-clause and the context which serves to enrich or expand the 
proposition. 
 Let us see how this approach allows us to handle the Paderewski case. Let us 
recall that the problem arises due to ignorance: Peter has two notions of Paderewski, 
which, as Crimmins & Perry say,  he is not able to connect. Peter  believes of 
Paderewski, of whom he knows that he is a musician, that he has musical talent. And 
he believes of Paderewski, of whom he knows that he is  a statesman, that he has no 
musical talent. Peter is not able to connect the two notions as he is ignorant of the 
fact that Paderewski the statesman is nothing but Paderewski the musician. Thus, we 
can say of Peter both (17) and (18): 
 
(17) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent; 
(18) Peter disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent (understood as: Peter 
believes that Paderewski had no musical talent). 
 
(17) and (18) do not attribute contradictory beliefs to Peter  – even if  the speaker  of 
(17) and (18) knows that there is a referential identity between the two instances of 
„Paderewski‟ – provided that Peter is not able to connect the two notions he has of 
Paderewski. 
 Bach explains why (17) and (18) are not contradictory statements by saying  that 
the „that‟-clauses do not fully specify the propositions believed (by Peter), but simply 
characterize them. To fully specify what Peter believes in the two cases, we need to 
flesh out the proposition corresponding to the „that‟-clause, using appositives both in 
(17) and (18), thus obtaining (19) and (20): 
 
(19) Peter believes that Paderewski, the pianist, had musical talent; 
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(20) Peter disbelieves that Paderewski, the statesman, had musical talent. 
 
Bach writes: 
 
This difference could be indicated by using the appositives „the pianist‟ and 
„the statesman‟ after the name „Paderewski‟. Using one appositive rather than 
the other would be sufficient in the context to differentiate one belief from the 
other, although both beliefs are such as to be true only if Paderewski had 
musical talent (Bach 2000, 126). 
 
Bach‟s proposal is a step forward  towards a more accurate theory of belief 
reports. He proposes to make modes of presentation of the referent „Paderewski‟ 
explicit, in line with Salmon‟s idea that: 
 
The important thing is that, by definition, they [modes of presentation] are such 
that if a fully rational believer adopts conflicting attitudes (such as belief and 
disbelief, or belief and suspension of judgement) toward proposition p and q, 
then the believer must take p and q in different ways, by means of different 
modes of acquaintance, in harbouring the conflicting attitudes towards them – 
even if p and q are in fact the same proposition (Salmon 1990, 230). 
  
Bach‟s idea that an appositive qua-clause is supplied by pragmatics in utterances 
such as (17) and (18) is shared by Bezuidenhout (2000). Like Bach (2000), she too 
claims that this process of inferential enrichment is the norm, rather than an „ad hoc‟ 
way of resolving a puzzle. Bach‟s idea that modes of presentation must be made 
explicit in order to deal with Paderewski-like cases is important. Yet, something else  
has to be said. 
 First, (19), (20) are interpretatively  ambiguous: on one interpretation the 
appositive specifies how Peter thinks of Paderewski; on the other, it specifies who 
the speaker of the entire sentence has in mind
2
. The interpretative ambiguity must be 
resolved by pragmatics, as I argue in a later section, responding to a similar  
objection to my analysis of belief  reports based on pragmatic intrusion and 
                                                 
2
 This observation was made by a commentator. 
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specifically on the provision (or specification) of null appositives. The problem is 
tackled later on in this chapter. 
 Second, the fact that  Peter has two different notions of Paderewski, as is known 
in context, does not suffice to make his two beliefs about the two notions of 
Paderewski‟s non-contradictory. Suppose, in fact, that at some stage he thought that 
the two notions of Paderewski could be connected to the same individual (and this 
realization can be grasped pragmatically by using further appositives). Then, at least 
for a moment, he must have had contradictory thoughts contemplating the thoughts 
(19) and (20). So, I think that the „that‟clauses must be specified further and that the 
inexplicit hidden constituents to be fleshed out must include Paderewski, the pianist, 
and individual  distinct from Paderewski, the statesman. 
 The most interesting part of the theory is that it is applicable to all substitution 
cases, as well. Thus, in principle it ought to explain why is it that a speaker can  say 
both of: 
 
(21) Alexander believes that Cicero  was a great orator of the past; 
(22) Alexander does not believe that Tullius was a great orator of the past 
 
provided that it is part of contextual knowledge that Alexander does not know that 
Cicero is also known under the mode of presentation „Tullius‟. 
 Bach does not go to great length to explain how pragmatic intrusion can account 
for examples such as (21) and (22). Intuitively, it is clear that what makes the two 
statements non-contradictory is the fact that Alexander is not able to connect his two 
notions „Cicero‟ and „Tullius‟. Now,  pairs of sentences such as (21) and (22) must 
always be evaluated in context, where contextual knowledge provides  linguistic 
materials that expand the that-clauses further  and make it clear that the notions 
„Cicero‟ and  „Tullius‟ are not linked. The missing constituent is something like (23) 
or (24): 
 
(23) the great orator; 
(24) the man I  bumped into yesterday at the market place 
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6. On modes of presentation again! (pragmatic intrusion). 
I think it is time to explain opacity phenomena and the puzzles associated with belief 
reports through a theory of pragmatic intrusion in which modes of presentation of 
propositions are supplied through pragmatics. 
 Suppose for a minute that a pragmatician says that pragmatics is merely involved 
in explaining why we find it misleading to report a belief utterance by substituting an 
NP with a coreferential one, while he accepts that the beliefs reported are essentially 
the same (thus excluding pragmatic intrusion into the proposition expressed). Now, 
consider a sentence such as (25): 
 
(25) John believes that Mary Smith is clever. 
 
Suppose that the referent of „Mary Smith‟ is x; then it would be reasonable to assume 
that if (25) is true,  John must believe of x, under the mode of presentation „Mary 
Smith‟, that she is clever.  For Salmon (26) expresses the same proposition as (27): 
 
(26) John believes that she is clever; 
(27) John believes that Mary Smith is clever. 
 
He explains the fact that an ordinary speaker surely finds that (26) and (27) have 
distinct truth-values by resorting to a Gricean pragmatic reasoning. If a  speaker 
attributes the pronominal mode of presentation „she‟ to John, it would be misleading 
to use a more informative sentence such as (27), which leads the hearer to attribute 
the mode of presentation „Mary Smith‟ to John. Thus, it is not really reasonable to 
trust the ordinary speaker‟s judgements, who cannot distinguish between truth-
conditional and non-truth-conditional elements of meaning. 
 My view instead is that Salmon‟s  pragmatic view must be refined and recast in 
terms of Relevance Theory in order to reply to some obvious objections. 
 
 Consider  a simple sentence such as (28) 
 
(28) John believes that Mary Smith is clever. 
 
(28) has the following logical form: 
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John believes of x  that she is clever. 
 
Pragmatics adds the constituent: under mode of presentation Mo/Mary Smith. Thus, 
via pragmatic intrusion, we have: 
 
John believes of x, under MoP, that she is clever. 
 
A more elegant representation of this interpretation is certainly the following, 
adapted from Green (1998): 
 
BEL [John, that Mary Smith is clever, ft (John, „Mary Smith is clever‟)] 
 
Where ft (x, S) is a function that takes  a person x, a sentence S and a time argument 
t as arguments and gives as values the way x would take the information content of 
sentence S, at t, were it presented to him or her through the very sentence S. 
 
I now try to provide an explanation of the interpretation of belief reports on the basis 
of Sperber & Wilson‟s relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986).  The principle at 
work in the pragmatic  specification of modes of presentation is the following: 
 
Communicative principle of relevance. According to this principle, every act 
of ostensive communication  communicates a presumption of its optimal 
relevance.  An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant iff it is (a) relevant 
enough to be worth the hearer‟s attention; (b) the most relevant stimulus the 
speaker could have produced given her abilities and preferences (Sperber & 
Wilson 1995,  270). 
 
The sentence (28) is optimally relevant if the NP „Mary Smith‟ is the mode of 
presentation associated (pragmatically) with the referent of „Mary Smith‟, in other 
words if it plays some role in the identification of reference for the believer. Given 
that relevance is a ratio of contextual effects and cognitive efforts, it goes without 
saying that  the use of a proper name in the that-clause of a belief-sentence is 
maximally relevant if it has maximal positive effects, in other words if it does not 
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just provide a referent but if it is actually used by the believer in identifying the 
referent in question.  
 Now we can explain in a more articulated manner why we have the intuition  that 
(26) and (27) do not have the same truth-conditions, given that we accept that 
pragmatic intrusion contributes to a fully truth-evaluable proposition (e.g. Carston 
1999) and, thus is part of what is said (according to Carston‟s 2002 notion of what is 
said, not according to Bach‟s notion of what is said; on the distinction see Burton-
Roberts 2005 and Burton-Roberts 2006). Furthermore, in Capone (2006a) and 
Capone (2009) I also argued that pragmatic inferences that contribute to pragmatic 
intrusion are not cancellable (see also Capone 2009; Burton-Roberts 2005; 2006 in 
support of this view). If my ideas are correct, the fact that (26) and (27) intuitively 
have got distinct truth-conditions (ordinary speakers would perceive them to have 
distinct truth-conditions, regardless of how things are from a theoretical point of 
view) is  just the consequence of our theoretical assumptions about explicatures: 
explicatures are non-cancellable.  My ideas are in line with Sperber & Wilson‟s view 
of explicitness outlined in Relevance (1986, 182): 
 
Explicitness: 
An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a 
development of a logical form encoded by U. 
 
On the analogy of „implicature‟, Sperber & Wilson call an explicitly communicated 
assumption an explicature. Logical forms are „developed‟ into explicatures by 
inferential enrichment. Every explicature, then, is recovered by a combination of 
decoding and  inference. 
 The picture we have come to is somewhat different from that adopted in other 
pragmatic views of propositional attitudes. Salmon (1986) would say that the 
sentences (26) and (27) have got the same truth-conditions, because he essentially 
leaves pragmatic intrusion out of the picture. Or, to be more precise, he allows 
pragmatic intrusion up to a point, until the referents of „she‟ and „Mary Smith‟ are 
made part of the interpreted logical form, but does not accept (at least not explicitly) 
a more radically  intrusionistic view, like the one I proposed along the lines of 
Carston (1999) or Wilson & Sperber (2002), in which the provision of modes of 
presentation is made part of the proposition uttered.  Consider (29) and (30): 
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(29) John believes that Hesperus is Hesperus; 
(30) John believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
 
Ordinary speakers appear to attribute distinct truth-conditions to these statements. 
Salmon explains the oddity in such a judgement by saying that it would be 
misleading for a speaker who commits herself to (29) to utter (30), since the 
reference to a mode of presentation (of the reference) is part of the pragmatics of the 
belief report. Yet, he does not consider the case in which (29) and (30) are not real 
utterances, but just thoughts, to be attributed to a thinker (in silent utterances). In this 
case, his pragmatic strategy is not available. Yet, Sperber & Wilson‟s theory helps to 
explain why (29) and (30) are distinct thoughts by providing each of them with a 
distinct explicature. 
 
Timothy Williamson (2006) makes an interesting comment. After all, even in 
thought one can entertain a proposition under the guise of a sentence. Presumably, 
Williamson thinks that modes of presentation, in thought, are supplied directly by the 
sentence used to express that thought. But this not entirely persuasive. Even in 
thought, we need a mechanism that blocks substitution in opaque contexts, so that we 
shall not say of Mary  who thinks that John believes that Hesperus is Hesperus that 
she thinks that John believes  that Hesperus is Phosphorus. As Williamson argues, 
the sentence used in thought surely can provide a suitable mode of presentation of 
the reference, but it is no guarantee that substitutions of synonymous expressions is 
blocked. This is blocked, instead, by mechanisms of interpretations such as those 
advocated by relevant theorists. A sentence can provide a suitable mode of 
presentation to a thought, but the principle of relevance ensures that that mode of 
presentation is the only one under which the proposition is held by the believer or, if 
this is too strong, that that proposition is not necessarily held under all possible 
modes of presentation of the reference. 
 It could be added that surely implicature can occur in the realm of thought as well: 
I think to myself “Good thing I took the medicine and got better!”. I am sure that I 
take the content of my thought to be some such proposition as „good thing I took the 
medicine and, as a result, got better‟, even though I am not communicating with 
anyone else. 
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I quite agree with the above. Pragmatic processes are present  even in thought, 
provided that thought occurs through some linguistic sentences. I take the remarks 
above as supporting my view that pragmatics is needed to construct propositions 
even in thought and, thus, to provide modes of presentation. Presumably, what I was 
opposing is a view that accepts that it would be misleading for a speaker to utter a 
belief sentence in case the NP in the embedded that-clause is not a mode of 
presentation under which a referent is thought of by the believer (see also Recanati 
1983). Such a view is intrinsically connected with the notion of what goes on in 
conversation, while we need an account that dispenses with the representation of a 
real conversation, because belief sentences are employed even in thoughts. Of course 
it is right that even in thought there are inferences which are the counteraparts of the 
implicatures which would be triggered in actual communication, but here I assume a 
relevance theory explanation of  sentences-in-thought such as “Good thing I took the 
medicine and got better!”, as this is more in tune with the issue of sentences-in-
thought. Gricean explanations are more suitable for actual communication acts.
3
 In 
fact, the way Levinson‟s (2000)  Q- and I-Principle are formulated seems to me to 
need some notion of actual communication (The Q-principle says that we should not 
proffer an assertion that is weaker than our knowledge of the world allows, unless 
asserting a stronger assertion violates the I-Principle. The I-Principle says that we 
must produce the minimal semantic clues indispensable for achieving our 
communicative goals (bearing the Q-principle in mind)). 
 Furthermore, it can be evinced from Green‟s (1998) discussion of Salmon‟s 
treatment of belief reports (perhaps one of the clearest expositions of Salmon‟s 
views) that the Gricean explanation of belief reports makes a heavy use of the notion 
of  „asserting‟, while my relevance theory explanation of the phenomena in question 
makes allowance for sentences in thought. 
 
 Unlike Salmon, I adopt a fully intrusionistic picture in lines with  Carston (1999) 
and Wilson & Sperber (2002), and say that the propositions which John is said to 
believe in (29) and in (30) are distinct, as they include distinct modes of presentation. 
The pragmatic machinery is responsible for the fleshing out of the propositions 
believed and the  inclusion there of distinct modes of presentation. 
                                                 
3
 To deal with this issue exhaustively one needs one further paper. 
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 It might be worth our while examining more closely the way Relevance Theory 
can  deal with belief reports, in the light of a natural objection arising from accepting 
Devitt (1996).  
 Sperber & Wilson (2004) propose the following sub-tasks in the overall 
comprehension process 
 
(a) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicatures by developing the 
linguistically-encoded logical form; 
(b) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended  contextual 
assumptions (implicated premises); 
(c) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual 
implications (implicated conclusions). 
 
So, let us reconstruct the steps required in processing belief reports of the type: 
 
(31) John believes that Mary is pretty. 
 
The speaker uttered (31) saying that John believes the proposition that X is pretty. 
The speaker could have chosen  a range MoP1, MoP2, MoPn of modes of 
presentation to present John‟s belief (about Mary), but he chose „Mary‟ as a mode of 
presentation of X. The utterance (31) comes with a presumption of optimal 
relevance, that is with the promise that the actual  linguistic choice is determined by 
the intention of  causing maximal contextual effects with minimal processing costs. 
The hearer now realizes that the reason why „Mary‟ was chosen in the utterance (31) 
is that the speaker thus hopes to obtain maximal relevance by increasing contextual 
effects. The interpretation according to which „Mary‟ is the mode of presentation 
under which the belief is held involves maximal positive effects because it serves to 
differentiate what John believes from what John does not believe, or at least it serves 
to specify a more fine-grained ascription of belief
4
. 
 A natural objection is that an utterance of  (32) 
 
(32) John believes that Mary Smith is pretty, 
                                                 
4
 I was told  that  the choice of NP may ease the comprehension process (thus 
reducing processing costs)  and that reduced effort may increase overall relevance. 
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can be interpreted without having to assume that „Mary  Smith‟ is a mode of 
presentation under which the belief is held. After all, as Devitt (1996) says, the NP 
could be used to facilitate recognition of the referent to the hearer of the belief report, 
in which case it need not play a crucial role in the mental life of  the believer (John). 
Presumably, Devitt‟s position is in line with Quine (1960, 218): 
 
Commonly the degree of allowable deviation depends on why we are quoting. 
It is a question of what traits of the quoted speaker‟s remarks we want to make 
something of; those are the traits that must be kept straight if our indirect 
quotation is to count as true. Similar remarks apply to sentences of belief and 
other propositional attitudes (Quine 1960, 218). 
 
Now, I do not deny that there might be a context in which the hearer H, faced with 
(32), replies: “Sorry, I do not know Mary Smith”, and then the speaker replaces (32) 
with (33): 
 
(33) John believes that [our department‟s secretary]0  is pretty. 
 
Well, in this case, given that the context is different, and that the hearer understands 
that the correction has been made to enhance the hearer‟s comprehension, maximal 
relevance is  achieved if „our department‟s secretary‟ is not the mode of presentation 
under which the belief is presented (to the believer). In a context in which the focus 
is on action, maximal positive effects are achieved if one uses descriptions which 
facilitate the action in question. The practical concerns which lie at the heart of 
Devitt‟s treatment do not necessarily clash with my view, since Devitt must be aware 
that his proposal is based on heavy contextual assumptions. What, nevertheless, I 
would like to stress is that Devitt‟s treatment does not do justice to the standard 
pragmatic interpretation of belief reports. After all, the use in (33) is not perceived to 
be the normal, ordinary use of belief reports, which is to throw light on the mental 
life of the believers. There is one more thing to be added. In the sentence (33), I think 
there is an implicit mode of presentation which I marked as 0, which is bound 
(through pragmatic anaphora) to the NP „Mary Smith‟ in (32). This is not to suggest 
that there is always this implicit mode of presentation in the structure of the 
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explicated thought, yet an array of implicit contextual assumptions may make the 
interpretation of this 0 as a neutral (and inert)  mode of presentation under which the 
belief is held by the believer.  
 To consider  an example adapted from Devitt (1996), suppose that my cousin, 
Robert McKay, has recently murdered John Gruff. I know that he is the murderer 
(furthermore suppose that he always tells me what he does). We happen to read the 
local newspaper, which has published an interview with an important detective, 
Sherlock Holmes. The detective  provides some details about the state of the 
investigation and says that he is far from knowing the identity of the murderer. 
Among the things Sherlock Holmes says is that he believes that the murderer is 
insane. So both my cousin and I know that Sherlock Holmes is far from knowing the 
name of the murderer. Yet, I say  
 
(34) Sherlock Holmes  believes that the murderer is insane. Thus, Sherlock 
Holmes  believes that [Robert McKay] 0 is insane 
 
where „Robert McKay‟ is the mode of presentation adopted to make Sherlock 
Holmes relevant to H and to induce him to reflect on his mental state and 0 is the 
mode of presentation under which the belief is originally held by the believer. 
 That contextual assumptions must be taken into account in pragmatic  
interpretations is well-known. I do not take these as fatal objections to my relevance-
theoretic treatment of belief reports. Green (1989), instead, believes that  cases such 
as the one by Devitt militate against a pragmatic analysis of belief reports, 
presumably because he would like to align inferences such as the ones arising from 
belief reports to almost-universal implicatures such as those arising from utterances 
of “I lost a contact lens”. Green argues that the implicature “I lost my contact lens” 
falls under the scope of negation and of modal embedding (conditionals) and, thus, is 
an ideal candidate for inclusion in “what is said” by a speaker. Implicatures from 
belief reports lack the almost-universal feature, presumably because they are 
defeated in some contexts. Yet,  Green undervalues cases of defeasibility such as “I 
found a contact lens” where the intuitive understanding is that the speaker found 
somebody else‟s contact lens. Thus it can be doubted that there are near-universal 
implicatures in Green‟s sense.  It appears to me that what makes inferences of belief 
reports  eligible to be part of what is said, in addition to being part of the proposition 
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expressed, is the fact that they are not cancellable. I personally find the examples of 
cancellability by Green (1998) based on Barwise & Perry (1981) and Berg (1988) 
hard to swallow. Furthermore, the fact that, as Green notes, ordinary speakers‟ 
judgements consider utterances of belief reports that express the same proposition 
but contain distinct modes of presentation as truth-conditionally distinct seems to 
militate against the view that the inferences of belief reports are implicatures and in 
favour of the view that they are part of what is said and of (uncancellable) 
explicatures. 
 
 So far, I have argued that pragmatic intrusion is responsible for enriching the 
logical forms of belief sentences and fleshing out the full truth-evaluable 
propositions  associated with belief reports. The processes I have inquired into are 
unreflective, and largely intuitive, in line with considerations by Wilson (2000, 417). 
The fact that explicatures are mainly unreflective can explain why it is that most of 
us are inclined to think that belief reports are not interchangeable salva veritate if an 
NP is replaced with a coreferential expression. 
 Devitt‟s  (1996) approach may be seen as an  ideal candidate for the treatment of 
belief reports presumably because it has the merit of reconciling Millian  with 
Fregean theories (Davis 2005). Yet, the approach is unsatisfactory because it does 
not address semantic and syntactic problems properly. The way Devitt hopes to 
reconcile both positions is to say that each NP (or AP) within the clause embedded in 
a belief verb expresses both a referent and a mode of presentation. Yet this 
apparently conciliatory move does not take into account the syntactic difficulties 
which were a threat to Schiffer‟s theory. Surely Devitt would not want to say that 
each NP (or AP) semantically expresses both a referent and a mode of presentation. 
Such a claim, even if possibly true, does not explain the opacity problem: the fact 
that belief contexts block the application of Leibniz‟s law. Consider Leibniz‟ Law: 
 
Two things are identical  with each other if they are substitutable preserving 
the truth of the sentence (Jaszczolt 2005, 120)
5
. 
                                                 
5
 Williamson (2006) correctly argues that a better formulation of Leibniz‟s law is 
required. The reader is referred to Asher (2000) and in particular to his identity 
principle: Suppose that φ is an expression denoting an abstract entity, that   φ 
contains an occurrence of a name α,  and that the denotation of α is the same as the 
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Arguing in favour of  the (semantic) association of every NP with a referent and a 
mode of presentation would ipso facto create a problem in that Leibniz‟s law would 
then be inapplicable even in the case of NPs outside the scope of belief-like operators 
(opacity would be exported outside the scope of belief verbs); not to mention the fact 
that not all NPs can be directly associated with referents (what about „beauty‟, 
„wealth‟, „justice‟?).  
 An additional problem is that, in the spirit of his conciliatory proposal, Devitt 
grants that both transparent and opaque interpretations are licensed by belief reports, 
following Quine (1960). He grants that a sentence such as (35) 
 
(35) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy 
 
has got the two following interpretations: 
 
(36) Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy; 
(37) Ralph believes that (assents to) “Ortcutt is a spy”. 
 
(36) constitutes the transparent construal, whereas (37) constitutes the opaque 
construal. 
 
A thorny problem for Devitt (and for Quine) is that, everything being equal, a 
univocal semantic representation should be preferred to the ambiguity view, on 
grounds of parsimony (Modified Occam‟s Razor; see also the important work by  
Jaszczolt 1999, who tries to eliminate ambiguities in favour of  univocal 
interpretations). Another problem would be that the transparent reading, given his 
general conciliatory strategy of associating an NP both with a referent and with a 
mode of presentation, should be obtained by suppressing the mode of presentation 
the referent is associated with. So,  Devitt faces the hard task of explaining  where 
the mode of presentation comes from (semantically) in the opaque construal; in 
addition,  he must explain  how the mode of presentation is suppressed in the 
transparent construal. The move of resorting to the context of utterance is not 
                                                                                                                                                                  
denotation of  β, then the denotation of  (φ) = denotation (φ [β/ α]). Something along 
these lines is required. 
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allowed him, if his strategy is not pragmatic, but merely semantic. His strategy is 
clearly not pragmatic, given what he says, because he invokes no pragmatic 
machinery to explain what he assumes. In my opinion, explaining in semantic terms  
how a mode of presentation within the scope of „believe‟ is associated with an NP 
involves syntactically deriving the mode of presentation from the belief verb and 
claiming that it is an argument of the verb. But this move is not devoid of problems, 
as Schiffer and Recanati convincingly noticed. 
 A pragmatic approach avoids the proliferation of senses (the ambiguity problem) 
and also explains why in some contexts, but not in others, modes of presentation are 
suppressed. It also explains why the opacity construals are default
6
, achieved by 
maximizing relevance. The transparent interpretation is simply achieved by 
preventing a mode of presentation from arising, and thus needs a context in which 
the suppression of the mode of presentation is mandated by background knowledge. I 
also want to consider that the suppression of a mode of presentation should not be 
considered a case of defeasibility. Explicatures are derived/constructed through 
unreflective pragmatic mechanisms that promote the most relevant interpretation, 
that is to say, the one which has the greatest  amount of positive cognitive effects. An 
interpretation which reduces the possibility of mistaken action  is more relevant than 
an alternative interpretation (in a context in which action is being focused on) 
because it maximises contextual effects. This is why MoPs are prevented from 
arising in certain cases in which there is a heavy emphasis on the facilitation of 
action (presumably in Devitt‟s cases discussed above). 
 My proposal has much to do with modes of presentation, but in a sense, it ignores 
a very important fact pointed out by Jaszczolt (1999). An  NP embedded in that-
clauses in belief reports has the main function of referring to an entity that belongs to 
the real world. In my approach, this important fact can be reconciled with the fact 
that the referent is normally associated with a specific  mode of presentation. That 
NPs within that-clauses of belief reports refer to extra-linguistic entities is also 
ensured by inferential pragmatics, since a that-clause which provides information 
about the world, in addition to providing information about the believer‟s mental life, 
is more informative, as it eliminates a greater amount of states of the world, and is 
conducive to successful action (on the notion of informativeness, see the important 
                                                 
6
 I am not arguing that the inferences in question  are the result of default rules, but 
only that they standardly get through. 
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work by Levinson (2000), as well as his papers on anaphora). Thus relevance is 
increased, as a result of  increased contextual effects. 
 
7. Further considerations on null appositives 
What I have so far proposed is that pragmatic intrusion provides a specific mode of 
presentation, while I have suggested that there is a constituent present in the structure 
of the explicature, which has the features of a pronominal or a free variable and is a 
(pragmatic)  empty category, in that it does not receive a phonological 
representation. This is  a null appositive (it should be clear, however, that I am not  
proposing that the variable is present at LF).  The possibility of  an NP‟s having an 
appositive is exemplified by sentences such as (38) 
 
(38) Mary, the President of our union, is clever. 
 
An appositive is surely a modifier, in that it adds further qualifications or restrictions  
to those expressed by the main NP. The appositive adds a superior node to an NP 
node, a node which has similar features, thus an NP. Of course, it is  important to 
know whether the appositive adds a further constituent to the main proposition 
expressed by the sentence. My answer is that it does not and simply makes the 
referring potential of the name it is an appositive to more explicit.  Given that, in our 
belief sentences, the appositive representing a mode of presentation is a null element, 
we can represent it in this way: 
 
(39) John believes that [NP [NP Mary] [NP 0] ] is clever. 
 
The most thorny problem I can see, with this proposal, is that, after all, we would 
have to generalize it to all NPs. Thus, in (39), the NP „John‟ too would have to be 
associated with a null Mode of Presentation. Is not then opacity created in subject 
position too? Well, my proposal crucially hinges on the interaction between the 
empty category 0 and the verb „believe‟ which has 0 in its scope. „John‟ is outside 
the scope of „believe‟ and thus no interesting interaction, resulting in an opacity 
effect, obtains. The implicit mode of presentation in the subject position of (39) does 
not result in opacity effects, because it does not prevent substitution salva veritate of 
the NP „John‟. 
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 Another problem with my proposal could be the following. It may be plausibly  
argued that a sentence such as (38) is truth-conditionally equivalent to (40): 
 
(40) Mary, who is the President of our union, is clever. 
 
Now, suppose we embed this sentence into a belief sentence, we obtain: 
 
(41) John thinks that Mary, who is the President of our union, is  clever. 
 
However, on one interpretation  the relative clause just gives more information about 
Mary without shedding light on how John thinks of her. The objection is a natural 
one and a very good one too. I pointed out in a previous section that Bach‟s use of  
appositive clauses could not be the end of the story and that further pragmatic 
processing was involved. The objection is one further reason for assuming that a 
story in terms of Relevance Theory is needed. This must be a story that explains why 
an appositive clause is needed and how this appositive clause is assumed to be part of 
the believer‟s mode of presentation of the proposition believed. The problem, 
however, one might retort, arises not really from implicit appositives, but from 
explicit ones, like the ones above, which can be understood „de re’ (as not being part 
of the believer‟s mode of presentation). Cases such as this can be disposed of with a 
pragmatic treatment in line with Sperber & Wilson‟s considerations. The implicit 
appositive clause is interpreted as providing a mode of presentation that serves to 
specify further the believer‟s belief state because this interpretation has greater 
contextual effects than a merely referential interpretation. In other words, 
considerations analogous to the ones I adopted in resolving Jaszczolt‟s problem 
apply here. This problem seems to me of great theoretical importance. I will take it 
up later. 
 The discussion so far has hinged on the assumption that we can have something 
like null appositives, specifically modes of presentation, in the structure of NPs 
belonging to that-clauses embedded in verbs of belief. The literature on pragmatic 
intrusion is characterised by endless discussions on whether we should posit empty 
constituents in logical forms of sentences such  as “It rains”. Recanati (2004) is a 
champion of the view that we should not posit these empty categories at logical form. 
I must say, in the words of Mey (personal communication) that in cases such as the 
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one discussed by Recanati there is not clear-cut evidence in favour of one or another 
theory. But have we got independent evidence for the existence of this null 
appositive that modifies NPs within the scope of belief verbs? I propose that we 
should set  aside the task of assigning  null appositives at logical form and remain 
content with stipulating that such appositives appear in the propositions expressed 
(so  we are following  Recanati 2004 and Carston 2002). Some crucial and 
indubitable evidence comes from sentences such as (42): 
 
(42) John believes that Mary Pope went to Paris and that she had fun. 
 
I propose we should analyse  (42) as providing evidence for a proposition such as: 
 
(43) John believes that [Mary Pope] 0 went to Paris and that [she] 0 had fun. 
 
It is interesting to note that if we allow implicit modes of presentation, we have got a 
double anaphoric pattern, as the indexes show: 
 
(44) John believes that [Mary Pope]i 0n went to Paris and that [she]i 0n had 
fun. 
 
The subscript i represents the reference of „Mary Pope‟, and this is attributed through 
coindexation to „she‟. Instead,  n is the subscript attributed to 0, the mode of 
presentation associated with „Mary Pope‟ (which must be coindexed with the form 
„Mary Pope‟), and that is coindexed with the implicit mode of presentation 0 
associated with „she‟. Notice that, unless we have got this (conceptual) anaphoric 
chain, which is possible only through the existence of  null modes of presentation (or 
null appositives), it would be possible to understand (42) allowing „she‟ to be 
intersubstitutable with any NP at all that has the same referent as „Mary Pope‟, with 
no regard for the mode of presentation „Mary Pope‟. But this is not the natural 
interpretation of the utterance. 
 Further evidence comes from control structures: 
 
(45) John believes Mary Pope to be in Paris and [PRO]0 to be working hard 
(instead she is having fun with her other boyfriend). 
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The control structure ensures that the reference of „Mary Pope‟ is transmitted 
through anaphora to PRO; however unless we posit that PRO has got a null 
appositive in the explicature, we cannot account for the opacity of the structure, as 
certainly by replacing PRO with an NP coreferential with „Mary Pope‟ (but distinct 
from it) a statement having different truth-conditions is obtained
7
. 
 A more interesting piece of evidence comes from Italian control structures: 
 
(46) Maria crede di PRO essere intelligente. 
(lit. Maria believes  PRO  to be intelligent) 
Maria believes she is intelligent. 
 
Suppose we call Maria „Maria‟, but she does not know that this is her name; in fact, 
she does not know that she has a name. Maria thinks of herself under some mode of 
presentation of the self (a first-person mode of presentation), but this does not 
include the name „Maria‟, which, instead, is the mode of presentation we associate 
with her. This case strongly supports the idea that we must posit a propositional 
structure  such as the following: 
 
(47) Maria crede di [PRO] 0 essere intelligente. 
 
In fact, while PRO in the present case receives its reference through an anaphoric 
link with Maria,  it cannot be associated with the mode of presentation „Maria‟. We 
thus need a way of signalling  that PRO must be possibly distinct from 0 and that 0 
must be possibly distinct from „Maria‟. 0 is associated with PRO, but not through 
anaphora, only as a null appositive, which is capable of having the meaning of 
„whatever coincides with the subject of belief‟8. This is what Lewis (1979) calls an 
attitude „de se‟. Higginbotham‟s (2004) considerations on the “internal” aspect of 
PRO (in the context of a discussion of „de se‟ beliefs) are applicable here: what is 
believed by Maria to be intelligent is the subject of the experience BELIEVING (see 
also Stanley & Williamson 2001, for an analogous view). The example (47) is 
                                                 
7
 In this respect, my view is different from Salmon‟s. 
 
8
 My example is reminiscent of an example by Stanley & Williamson (2001), who 
actually use a case of amnesia to exemplify de se interpretations. 
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reminiscient of Castañeda‟s (1966) famous example “The editor of Soul knows that 
he is a millionaire”. This, according to Castañeda, does not entail that the Editor of 
Soul knows that the Editor of Soul is a millionaire. 
 In Capone (2000), I proposed that clitics in clitic-doubling constructions qualify 
propositions believed or known in a special way, anchoring them to discourse. While 
I recognize that more than one view is tenable in connection with the Italian clitic 
„lo‟, I now think that a theory along the lines I have just proposed is not untenable. 
Consider (48): 
 
(48) Giovanni lo sa che Maria è a Parigi. 
(lit. Giovanni it knows that Mary is in Paris) 
(Giovanni knows that Mary is in Paris). 
 
I claimed that the clitic „lo‟ qualifies the proposition known as being part of shared 
knowledge. I have wavered between a semantic and a pragmatic analysis, but this is 
not important for the present chapter, as the semantic analysis may be seen as 
deriving diachronically from the pragmatic analysis. In any case, both Uriagereka 
(1995) and I have claimed that the clitic has the effect of qualifying the that-clause 
embedded in the verb of propositional attitude as being part of the commonground. 
Yet Uriagereka claims that the that-clause is an appositive to the clitic, the clitic 
functioning as an argument to the verb. This view is not implausible. Suppose, 
however, that we reverse this view and claim that the clitic is an appositive to the 
that-clause. In this way we obtain an analysis parallel to the one I have proposed for 
verbs of propositional attitude in general. Modes of presentations are appositives. In 
the case of clitics (in clitic-doubling constructions), they are pronominal appositives, 
which qualify a proposition in a certain way: they can function as words that imply 
certain modes of presentation. Of course, they need not be called modes of 
presentation, except in a special sense.  The word „lo‟ qualifies the embedded 
proposition (in clitic doubling constructions) as being part of  the commonground, 
but the word itself is not the mode of presentation of the embedded proposition. It 
implies a mode of presentation. 
 Further evidence comes from verbs of propositional attitude like „want‟, which 
mandate control structures. Consider (49): 
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(49) Mary wants Cicero PRO, but not Tullius,  to come to her party. 
 
Suppose Mary is not aware that Cicero is Tullius; she would like Cicero to come to 
the party, but she would like  Tullius not to come to her party (say she has always 
heard nice things about Cicero but bad things about Tullius). If she knew that Cicero 
is Tullius, she would not let him come. (49) ought to be analysed as (50): 
 
(50) Mary wants Cicero [ti 0 to come to the party] but she does not want Tullius 
[tii 0 to come to the party]
9
. 
 
Unless we posit null appositive modes of presentation associated with ti and ti, the 
sentence (50) has to be perceived as a contradiction, since ti inherits its reference 
from „Cicero‟, tii inherits its reference from „Tullius‟ (in conjunction with the 
premise that Cicero = Tullius). However, the sentence is not contradictory because 
Mary, due to her frame of mind, will not admit  Tullius to her party (given the bad 
things she has heard about him), but she will allow Cicero (given the nice things she 
has heard about him). The sentence (50) reminds us of Carston‟s famous example 
(originally from Cohen 1971): 
 
(50) If the king of France dies and France becomes a republic, I shall be happy, 
but if France becomes a republic and the king of  France dies I shall be unhappy. 
 
The sentence (50) has an appearance of contradiction, unless we furnish the 
explicatures and provide a temporal and causal interpretation for the material in each 
if-clause. When the underdeterminacy  is resolved, we no longer face a possibly 
contradictory sentence (however, see Capone 2006 for a more detailed proposal, in 
addition to  Burton-Roberts 2005). Analogously, by furnishing the explicature of  
(50) and in particular by coindexing each 0 (implicit mode of presentation) with the 
NP  0 is an appositive to, we obtain a statement  which is no longer contradictory. 
 My proposal abides by Carston‟s precept that: 
 
(…) pragmatic processes can supply constituents to what is said solely on 
communicative grounds, without any linguistic pointer (Carston 2002, 23). 
                                                 
9
 I am adopting this analysis from Carnie (2002). 
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 There is an interesting interaction between modality and belief reports, and  it 
might be useful to analyse the modal „ought‟. Obligations are normally imposed by 
the rules of society on people who act in certain roles. Were they not to act in such 
roles, they would not contract the relevant obligations. For example, as I am a 
teacher I ought to lecture almost every morning in my school (but not on Sundays!). 
The mode of presentation is important, as the obligation is perceived only under a 
specific mode of presentation, which includes a public role (it follows that I should 
not lecture on Sundays, when I do not act as a public official). So consider the 
following example: 
 
(51) John believes he ought to lecture in the morning. 
 
Although some may deny this, I believe that some implicit modes of presentation are 
at play here, explaining that the propositional form includes that John believes that 
he, qua teacher, ought to lecture in the morning (every working day  of his life as a 
teacher, but certainly not when he  retires); in other words, the modal  „ought‟ selects 
a stage of John‟s life in which he is a teacher and cannot be extended to periods of 
time in which he is retired). If such considerations make sense, we can explain why 
substitution can be  blocked in the following case: 
 
(52) John believes that the Prime Minister ought to go to the ceremony of the 
opening of the judiciary year; 
(53) John believes that Berlusconi ought to go to the ceremony of the opening 
of the judiciary year. 
 
The expression „the prime minister‟ in (52) may receive an attributive or a referential 
interpretation. The attributive interpretation is „whoever is the Prime Minister‟; the 
referential interpretation is „Berlusconi‟. Suppose we confine ourselves to the 
attributive interpretation. From this interpretation, it follows that if the Prime 
Minister ought to go to the ceremony, then Berlusconi has to go. Yet, from (52) it 
does not follow that (53) is unconditionally true. First, the speaker need not know 
that Berlusconi happens to be the Prime Minister. Secondly,  (53) follows from (52) 
provided that the speaker knows of the identity in question  and on the 
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understanding that  „ought‟ is confined to the period in which Berlusconi is in charge 
as Prime Minister. I think these moral matters ought to have discouraged Devitt 
(1996), who, instead, uses the attributive/referential interpretative ambiguity to argue 
that substitution of NPs in belief sentences is licit for communicative purposes. 
 A further example that can be used to prove that implicit modes of presentation do 
some work at the propositional level is drawn from Seymour‟s (1992) paper. 
Seymour defends a sentential theory of propositional attitudes and essentially 
believes that a person X believes that S in case he is in a relation R to a certain 
sentence. If we mention the sentence in order to specify its character, the whole 
belief sentence reports a belief relation between the agent and a certain linguistic 
meaning under a mode of presentation that is a certain verbal form. If we mention the 
subordinate clause in order to specify its content, the agent is then described as being 
in a relation with the content of the sentence mentioned and, in this case, the sentence 
no longer behaves as a mode of presentation.  Seymour calls the first type of belief 
intentional belief and the second material belief. Seymour considers that intentional 
beliefs (opaque readings) are distinguished by the fact that they are reflexive. 
Material beliefs are distinguished by the fact that they are not reflexive. Thus, if  (54) 
is true, (55) must be true, provided that we consider the opaque reading of (54): 
 
(54) John believes that Mary Simpson went to Paris. 
(55) John believes he believes that Mary Simpson went to Paris. 
 
If John is not ready to assent to „Mary Simpson went to Paris‟, there is no way to 
derive the inference (55). Seymour‟s  intuition is most easily explained away by 
resorting to modes of presentation (given Kripke‟s reasonable doubts about the 
equation of believing and assenting to a proposition). Thus the statement or thought 
(54) must receive an adequate representation as (56): 
 
(56)  John believes that [Mary Simpson]i 0i went to Paris 
 
where 0 represents the null appositive or mode of presentation, which is coindexed 
with the form „Mary Simpson‟. 
  Timothy Williamson (2006) says that  there is the case in which John lacks self-
knowledge or does not grasp the concept of belief.  Presumably this amounts to an 
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objection against my treatment. As a reply, I must consider that in some cases the 
reflexivity of belief (or of knowledge) comes to the philosopher‟s help in resolving 
otherwise insuperable problems. Stanley & Williamson‟s (2001) discussion  of 
opacity in favour of the idea that  knowledge-how is a sub-species of  knowledge-
that is one  such case. Of course, if knowledge-that involved opacity while 
knowledge-how involved a transparent relation to an embedded proposition p, there 
would be serious trouble for Stanley & Williamson who have taken great pains to 
analyse knowledge-how in terms of a relation between a (cognitive)  agent and a 
proposition (invoking the semantic machinery of embedded questions). In particular, 
there would be trouble if there was no significant truth-conditional difference 
between “Hannah knows how to locate Hesperus” and “Hannah knows how to locate 
Phosphorus”. Stanley & Williamson claim that the latter proposition does not seem 
to follow from the former. But I think that their analysis tacitly assumes that 
knowledge is a reflexive relation. Only reflexivity can block the intersubstitution of 
the two names, because despite the fact that Hannah is able to locate on a map (of the 
universe) that planet there in the sky regardless of  its name(s) (and thus in a sense 
she is able to locate both Hesperus and Phosphorus), she would not say of herself 
that she knows she knows how to locate Phosphorus even if she knows she knows 
how to locate Hesperus. As Seymour would say, it is the reflexive notion of 
knowledge-how that blocks substitution. 
 Independent evidence in favour of the presence of modes of presentation of the 
referent in that-clauses of belief reports comes from what Stanley (2005) says about 
ellipsis. Stanley argues that explicatures enter into certain linguistic processes such 
as anaphora and deixis (this is well known since Chomsky  1972, 33). An example 
such as (57) 
 
(57) The ham sandwich wants his bill now 
 
proves that the pragmatic determination of the referent of „The ham sandwich‟ (the 
person who ordered the ham sandwich) must be available for anaphoric 
coindexation. The examples of ellipsis are even more interesting. Consider (58): 
 
(58) Bill served  a ham sandwich, and John did too. 
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(58) cannot be interpreted as conveying that Bill served a person who ordered a ham 
sandwich, whereas John served a ham sandwich. The explicature of the first conjunct 
of (58) must be available for the understanding of the elided constituent too. In other 
words it must be used in providing an explicature that reconstructs the missing 
(elided) constituent. 
 Analogous considerations apply to metaphorical meaning, which is carried over in 
ellipsis, showing that explicatures play a role in this linguistic process: 
 
(59) John is a pig and Bill is too. 
 
 Now,  let us apply ellipsis to belief reports. Consider: 
 
(60) John believes that Kent Clark is not Superman and Fred does too. 
 
We said above that ellipsis carries over the explicature  of the first sentence to the 
elided constituent. Thus, it is not licit to interpret (60) as the thought that John 
believes a non-contradictory thought while Fred believes a contradictory one. In 
other words, it is not licit to replace „Kent Clark‟ with „Superman‟ in the elided 
constituent, as a result of a syntactic constraint due to ellipsis: the explicature of the 
first sentence must be used in reconstructing  the meaning of the elided constituent 
(we could also use talk of a „parallel‟ explicature). What is this explicature? I assume 
that it consists in the attribution of the mode of presentation „Kent Clark‟ to the 
referent Kent Clark. 
 Analogous considerations apply to (61) (to use comparatives, which were first 
taken account of by Carston in her discussion of the semantics/pragmatics debate): 
 
(61)  John believes that Kent Clark is better than Superman and Fred does too. 
 
As Carston (2002) and Levinson (2000) noted, the statement „A is better than B‟ 
presupposes that A and B are distinct, otherwise it communicates a patently false 
thought. 
Ellipsis in (61) imposes the constraint that the explicature of the first conjoined 
sentence should carry over to the elided constituent.  In particular, the elided 
constituent cannot be interpreted as “Fred holds the belief that Kent Clark is better 
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than himself”. What is it that blocks substitution „salva veritate‟ in the elided 
constituent? Presumably it is the fact that „Kent Clark is associated with the mode of 
presentation „Kent Clark‟ in the explicature of the first conjunct  and it cannot be 
associated with the mode of presentation „Superman‟ in the explicature of the second 
conjunct. This is best explained away on the assumption that  the explicature of the 
first conjunct is that  Kent Clark is associated with the MoP  „Kent Clark‟ in John‟s 
belief and that there is a linguistic constraint due to ellipsis such that the explicature 
of the first conjunct is carried over to the elided constituent of the second conjunct. 
 
8. An alternative analysis 
So far, I have developed an analysis following Bach‟s idea that one should posit null 
appositives (not in the logical form, but)  at the level of the propositional form. I 
have also elaborated on the reasons why null appositives are required at the level of 
the logical form. Yet, as it could be correctly pointed out, I am not exempted from 
providing a semantic analysis of the propositional form thus obtained through 
pragmatic expansion. Furthermore, it is possible that the ideas exposed so far may be 
further expanded so as accommodate a plausible objection on the part of my 
hypothetical opponent. Presumably a semantic analysis of the propositional 
development of null appositive clauses looks like this: 
 
John believes that [NP  0  VP] 
 
where 0 is a null appositive (presumably an NP). This is in line with Del Gobbo‟s 
(2003) idea that appositives expand NPs into NPs (through adjunction). If we adopt 
the idea that a null appositive is nothing but a relative clause, then we have a further 
expansion of  the structure above: 
 
John believes that [NP  [CP who [ t is NP]] VP] 
 
where t is the trace of the relative pronoun which moves to a node dominated by CP 
(complementizer phrase) (see Haegeman 1994).  
 A plausible consequence of this analysis is that the null relative clauses may be 
taken as providing the speaker‟s mode of presentation of the reference (in addition to 
the believer‟s mode of presentation of the reference). In response to this possible 
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objection, I think that something else must be said about  a sentence such as “John 
believes that Mary  went to Paris”.  
 
Suppose that we exploit the intuitions about the role of clitics in clitic-doubling 
constructions (e.g. “Giovanni lo sa che p” (Giovanni it knows that p)). We said that 
the clitic is mainly an appositive (reversing Uriagereka‟s analysis according to which 
the clitic  was the complement of the attitudinative and the proposition p an 
appositive). Furthermore suppose that all attitudinatives have got a null appositive 
similar in semantic/syntactic structure to the clitic, but syntactically different in that 
it has got an internal articulation of the type [MoP/SN, MoP/VP], where by MoP we 
indicate a mode of presentation. We also suppose that this supposition can be held 
cross-linguistically (unless there is evidence that a language has got a different 
structure; we are open to the hypothesis that languages may vary according to 
whether they exhibit tacit or otherwise explicit appositive clauses to attitudinatives). 
 Well, at this point all attitudinatives have got the following semantic/syntactic 
structure: 
 
John believes [[that P] [NPMoP VPMoP]] 
 
It is not surprising that there are appositives to sentences, given that sentential 
arguments are assimilated to NPs. In any case, De Vries (2002) provides a number of 
examples of appositives to sentences. Given this semantic structure, relevance theory 
intervenes to supply appropriate binding between NPMoP and the NP occurring in P. 
 At this point we can easily explain the intuition that non-restrictive relative 
clauses actually express a speaker‟s mode of presentation (in addition to a believer‟s 
mode of presentation). This may find an explanation in the fact that processing effort 
decreases relevance and, thus, to preserve the high relevance of the non-restrictive 
relative clause, we need the extra assumption that  the non-restrictive relative clause 
expresses the speaker‟s mode of presentation, in addition to the believer‟s mode of 
presentation. 
 By incorporating qua-clauses not at the level of the uttered sentence, but at the 
level of the null appositive we have immediately resolved the  problem we are 
tackling.  
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 It may be objected that this alternative analysis places a greater load on the 
semantics, than on the pragmatics. Yet, we still have to posit appositives to explain 
the behaviour of clitic-doubling in languages like Italian and to posit null appositives 
for English is no costly move, given that appositives exist in English and thus the 
English language must have the semantic and syntactic resources for expressing 
them. 
 It may take time to adjudicate between the previous position and the one I express 
admittedly tentatively in this section. It is not clear to me that the null appositive 
view, as I expressed it, requires positing free variables (of a complex kind) at Logical 
Form, in the sense of Stanley (2000), in which case pragmatics is assigned the 
modest role of filling in these variables, of giving them semantic values by saturating 
them. The picture I have so far provided is compatible with a full pragmatic intrusion 
story. The syntactic structure of the null appositive to the embedded clause of a belief 
report is just the structure of a constitutent we mentally supply through pragmatics 
and it is possibly not part of the semantic  structure of  a belief sentence. 
 At this point, we have to clear out how we should treat clitic doubling belief-like 
constructions. Supposedly, they have a structure similar to the constructions where 
no clitic appears, with the difference that the clitic is already there, and already 
functions as an apposition to the that-clause. However, there is nothing in the 
grammar that banishes the idea of having cyclic appositives (or reiterated 
appositives), an appositive being an appositive to another appositive. At this point, 
we can assign the following  structure to clitic doubling constructions such as 
“Giovanni lo sa che p”: 
 
Giovanni sa [[che S] [[ NP lo] [NP/MoP, VP/MoP]]] 
 
This enables the clitic to provide, by semantic implication, a mode of presentation of 
the whole of S, while [NP/MoP, VP/MoP] supplies a structure which is more 
articulated and provides modes of presentation variables which can be bound with 
NPs within the embedded clause. We can think of these variables as present in 
constituents we assign the sentence through pragmatics. The present analysis 
assumes, in line with de Vries (2002), that appositives can be stacked in English and 
in many other languages (an English example is “This man, who came to dinner late, 
about whom nobody knew anything…”). 
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9. Loose ends 
I think we should now turn to a problem noted by Braun (1998).  Braun believes that 
Fregean theories hold the view that speakers routinely think about other people‟s 
mental representations and intend to talk about those mental representations when 
they utter belief sentences. He thinks that the following case is problematic for 
Fregean theories. Suppose Gingrich says: 
 
(62) I am a Republican. 
 
Linda hears that and forms a belief about Gingrich. Any of the following is a correct 
description of  Linda‟s belief: 
 
(63) Linda believes that Gingrich is a Republican; 
(64) Linda believes that you are a republican (addressing Gingrich); 
(65) Linda believes that he is a Republican (demonstrating Gingrich). 
 
I think Braun‟s point is to show that, regardless of the mode of presentation Linda 
makes use of in her (unexpressed) thought, one can use modes of presentation such 
as „Gingrich‟ or pronouns whose content is retrieved relative to the context of 
utterance. I think Braun concludes that the Fregean emphasis on the mode of 
presentation of the believer is misguided, as in actual conversation we are in fact 
more busy in identifying reference.  
 Wayne Davis (2005, 268) provides the following reply to Braun‟s argument: 
 
In this case, the fact that „Gingrich‟, „he‟ and „you‟  differ markedly in meaning 
does not matter at all. But this is clearly a case in which the belief ascriptions are 
intended transparently. It is on the opaque interpretation that substitutivity fails 
(Davis 2005, 268).  
 
My answer to Braun is different from Davis‟s.  I think that a point  Braun neglects is 
that in context we know quite well that Linda thinks of Gingrich as Gingrich and thus 
it  follows  that a suitable mode of presentation of the referent could either be the 
name „Gingrich‟ (as was done in (63)) or a pronominal, making an implicit reference 
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to the mode of presentation „Gingrich‟. In other words, Braun‟s considerations, 
valuable though they are, do not  militate against my approach which posits implicit 
appositives (in the explicature) to account for implicit modes of presentation. 
 Davis (2005) has an example that is useful for the discussion of explicatures (once 
again I notice that I talk of explicatures, while other theorists talk about 
implicatures). I believe that explicatures are not cancellable (see Capone 
forthcoming). Consider in detail Davis‟s discussion in terms of the implicatures of 
belief reports: 
 
The metalinguistic implicature will be cancelled when it is evident in the 
context that the speaker is using a language not known by the subject being 
described. If I say, „Boris Yeltsin believes that the Pacific Ocean is larger than 
the Atlantic‟, I would not imply or be taken to have implied that Yeltsin 
believes any English sentence to be true. When we ascribe beliefs to a 
prelinguistic child or animal, we do not implicate that the subject would 
believe any sentence at all to be true (Davis 2005,  177). 
 
The hearer knows from the very beginning that Yeltsin‟s thoughts are described 
through translation and thus immediately accesses the assumption that the 
proposition embedded in the belief report is not as fine-grained as if the speaker were 
talking about an English believer (see also Green 1998 on similar cases). Yet, this 
pragmatic information amounts to an explicature, not to an implicature. On the 
present view, the following argument  (from Williamson 2006) turns out to be valid 
(with the proviso that we are talking about coarse-grained beliefs and that, following 
Kripke, we give up the assumption that believing amounts to assenting to a 
sentence): 
 
Bush believes that it is raining; Yeltsin believes that it is raining; Bush is not Yeltsin; 
therefore at least two people believe that it is raining. 
 
  The reasoning should suffice to prove that the pragmatically supplied constituents 
of belief reports (in particular appositive clauses specifying modes of presentation) 
are part of explicatures. It is propositions that are involved in logical deductive 
inferences, not fragmentary logical forms. For a full discussion of the role of 
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pragmatic inference in deductive inferences see Levinson (1983). The explicatures in 
belief reports like the ones in the Bush/Yeltsin case  are motivated by the search for 
the most relevant proposition  effects compatible with the speaker’s abilities and 
preferences. The speaker is obviously not capable of translating a belief and of 
doing justice to the original modes of presentation because the translation would 
become too laborious and thus relevance would be threatened by undue processing 
efforts. 
 I think that the differences between my approach and standard pragmatic 
approaches (e.g. Salmon‟s) can surmount an otherwise insuperable objection by 
Davis (2005,  278), which I deal with below. One who knows the Superman story (I 
assume everyone is acquainted with it) must accept the following thoughts: 
 
(66) Lois knows that „Superman‟ refers to Superman; 
(67) Lois knows that „Clerk Kent‟ refers to Clark Kent. 
 
But in the Millian theory „Superman‟ refers to Clark Kent and „Clark Kent‟ refers to 
Superman. 
 Thus, if we conjoin the thoughts in (66) and (67) with these referential identities, 
we obtain the following true statements: 
 
(68) Lois knows that „Superman‟ refers to Clark Kent; 
(69) Lois knows that „Clark Kent‟ refers to Superman. 
 
But then how can Lois fail to know that the two names are coreferential? 
 Davis‟s reasoning is easily surmounted if one accepts, as I proposed earlier, that 
pragmatic intrusion characterises the proposition expressed. Once the intrusion is 
fully characterised, the proposition expressed cannot be cancelled. Thus, unless the 
context is such that Lois knows the identity Superman = Kent Clark, it will not do to 
replace Superman in (67) with Kent Clark, in that this substitution suggests that the 
mode of presentation of the reference should be changed too, but this is not possible 
because the explicature is not cancellable. 
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Conclusion 
In this  chapter I have tried to connect two issues which are usually dealt with 
separately: belief reports and pragmatic intrusion (the semantics/pragmatics debate). 
I have proposed that advances in the former issue cannot be made without advances 
in the latter. The semantics of a sentence is often too skeletal to accommodate all the 
elements of a thought; thus pragmatics must contribute to the expression of implicit 
constituents. Modes of presentation are usually contributed to a thought through 
pragmatics. The contribution of this chapter is to explain, though relevance theory, 
that a belief report opens a window on the mental panorama of a believer and focuses 
on his way of representing constituents of thought. I also argued that this pragmatic 
picture is necessitated by linguistic facts, such as anaphora, control, ellipsis, de se 
beliefs, inferential properties of beliefs, modality, presuppositional clitics, etc. 
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Chapter 7 
 
On the social practice of indirect reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
In this chapter I postulate a number of principles of language use connected with the practice 
of indirect reporting, based on the idea that the original speaker should ideally approve of the 
report in case her words were not completely and arbitrary transformed. I connect these 
principles of use to a more general cognitive principle. 
   
 
 
Introduction. 
This chapter is a contribution to the pragmatics of indirect reports. In this chapter it is 
my aim to show how semantics and pragmatics can be harmonised in the context of 
the issue of indirect reports. Semantics involves recursive rules applying to a formal 
syntax, operates on expressions at a level of 'logical form', and is thus distinguished 
from pragmatics, through which such logical forms are developed into richer 
propositions.  In many, perhaps almost all, cases a given surface sentence can 
generate a variety of logical forms. But in a speech context these will be ordered so 
that some are preferred to others and some are ruled out entirely. Pragmatic  
principles are mainly responsible for this.  If this is right, then semantics and 
pragmatics are part of a harmonious picture.  
In connection with indirect reports, I argue that  we need to invoke pragmatic 
considerations that will complement  semantic considerations, semantics and 
pragmatics working in tandem.   Very often, in fact, substituting an NP into an 
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indirect report results in different speech act being erroneously reported. I do not 
expect to discover the exceptionless principles governing indirect reporting. Such 
principles are hard to find. However, what I propose is that such principles are tied to 
the function of utterances in discourse, and, thus, should be sensitive to the speaker‟s 
orientation to the communicative situation. 
  I propose that the principles governing indirect reports should be ultimately 
connected with the principle of Relevance by Sperber & Wilson (1986) (the matter 
whether the principles follow from Relevance Theory‟s assumptions or simply give 
independent  support to it will remain open for the time being). I therefore choose  
Relevance Theory as a framework that gives unity to my various considerations.  
 In this chpater, it is also my wish to draw the implications of the theory of 
pragmemes, which I have advanced in other articles (Capone 2005a, 2004a) 
following ideas broached by Mey (2001) and to apply them to  areas of inquiry 
which certainly  need being revisited with modern and efficient analytical  tools, such 
as the detailed study of the interplay between speech acts and context.  
 
 
1. Pragmemes and indirect reports. 
This chapter owes much to Mey‟s theory of pragmemes (Mey 2001).  For Mey, all 
utterances are situated and their intended meanings must be recovered starting from 
the situation of utterance. It should be possible, in theory and in practice, to recover 
(or discover) the speaker‟s intended meanings on the basis of the (rich) contextual 
clues which s/he utilises in getting her message across.  This is what Mey says about 
pragmemes or pragmatic acts: 
 
 
The theory of pragmatic acts does not explain human language use starting from 
the words uttered by a single, idealized speaker. Instead, it focuses on the 
interactional situation in which both speakers and hearers realize their aims. The 
explanatory movement is from the outside in, one could say, rather than from the 
inside out: instead of starting with what is said, and looking for what the words 
could mean, the situation where the words fit, is invoked to explain what can be 
(and is actually being) said (Mey 2001: 542). 
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I suppose that a great deal can be said about this excerpt. For the time being, I will 
simply say it reminds me of a film in which the frightened heroine was trying to 
shout and say something, but was prevented from doing that, her voice never came 
out. How can we know what she was  desperately trying to say, but did not say? The 
recovery of her intentions, in this case, as in many other similar cases, proceeds from 
the outside and the movement  is from the outside in. We can reconstruct what is 
going on in her mind only because we can understand what kind of situation she is 
in.  
 
The considerations above are relevant to my remarks on indirect reports for the 
following reasons. 
 
The situation of utterance plays a major role in shaping the obligations of the reporter 
and the degree of accuracy with which the original speech act is reported. Sometimes it 
determines a more fine-grained report, sometimes a less fine-grained report. 
 
There are contexts in which the hearer is able to separate the reporting speaker‟s and 
the reported speaker‟s voices. While  in a  default context, I propose a default principle 
saying that the words used in an indirect report should not lead us too far away from the 
original statement, I am ready to assert that we also need to investigate those contexts in 
which the hearer uses some practical means for discerning one voice from another, 
having at his/her disposal contextual clues and large chunks of world knowledge. For 
example, if a hearer knows that a certain item of vocabulary belongs to the reporting 
speaker‟s linguistic habits, but NOT to the reported speaker‟s linguistic habits, and s/he 
knows that the speaker may want to use such a piece of world knowledge to leave 
implicit part of the message, then s/he will be able to apportion a certain word (the 
usage of a certain word and the responsibilities involved) to the reporting speaker.  
 
 
Societal considerations are involved in indirect reports because indirect reports are 
language games in which in reporting that P, the speaker offers two voices: his voice 
and that of the original speaker. The reporter does not take responsibility for the 
embedded voice.  
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Societal considerations are involved in the fact that certain transformations are 
precluded in indirect reports, in case such transformations have effects on the speech act 
reported (threatening to alter it in a drastic way). It is not just words or events that are 
reported, but speech acts. Since speech acts require appropriate contexts, it is important 
that the indirect report should present the appropriate context for the speech act 
narrated, by using words that do not distort that original speech act. As can be easily 
understood, Mey‟s idea that speech acts are situated explains the fact that one is not 
(completely) free to replace one word with another in indirect reports, as, after all, 
words serve to shape the speech act. The indirect report should provide sufficient 
contextual clues for the recovery of the original speech act.    
 
That societal information goes into utterance interpretation is now being accepted by 
leading theorists within pragmatics. There is, in fact, pioneering work by Jaszcolt 
(2005) saying that the final result of semantic and pragmatic interpretation should take 
into account socio-cultural defaults.  I suppose that the contents of this chapter 
corroborate Jaszczolt‟s important, albeit general, considerations. 
 
The problems addressed in this chapter are reminiscent of the issue of mixed 
quotation, raised by Cappelen & Lepore (2007).  In that volume, the authors say that the 
most typical reasons for preferring mixed to direct or indirect quotation are that the 
reported utterance is too long to quote, but the reporter wants to ensure accuracy on 
certain key passages; certain passages were particularly well put; perhaps the words 
used by the original speaker were potentially offensive to an audience and the speaker 
wants to distance himself from them; the expression being mixed quoted is 
ungrammatical or a solecism and the speaker doesn‟t feel responsible, etc. 
 
The authors opt for a semantic theory of mixed quotation, on the basis of data drawn 
from the written language. In my review of the book (Capone 2009c), I insisted that by 
focusing on the written dimension of language, where devices for signaling mixed 
quotation are quite explicit and of a grammatical nature, Cappelen & Lepore are led 
astray, as the task of distinguishing quoted from not quoted items is basically a 
pragmatic one. Fundamentally, in the same way in which mixed quotation poses the 
pragmatic task of recovering which item belongs to which voice, in indirect reports 
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more generally there is the problem of telling voices apart. Cappelen & Lepore‟s 
problem and my problem intersect, even if, unlike them,  I am willing to resort to a 
theory of pragmemes to show how, in practice, the two voices are to be distinguished.  
 
 If we consider indirect reports language games we can see them in a different light 
from the way philosophers look at them. Indirect reports require a reporter, a piece of 
language behavior to report and a situation that motivates the  reporting and ends up 
constraining the form of the report. We shall look at indirect reports in the way 
suggested by Mey, as situated activities, in which the purpose, the participants and the 
societal rules play major roles in interpretation. As Mey says,  
 
Speech acts, in order to be effective, have to be situated. That is to say, they both 
rely on, and actively create, the situation in which they are realized. Thus, a 
situated speech act comes close to what has been called a speech event in 
ethnographic and anthropological studies (Bauman and Sherzer, 1974): speech as 
centered on an institutionalized social activity of a certain kind, such as teaching, 
visiting a doctor‟s office, participating in a tea-ceremony, and so on. In all such 
activities, speech is, in a way, prescribed: only certain utterances can be expected 
and will thus be acceptable; conversely, the participants in the situation, by their 
acceptance of their own and others‟ utterances, establish and reaffirm the social 
situation in which the utterances are uttered and in which they find themselves as 
utterers (Mey 2001, 219). 
 
From this, we can infer the following: 
 
Indirect speech acts are situated activities. The way the speech act is produced must 
conform to the rules that pertain to that situation of use. Conforming to the practice of 
indirect reports implies being competent members of a community of individuals, 
equipped with  communicative competence. This competence has evolved through a 
mixture of exposure to communicative events and the interplay of cognitive principles.  
Indirect reports show a double level of embedding. There is the original act, that was 
embedded in the situation in which it was uttered; there is the indirect report, which is 
sensitive to the situation in which it is uttered. Some of the constraints posed by the 
former context may be overridden by the new constraints of the latter context (for 
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example an utterance which was inappropriate, misplaced in the former context may be 
appropriate in the latter context), but in general it can be said that the former context 
and the interpretations licensed in it will constrain the latter context, UNLESS there are 
reasons for deviating from such a practice. 
Understanding the context in which the original statement reported was made is a 
step towards a radical theory of pragmemes.  In this chapter , I will not discuss in detail 
a radical treatment of the pragmeme of indirect report, but I must at least mention that 
the research by Tannen (1989) on talking voices paves the way for an understanding of 
indirect reports in context. An indirect report is felicitous if it takes into account the 
original context of utterance, the motives and contingent actions occurring there. Thus it 
should not be taken for granted that a report that confines itself to repeating certain 
words is maximally faithful, as it may obscure the contingent function of those words, 
as well as the speaker‟s intentions. Radical though that research might be, it does 
corroborate what I have been saying so far, that is to say that the context of utterance of 
the original statement  constrains the (felicitous making of) the indirect report. 
 
2. A unifying framework: Relevance Theory. 
I want to sketch, without going into great detail, the unifying assumptions of this 
chapter. Many of my considerations given in terms of Principles in this chapter can 
be connected with the basic assumptions of Relevance Theory by Sperber & Wilson 
(1986) and  Wilson & Sperber (2004). Relevance Theory develops an alternative to 
the code model of communication, mainly an inferential model in which a 
communicator provides evidence  of her intention to convey a certain meaning, 
which is inferred by the audience  on the basis of the evidence provided. According 
to the authors, the decoded linguistic meaning is just one of the inputs  to a non-
demonstrative process  which yields an interpretation of the speaker‟s meaning. The 
pragmatic process of interpretation is constrained by the following principle: 
 
Cognitive principle of Relevance 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance. 
 
 According to RT, an input (whether linguistic or not) is relevant to an individual  
when it connects with background information  to yield conclusions that matter to 
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him. A positive cognitive effect is a worthwhile  difference to the individual‟s 
representation of the world. 
The authors accept the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
Relevance of an input to an individual 
 
(a). Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects 
achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the 
individual at that time; 
(b). Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the 
lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time. 
 
Pragmatic processing is constrained by the following Presumption: 
 
Presumption of optimal relevance 
(a). The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the audience‟s processing 
effort; 
(b). It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator‟s abilities and 
preferences. 
 
According to the authors, the hearer/interpreter  should follow a path of least effort in 
computing cognitive effects; test interpretative hypotheses in order of accessibility; 
and stop when her expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
 
Many authors have written on Relevance Theory, most notably Carston (2002), 
Bezuidenhout (1997), Rouchota (1992), Powell (2001), and Capone (2008a) (from a 
more philosophical perspective, which is what I am primarily interested in here) – the 
main idea that emerges from these publications is that pragmatics provides full 
propositions out of the fragmentary ones provided by semantics. However, in this 
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chapter I will mainly address the issue of indirect reports and I will presuppose that 
semantics and pragmatics work in tandem. 
 
3.  Indirect reports as language games. 
Wittgenstein writes: 
 
Here the term “language game” is meant to bring into prominence  the fact that 
the speaking  of language is part of an activity, or a form of life (Wittgenstein 
1953, 11).  
 
Wittgenstein continues, making a list of language games, and includes among them 
the game of „reporting an event‟. It is a natural extension of Wittgenstein‟s ideas to 
say that  making an indirect report is a language game – although we must explain 
why making an indirect report is a  more specific language game than making a 
report. 
If we consider indirect reports  language games we can perhaps put them in a 
different light from the one which is usually cast on them by scholars in the 
philosophy of language.  Indirect reports require a reporter, a piece of language 
behaviour to report, a situation that motivates the reporting (one that includes a goal) 
and that ends up constraining the form of the report (especially of the NPs in the that-
clause). The reporter usually does the reporting for the benefit of the hearer 
(however, it is not difficult to imagine perlocutionary acts such as „scaring‟ the 
hearer or putting him off from carrying out an action). This presupposes 
asymmetrical knowledge between the reporter and the hearer. The speaker would not 
do the reporting if the hearer were informed of the reported speech (but of course 
there is the marginal chance that an indirect report has the  perlocutionary effect  of 
making the hearer notice that a speaker is a liar – in this case the hearer knows the 
fact reported, but the indirect report is proffered all the same to focus on the issue of 
the lie). The reporter qualifies himself and the speaker of the event reported as 
samesayers (to use Davidson‟s (1968) words) with respect to the content of the 
report (the that-clause in “He said that P”). „Samesayers‟ does not mean that the 
same words are used in the report and in the speech to be reported: it just means that  
the report and the speech to be reported have some broad content in common. As 
Burge says: “To use indirect discourse, one must master the practice of samesaying. 
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One must be able to use utterances that are relevantly synonymous with the 
utterances of the original speaker” (Burge 1986, 192). 
 
The practice of indirect reports rests on the following  rule: 
 
The reporter X will report what was said by Y (Y usually distinct from X, but 
sometimes coinciding with X) by using a predicate such as „say‟ that makes 
reference to a verbal event of some kind (an utterance), by applying it to Y (the 
participant whose speech is being reported) and by letting the direct object of 
the predicate „say‟ express the content of the utterance by Y (at some prior 
time) by way of paraphrasis, that is by letting the that-clause refer to the same 
situation or event e that the utterance u reported was actually used (by Y) to 
refer to, without necessarily using the modes of presentation (of objects and 
participants) which were actually used by Y in u, and in fact allowing context 
to play a pervasive role in making reference to objects, activities, and 
participants thereof. In case doubts arise about interpretation of a constituent of 
what was said or about authorship, quote that part of the utterance, ensuring 
that the hearer grasps that what follows „that‟ (quotation marks excised) is the 
content of what was said, while the quoted part same-tokens an expression 
actually used. 
 
Such a rule accommodates the problems noted by Davidson concerning reports of 
utterances in languages other than the reporter‟s. The rule above relies on the premise 
that two expressions are pragmatically equivalent if they express the same content 
(Jaszczolt 2003) and is reminiscent of Soames‟s  (1989) position, which has been 
criticised by Cappelen & Lepore (1997). Of course, this basic rule is incomplete, and 
I shall attempt to come to better versions of it while I consider crucial examples. A 
first shot at completing the considerations above is to introduce a rule of use, 
sensitive to the pragmatic  “requirement that the reporter be maximally faithful to the 
words of the agent unless there is a reason to deviate” (Soames 1988, 123) (see also 
analogous considerations for belief reports in Salmon‟s work (Salmon 1986), and 
Saul 1998 for a critique).  
 A second shot is that contextual considerations (e.g. the formality/informality of 
the situation) can increase the need for a more fine-grained report, or coarse-grained 
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report. In other words,  a speaker has to  fine-grain an indirect report in order to 
adjust to the situation of use. 
Making an indirect report is a language game that is more specific than making 
an assertion: in asserting P a speaker  merely  offers her own voice (unless ironies are 
involved; see Giora (2003) for an original and important view of ironies); in 
reporting that P, the speaker offers two voices: her voice and that of the speaker in 
the original speech event (see also Vološinov 1973) . The reporter does not take 
responsibility for the embedded voice (except in so far as he attributes it to a speaker 
or another). Reported speech is usually elicited (A: What did John say?) or prompted 
by the desire to offer H (the hearer) an essential clue to a solution of a problem viz. 
some piece of information that is contained in (or is a consequence of) the speech 
reported (I admit I was influenced by Devitt‟s  1996  pragmatic approach to belief 
reports, which I freely extend to indirect reports).  Reporting speech is a language 
game because it involves some principles. It is a principle-based activity. 
Furthermore, the language game of reporting (someone‟s) speech is sensitive to 
contextual factors and the context of speech determines whether a report should be 
more (or less) fine-grained.  
 The problem as I see it  is that reporting speech (indirect reports) is a language-
game of its own that is severely constrained by the fact that it displays two voices, 
the reporter‟s and the original speaker‟s, and there is a tension between them, such 
that the interests and the point of view of the reporter cannot prevail over those of the 
original speaker. Furthermore, the specificity of the language game „reporting (one‟s) 
speech‟ consists in the tension between the two voices and in the fact that none of 
them  prevails over the other. The specificity of the language game „reporting 
speech‟  also consists in the fact that the report partially answers the question “would 
I accept the report (the way in which the report has been put), were I the original 
speaker whose speech is being reported?”. This (salutary) question serves to 
eliminate possible distortions of what was said. Indirect speech reports represent 
what Bakhtin calls „discourse of the third type”, that is discourse which does not just 
express the speaker‟s voice or that of a third person, but multiple voices (Robinson 
2003, 107;  Bakhtin 1984, 187). 
 The situation of utterance plays a major role in shaping the obligations of the 
reporter and the degree of  accuracy with which the original speech is reported. 
Sometimes it determines a  more fine-grained report, sometimes a less fine-
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grained report. We can extend somewhat the principle  we came up with by 
incorporating the notion of the specificity of the language game we are dealing 
with: 
 
Paraphrasis Principle
1
 
The that-clause embedded in the verb „say‟ is a paraphrasis of what Y said that 
meets the following constraint: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he 
would not take issue with it, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of 
her original utterance. 
 
This is somewhat reminiscent of Burge‟s position (Burge 1986) that: 
 
The point of indirect discourse might be fairly taken to be to introduce and produce a 
given utterance that gives the content of the original speaker‟s utterance (Burge 
1986, 196). 
 
Now it should be clear why the language game „indirect report‟ is more specific 
than that of „assertion‟. In factual assertions, only the speaker and the hearer are 
involved; the speaker takes responsibility for what he takes to be the case in the 
actual world. In the case of indirect reports, we have got a speaker‟, a hearer and a 
speaker‟‟ (the original speaker), and both the speaker‟ and the speaker‟‟ take 
responsibility for the content of the that-clause in case all goes well, that is to say, in 
case the indirect report is felicitous. 
 There is another aspect to take into account in our argument that indirect reports 
are specific language games. Matters of  form also go into an evaluation of whether 
the reporter made a correct report. In fact, as Dummett (2003, 110)  says, one may 
assent to a statement without being prepared to make that statement (since it may be 
objectionable  in other ways, e.g. by being insulting).  
Thus we also need the Paraphrasis/Form principle for indirect reports: 
 
Paraphrasis/Form Principle 
                                                 
1
 This position is somewhat reminiscent of Seymour‟s (1994) treatment of in direct 
reports, in which reference to a translation of the reported sentence is explicitly 
incorporated in the semantics of in direct reports. 
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The that-clause embedded in the verb „say‟ is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and  
meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he 
would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair 
paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to 
vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 
„that‟ on  account of its form/style. 
 
Now, it should be clear that the way I have formulated this principle is that of a 
generalization or a rule. It would be good, however, if this were not an isolated rule, 
but if it could be reducible to a more general cognitive principle (or if it could be 
connected with such a principle). The Form/Paraphrasis Principle could be explained 
by resorting to Sperber & Wilson‟s (1986) theory of Relevance. According to 
Relevance Theory,  an assumption is more relevant if it has greater cognitive effects 
or if it has smaller processing efforts. An indirect report in which it is the reported 
speaker‟s voice and not the reporting speaker‟s voice that prevails is a case in which 
the hearer of the report is put to smaller processing costs. Thus it follows that that the 
indirect report will merely serve to give voice to the reported speaker (unless 
otherwise indicated, by contextual clues). 
 Of course, if the discourse is rich enough and offers contextual assumptions that 
help separate the reported speaker‟s voice from the reporting speaker‟s voice, the 
greater processing costs involved in the report will be offset by greater contextual 
effect. 
 
 A very interesting objection could be levelled to the Paraphrasis/Form Principle: 
 
Suppose that I mistakenly think that Sam is a woman. I utter „Sam is a philosopher‟. 
You report my utterance by uttering „X said that he is a philosopher‟ (my own 
addition: „he‟ being used in combination with a demonstrative gesture). I would take 
issue with „he is a philosopher‟ (or otherwise object to its form), because I think that 
„he‟ is not the right grammatical gender for Sam. So, either you cannot replace „Sam‟ 
with „he‟ or the author‟s Paraphrasis/Form Principle – according to which the „that‟- 
clause in your report of my utterance must be such that, “should [I] hear what [you] 
said [I] had said, [I] would not take issue with it and would not “object” to it on 
account of its form/style” – is false. 
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The example is rather tricky. However one can hope to  deal with it as follows. 
Surely, if there was no way to settle the issue of  Sam‟s sex, the Paraphrasis/Form 
Principle would be a serious problem. However, there are ways to surmount the 
problem  provided that there are publically available and objective criteria for 
establishing sex (usually by exterior physical appearance). Suppose X utters „Sam is 
a philosopher‟ and I report „X said that he is a philosopher‟; surely X can object to 
my report because he is falsely persuaded that Sam is a woman and until he is so 
persuaded he will object to my report. This is not to say that he is entitled to object to 
my report. All we need is a notion of being entitled to object to the report. All we 
need is a principle  of use to the effect that the report is felicitous provided that the 
reported speaker is not entitled to object to it. The example is also tricky because it 
makes use of the English language, where names can be ambiguous as to gender. But 
in many languages of the world there are no such ambiguities, and, thus, the 
reviewer‟s story would not work there. 
 
Another line of objection could be the following: 
 
Depending on the context, I needn‟t be beholden to the original speaker‟s 
„approval‟ of my paraphasis as fair, nor need I avoid manners of speech which the 
original speaker would shy away from. In such contexts, if John said of a person x 
that he will be coming to the party, my report to that effect is true whether  I refer to 
person x politely, as John would approve of, or impolitely, as (let us imagine) my 
hearer would approve of. John may, upon hearing my report, demur:  “Well, I don‟t 
know why you‟d call x a jerk but, yes, I did say he was coming to the party”. The 
Paraphrasis Principle and the author‟s other  remarks are intended to rule out 
contexts of indirect reporting that seem to allow this type of license with the original 
speaker‟s words. 
 There are two points to be noted, in this objection. The hypothetical reply above 
by someone whose speech  was reported by a mixture of the reported speaker‟s voice 
and of the reporting speaker‟s voice at least signals a complaint, and a complaint is 
something which one voices when a trouble has been noted. Furthermore, one has to 
ask whether the reported speaker who said “Well, I don‟t know why you‟d call x a 
jerk but, yes, I did say he was coming to the party” would also be inclined to say 
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“You reported what I say all right” – it is not clear that s/he would also exhibit such 
an inclination. The second point to be noted is that the objection starts with 
„Depending on the context‟ – and thus I am inclined to grant that there are contexts in 
which the hearer is able to separate the reporting speaker‟s and the reported speaker‟s 
voice and in such contexts the Paraphrasis/Form Principle will be blocked. The 
versatility of such principles seems to attest to the fact that we are dealing with 
procedures determined by language use, which are therefore sensitive to language 
use. We are dealing with the social practice of indirect reports, which rests on usage 
and on regularities of usage. If a context is such that a hearer can separate the 
reported speaker‟s from the reporting speaker‟s voice, the Paraphrasis/Form Principle  
is no longer operative. It is operative only in those contexts in which it is not easy to 
keep the voices apart. I am conscious that the discussion at this point become very 
interesting and stimulating, but for the sake of time I have to stop here. 
 
 
4. The logic and structure of indirect reports 
I want to outline briefly the logic of  indirect reports. Indirect speech reports are 
micro-narrations: in particular, they narrate certain events (deemed to be of interest 
to the hearer) that occurred at some time prior to the speech report and that amounted 
to saying something with appropriate intentions (here intended a la Habermas 2001, 
as teleological entities; see also Peirce 1958, 414)). Assertive speech acts are  events 
reportable in indirect speech reports. But now, in the case of indirect speech reports, 
there are two speech acts: the original assertion (subsequently reported) and the 
micro-narration of the original assertion (another assertion). It is reasonable to 
assume that the original assertion was connected/related to a certain situation (a 
complex of cognitive states, goals, desires) and had a bearing on the formation of 
certain decisions on the part of some of the participants to the speech event (in this 
way, cognitive effects, to use terminology by Sperber & Wilson 1995, are maximal; 
see also Wilson 2000; Capone 2001). The indirect report, analogously, relates to 
some (new) situation (a complex of cognitive states, goals, desires, etc.) and since, 
following Wilson 2000 and Kamp (1990, 70),  it leads to an inference concerning the 
beliefs of the original speaker, it is tantamount to a belief attribution; thus, following 
Kamp (1990, 30), it ends up  having  a bearing on the formation of decisions on the 
part of some of the participants (to the speech event), in the sense that if the hearer is 
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informed of a certain situation that has a bearing on taking a decision, then he will be 
willing to take it given this piece of information. The way the indirect speech report 
can bear on a certain decision is to propose what another person said (asserted) as a 
source of knowledge. If the original speaker qualified as a reliable informer, then 
what he said can be counted on for the formation of appropriate beliefs that have a 
bearing on the formation of current decisions relating to the current complex of 
cognitive states, goals, desires. Alternatively, what the original speaker said can be 
subjected to further inquiry and can be contrasted with conflicting pieces of 
knowledge. So far, I have presupposed (rather generously) that there is (normally, 
albeit not always) an inferential transition from what a speaker A says to what she 
believes. The way I see the difference between a factual assertion and an indirect 
report is that  the factual assertion is merely a response to the interests of the hearer 
at t (the time of utterance); instead, an indirect report embodies a sensitivity to two 
situations, s and s‟. s is the situation in which a factual assertion (in any case the 
original speech act reported) was uttered in response to the interests of recipients R. 
s‟ exhibits a sensitivity to both recipients R and R‟. It goes without saying that if 
modes of presentation reflect the interests of the hearers (as well as of the speakers), 
then an intersection of the interests of R and R‟ should be taken into account in the 
choice of mode of presentation (as Sperber 1996 says, communication normally 
slightly transforms the message). As should now be obvious, the methodological 
approach to be used in this chapter is to accept that since users and their language are 
at the core of all things pragmatic, the world of users is the very condition for doing 
pragmatics (Mey 2001, 29; Haberland and Mey 1977, 1-16). 
 
5. Restrictions on transformations. 
Suppose that a certain referent, say  A, features in both the original speech act and in 
the reported (indirect) speech act. Suppose that in the original speech act, A is 
presented through a mode of presentation M, whereas in the indirect reported speech 
act, it is presented through a mode of presentation M‟ and also suppose that M and 
M‟ happen to be distinct. Surely,  the context has to determine the level of detail 
associated with the mode of presentation and whether a more fine-grained linguistic 
expression is to be preferred to a more coarse-grained expression. Yet, the latitude 
of the choice can be restricted a priori. Consider the following example from 
Higginbotham‟s lecture notes (2004/2005): 
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(1) Galileo said that the earth moves. 
(2) Galileo said that the planet in which Arnold Schwarzenegger is a governor 
moves. 
 
Higginbotham says that (2) is “ridiculous” (even if it is obtained by substituting a 
coreferential expression for „the earth‟).  He does not explain, though, why he 
considers examples such as (2) (obtained through substitution of identicals from (1)) 
ridiculous – presumably his explanation is that it was unlikely for Galileo to have any 
thoughts about Schwarzenegger and, thus, to use a mode of presentation making 
reference to such thoughts. However,  I believe the explanation cannot be that verbs 
such as „said‟  block Leibniz‟ s Law, because indirect speech reports that are not 
pedantic do involve some latitude in the choice of mode of presentation for a referent 
presented via a different mode of presentation in the original speech act.  
 There is a reason why we are barred from shifting freely  from (1) to (2), a reason 
that does not consist in the blocking of Leibniz‟s law (a statement will result in a 
coextensive statement if an NP is replaced with a coextensive NP; see also Jaszczolt 
1999) in connection with verbs of propositional attitudes.  Suppose that we have 
some latitude in shifting freely from one mode of presentation to another in 
paraphrasing a sentence (subject to the constraints  formalized above), thus making 
the application of Leibniz‟s law tolerable. Although we are allowed freedom in 
choosing modes of presentation of the same referent, we are barred from choosing a 
mode of presentation which, once inserted in the proposition said, would amount to 
our accepting that the original speaker said something implausible. Surely Galileo 
could not have said that the planet in which Arnold Schwarzenegger is a governor 
moves, because Arnold Schwarzenegger was not living at Galileo‟s time. 
 A semantic story could, however, compete with a pragmatic story, in this 
particular example. It could be said that the contrast between (1) and (2) could be 
handled in terms of scope phenomena.  Presumably, such a story assumes that „say‟ 
is, in respect to quantificational structure, similar to „believe‟ and allows the 
existential quantifier to take wide scope. Semantic theory allows two logical 
interpretations of (2): one true and one false. Yet, as I maintain, we  almost always 
interpret (2) in the second way. In the case of (2), the two logical accounts are: 
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(2a) There was an x, x is the planet where Arnold Schwarzenegger is a governor: 
Galileo said that it moves; 
 
(2b) Galileo said that: There was an x, x is the planet where Arnold Schwarzenegger 
is governor and x moves. 
 
The pragmatic point is that in normal circumstances an utterance of (2) is to be 
interpreted as (2b), rather than (2a). (2a), though not doubt rare, may not be 
impossible, for instance if it is a conversation in which the participants know that (1) 
is true, but don‟t know what Schwarzenegger is governor. Even then (2) would 
probably be odd, and it is pragmatics that  establishes this. Of course the problem, for 
pragmatics, is to specify why logical form (2b) gets chosen. Suppose we stick to the 
notion I have so far expressed that an indirect report can express one or more voices. 
(2a) is clearly the case where there are two voices to be taken into consideration: the 
reporting speaker and the reported speaker. (2b) is clearly the case where there is 
only one voice to be taken into consideration: the reported speaker‟s. If we adopt 
Sperber & Wilson‟s (1986) idea that an assumption (an input) is more relevant if 
either (a) it has greater positive cognitive effects or (b) it has smaller processing 
efforts, we can easily understand why (2b) gets standardly chosen. In fact, (2b) 
involves smaller processing effects, as the hearer must simply allocate the reported 
speaker‟s voice, while it does not need to separate it from the reporting speaker‟s 
voice. 
 
 There are many examples, similar to Higginbotham‟s case, that need to be  
accounted for. In fact, while in a few cases replacement of an NP with another co-
referring one is barred, in general, unless problems arise, such substitutions are 
possible in indirect reports, especially when they aid understanding on the part of 
the hearer. So the real problem, for the semanticist, is not to say that substitutions 
are not possible in indirect reports, but to specify those cases in which substitutions 
are blocked, explaining why they are.  
One such case is the following. Suppose John utters: “A fortnight is a two week 
period”. Assuming that in transformations from direct to indirect speech (NP) 
substitutions are licit, one could then report the following: “John said that a fortnight 
is a fortnight”. This is a tautology which did not appear in the original speech act. An 
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easy way out of this problem is to say that if no tautology appeared in the original 
speech act, it must not appear in the reported speech act, because it will give the 
hearer the impression that it was also present in the original speech act (which is not 
the case). 
 But this is only an easy way out. The real problem is whether “John said that a 
fortnight is a fortnight” does capture the original speech act. There is no reason to 
believe that it does. The original speech act, in fact, is motivated by the goal of 
explaining one word by making recourse to an easier word. The reported speech act, 
instead, does not explain anything, because it just establishes an identity between a 
word and itself. Since the illocutionary force of the original speech act (explanation) 
is lost due to a transformation that amounted to replacing a term with a co-referential 
one, it is fair to say that such substitutions are not legitimate in the transition from 
direct speech to indirect speech reports. This presumably follows from a general 
semantic principle, worked out by Alston: 
 
A meaning of a sentence fits it to play a distinctive role in communication just 
because that meaning consists in the sentence‟s being usable to perform 
illocutionary acts of a certain type (Alston 2000, 282). 
 
 We are now in a position to explain what is odd with substitutions of terms having 
the same sense within indirect reports. Platts (1997) is puzzled by the fact that, 
contrary to what might be expected given the acceptance of Frege‟s explanation of 
failure of substitution in intensional contexts (the view that in intensional contexts 
NPs refer to their senses), in indirect reports one obtains strange results by 
substituting an NP with a distinct one which has the same sense (so, not only 
coreference, but sense identity are at stake here). For example, see what happens 
when we replace „oculist‟ with „eye-doctor‟ in the sentence: “John said that an 
oculist is an eye-doctor”. The result is the sentence “John said that an eye-doctor is 
an eye-doctor”, which may be rejected as false (or pretty inaccurate) by John, since 
his original speech act did not contain a repetition unlike  the sentence which is the 
result of the substitution.  A way out of the puzzle for Platts is to deny that „oculist‟ 
and „eye-doctor‟ have the same sense (but this would amount to denying that the 
words are synonymous). Another way out of the puzzle is to say, as I have done for 
the previous example, that substitutions of co-referring or synonymous expressions 
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are prohibited when they severely distort the nature of a speech act originally 
proffered by the speaker. In the case we are discussing, the original speech act is an 
explanation, in which a more difficult word is explained via a less difficult one. If 
we replace the more difficult word with a synonymous less difficult one, we lose the 
pragmatic force of the utterance, which was meant to be an explanation.  
 We can also frame this explanation in the framework of Relevance Theory. If a 
transformation results in a different speech act being understood, then it is clear that 
what bans the transformation is the Relevance theory assumption that greater 
processing efforts (as the ones involved here) will result in a less relevant 
proposition. A transformation that obscures the original speech act will result in a 
blend of two voices, whereas an interpretation that merely promotes one voice keeps 
processing efforts lower. 
 
6. Indirect reports, indexicals, and speech acts. 
It is good at this point to dwell on the interaction between indirect speech reports and 
indexicals. Among modes of presentation, the indexical has a special status. When a 
person says “I”, she is presenting herself not only as the person who is speaking, but 
also as the experiencer of a special state of perception: “I” is a mode of presentation 
that presents the subject of a special type of experience: a person who has privileged 
access (direct access) to one‟s thoughts and being (see also Zeevat 1997, 163). There 
is a substantial difference between saying: 
 
(3) I am happy; 
(4) Alessandro is happy. 
 
(3), through the mode of presentation “I”, makes it clear that the state of perception 
“happy” (attributed to the subject) is experienced directly by the person who speaks 
or thinks; (4), instead, attributes a state to a subject by implying that such an 
attribution is based on an external mode of inference: 
 
e.g. 
Alessandro is dancing at a party; 
Alessandro dances only when he is happy 
 
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Alessandro is happy. 
 
It would be misleading to utter the third person statement (4) in case the person who 
speaks (or thinks) is speaking of himself, as (4) implies that the attribution is based 
on an external mode of inference, whereas an internal mode of inference (direct 
perception) is implied in first person attributions. 
 Levinson (2004) notices that it will not do, in many cases, to replace the indexical 
pronominal “I” with  a third person paraphrasis (e.g. Stephen Levinson). The 
contexts he has in mind are constituted mainly by identity statements such as: 
 
(5) I am Stephen Levinson. 
 
 It is obvious that, by replacing the indexical pronominal “I” with a third person 
paraphrasis, one obtains a (relatively) uninformative sentence: 
 
(6) Stephen Levinson is Stephen Levinson. 
 
Now, while  Levinson‟s point is to show that the indexical mode of presentation has 
a special status, this example throws light on the mechanism of indirect speech 
reports. In fact, it goes without saying that it will not do to report the utterance (5) by 
saying: 
 
(7) He said that Stephen Levinson is Stephen Levinson. 
 
Of course, it should be explained that „He said that I am Stephen Levinson‟ and  „He 
said that Stephen Levinson  is Stephen Levinson‟ do not have the same meaning 
(semantic import), as in the former sentence we find a pronominal while in the same 
syntactic position we find a full name in the second sentence
2
. Even if the two 
sentences in context may end up having the same truth-conditions,  intuitively we 
know that they count as different assertions. So it appears that a semantic story plus 
saturation of indexical elements does not suffice to distinguish between the two 
resulting statements. We need to know the purpose with which the speech act 
connects.  
                                                 
2
 I thank a referee for this not uninteresting observation. 
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In fact, the indirect speech report should also inform the hearer of the type of  
speech act  the original speaker made, in saying what he said. (7) is not a good 
indirect report because, by replacing the indexical mode of presentation with a third 
person paraphrasis, the speaker has managed to obscure the original relationship 
between the indexical mode of presentation and the speech act actually made: the 
speaker was introducing himself by an identity statement. In introductions, the 
indexical mode of presentation is crucial, because it renders the identity statement 
informative. By replacing the indexical mode of presentation with a third person 
paraphrasis, the identity statement is made ipso facto uninformative as in (8): 
 
(8) Stephen Levinson is Stephen Levinson. 
 
While this is still an identity statement, it is not an introductory speech act. The 
introductory speech act needs to establish an identity between the indexical mode of 
presentation and another mode of presentation. This is the change it has to bring 
about in the existing state of affairs, to put it with Mey‟s (1993, 111) words. The 
consideration that pragmatic equivalence (or the lack of it)  explains why substitution 
of an NP is sometimes not licit certainly follows from Jaszczolt‟s (2003) remark that 
equivalence of meaning is not just of the semantic type, but also of the pragmatic 
type (sometimes, according to Jaszczolt two completely different sentences are 
pragmatically equivalent; her examples are based on contrasts between languages). 
 
So a plausible  generalization for indirect speech reports is that: 
 
a mode of presentation cannot be replaced with a third person paraphrase if such a 
change will  inevitably obscure the kind of speech act which was made in uttering the 
original sentence. 
 
Again, I would like to connect my considerations with Sperber & Wilson‟s (1986)  
Principle of Relevance. If an indirect report effects a transformation that has a 
bearing on the resulting speech act, it will put the hearer to greater processing costs. 
Suppose we can freely transform from „He said he is Stephen Levinson‟ to „He said 
Stephen Levinson is Stephen Levinson‟;  we move from an indirect report from 
which we can evince the speech act performed by the original speaker to an indirect 
263 
 
 
report where the hearer must use greater inferential powers to infer the original 
speech act. The hearer has clearly to embark on greater processing costs and the 
input is thus not ideally relevant. 
 
7. Choice of mode of presentation and the hearer. 
It may be thought that the choice of a certain lexeme (instead of  a competitor) in an 
indirect speech report  is not a matter of having respect for what the original speaker 
actually said, but  a matter of ensuring that the hearer be able to identify the referent. 
If the purpose of an indirect speech report is to inform a hearer H of what a speaker S 
said in a prior speech act, so that H can utilize the knowledge imparted by what S 
said (assuming that what he said transmitted S‟s knowledge), then it goes without 
saying that it would be better to choose an NP (or mode of presentation) recognizable 
by the hearer (otherwise the purpose of the indirect speech act will not  be fulfilled).  
Habermas is quite right in saying that  
 
By describing behaviour as an intentional action, we take the perspective of the 
actor himself; but this agent‟s point of view signifies a two-tiered intentional 
relation to something in the world, namely the relation to the cognitive 
representation of reality that is valid for the agent and to the subjective attitude 
that the agent takes towards this representation of reality (Habermas 2001, 
113). 
 
The fact that indirect reports can use different modes of presentation from those used 
in the original speech acts, shows that Habermas‟ two levels of intentionality are at 
work in indirect reports
3
: the Russellian proposition of the that-clause (the cognitive 
representation of reality Habermas alludes to) and the intention to use a mode of 
presentation that is more familiar to the hearer so that the hearer can utilize the 
knowledge imparted with the that-clause to carry out whatever action he deems 
necessary. The subjective attitude Habermas speaks of is the intention to act in a 
certain way (propositional attitudes such as desiring to act in a certain way). 
 Indirect reports, from what we have seen, are often associated with perlocutionary 
purposes; thus, it is correct to say that “minds are partial causes of events in the 
                                                 
3
 It is clear from the discussion that  Habermas aims to reconcile Brentano‟s notion 
of intentionality (thoughts are intentional in that they are directed towards objects 
and contents) with a teleological notion of intentionality. 
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world and in other minds” (Zeevat 1997, 156). It is uncontroversial  that when the 
indirect report has got the purpose of letting a hearer utilize what an original speaker 
said so that the hearer of the speech report can form some knowledge of a situation, 
then an NP that can guide the hearer towards identifying the referent must be chosen. 
However, there are constraints on such a choice. The NP chosen must not distort 
what the original speaker said in such a way that, faced with the indirect speech 
report, the original speaker is likely to say that he does not recognize his intention in 
that report. 
 
8. Indirect reports and expressives 
As an authoritative linguist has said, we can sometimes be faced with a text or an 
utterance “whose ambiguous linguistic form makes it „double-voiced‟…”with an 
ambivalence of voice” (Fairclough 1992, 108). The practice of indirect reports 
involves being able to separate what is attributable to the original sayer and what is 
attributable to the current speaker, even if both things appear in the that-clause. So a 
good Principle is the following: 
 
Do not take everything that appears in the that-clause of the indirect report as 
belonging to the voice of the original speaker whose speech act is being 
reported. 
 
A complementary Principle is the following: 
 
Separate the elements of the that-clause that contribute to the voice of the 
original speaker from those that contribute to the voice of the reporter by 
exploiting contextual clues – assuming that these  are sufficient for the purpose 
of separating the two voices. 
 
An important example that illustrates the role contextual clues play in separating the 
two voices is the following drawn from Potts‟s  (2005) discussion of conventional 
implicatures and, in particular, of expressive acts (the author takes expressive acts to 
be a special class of adjectives that can never contribute to the at-issue content): 
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9) 
Edna is at her friend Chuck‟s house. Chuck tells her that he thinks all his red vases 
are ugly. He approves only of his blue ones. He tells Edna that she can take one of 
his red vases. Edna thinks the red vases are lovely, selects one and returns home to 
tell her housemate: 
„Chuck said I could have one of his lovely vases!‟ (Potts 2005, 18). 
 
Pott says: 
 “We easily recognize  that Edna is contributing  the adjective (lovely); the 
utterance expresses two propositions: (i) that Chuck said Edna could have one 
of his vases; (ii) Edna thinks Chuck‟s vases are lovely (Potts 2005, 18). 
 
It is not clear that Potts is completely right about what he says. Surely Edna‟s 
housemate need not understand that „lovely‟ refers to Edna‟s  and not to Chuck‟s 
voice in the absence of appropriate information. In fact, he has got no contextual 
clues to separate Edna‟s  from Chuck‟s voice in the that-clause attributed to Chuck. 
Perhaps he can do so only after Edna narrates the whole story, as we have it above. 
Instead, Edna and the readers, who have access to the whole story, are able to 
separate Edna‟s  from Chuck‟s voice. One obvious way to do so is to avoid 
attributing to Chuck elements of the that-clause in case  it is clear from the context 
that they do not reflect (they contradict) Chuck‟s opinion. In this case, context is used  
to filter out from the that-clause elements (of meaning) that do not reflect the opinion 
of the original utterer. Without full contextual knowledge, it is impossible to separate 
the original speaker‟s from the reporter‟s voice (some underdetermination of 
meaning will result). 
 As usual we may want to frame this discussion within the context of Relevance 
Theory. If one accepts that an assumption is less relevant in case it puts the hearer to 
undue processing efforts, then one at the same time explains why, in the case of lack 
of contextual information about Chuck‟s beliefs,  Ednas‟a utterance „Chuck said 
I could have one of his lovely vases‟will be typically interpreted as expressing 
Chuck‟s and not Edna‟s  voice. Having two voices in the same utterance would make 
processing costs greater, and there would be no contextual assumptions to yield a 
plausible interpretation on how to distinguish the two voices. On the contrary, when 
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there are contextual assumptions that allow us to distinguish the two voices, the extra 
processing costs will be offset by rich positive contextual effects. 
 It could be said that it is the semantical assumptions that makes it the case that 
there is a way of interpreting (9) which makes what Edna says true, in case we know 
that Chuck thinks the vases are ugly but Edna does not. Presumably it could be 
thought that we might analyse (9) semantically as characterised by a scope ambiguity 
and as being associated with two logical forms: 
 
(9a) There are two lovely vases such that Chuck said I could have one of them. 
(9b) Chuck said that there are two lovely vases and I could have one of them. 
 
As in the previous case of ambiguous logical forms, pragmatics will intervene in 
promoting one, rather than the other logical form. As I said previously, the principle 
of Relevance will give expectations that are precise and predictable enough to guide 
the hearer towards the speaker‟s meaning. Since (9a) involves greater processing 
efforts, (9b) will be selected instead, unless there is a rich context in which through 
contextual assumptions one will be able to separate the two voices (the reported 
speaker‟s and the reporting speaker‟s) and thus (9a) could be promoted as a 
reasonable interpretation. 
 
9. Final remarks 
This chapter  endeavoured to contribute to  the theory of indirect reports, by the 
notion of  linguistic practices (certainly a societal notion) and by the formulation of a 
number of principles that are central to these practices. Yet, it would be good if we 
could find out some general rationale for the fact that sometimes co-referential 
expressions are inter-substitutable in that-clauses (of indirect reports), while 
sometimes they are not.  I believe that  a good filter is to be found in speech act 
theory. If we agree that saying is not just a locutionary, but  also an illocutionary act, 
then transformations of what a speaker originally said can be tolerated provided that 
the illocutionary act originally made is preserved in the final indirect speech report.  
This is the way the filter works. Now we can understand why an NP cannot be 
replaced with an NP that contains an epithet (e.g. “That bastard”), since, by so doing,  
the assertion will ipso facto be transformed into an insult, which is a different speech 
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act from an assertion. This is not to say that one cannot disagree on this. I expect the 
following objection: 
 
But if you utter „I voted for Obama‟ and I am a McCain supporter, when I am talking 
to my fellow McCain supporters I can report your utterance by uttering „X said that 
X voted for that bastard‟. This use is called „pseudo de re‟. 
 
However, there is in this alleged counterexample a deictic element combined with 
the epithet (which correctly deserves the name of „pseudo de re‟)  that gives the 
hearer enough clues to tell apart what is said by the reported speaker and what is said 
by the reporting speaker. Thus, it is not a good counterexample. A good 
counterexample would be something like the following: „Obama said that he voted 
for McCain the bastard‟.  Here there are no sufficient contextual clues to tell apart 
what Obama said from what the reporter said, and thus the indirect report is not 
felicitous.  
 
However, suppose one takes the objection above seriously.  Suppose that the 
grounds for not accepting  my story  that some transformations  strongly imply that 
the original speaker is responsible for the epithet are that there is no reason to think 
that contexts in which the hearer of the indirect report knows  that the reporter has a 
negative attitude toward the individual and knows that the reported speaker does not 
are rare. In such contexts there would be no tendency of the hearer to impute the 
epithet to the reported speaker. 
 
I agree that the counterexample discussed before (the Obama / McCain example)  
is suitable to such contexts and I agree that in such contexts the hearer of the report 
will use whatever contextual clues are available to distinguish the reporter‟s from the 
reported speaker‟s voice. The problem is what happens in a context where there are 
no such strong contextual clues. What is the default procedure in such contexts? I 
suppose that the purpose of an indirect report is to give voice to the reported 
speaker‟s voice and it is this that prevails. The alternative I envisage to my own 
solution is that one tries to establish from case to case, without any default procedure, 
whose voice is in question. However, a default procedure  is probably what captures 
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best the fact that indirect reports evolved with a precise function in mind: reporting at 
some level of precision the voice of the reported speaker. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The theory of indirect speech reports will be advanced considerably if we place this 
issue, which surely pertains to the philosophy of language, in a societal perspective. 
It is very instructive to investigate the societal principles having a bearing on the 
transformations involved in the transition from direct speech to indirect speech 
reports, in particular, those pertaining to modes of presentation. The use of some, 
rather than some other, mode of presentation is a matter of being situated in a certain 
context. It follows  that contextual information severely limits  transformations 
pertaining to modes of presentation. Such a story become even more plausible if it is 
framed in the context of Relevance Theory and if one can show that the constraints 
on the interpretation of indirect reports follow from the principle of Relevance. This 
is what I have done. 
 I end this section by voicing a thorny objection to myself.  Do I really believe that 
my societal considerations can be reconciled with Sperber & Wilson‟s theory of 
Relevance? Surely there may be more than one answer to this question. My modest 
answer is that, even if Relevance is a cognitive principle, it could be used to justify 
social practices. There is no reason why social practices should not conform to a 
cognitive principle that has explained much of language behaviour so far. Language 
behaviour is, ipso facto, a social practice. On the one hand, social practices can be 
sensitive to cognitive principles and be influenced by them; on the other hand, since 
social life has a life of its own, habits and practices which become consolidated are 
propagated and transmitted to further generations as unmotivated practices. Sperber 
(1996) shows that the Principle of Relevance plays a major role in creating cultural 
practices. Cultural practices which conform to the Principle of Relevance have 
greater chances of survival and will be more likely to be transmitted from one 
generation to the next. In the case of linguistic practices, I propose that on the one 
hand, the principle of relevance will play a role in promoting one, rather than 
another, cultural practice; on the other hand, it will play a role in the preservation and 
transmission of the practice, as other competing practices will be ruled out due to 
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cognitive considerations. This is what makes certain practices better candidates for 
propagation than others.  
 There is one further sense in which the practices we have considered in this 
chapter, as determined by the principle of Relevance, are social. The fact that the 
Principle of Relevance  creates expectations that  are precise and predictable enough  
to guide the hearer toward the expected meaning guarantees that what is cognitively 
convenient also becomes socially convenient, as one will be certain that an 
interpretative pattern or a social practice that is more economical will be more likely 
to be adopted by society. There is every reason to believe that society will orient 
towards those practices that are more in line with the Principle of Relevance. 
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Chapter 8 
Indirect reports as language games. 
 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter I deal with indirect reports in terms of language games. I try to make 
connections between the theory of language games and the theory of indirect reports, in the 
light of the issue of clues and cues. 
 
 
 
 
En outré, comme tout autre terme predicative, „jeu de 
langage‟ n‟acquiert un sens qu‟à travers ses 
applications, c‟est-à-dire, dans le jeux qu‟on joue avec 
lui. (Dascal et al. 1996, 1371). 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall investigate the issue of  indirect reports within the framework 
of societal pragmatics (Mey 2001) or socio-pragmatics (Dascal 2003). Indirect 
reports are language games based on norms or principles which are rigidly enforced; 
like language games they are practices which need to be learned in environments 
where actors engage in  the practice and where there are people ready to enforce 
norms. 
 Indirect reports are based on an interplay of voices. The voice of the reporter must 
allow hearers to „reconstruct‟ the voice of the reported speaker. Ideally, it must be 
possible to separate the reporter‟s voice from that of the reported speaker. When we 
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analyze the language game of indirect reporting, we ideally want to establish which 
parts belong to the primary voice (the reported speaker‟s voice) and which parts 
belong to the reporter‟s voice. If we have ways to recognize separate styles, separate 
grammars, etc. then the process of separating  voices will be easier. We should 
however expect that the reporter will do what he can to make it easy for us to 
distinguish the two (or more) voices. In other words, UNLESS there are clues which 
can lead the hearer to recognizing separate voices, the reporter should do his best to 
represent (without interpolations) the reported speaker‟s voice (This polyphonic 
approach is indebted to ideas by Bakhtin  1984, 1986). 
 The literature on indirect reports lives on the heritage of Davidson (1968)  and his 
critics. In this chapter, I will not directly address the issue of whether the semantics 
proposed by  Davidson is correct or not. Despite my neutrality, I claim that  
Davidson‟s treatment gives us numerous clues on how to deal with the practice of 
indirect reporting. Consider the famous report: 
 
1) Galileo said that the earth moves 
 
Davidson‟s proposal is to treat  (1) as if it meant: 
 
Galileo uttered a sentence that meant in his mouth what „The earth moves‟ means 
now in mine. 
 
I know well that this is only part of Davidson‟s picture; however, this is the part 
which can be exploited  in the discussion of the phenomenon of „voicing‟ which this 
chapter is about. Davidson‟s treatment makes it clear that there are two voices (the 
reference to the mouth is clearly a reference to the mouth proffering the speech or the 
utterance). Davidson, of course, is interested in the equivalence between the speech 
proffered by the reported speaker and the speech proffered by the reporter, an 
equivalence being based on intended meaning, not only on sentential meaning. We 
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are not dealing with sentential meanings because Davidson makes an explicit 
reference to a proffered  sentence, that is to say an utterance. 
So we have a solid platform from which to start working. In the following sections 
I shall discuss the phenomenon of voicing and the problem of how to separate voices. 
  
1. The transformation problem 
 
It would be naïve to believe that an indirect reporter has a duty to report verbatim 
what was said. If she had such a duty, then we would not be able to make any 
difference between indirect and direct reports. Instead, we all have a firm grasp of 
the difference between: 
 
(2) She said: I am happy; 
(3) She said she was happy. 
 
The difference is not only one based on transformations of deictic elements (e.g. „I‟ 
 she; present tense  past tense; first person morphology  third person 
morphology), but one based on a greater number of transformations. For example it 
is normally licit to make an indirect report by summing up what a speaker said, 
rather than reporting all the elements he uttered. (See also Wieland Forthcoming). It 
is possible to omit adverbs, adjectives, modifiers, in a sentence, without distorting it, 
if the purpose which the indirect report serves is fulfilled by the omission of certain 
words. Of course, if the omission of a certain word results in an utterance which 
somehow distorts the reported speaker‟s message, then the omission should not be 
tolerated. There are small transformations of a message which serve to modify the 
message considerably. Consider what was done by the blacksmith who created the 
inscription „Arbeit macht frei‟ over the Auschwitz main gate. By creating a letter 
which was upside down, he managed to express his own negative attitude to the 
message which he was reporting by his manual work.
1
 The change of a letter in the 
                                                 
1
 At Auschwitz, the sign was made in 1940 by Polish political prisoners headed by 
Jan Liwacz (camp number 1010). The upper bowl in the "B" in "ARBEIT" is wider 
than the lower bowl, appearing to some as upside-down. Allegedly it was made on 
purpose by political prisoners to make a signal about what was actually happening 
behind the gates of Auschwitz. 
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message seems to stress the awareness that he was used to report a message and his 
moral reluctance to be so used. In other words, he was distinguishing his voice from 
those of the Nazi – in a way he was a polyphonic „animator‟ in the sense of Goffman. 
 Transformations of the original message of indirect reporting include expansion of 
the original message, like the following case. Prisoners in Auschwitz ridiculed the 
German cynicism of the slogan by saying Arbeit Macht Frei durch den Schornstein. 
They were clearly reporting a message by expanding it so as to recuperate its (real) 
intended message. The general point of transformations concerning indirect reports is 
to make explicit otherwise implicit components of the message. It is licit in general 
to render explicit what relevance theorists call the „explicatures‟ of an utterance. In 
neutral cases,  reports that expand the message so as to include explicatures need not 
express a critical attitude to the message, as was the case in the „Arbeit macht frei‟ 
report. 
 It is less clear that one can expand the message by including elements obtained 
through logical inference:  
 
The Nazi used the slogan „Arbeit macht frei‟ in order to indulge in a morbid 
exaltation of their crimes. 
 
This may not belong to ordinary practice of indirect reporting, but it is clear that this 
is a practice in which all historians indulge. 
 
A transformation which, instead, belongs to daily practice is the following. One 
can report an utterance proffered in a different language by someone who spoke 
(only) that language, through the reporter‟s language. So, suppose I report that Cesar 
said that he came, he saw and he won; it will be implicit that the words used by 
Caesar were words of Latin, and not of English. My report, therefore, only relates the 
content  of what he said, and does not report it verbatim. The report involves a 
translation. But then, one may say, translation allows all sorts of transformations, as 
one clearly sees if one for example reads the many translations of Thomas Grey‟s 
„Elegy written in a country churchyard‟. Translation may involve greater levels of 
literality or  departures from the literal meaning in the attempt to capture the 
authorial intentions. No surprise then if Grey‟s words  
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„Some pious drops the closing eye requires‟ 
 
were translated by a translator as meaning that the closing eye requires some pious 
verses inscribed on the grave. Translations may depart from literal meaning in the 
attempt to capture the authorial intentions. In the same way, indirect reporting may 
depart from literal translations in the attempt to provide the authorial intentions. The 
most drastic departures from literal meanings are seen in those cases when the 
indirect report is confronted with an utterance whose words were not used as having 
literal meaning, as in the case of metaphors. To construct indirect reports based on 
literal meanings in these cases would end up providing unfaithful and infelicitous 
indirect reports. To use a term by Jaszczolt (2005), the reporter aims at „pragmatic 
equivalence‟, not at semantic equivalence. This is perhaps implicit in the treatment of 
indirect reporting by Donald Davidson.  
 
2. Indirect reports and language games 
In this section, I will mainly discuss ideas pertaining to language games as filtered 
through Dascal et al.‟s (1996) discussion of Wittgenstein‟s language games. I quite 
agree with Dascal et al. that it is not easy to provide a definition of language game, 
and that it is best to provide examples of language games so that the notion of 
language game can be illustrated through exemplification. Although Wittgenstein 
includes indirect reports in his list of language games, to my knowledge this type of 
exemplification has not been properly investigated in the literature, apart from the 
discussion in Capone (2010a). However, Dascal et al. through their paper in which 
they present possibly dissonant voices without wanting to harmonize them, illustrate 
a kind of language game which can be called „presenting multiple voices‟. This is 
similar to the language game „Indirect reporting‟ since many of the norms governing 
indirect reporting make reference to the language game „presenting multiple voices‟. 
Is it impossible that a language game is embedded in another language game? If it is 
not (as I believe), then the language game „presenting multiple voices‟ should be 
embedded in the language game indirect reporting. Dascal et al. by discussing 
Wittgenstein‟s notion of language game stress the shift (in Wittgenstein‟s thought) 
from phenomenalism to physicalism, in the sense that language is no longer 
conceived of as a means of representing reality but as a means of  creating (social) 
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reality. I quite agree with the authors on the importance of emphasizing this shift. 
But what consequences does this shift (or the grasp of this shift) have on the 
understanding of indirect reports as language games? We said that language games 
want to create social reality, but indirect reports seem to be anchored to language 
representative power. Language in such cases is used to represent occasions of 
language use (or events which can be called „utterances‟). So what is the point of 
considering indirect reports language games if we are reluctant to stress the 
connection with action and favor  stressing the connection with representation? My 
idea that a language game such as indirect reporting embeds another language game 
may suffice to rescue the language game from the attack we have leveled to the 
concept – after all, if the purpose of the language game is to make sense of the 
transformations of reality on the part of the reporter (and to separate one voice from 
an another), then it is reasonable to make use of this new notion in order to account 
for the fact that reporting is a sort of action in that it transforms events in the light of 
the needs of hearers in the context of the reporting event. However, we do not want 
to confine ourselves to a derivative justification of the use of the notion of language 
game. If we want to see how the language game fits a conception of language in 
which language is used to act, we must consider narrations (as indirect reports are 
micro-narrations, after all) as actions. Furthermore, if we follow Tannen (1989), the 
language game of indirect reporting  is aimed at „constructing‟ social reality.  Like 
actions, indirect reports can transform reality. Like actions, they can have a number 
of consequences. An indirect report may be part of an argumentative structure, 
whose aim is to justify a certain kind of action or deliberation. Thus an indirect 
report (of someone‟s words) can be seen as a spur to act, to deliberate, etc. Seen in 
this light, an indirect report can become a „form of life‟ (Wittgenstein 1953; 
Carapezza Forthcoming).  
 Another feature of language games, according to Dascal et al. is the fact that they 
are cooperative games. They cannot be played unless the actors cooperate in an 
action in which they play different roles. In what ways can this feature help us grasp 
the particularities of the language game „indirect reporting‟? I propose that we 
conceive of an indirect report as a game involving at least three actors: the original 
speaker, the reporting speaker and the hearer. The hearer plays an active role in 
indirect reports because, many times, transformations of NPs are effected in order to 
favor understanding on the part of the hearer. Suppose the original speech act was 
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about John Campbell, suppose the reporter knows John Campbell under the modes of 
presentation „John Campbell‟ and „The owner of the bar round the corner‟ and 
suppose that the hearer knows John Campbell only under the guise „The owner of the 
bar round the corner‟. In such circumstances, it is obvious that the reporting speaker 
must transform the original NP (John Campbell) into the NP with whom the hearer is 
familiar (The owner of the bar round the corner). The transition from one NP to 
another (pragmatically equivalent) is dictated by the communicative function of the 
indirect report.  (See also Devitt 1996 for a similar argument applied to belief 
reports). What would be the point of issuing a report which, though faithful to the 
original speaker‟s voice, could not be grasped and, hence, utilized by the hearer? The 
reporter is compelled, in these circumstances, to adapt to the hearer. The NP „The 
owner of the bar round the corner‟ will express the perspective of the hearer. We 
could then say that the hearer plays a role in the language game – it modifies or 
orients the language game, has an effect over the choice of words. The recipient, in 
so far as she figures in the language game though a choice of words which must be 
regarded as potentially made by her, is one of the participants who cooperates in the 
language game. She does not speak, but her mere presence serves to perspective the 
game. She is present as a voice and therefore it is as if she spoke in the language 
game. The reporter in a sense partially, ventriloquizes the hearer. 
 
3. Capone 2010a and indirect reports as language games 
In Capone (2010a) I advanced a number of ideas on how to capture constraints on 
replacements of coreferential NPs in the context of  direct reporting (and, in 
particular, in the complement that-clause). The explanation may be parallel, but not 
identical with the one I gave on the issue of belief reports in Capone (2008a). Such 
an explanation rests on the idea that replacements of  co-referential NPs should not 
alter the speech act which the indirect report aims to report (or describe) and that the 
original speaker would like to see herself reported in such a way that it does not 
attribute her offenses, impoliteness, rudeness, obscenity, and also slurring. In other 
words, reporting must be done in a way that the voice of the reporter is separated 
from the voice of the reported speaker or, if this separation is not possible, in such a 
way that the original speaker‟s voice is prevalent. Why should the reported speaker‟s 
and NOT the reporting speaker‟s voice be prevalent? I assume that it is a matter of 
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relevance. Since we are dealing with the verb „say‟, we are happy to primarily 
express the original speaker‟s voice and then the reporting speaker‟s voice, but only 
if this is possible. I now succinctly sum up the main points of Capone (2010a). 
 
The practice of indirect reports rests on the following  principles: 
 
Paraphrasis Principle
2
 
The that-clause embedded in the verb „say‟ is a paraphrasis of what Y said that 
meets the following constraint: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he 
would not take issue with it, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of 
her original utterance. 
 
Paraphrasis/Form Principle 
The that-clause embedded in the verb „say‟ is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and  
meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he 
would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair 
paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to 
vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 
„that‟ on  account of its form/style. 
 
In my paper I also discussed possible objections to the Paraphrasis/Form principle. 
Since this discussion will be amplified in the present chapter, I present some of the 
original discussion in this section. 
 
Depending on the context, I needn‟t be beholden to the original speaker‟s 
„approval‟ of my paraphasis as fair, nor need I avoid manners of speech which the 
                                                 
2
 This position is somewhat reminiscent of Seymour‟s (1994) treatment of in direct 
reports, in which reference to a translation of the reported sentence is explicitly 
incorporated in the semantics of in direct reports. 
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original speaker would shy away from. In such contexts, if John said of a person x 
that he will be coming to the party, my report to that effect is true whether  I refer to 
person x politely, as John would approve of, or impolitely, as (let us imagine) my 
hearer would approve of. John may, upon hearing my report, demur:  “Well, I don‟t 
know why you‟d call x a jerk but, yes, I did say he was coming to the party”. The 
Paraphrasis Principle and the author‟s other  remarks are intended to rule out 
contexts of indirect reporting that seem to allow this type of license with the original 
speaker‟s words. 
 As I said in Capone (2010a), I am quite open to the possibility that in suitable 
contexts one should be able to replace an NP with a coreferential expression in the 
that-clause of an indirect report. However, I stick to the proposal that, in the absence 
of contextual clues and cues allowing us to separate the original speaker‟s voice from 
that of the reporter, the default interpretation of the utterance conforms to the 
paraphrasis rules stated above. In a later section I address the issue of clues and cues 
as originally contributed by Dascal and I will show how it bears on the issue of the 
language game of indirect reporting. 
 
4. Slurs and taboo words 
 
An interesting phenomenon was noted by Lepore and Anderson (Forthcoming). 
When we report or quote uses of slurs of taboo words, the offense is assigned to the 
reporter (or the person quoting) rather than to the original speaker. The words that 
count as slurs are words which offend vast categories of people, such as black 
people, homosexuals, Jews, etc. So, no matter how you may want to distance 
yourself from the use of the word „negro‟ in reporting such a use you are also liable 
to be blamed for the use. Lepore and Anderson are adamant that there is something 
offensive in reporting a slurring word. This is not to say that there are no contexts 
where the offense is mitigated or nullified (e.g. the academic context in which one 
discusses a phenomenon scientifically and goes to great pains to show that one 
deplores such uses). However, in ordinary contexts  reporting slurs or taboo words is 
not convenient.  Lepore and Anderson reject the idea that slurs be considered 
presuppositions or be explained by resorting to the notion of conventional 
implicature. Verbs of saying such as those involved in indirect reporting, in fact, are 
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plugs to presuppositions and thus we should predict that the presuppositions are 
filtered out by such contexts. The notion of conventional implicature, being 
semantic, cannot explain why slurring persists despite embedding in verbs of saying  
in negative structures. Conventional implicatures, in fact, appear to be negated: 
 
(4) John did not say that Mary is French but brave. 
 
It appears that neither John nor the reporter of (4) is committed to there being a 
contrast between being French and being brave (but it is presupposed that at least 
someone might hold this contrast). However, slurs and taboo words persist despite 
embedding in verbs of saying. 
 I accept  that reports of slurs or taboo words are often embarrassing, though I do 
not completely agree with Lepore and Anderson that only the reporter is perceived as 
being responsible for the slur. I am persuaded that mainly the reported speaker is 
perceived as responsible for the slur and that at most responsibility is shared between 
the reporter and the reported speaker. I would also like to insist that even if the 
addition of prefatory speech aiming at providing justifications for the report and at 
softening the hearer‟s judgments cannot completely nullify the offence, it can at least 
serve to mitigate it. 
 Lepore and Anderson insist that neither conventional implicature nor 
presupposition can explain the embarrassment caused by reporting slurring words 
and finally opt for the explanation according to which there is a prohibition against 
using slurs which applies  both in the case of the original speaker and of the reporter. 
I applaud this explanation, as this is an explanation which considers the practice of 
reporting a speech act a language game subject to rules of use. It is not semantics 
(either in the form of conventional implicatures or of presuppositions) which 
prevents us from reporting slurs easily, but it is a rule of use. We must know what 
uses are licit or not and thus, to master the practice of the language game „reporting 
speech‟, we must know what uses are licit or  prohibited. The rules and uses in 
question are not semantic, but are societal. We must know what practices society 
allows and what practices it bans. Thus using (or not using a word) is ultimately a 
matter of knowing societal, rather than linguistic uses.  
 If the considerations by Lepore and Anderson were completely accepted in their 
current form, this would have severe implications concerning my stance to the 
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principles involved in the language game „reporting speech‟. In fact, in my 2010 
paper on indirect reports (Capone 2010a), I claimed that whenever strong contextual 
clues allowing us to distinguish voices within the same speech act are missing, 
considerations of processing efforts militate against having two voices in the same 
report. The interpretation that is most relevant is the one that attributes the voice 
expressed in the that-clause of the report to the original speaker, since ultimately the 
aim of reporting is to say what an original speaker said. Having two voices involves 
greater processing efforts which are justified if the ultimate effect of the utterance is 
to let the hearer know how to separate the reporter‟s voice from the reported 
speaker‟s one – that is to say if numerous contextual clues are present and allow 
separation of voices. 
 So if  Lepore and Anderson are correct that the slurring words are attributed to the 
reporter, rather than to the reported speaker, my principles would have to be 
abandoned. However, I opted for a weaker version of Lepore and Anderson‟s theory, 
according to which both the reported speaker and the reporting speaker are perceived 
as slurring. My own theory actually predicts that the greater offence is attributed to 
the reported speaker. 
 
5. Default interpretations and modularity of mind. 
In Capone (2010b), I explored the idea that explicatures are the result of modular 
processes. In particular, I argued that the view by Kasher (1991) according to which 
only the pragmatic processes involved in understanding speech acts are modular 
needs to be reassessed. Kasher believes that cancelability (which is one of the 
characteristics of conversational implicatures) is an obstacle to seeing the 
interpretative processes involved in pragmatic inferences as modular. In fact,  
modular processes must be both mandatory and encapsulated. However, the fact that 
inferences can be aborted when we have access to a body of knowledge, shows that 
implicatures are not mandatory and, furthermore, require interaction with vast 
archives; hence they cannot be encapsulated. In Capone (2009), however, I argued 
that explicatures are not cancellable and this seems to be in conflict with Kasher‟s 
(1991) ideas. In Capone (2010c), furthermore, I argued that the processes involved in 
calculating explicatures are encapsulated (often requiring „modules on the fly‟ to 
search information). In Capone (2010d) I argued that pragmatic processes involved 
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in conversational implicatures can be of two types – modular or non-modular. 
Following ideas by Cummings (2009) I accepted that at least some cases of 
conversational implicatures involve the interplay of vast archives of information. 
However, modular pragmatic processes usually provide the propositional forms 
which are then utilized in non-modular processes. Now, this means that default 
inferences usually arise due to modular processes – these can become the final 
messages or otherwise be aborted or integrated by information accessed through vast 
archives (encyclopedic knowledge). The integration of propositional forms obtained 
by default inferences through access to vast archives is itself constrained by the 
Principle of Relevance. Thus, we will require that contextual effects and processing 
efforts are to be kept in balance while the integration of default propositional forms 
takes place. 
 Now, returning to the issue of indirect reports, what are the consequences of this 
modular approach? One of the consequences is that we consider the default 
interpretation of an indirect report one in which the voice of the original speaker (the 
reported speaker) is presented UNLESS there are ways of distinguishing voices 
(there can be at least two voices, but even more than two voices if we consider that 
reports may come as the result of chained indirect reports) and of assigning voices to 
the respective participants. In Capone (2010a) I claimed that  processing efforts are 
involved in selecting the voice of the original reporter. Surely, it must be admitted 
that a report in which there are two inseparable voices is one that requires greater 
processing efforts (as one cannot easily settle the question „Whose voice is this or 
that one?‟.). I admit that this way of resolving the problem is partial and not 
definitive. One must not only show that processing efforts play a role in deciding 
whether one or rather two voices, are present in the micro-narration of the indirect 
report, but ideally one should be able to demonstrate that we have a pragmatic 
explanation of why the original speaker, rather than the reporting speaker, is selected 
as the voice that counts. And here the problem must be framed in terms of contextual 
effects, rather than in terms of processing efforts, since if the original speaker‟s voice 
prevails, then we have additional information on the perspective of the original 
speaker – and now we remind readers that indirect reports are micro-narrations about 
the original speakers, about events in which the original speaker and not the 
reporting speakers were involved. Thus, if the modes of presentation of NPs used in 
indirect reports are those used by the original speakers, we have additional 
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information on their point of view, on their language, of their mental processes, and 
also on the context of utterance. These make contextual effects larger, following 
Sperber and Wilson (1986). 
  
6. Dascal and Weizman (1987) on clues and cues. 
Dascal and Weizman (1987, republished in Dascal 2003) is a superb exposition of 
the issue of clues and cues, which I want to put to use in the understanding of the 
logic of indirect reporting. Dascal and Weizman, following a tradition going back to 
Searle (1979), notice that understanding a speech act if often a matter of filling the 
gaps left there by the speaker by using pieces of information available in the context 
(whether intended as the specific situation of utterance or background and cultural 
information having a bearing on the utterance). Since texts may often depart from 
literal meanings in substantial ways, requiring not only filling of deictic elements but 
also drastic revision of the literal meaning, Dascal and Weizman are ready to admit 
that two types of instructions are needed to make sense of texts. These are called 
contextual „clues‟ and „cues‟. These are differentiated in a functional way. Cues 
allow readers or hearers to notice drastic departures from literality (e,g Is a lexeme 
used metaphorically? Is the speaker conveying irony? etc.) allowing contextual clues 
to provide specific solutions to the general problem addressed by cues. So, the 
questions introduced by cues are normally yes-no questions. The questions 
introduced by clues are more open, involving a search for items capable of filling 
lacunae in a text. As Dascal and Weizman cogently say, a cue problem soon turns 
into a clue problem. This interplay of cues and clues is at the basis of understanding a 
text. A practical method invented by Dascal and Weizman for distinguishing cues is 
to ask informants to transform a text. Those elements which are radically 
transformed in paraphrasis signal a cue problem. This is clearly relevant to 
understanding the logic of indirect reports, since paraphrasis is involved in reports 
and indirect reporting is perceived as deviant in some ways if the utterance is 
reported literally without taking into account the cues and clues which lead to 
meaning augmentations and legitimate departures from literal meanings. Indirect 
reporting is ultimately a way of checking whether the interplay of cues and clues has 
led to plausible meaning augmentations, because if it has not, then the report is not 
legitimate. I propose that indirect reporting is closely connected to the issue of cues 
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and clues as presented by Dascal and Weizman. There is another point of intersection 
between Dascal and Weizman‟s considerations on cues and clues and the logic of 
indirect reports. Dascal and Weizman discuss in detail various types of clues and 
distinguishes between: 
Clues related to extra-linguistic specific context; 
Clues related to meta-linguistic specific context; 
Clues relating to extra-linguistic shallow context: general assumptions about the 
features of a given set of situations; 
Clues relating to extra-linguistic background knowledge: general knowledge  about 
the world; 
Clues relating to meta-linguistic background knowledge: general knowledge about 
the functioning of verbal communication. 
 
Clues related to meta-linguistic specific context play an important role in indirect 
reports. We have, in fact, often said that understanding a report fully is a matter of 
separating the original speaker‟s voice from that of the reporter. Thus a clue that tells 
you that a certain word is part of the linguistic repertoire of a certain person (suppose 
that word is idiosyncratic to that person) will also allow you to separate the original 
speaker‟s voice from the reporter‟s voice. But first of all, the idiosyncratic word may 
constitute a cue allowing you to notice that there is an interpretation problem relating 
to indirectness. Then the cue problem will turn into a cue problem and the cue/clues 
will allow you to sift the original speaker‟s voice from the reporting speaker‟s voice. 
But now the question arises whether the interpretation process pertaining to 
separating voices in indirect reports can be included in the more general rubric 
„noticing a discrepancy between what the speaker literally says and what the 
speaker‟s meaning is‟. My answer is positive. Although the cue does not in this case 
allow you to detect a drastic departure from literal to intended meaning, it will allow 
you to establish a more accurate structure in the report and to fill the lacunae thanks 
to contextual clues. So, in a sense, the interpretation problem posed by indirect 
reports is a sub-case of the more general case discussed by Dascal and Weizman. 
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There are further parallels between the discussion in Dascal  and Weizman (1987) 
and the case of indirect reports. Consider the example discussed on: 
 father of fathers of. 
This expression is used to express the concept: the original cause of. According to 
Dascal and Weizman, the departure from literal meaning must be detected through a 
cue of indirectness: 
 A cue for indirectness is to be found,  if the reader employs her meta-linguistic 
shallow knowledge and, via the specific meta-linguistic acquaintance  with 
Biblical style (to which the literal Hebrew expression belongs), notices an 
unexpected register shift. (Dascal and Weizman 1987, republished in Dascal 
2003, 189). (See also Weizman and Dascal 1991 on extralinguistic shallow 
knowledge enhancing associations with the notion of „fighting family). 
 Now, following these ideas by Dascal and Weizman, I propose that meta-
linguistic specific context provides cues and clues allowing hearers to separate voices 
in an indirect report. There are many ways in which a reporter can allow hearers to 
recognize voices: they can imitate the voice quality, they may use items of 
vocabulary which are idiosyncratic to a certain speaker (including the reporter), they 
can use stylistic features that are recognizable as belonging to a certain well-known 
author, etc. (See also Recanati 2001). We should add that interpretative problems 
increase in complexity if the reported speaker in turn embeds somebody else‟s voice 
in his own voice (see cases of mixed quotation). 
 The ideas by Dascal and Weizman were taken up by Hirsch (2011), who applied 
them to humor. Typical cues for humor are discussed by Hirsch: script opposition 
(the violation of expectations), framing (jokes appear to have repeatable structure, 
usually a single scene terminating with a punch-line), word play and nonsense. For 
the sake of space I cannot go into this, but needless to say these ideas are very useful 
when it comes to identifying discrepancies between literal and intended meaning in 
indirect reports. Some parts of an indirect report can be humorous and it may be 
important in such cases to distinguish between the voice of the original speaker and 
that of the reporter. Who is being humorous? Although, I will not specifically discuss 
humor and indirect reports, I mention this possibility as part of the general task we 
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are confronted with of separating and specifying the voices expressed in an indirect 
report. Obviously, we need cues and clues to separate such voices. 
 
6.1 Applications of cues and clues. 
In this section I will apply the notion of cues and clues to three important cases of 
indirect reports. Needless to say, I will keep the discussion short for the sake of time, 
but I imagine that a number of other cases need to be discussed or taken into account. 
A case that is of great theoretical importance is  an indirect report with implicit 
translation. Sure, by now we have arrived at the plausible tenet that paraphrasis is 
involved in indirect reports. Paraphrasis may involve shortening (summing up) or 
even expanding the report. What makes an indirect report legitimate is the extent to 
which we are ready to re-express the original voice without distortions of the 
message or of the form of the message. In case of reports with (implicit) translation it 
is implicit that the paraphrasis was reached through a translation (the question 
„whose translation?‟ is not to be easily dismissed). Consider the report: 
 
(5) Putin said that any American  attempt to increase the nuclear arsenal will be 
considered as a threat to the talks on disarmament. 
 
Now it is clear enough that (5) is a paraphrasis of what Putin said – and this may well 
consist of an abridgment and of a translation. The translation is obviously one from 
Russian into English. So we may well accept that Putin‟s words were very different 
from the ones used in the indirect report. It is true that a polyphonic reporter may 
well utter the sentence (5) by using a recognizable Russian accent and may even try 
to imitate the specific quality of the voice of the Russian leader. However, there may 
be  strong cues telling us that there may be a divergence between the words used by 
the reporter and those used by Putin and clues leading the hearer to guess that Putin 
spoke Russian when he uttered the message (Suppose Putin prefers to speak Russian 
rather than English, which he may know well, due to patriotic reasons). In this case, 
the following types of clues may be relevant: 
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Clues relating to extra-linguistic shallow context: general assumptions about the 
features of a given set of situations; 
Clues relating to extra-linguistic background knowledge: general knowledge  about 
the world; 
 
In particular, the clues guiding our interpretation are knowledge of the general fact 
that Russians normally speak Russian and that the Russian political leader due to 
patriotism may want to speak Russian when addressing foreign policy (perhaps even 
before foreign journalists). 
 
The second type of example pertains to non-literal uses. Consider ironic uses. 
John and Mary are in the library, studying. It is almost time to leave the library and 
go to dinner. John says: „Are you staying here?‟ and Mary replies: 
 
(6) Yes, I will stay here all night long. 
 
Now, we want to ask whether Fred, who was near them and overheard the 
conversation could legitimately report: 
 
(7) Mary said that she will stay in the library all night long. 
 
In a sense, it may not be legitimate to report Mary‟s speaker meaning by a report of a 
literal utterance, if what is required of the reporter is Mary  speaker‟s meaning. So, 
whether or not an indirect report of an utterance is legitimate if it only reports the 
literal meaning of the sentence uttered very much depends on the requirements of the 
context. If the report was elicited by someone in need of the speaker‟s meaning, it 
would be illegitimate to report the literal meaning. In general, there should be 
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constraints preventing reporters from only reporting literal meanings of sentences.  
These constraints come from general Gricean principles or Relevance Theory 
considerations (the Communicative principle of Relevance):  one should avoid 
ambiguities and NOT  put the hearer to undue and unnecessary processing efforts. 
They also specifically come from accepting the Praphrasis Principle which I 
discussed in Capone (2010a) and reported here in a previous section.  One should 
notice that there is a tension between the Paraphrasis/Form Principle and my claim 
that it is not standardly legitimate to report literal meanings, when ironic messages 
are at stake. So how can we resolve this tension? The tension amounts to this: a level 
of literality is needed to prevent distortions and attributions of slurs, foul language, 
sexist language, taboo words, offensive language in general to the original speaker, 
when, in fact, these should be attributed to the reporter; a level of literality cannot be 
tolerated when the speaker‟s meaning diverges from the literal meaning in a drastic 
way as in ironies. Yet, the tension disintegrates if we consider that both in cases of 
NPs and of whole utterances speaker meaning is involved. No one prevents me from 
using the NP the original speaker used in his speech by using it both literally and as 
being speaker-intended. In other words, in some cases literal meanings are also 
speaker-intended. Thus, whether we report what the speaker said by using parts of 
what he literally said (and speaker-meant) or we have to drastically alter what he said 
to capture the speaker‟s meaning, we ultimately report the speaker‟s meaning. 
 Another issue I want to tackle in connection to reporting of  literal meanings is 
whether one really cannot find ways to report literal meanings and do so in a way 
that is considered acceptable at least in some circumstances. We have said that the 
reason why we intend to interpret indirect reports as reports of speaker‟s meaning is 
that doing otherwise generates ambiguities that cannot be easily resolved. And one is 
under the constraint to avoid ambiguities and to put the hearer to as little processing 
effort as possible. However, if processing efforts are balanced by rich cognitive 
effects, then it may be acceptable to report literal meanings. So even if we admit that 
this is not the general practice of reporting, in some cases where knowing what the 
speaker literally meant is of importance to the hearer, the consideration of  
processing costs is put aside in view of the richer cognitive effects. Suppose that 
something important and crucial hinges on what Mary literally said and this is made 
clear in the reporting context. Suppose further that there are rich cues and clues 
allowing us to assess that the reported statement is a literal and faithful reproduction 
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of the original speaker‟s words. Then we have the opposite process of what was 
described by Dascal and Weizman. In the original context cues and clues allow us to 
detect an interpretation problem and to construct the speaker‟s meaning. In the 
reporting context, there are rich cues and clues allowing us to detect an interpretation 
problem (in particular that the general practice of interpreting indirect reports is not 
applicable) and assign the words of the report a literal meaning status. What is clear 
is that in some contexts, this is possible and it is possible due to the existence of rich 
cues and clues. 
 The last case I want to discuss, in connection with cues and clues is an example 
proposed by Tannen (1989). This example is interesting because it corroborates what 
we have said so far, that is that  reported speech is often a transformation of the 
original words, which requires cues and clues for interpretation. Tannen like me 
proposes that intended meanings, considered as „constructed‟, should be at stake in 
indirect reports, and that interpretative problems arise when the recipient fails to 
reconstruct an utterance„s intended meaning. 
The  example is the following. Two sisters talk on the phone (let us call them A and 
B). A reports what their mother said about B: she criticized B for not returning home. 
Instead, she apparently did not criticize A for not returning home from college. B 
notices the illogicality of this situation, as A who is a college should be under a 
greater obligation to return home during holidays. B resents her mother‟s criticism, 
and apparently seems to take what her mother says literally. However, Tannen 
proposes that the mother for tact reasons avoids criticizing A directly but conveys to 
her her disappointment by criticizing B, expecting A to reason that if her mother has 
reasons for criticizing B, then she also has reasons for criticizing A. Apparently, 
neither A nor B grasp their mother‟s intended speech act and, thus, in reporting it, A 
concentrates on the literal meaning. Yet, there are cues and clues sufficient for 
signaling an interpretative problem and for solving it by assigning a specific 
interpretation of the speaker‟s intentions. The question which we may address now is 
whether these cues and clues are preserved by the telephone conversation between 
the two sisters. We have got situation S, where there is a telephone conversation 
between the mother and daughter A and situation S1, in which there is a telephone 
conversation between sister A and B. It is certainly possible, that certain cues such as 
quality of voice were lost when the first conversation was reported to B. So it is 
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possible that when the mother told A that it was ok for her if she did not return home, 
her voice was colored in a certain way and such quality could constitute a cue. It is 
possible however, that this cue was lost in the reporting of the conversation. 
However, the cue and cues constituted by the criticism of the other sister for a 
conduct which was similar to the conduct by the other sister who was not actually 
criticized do not disappear. The problem, however, is that sister B is not able to 
perceive such a cue, is not able to reason on the discrepancy between the mother‟s 
reasons for criticizing her conduct and her reasons for approving a similar conduct by 
her sister. Basic rationality principles could be easily conducive to a reasoning about 
what the mother‟s intended meaning is. So why is it that the two sisters were not 
aware of the intended meaning? Why is it that the indirect report only takes into 
account literal meanings? Tannen says that in American  English indirect reports are 
taken as reporting literal meanings. But this is to be excluded by what I argued 
before in this same section. Tannen is ambivalent on this; on the one hand, she takes 
American speakers to orient to literal meanings in indirect reports; on the other hand 
she says that  
 
I am claiming that when a speaker  represents an utterance  as the words of 
another what results is by no means describable as “reported speech”. Rather it 
is constructed dialogue. And the construction of the dialogue  represents  an 
active, creative, transforming move which expresses the relationship not  
between the quoted party and the topic of talk but rather  the quoting party and 
the audience to whom the quotation is delivered. (Tannen 1989, 11). 
 
But we have already seen that the picture of indirect reporting which does not 
consider transformations, voicing, cues and clues is deeply flawed. Thus, I take 
Tannen to express reservations for a notion of indirect reporting which is close to 
verbatim reports, but not to the notion of indirect reporting which we have defended 
in this chapter. The idea that construction is involved is also a familiar one for us, 
since we have already accepted that explicatures must be part of indirect reports, that 
an implicit reference to translation is sometimes made, that the reported words can be 
summed up or even articulated in a more precise and elaborate manner. Construction 
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also involves constructing a framework for separating voices. It also finally involves 
assigning an illocutionary intention to a speech act. Cues and clues, in the sense of 
Dascal and Weizman (1987), feature prominently in this picture of how indirect 
reports are constructed and deconstructed. The construction work involves taking 
into account a number of contextual elements which first of all tell you how 
something has to be taken and then allow you to assign specific content or voices to 
the indirect report. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that indirect reports often involve transformations of the 
message which was uttered in the reported utterance. There is a limit to the quality 
and number of transformations applicable, and such a limit can be found in norms 
that regulate the language game „indirect  reporting‟. I argued that indirect reporting 
is a societal practice, which involves societal pragmatics considerations along the 
lines of Dascal and Weizman (1987) and Mey (2001). Societal pragmatics must be 
allied with cognitive pragmatics, since the norms implicit in the practice of indirect 
reporting can often be deduced by cognitive principles like, for instance, the 
Cognitive Principle of Relevance. Since a theory of how indirect reporting works in 
conversation is also a theory of communicative practice, it follows that the 
Communicative principle of Relevance is also at work. This paper leaves some 
matters unsettled, though. It would be useful to consider the interaction between 
indirect reports and the theory of quotation. I leave this matter for another day. 
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Chapter 9 
  Knowing how and pragmatic intrusion. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract.  
In this chapter I try to apply pragmatic intrusion to the controversy of whether 
knowing how can be reduced to knowing that. I argue that pragmatic intrusion can 
resolve a number of problems encountered in the work by Stanley and Williamson 
(2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
I start this chapter with some programmatic statements.  We have seen how 
Grice‟s pragmatics was assimilated and put to use by linguistics in the course of 
this and the previous century. The assimilation of Grice‟s ideas almost amounted 
to a revolution and spurred an enormous amount of work on this topic. However, 
now the time has come for a new period of research, in which Grice‟s 
philosophical ideas are applied (back) to philosophical topics. We have sufficient 
evidence showing that this can be done successfully (see for example the brilliant 
paper by Douven 2009). The quantity of work on propositional attitudes and 
pragmatics indicates that this type of program can be successfully executed and 
should, therefore, be executed. It would not be a bad idea to extend the topics to 
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which we can apply our ideas about pragmatic intrusion and explicatures. I am 
persuaded that knowing how is one such topic in which pragmatics can be applied 
to philosophy in the attempt to resolve a philosophical problem. However, since 
„knowing how‟ attribution is also a linguistic practice, we should also find some 
harmony between philosophical and linguistic descriptions. It is, therefore,  
natural to want to explain a number of inferences triggered by knowing how 
utterances in terms of pragmatics.  
 
In this chapter I shall deal with the pragmatics of knowing how utterances. 
Since „knowing how‟ vs. „knowing that‟ has received detailed treatment in the 
philosophical literature (see Fantl  2009 for a good review), we cannot but pay 
attention to what philosophers have said. However, in the main, I want to stress 
what is needed for a theory of communication, rather than a theory of knowledge. 
Since a theory of knowledge and a theory of communication intersect at various 
points, this is not easy to do. For example,  one reason why we utter sentences 
such as “John knows that p” is to inform the hearer that p. Hearing a sentence like 
„John knows that p‟ the hearer is entitled to infer that p, provided that he trusts me 
and he trusts John. Nevertheless, I assume that epistemology and a theory of 
communication are different projects, with different aims, and it does no harm to 
reveal my bias towards a theory of communication. In starting this chapter, my 
hope is that we shall throw  light on pragmatic inferential processes involved in 
understanding apparently simple knowing how utterances. Essentially, I want to 
reflect on  what is being communicated  and on what inferential processes are 
triggered when  knowing how utterances are proffered. I will claim that such 
inferential processes are responsible for what is being communicated at a truth-
conditional level. 
 Indirectly, my inferential approach serves to throw  light on many problems 
that bear on the distinction between knowing how and knowing that and on the 
possibility of reducing knowing how to knowing that.  My inferential approach 
shows that, despite recalcitrant data  leading to the opposite view, the right 
interpretation of these data will, in fact, lead to  the idea by Stanley and 
Williamson that knowing how is a species of knowing that. 
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I start the chapter with the exposition of Stanley and Williamson‟s (2001) 
paper according to which „X knows how to p‟ must be analysed as „X kwows that 
there is a way w and that he can p in this way‟. I then move on to the discussion of 
opacity, which has been claimed to constitute another reason for  the asymmetry 
between knowing how and knowing that. I argue that opacity characterizes both 
knowing how and knowing that and answer some objections. I also discuss an 
objection to Stanley and Williamson‟s treatment of Gettier‟s problem. My 
analysis is that knowing how can be Gettiered. I then consider objections by 
Sgaravatti and Zardini to an assimilation of knowing how to knowing that based 
on negativity arguments and closure principles. I argue that these objections are 
not well-founded and can be dissolved through pragmatic intrusion. Subsequently, 
I discuss knowing how and modularity of the mind, and claim that modular 
considerations need not be inimical to a unified treatment of knowing how à la 
Stanley and Williamson. I argue that the considerations on contextualism and 
knowledge by Keith De Rose are also applicable to knowing how, in addition to 
knowing that. I also argue that Igor Douven‟s considerations on the pragmatics of 
belief apply to knowing how as well as to knowing that. 
In Part 2, I present a brief section   on the notion of pragmatic intrusion, 
which will be of help in understanding the issue of knowing how. I provide some 
of the standard examples of pragmatic intrusion.  Then, I deal with a number of 
uses of  the „knowing how‟ construction, and I focus, among other things, on the 
asymmetry between knowing that and knowing how, noticed by Snowdon.  While 
one can deduce „I know that p‟  from „X knows that p‟, it is not clear that one can 
deduce „I know how to p‟ from „X knows how to p‟. In section 2.2  I consider a 
famous objection by Rumfitt to Stanley and Williamson‟s treatment and claim 
that it can be dissolved through pragmatic intrusion. In section 2.3,  I consider 
various inferences in context and also argue in favor of pragmatic intrusion, 
considering a weak form of contextualism. I also consider interpretative problems 
with quantifiers and implicit arguments. In section 2.4,  I argue in favor of a 
unified treatment of knowing how and knowing that, through pragmatic intrusion. 
I consider two alternative hypotheses.  
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1.  Stanley and Williamson on knowing how. 
Stanley and Williamson (2001) question Ryle‟s (1949) considerations on the 
distinction between knowing how and knowing that, a distinction which has 
engaged many philosophers of mind and of language. In addition to this, they 
question Ryle‟s claim that an action of any kind requires a previous act of 
thinking, to count as intelligent. In this chapter, I will not dwell on this second, 
and important issue, but I will concentrate on whether or not knowing how can be 
subsumed into knowing that. Stanley and Williamson question Ryle‟s distinction 
on the basis of linguistic arguments – a move which has caused Michael Devitt‟s 
perplexity (since he claims that metaphysic claims should be settled by 
metaphysic arguments (Devitt Forthcoming)). Yet, it is not true that Stanley and 
Williamson simply deal with the linguistics of „knowing how‟; they also deal with 
various connected phenomena which are typical of propositional attitudes (e.g. 
Gettier‟s problem; the opacity problem). It simply turns out that many of the 
problems encountered in the discussion of the distinction between knowing how 
and knowing that can be resolved – if not dissolved – through the recognition of  
pragmatic intrusion. In this chapter I want to claim that one cannot understand the 
issue of knowing how independently of the understanding of the phenomenon of 
pragmatic intrusion. 
 So I am sympathetic in principle to Stanley and Williamson‟s (2001) 
„linguistic‟ treatment of knowing how, since linguistics and philosophy in this 
case intersect to a greater extent than in a number of different issues. 
 To make complex things simple, Stanley and Williamson take cases of 
„knowing how‟ to be cases of indirect questions (embedded questions) (In a later 
version of this paper, in press, Stanley cites Higginbotham (1993)). In this 
perspective, a sentence such as „Ann knows how to ride the bike‟ has the same 
truth-conditions as „Ann knows that there is a way w, which is a way for Ann to 
ride the bike‟. To be more explicit, this must be interpreted as „Ann knows that 
there is a way w such that she can ride the bike in way w. This proposal admits 
three kinds of pragmatic intrusion: a) assigning the „some rather than all‟ 
interpretation to the knowing how sentence (Ann knows some way (not all ways) 
which is a way for her to ride the bike); assigning a deontic modal interpretation 
to the infinitival construction (Ann knows how to drive the bike  Ann knows 
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there is a way w such that she can ride the bike in way w); assignment of a „de se‟ 
interpretation to PRO (Ann knows that w is a way for her to ride the bike; NOT: 
Ann knows that w is a way for one to ride the bike; I will return to this point later 
on). 
 The proposal becomes more complicated when it comes to modes of 
presentation. In line with considerations about propositional attitudes, given that 
„know‟ is like „belief‟ in giving rise to opacity problems, one had better introduce 
the notion of modes of presentation of the reference. The reference can present 
itself to the knower in different ways. To account for the cases in which knowing 
how is equivalent to having a skill, Stanley and Williamson introduce the notion 
of a practical mode of presentation. (Basically in addition to being told how to p, 
you can be shown how to p. 
 
1.1  Opacity. 
Those who want to emphasize the contrast between knowing how and knowing 
that typically invoke two characteristics of knowledge claims: opacity and 
Gettier‟s problem (Gettier 1963). Knowledge claims are typically opaque; in other 
words, substitutability of identicals (Leibniz‟s law)  does not work inside the 
scope of a knowledge/belief operator. Suppose that  Elisabeth = the Queen of 
England. Then in a sentence such as (1) 
 
(1)  Elisabeth greeted the Polish ambassador 
 
one can replace „Elisabeth‟ with „The Queen of England‟ without changing the 
truth conditions of the sentence. However, in a sentence such as (2) 
 
(2)  Mary knows that Elisabeth greeted the Polish ambassador 
 
one cannot freely replace „Elisabeth‟ with „The Queen of England‟ (in case  
Elisabeth = the Queen of England) UNLESS one also knows that Mary knows 
that Elisabeth = the Queen of England. After Salmon (1990), one tends to 
296 
 
interpret opacity pragmatically. Truth-conditionally, the sentence „Mary knows 
that Elisabeth greeted the Polish ambassador‟ is the same as the sentence „Mary 
knows that the Queen of England greeted the Polish ambassador‟, however they 
differ in the implicated import. Someone who utters (2) somehow commits herself 
to accepting that Mary knows Elisabeth through the mode of presentation 
„Elisabeth‟ and NOT through another mode of presentation. Thus she might not 
accept that Mary knows Elisabeth under the mode of presentation „The Queen of 
England‟ and, therefore, she might not accept the statement (3) 
 
(3)  Mary knows that the Queen of England greeted the Polish ambassador. 
Those who want to say  that knowledge-how and knowledge-that claims are 
completely different have the opportunity to deny that opacity applies to 
knowledge-how. Suppose that John attends regularly some Karate classes and 
knows how to make a move that involves three steps; let us suppose that there is 
also a type of dance, let us call it the Cuckoo dance, involving these three steps. 
Then we should  describe John, who knows how to practice Karate, as someone 
who knows how to engage in the Cuckoo dance.  Yet, he would hardly be willing 
to describe himself as someone who can practice the Cuckoo dance. He would 
answer negatively the question whether he can practice the Cuckoo dance. But  
why should it matter whether  John is willing to accept that he can practice the 
cuckoo dance? We know that, if we bothered to explain to him what the cuckoo 
dance is like, he would be able to do it. 
 There does, therefore, „prima facie‟ appear to be an asymmetry between 
knowing that and knowing how. When we come to knowing that, the subject‟s 
judgements about what he knows are important. After all, usually one knows that 
he knows that p (but see Williamson 2002 for the claim that one who knows p 
need not know that he knows p). If the subject‟s judgements are important, then 
one hardly knows that p UNLESS one knows that he knows that p and, if p is 
presented under a different mode of presentation, the risk is there that the subject 
will not accept that he knows that p under mode of presentation q, because he has 
introspective access to his knowledge state and he does not find there the 
proposition q. 
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Now, the contrast between knowing how and knowing that, in terms of 
opacity  seems to depend on two facts: luminosity; and pragmatic intrusion. 
Concerning luminosity, I am inclined to say, following Williamson (2002), that 
not in all cases in which one knows p one knows that one knows p, albeit 
normally luminosity is implied. Concerning pragmatic intrusion, we must 
remember that opacity was heavily dependent on that. There may be pragmatic 
reasons why pragmatic intrusion occurs to a greater extent in knowing that claims 
than in knowing how claims. Knowing how claims, in fact, are normally 
connected with practical problems. Why do I know whether John knows how to 
p? Presumably I want to know whether John knows how to p because I need to p. 
And if I know that John knows how to q and that knowing how to q is equivalent 
to knowing how to p, then I can use John‟s know how for the purpose of resolving 
my practical problem. Knowledge that claims, on the contrary, are not connected 
with practical problems, but with inferential knowledge. Often I need to know that 
p, because p, together with q, tells me whether n and I need to know whether n is 
true in order to do F. (And I can know p if I know  that John knows that p). 
Opacity is clearly a problem in inferential knowledge, since it is a limit to what 
can be inferred given a knowledge claim. Surely it would be of help to me to 
know that Mary knows that the Queen of England will be here today – I would 
know that there is a likelihood that the traffic will be jammed and I will avoid 
driving in the city centre. Yet, there is no way to extract this information from 
knowledge that Mary knows that her friend Elisabeth will be here today. 
 So my conclusion is that knowing that and knowing how behave differently 
with respect to opacity not because they are inherently different claims, but 
because they serve different purposes. It is the function of the claims that makes 
them appear as if they were different with respect to opacity. 
 
1.2  Gettier’s problem 
Many have found it reasonable to assume that if knowing how is not completely 
different from knowing that, then it is vulnerable to Gettier‟s problem. In short, 
Gettier‟s problem consists in the fact that a proper knowledge claim must not 
admit devious types of justification.  For instance, the following case does not 
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count as knowledge. John sees Billy drive a new Mercedes. He concludes that he 
is the owner of a new Mercedes. Thus, he is able to make the inference that either 
Billy or Fred  bought a new Mercedes. It then turns out that Fred bought a new 
Mercedes, but Billy didn‟t (he was simply trying Fred‟s car). Then by pure luck, it 
is true that  Fred bought a new Mercedes; hence it is true that either Fred or Billy 
bought a new Mercedes. John believed that either Fred or Billy bought a new 
Mercedes; he was somehow justified in coming to that belief. So should we say 
that he knew that Fred or Billy bought a new Mercedes? The standard answer has 
been negative and epistemologists have pondered on the nature of the 
justification. In short, the justification must be non-devious.  
Now, can knowing how claims be Gettiered? Stanley and Williamson 
(2000) answer this question positively and contrive a case to show that knowing 
how can be Gettiered.  Suppose that John wants to learn how to fly a plane and 
does that through a flight simulator. Wicked  Fred changes the simulator‟s 
programs intending to disorient John, thus preventing him from learning how to 
fly a plane. Yet, despite his evil intentions, by mere luck the simulator activates 
the right programs, designed to train a learner how to fly  a plane. When he 
finishes his simulation courses, John  is actually able to fly a plane and everyone 
admires him for his skill. Should we say that he knows how to fly the plane? If he 
knows how to fly a plane, he knows that by mere luck. Surely the success is 
fortuitous and even if AFTER he actually proves that he is able to fly a plane, we 
are willing to grant him know-how, we would reluctant to let him fly a plane if we 
knew what evil Fred has done to the simulator. After seeing what Fred has done to 
the simulator, we would predict that John will not be able to fly the plane. We 
would not be willing to let him fly the plane because we think he has not acquired 
know-how. 
 It has been objected (Poston 2009) that, appearances notwithstanding, John 
has know-how. He knows how to fly the plane, and that is all that matters to show 
that knowing how cannot be Gettiered. Yet, it would be reasonable to suppose that 
when John knows how to fly a plane, he knows all the kinds of steps involved in 
flying a plane and he knows of all ways w in which one can fly a plane, that w is a 
way for him to fly the plane. How can he know that w is a way for one to fly the 
plane if he learned that w is a way to fly the plane through an evil instructor? If 
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knowing how has to be learned, it must be learned in the proper way. The case is 
analogous to knowing that. Suppose that Mary tells me that Fred is in Paris. Fred 
happens to be in Paris. Yet Mary was evil enough to tell me a lie. Did I really 
know that Fred was in Paris? The justification for my belief was devious, thus I 
did not really know. In the same way, when an evil instructor tells me (or shows 
me) that w is a way to fly a plane, hoping to induce me to make a mistake and, 
unaware to him, w proves to be an efficient way to fly the plane, then it is by mere 
luck that I can fly the plane, as my justification for believing that w is a way for 
me to fly the plane was devious. 
 
1.3  Sgaravatti and Zardini against  the assimilation of knowing how to 
knowing that. 
Before moving on to a deeper treatment of knowing how vs. knowing that, I 
would like to consider some interesting objections by Sgaravatti and Zardini 
(2008) to subsuming knowing how into knowing  that. The objections are 
intelligent and worth-while discussing. The analysis according to which knowing 
how is subsumed into knowing that, following Stanley and Williamson, amounts 
to more or less the following: 
 
John knows how to ride the bike = def John knows that there is a way w which is 
a way to ride the bike. 
 
This analysis is still incomplete, in that it requires the introduction of a modal 
element, but this will not change the gist of our discussion. 
 
Now, Sgaravatti and Zardini argue against Stanley and Williamson on the basis of 
negativity. Consider (17) 
 
(4)  John knows how to square the circle. 
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Translated through Stanley and Williamson‟s semantics, this would come to: 
 
(5)  John knows the answer to the question how he can square the circle 
 
or 
 
(6)  John knows that w is an answer to the question how he can square the 
circle. 
 
 
However, Sgaravatti and Zardini argue, John knows a perfect answer to the 
question how to square the circle and that is „In no way!‟, but nevertheless he 
cannot square the circle. When the negativity argument is introduced, Stanley and 
Williamson‟s treatment faces a serious problem.  
 If I were Stanley and Williamson, I would not be worried by the negativity 
problem. I assume their answer would be that if one answers „In no way!‟ to the 
question how to square the circle, then one has no answer to the question how to 
square the circle. If you were to ask me to make 8 loaves of bread out of  just two 
loaves, or how one can make 8 loaves of bread out of just two loaves, I would not 
be able to provide a satisfactory answer to your question. Knowing how involves 
providing a satisfactory answer to a (practical) question, and not just an answer 
whatsoever. If providing an answer whatsoever to the question how I can drive a 
powerful motorbike is what enables me to drive a motorbike, then, I (who cannot 
ride a powerful motorbike) could qualify as knowing how to drive a powerful 
motorbike. But it is not an answer whatsoever, that is required, but an answer that 
allows me to carry out a task. In Sgaravatti and Zardini‟s case, could we honestly 
say that the answer „In no way!‟ provides a satisfactory answer to the question 
how to square the circle? If it does not, then we should not be surprised if one 
cannot manage to square the circle, even if one is able to provide an answer 
(which turns out to be inadequate). 
     If anything, Sgaravatti and Zardini‟s contribution is to clarify what is or 
must be intended when one says that w is the answer to a question. Presumably, 
the notion of Relevance (à la Sperber & Wilson 2004) may be of help. Relevance 
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is defined (by Sperber & Wilson) in terms of contextual effects and processing 
efforts. There are three ways in which a newly presented piece of information may 
interact with the context to yield a contextual effect: (i) it may combine with 
contextual assumptions to yield a contextual implication (that is a logical 
implication derivable neither from the contextual assumptions nor from the new 
information alone); (ii) it might strengthen an existing assumption; (iii) it may 
contradict and lead to the elimination of an existing assumption. 
Now, let us reconsider the question whether the answer „In no way!‟ is 
relevant to the question „How can one square the circle?‟. Does this answer create 
cognitive effects which justify the effort of vocalizing it? One thing the answer 
does, surely; that is, it questions the question and categorizes it as a question that 
cannot be answered. But then „In no way!‟ is NOT an answer to the question, but 
a challenge to the question, amounting to, more or less, “Why did you ask me 
such an absurd question?‟.  Then, if it is not an answer to the question, it is not in 
conflict with the fact that nobody actually possesses this know-how. I assume 
Relevance Theory – and in general theories about communication – have a role to 
play in clarifying this not uninteresting case posed by Sgaravatti and Zardini. At 
this point,  I want to ask the question whether the one we have just encountered is 
a case of pragmatic intrusion. Pragmatic intrusions are cases in which a 
pragmatic inference allows truth-evaluability. If I remember well, the cases of 
pragmatic intrusion discussed by Carston (1999) were exactly cases in which, 
unless pragmatic intrusion was posited, one ended up with a logical form which 
could lead to contradictory interpretations. Consider one of those examples: 
 
(7)  If the King of France died and France became a republic, I would be happy; 
but if France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy. 
 
There is, in this sentence, a potential for contradiction, if only truth-conditional 
elements of meaning deducible from semantics are considered. However, in 
context the sentence is NOT contradictory, provided that the right temporal 
relations are assigned at the level of the utterance. In  Sgaravatti and Zardini‟s 
case, we have a potential contradiction: 
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(8)  John knows the answer to the question how to square the circle: “In no 
way” but he does not know how to square the circle. 
 
However, once pragmatic intrusion is considered, and the pragmatics overrides 
the semantics of „John knows the answer to the question how to square the circle: 
“In no way!” by yielding the interpretation „John challenged the question how to 
square the circle as absurd‟, the contradiction which Sgaravatti and Zardini called 
our attention to disappears. We should not be surprised that this happens, as this is 
in line with many cases of pragmatic intrusion. 
 
The case of „In no way!‟, given as a reply to the question whether one can 
square the circle is clearly a case of metalinguistic negation. Metalinguistic 
negation, according to Horn (1985, 134) is a means for objecting to a previous 
utterance on any grounds whatsoever. In our case, however, the utterance is an 
answer to a question, not to a statement, and thus it is challenge to the 
(reasonableness) of the question. 
 
 
1.4  Knowing how and modularity of mind. 
Now, I want to address a  different issue, which have a theoretical bearing on our 
decision to treat know how and theoretical knowledge as distinct or, otherwise, as 
unified. It has been claimed in the literature that knowledge how and knowledge 
that belong to different modules of the brain. There are studies on dissociations 
between knowing how and knowledge-that. (For a review, see Williams 2009; 
also Young 2004; for a detailed treatment of the distinction between declarative 
and procedural knowledge, see Devitt Forthcoming). An amnesic patient can lose 
her knowledge that without losing her knowledge-how. This is amazing to say the 
least. To those who are not persuaded, consider what happens when I am on the 
speedway and without seeing the car in front of me I suddenly stop my car. I am 
amazed. I know that I did not see that car, but I stopped my car nevertheless. It is 
NOT a miracle occurring or an angel that continuously assists me. We have a dual 
visual system, one of which is specialized in seeing objects, the other being 
specialized in knowledge-how. I was not involved in an accident because one 
visual system specialized in motion orientation was able to orient my motion path 
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and to block it. In other words, I know how to drive my car in a the speedway, 
even if I do not see the car in front of me (say, I am distracted by intense thoughts 
about something else). 
     Now, I do not want to take issue with  this type of argument and claim that it is 
wrong. But I would like to know what it shows. Does it show that there is no 
connection between knowing how and knowing that? Is not an expert driver able 
to articulate his know-how and put that into writing, writing a manual on how to 
drive a car? Analogously, cannot a man who lives by buying shares on the stock 
exchange articulate his tacit know how and write a book on how to make 
investments? Assuming that there are different compartments in the mind for 
techniques and strategies, for  skill know-how and articulated know-how, is it 
impossible to argue that a certain knowledge-that claim (tacit or overt) is 
associated with a practical mode of presentation that resides in the knowledge 
how module? 
 
    Surely a  knowledge-how claim could be minimal.  A person who knows how 
to drive the car can minimally have knowledge-that by knowing that w is a way of 
answering the question how to drive the car, while storing  the practical mode of 
presentation with which w is associated in a different module of the brain. Such a 
minimal knowledge-that is not impossible. Stanley and Williamson‟s claims are 
not incompatible with the current theories on the modularity of mind, since they 
can allow that practical modes of presentation can be stored in a module which is 
reserved for know-how. 
 
1.5  Knowing how and contextualism 
Now I will address the problem of epistemic contextualism.   Assuming that 
contextualism à la Keith De Rose (2009)  has its validity (one can accept it fully 
or in part), how does the bifurcation between knowing how and knowing that fare 
in the light of contextualism? 
     Contextualism in epistemic philosophy is the claim that the same 
knowledge claim can have different truth conditions in different contexts. The 
utterance 
 
(9)  Mary knows that the bank is open on Saturday 
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may be true or false depending on the situation of utterance. In a low stake 
situation, the claim may be true, while in a high stake situation the claim may be 
false. Can this be applied to knowing how claims too? Intuitively one would say 
that contextualism provides  the strongest objection to the propositional view of 
knowing how (How can skill  cases of know-how be sensitive to low and high 
stakes situations?). Yet, on a pondered analysis, this is not the case. Consider the 
situation in which John is asked to open the safe which is connected with an 
explosive device and a timer. In five minutes the explosive device will explode. In 
this situation, if we ask whether Mary can open the safe, we may waver, even if 
we know that she has done that in the past and  efficiently. We do not  know 
whether she can do it in 5 minutes.  The bifurcation between high stakes and low 
stakes situations and varying truth conditions can be transferred from knowing- 
that to knowing how. And this seems to support the lack of a rigid division 
between knowing that and knowing how. 
 
1.6   Knowing how and  Igor Douven’s The Pragmatics of Belief. 
Another testing bed for  the assimilation of knowing how to knowing that is Igor 
Douven‟s (2010) „The pragmatics of belief‟. Igor Douven proposes that when we 
store a belief (in the form of an assertion or a sentence or a thought), we avoid 
storing it together with inferential augmentations which may lead us  later to 
remember something which was not the case. This is called  epistemic hygienics. 
A vivid example which comes from that paper is the reference to Gettier‟s 
problem. Suppose I know that p. Then, even if I can infer „p or q‟ from „p‟, it will 
not do to store in memory „p or q‟ if that is going to create trouble later, leading 
me to believe something that is false or unjustified. We may remember that what 
creates havoc in Gettier‟s problem is the shift from „p‟ to „p or q‟. Keeping in 
memory „p or q‟ when one believes „p‟ creates trouble, as that may lead to an 
apparently justified belief which happens to be true.  
 
The Principle which will avoid us many problems in the future is the following: 
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Epistemic Hygienics (EH): Do not accept sentences that could mislead your future 
selves. 
 
Other interesting examples by Douven are  the following: 
 
(10)  Peggy‟s car is blue; 
(11)  Peggy‟s car is bluish. 
Now, it is clear that if Peggy‟s car is blue, it is also bluish (blue being a stronger 
gradation of bluish). However, if one commits to memory „Peggy‟s car is bluish‟ 
when one believes that it is blue, one will commit to memory a piece of 
information which will mislead one‟s future self. Igor Douven compares  
memorizing or committing to memory writing notes (e.g.  Turn off the gas) which 
will be of use to our future selves. If memories are like notes, we should avoid 
writing notes that mislead our future selves. 
 Igor Douven‟s paper is of great importance to epistemology but also to 
pragmatics. He shows that pragmatics and epistemology are intimately connected. 
While Igor Douven‟s story can be interpreted in the light of more general 
principles of cognition (a memory that is misleading obviously is  a case in which 
a believed assumption is more costly than beneficial in terms of cognitive effects; 
positive cognitive effects being those which put me in touch with reality, not those 
which drive me away from it), I cannot do this in this chapter. I confine myself to 
asking the innocent question whether the pragmatics of belief also applies to 
knowing how  (knowing entailing belief). Here another crucial question arises. 
Does knowing how involve belief?  Well, here the treatment of knowledge by 
Williamson may come to our aid. While all or almost all philosophers insist on the 
fact that belief is more basic than knowledge, Williamson (2002) insists that 
knowledge is more basic than belief. The case of knowing how seems to attest that 
he is right. One who is skilled in making a tie knot  may have no beliefs on how to 
make a tie knot. He simply knows a practice. Of course, he must minimally 
believe that there is a way of making a tie knot.  
 Returning to the pragmatics of belief, it is useful  to choose an example in 
which  a strategy and not a skill is involved. Consider  the case in (12), which 
happens to be true: 
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(12)  John knows how to reach Trafalgar Square in 5 minutes. 
 
Surely then he knows how to reach Trafalgar Square in 6 minutes; in 10 minutes, 
in an hour. 
 
 Suppose that asked whether he can answer the question whether he can 
reach Trafalgar Square in five minutes, John ponders on the answer that yes he 
can do it. Then he ponders on the logical consequences of this. He arrives at the 
conclusion that he can reach Trafalgar square in 10 minutes. He can also reach 
Trafalgar Square in 100 minutes. Suppose that, taken by the enthusiasm due to his 
logical deductive abilities, he goes on computing the answers to all the least 
stringent questions. Then  he may forget the answer with which he started, which 
answered the question whether he could reach Trafalgar Square in five minutes. 
Igor Douven‟s epistemic hygienics will thus do some work in preventing John 
from memorizing all the logical consequences of his answer, which, if pursued in 
an endless line, will distract him from keeping his answer in mind. 
 
 So the answer is „yes‟, knowing how obeys Igor Douven‟s epistemic 
hygienics. Thus the case from a dichotomy between knowing how and knowing 
that is made weaker. 
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PART II 
PRAGMATIC INTRUSION 
 
 
2.  Pragmatic Intrusion.  
Pragmatic theory (usually) deals with inferential phenomena that are intentional. 
On the one hand a speaker gets a message across by using non-linguistic means 
(or by combining linguistic means with features of the context that point 
interpretations in the right direction), on the other hand a hearer is busy trying to 
retrieve the speaker‟s intention. Communication must be essentially seen as a 
matter of projecting and recovering intentionality through the multiple clues, 
linguistic and otherwise, disseminated by the  speaker and available to the hearer. 
The speaker uses a number of clues to get across her intention aware that the 
hearer will use them  for recovering it. While Grice‟s project confined itself to 
recovering and studying conversational implicatures (inferences that are mainly 
cancellable, reinforceable, non-conventional and calculable), neo-Griceans (e.g. 
Levinson 2000) and Relevance Theorists (Sperber and Wilson 2002; Carston 
1999) recognized that more is at stake than conversational implicatures and that 
the same processes available for the projection and recovery of conversational 
implicatures can be put to use in the recovery of explicatures, inferential 
contributions (or augmentations) that make an utterance truth-evaluable. 
Relevance theorists ponder on the issue of the truth-evaluability of sentential 
meanings, and come to the conclusion that sentential  meaning is  mainly 
underdetermined. In other words, were we to know ONLY what a sentence 
means, we would know little of what is being communicated, and the sentence 
would not be truth-evaluable (in many cases), simply because many other 
elements of a pragmatic kind enter into truth-evaluation. I have written about this 
in Capone (2006, 2008, 2009) by exploring the issue of whether the pragmatically 
obtained elements of explicatures are cancellable or not. My main conclusion is 
that explicatures are NOT cancellable. This is an assumption that can be put to use 
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in this chapter on knowing how and pragmatic intrusion. I will not dwell on 
pragmatic intrusion here, because the reader has the opportunity to read about it 
elsewhere; however, I will produce a number of examples which have been taken 
to represent cases of pragmatic intrusion. Consider the case in which Mary is 
asked whether she would like to join for breakfast and she replies “No, thanks; I 
have already had breakfast”. Clearly, she does not mean that she has had 
breakfast, say, on the previous day or a week ago; presumably she means that she 
has had breakfast on the morning of the invitation. This makes her contribution 
relevant to the previous invitation.  Similarly, if someone asks you whether you 
have turned the gas off,  she presumably intends to ask you NOT whether you 
turned the gas off ten days ago, but a few minutes ago, say before leaving the 
house. One of the most celebrated cases of pragmatic intrusion is the following 
one by Carston: „It is better to meet the love of your life and get married than get 
married and meet the love of your life‟ 1 . Now, clearly settling temporal 
specifications into utterance interpretation is of importance in the evaluation of the 
utterance.  „Better‟ requires that the two propositions compared be different, but 
UNLESS we specify (by free enrichment) the temporal specifications inside each 
sentential fragment, we either come up with a sentence which is potentially false 
or with a sentence whose truth-conditions are radically underdetermined and 
about which we cannot say whether it is true or false. Various authors have 
written about pragmatic intrusion. There is no space here for a review, however 
see Capone 2006 for a review; also Claudia Bianchi 2001. 
 Pragmatic intrusion, in the case of „knowing how‟ occurs on a heavy 
contextual basis. Depending on what the context is, you must choose a specific 
modal, a „de re‟ interpretation or the quantifier „some‟ (rather than „all‟).  I have 
argued elsewhere that explicatures (at least actual explicatures) are not 
cancellable. This is strong proof that the explicature is a crucial contribution to 
what is said, as it contributes a layer of truth-conditional meaning. 
 Suppose you are interested in Mary‟s know-how because you want to carry 
out a certain job, such as opening a safe.  Then it will not be indispensible  to 
know whether Mary knows all ways to open the safe. One way is sufficient. We 
are not interested in exhaustive knowledge. Furthermore, in this situation, I am 
                                                          
1
 This example is originally Cohen‟s (1971). 
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not interested  in knowing whether Mary knows how one would open the safe, but 
in I am interested in knowing whether she knows some way for her to open the 
safe. I am not interested in knowing  whether she has seen the procedure effected 
in the past, but in whether  she has herself effected the procedure. In addition to 
that, I am interested  in whether there is a way w such that she can open the safe 
with w. I am not interested  in a modal such as „must‟. In other words, I leave her 
free to choose one way or the other, in case she knows more ways to open the 
safe. 
 
2.1  On the uses of ‘knowing how’. 
 
What does one communicate when one says (13)? 
 
(13)  John knows how to fix the bike. 
 
Is it different from what one says through (14)? 
 
(14)  John knows how Napoleon lost at Trafalgar. 
 
Intuitively, one feels that (13) is connected with expertise, as John has the 
expertise to fix the bike, even if he may not be able to articulate his expertise apart 
from pointing to his actions “This is the way I do it”. 
 On the contrary, we have a feeling that (14) attributes to John articulated 
knowledge, which he may be able to articulate through a series of answers.  
 The question is even more complicated, as there are contexts in which the 
speaker‟s meaning  is ambivalent, pointing both to expertise and to articulated 
knowledge (Damschen 2009). Consider, in fact, (15) 
 
(15)  John is a driving instructor. He knows how to drive. 
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Unlike an ordinary driver, not only does John know the technique involved in 
driving cars, but he can also articulate it through answers to questions by the 
learners. He must be able to teach learners, not only by pointing to the way he 
does it (This is how you must do it!), but by giving articulate answers to questions 
and by  explicit teaching. 
 So, it is clear from the start that we are faced with an ambiguity and even 
with cases in which both readings are possible simultaneously (the two readings 
not being mutually exclusive). Possibly we are faced with an interpretative 
ambiguity. Since one of the explicit aims of pragmatic theories is to avoid 
semantic ambiguities (see Jasczolt 1999), from the start we opt for an 
interpretative ambiguity, which means we must aim at providing a logical form, 
which, by interacting with contexts, furnishes specific interpretations. 
 
It is very instructive to  consider  an asymmetry pointed out by Snowdon (2003), 
between knowing that and knowing how. 
 
John knows that p  I know that p 
NOT: John knows how to p  I know how to p 
 
I take   to be a symbol of entailment. 
 
Actually the phenomenon should be described with a greater number of details. 
A person who utters „John knows that p‟ is committed to knowing that John 
knows that p. Since that person  knows the obvious consequences of what she 
knows, she also knows that p, given the fact that if John knows that p, p is true. 
The asymmetry pointed out by Snowdon (2003)  should remind us that 
differences exist. However, there are similarities too.  
One such similarity, it should be stressed, is  that „knowing how‟ can be 
communicated. In these cases, it behaves like  „knowing that‟. Knowledge can be 
transmitted through speech acts, if the proposition known is not yet known to a 
third person and is deemed to be of use to her (say, it bears on a question which is 
of crucial importance to her either because she asked a question or because her 
behavior evinced eagerness to know a certain fact). One can say things such as: 
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(16)  John taught me how to drive a bike; 
(17)  John learned how to ride a bike from Mary; 
(18)  John told me how to cook lasagna; 
(19)  John explained to me how to make the exercise; 
(20)  He taught me how to cook lasagna and I remember well. 
 
Depending on the scenarios in which these sentences are used, they may implicate 
that the way one learned or was taught was a verbal way. Words like „teach‟, 
„tell‟, „explain‟ all involve the use of explicit instructions, maybe  combined with  
showing. They strikingly contrast with „show‟, which involves non-verbal ways of 
teaching. „Learn‟ is perhaps neutral between learning by being taught through 
verbal instruction and learning by being shown how one does something. 
There are uses of „knowing how‟, however, which are very different or look 
very different from „knowing that‟: 
 
(21)  John knows what being operated on is like; 
(22)  John remembers what falling down the stairs is like; 
(23)  John imagines what falling down the stairs is like; 
(24)  John tried to explain to me how it hurts to fall down the stairs. 
 
What is known in these cases is an inner experience, which cannot be 
communicated or can only be communicated partially. 
 
There are uses of  „knowing how‟ which are odd, probably because knowing how 
involves explicit instruction, practice, and ability. 
 
(25) ? John found out how to cook lasagna; 
(26) ??John guessed how to cook lasagna; 
(27) Mary knows in part how to cook lasagna. 
 
If John was shown two cards, each describing a procedure for cooking lasagna, 
and just tossed a coin to guess which card is right, he  would  not exhibit 
knowledge that this is the right procedure for cooking lasagna. John‟s finding out 
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how to cook lasagna is strange and must be interpreted as saying that John found 
the instructions how to cook lasagna (but he need not know how to cook lasagna, 
because he is not good at following instructions). (27) is used to support the 
distinction between knowing how and knowing that. It is claimed that one can 
have partial knowledge that, but not partial knowledge how. It seems to me that 
things are the other way round. One cannot have partial knowledge that, but one 
can have partial knowledge how. Consider, in fact, a worker who is instructed on 
how to execute a procedure;  being late, he will be taught the rest of the procedure  
the day after. In this case, he has partial knowledge how, which will be developed 
into full knowledge-how when certain other skills will be integrated. 
 
It has long been debated, since Ryle (1949), whether knowing how involves 
ability. Surely if I know how to ride a bike, I can ride a bike. However, the 
question to ask is whether this inference is an entailment or an implicature. 
Implicatures (in particular, potential implicatures) are defeasible, entailments are 
not (cases in which entailments are defeated are cases of loose usage). The 
philosophical literature is adamant on this. Snowdon argues convincingly that, 
while in many cases, if one knows how to p, one can p, this is not always the case. 
In particular, ability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for  knowing 
how to p (See also Bengson 2009). The standard examples discussed by Snowdon 
are cases like the following: 
 
 
I know how to ride the bike. However, I have just had an accident and I have 
broken my leg. Thus, it appears that I cannot ride the bike. Nevertheless, I still 
how to ride the bike. When I recover, I will ride the bike again without any 
problems. 
 
Various authors recognize that while ability is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
knowing how, in many cases when one says: 
 
(28)  John knows how to cook spaghetti 
 
it is implied that he can cook spaghetti. 
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It has been proposed that this is a conversational implicature. Surely this must be 
the case, given that conversational implicatures are non-monotonic inferences, and 
may arise standardly (standard implicatures). It is our world knowledge that 
licenses the „ability‟ implicature when one says „X knows how to p‟. We know 
that, if there are no special impediments, knowing how ipso facto creates the 
ability to do p. In other words, we are empowered to do p by our knowledge on 
how to p. The implicature  that one can do things becomes an explicature  when 
knowing how has to be put to use. Suppose I am interested in whether John knows 
how to open the safe. Then I am not only interested in knowing  whether John 
knows a procedure  but whether he has ever applied that procedure in the past. 
Depending on the context, the ability explicature becomes consolidated, and it 
may even become hard to cancel. 
 
 
2.2  Rumfitt and ‘savoir  + infinitive’ : towards a pragmatic story  
Rumfitt (2003) proposes a strong objection to Stanley and Williamson. He 
considers a wide range of languages in which „knowing how‟ is expressed through 
a construction of the type „savoir + infinitive‟ (e.g. French, Italian, Russian). It 
appears that there is a difference between 
 
(29)  Giovanni sa nuotare 
(lit. John knows to swim) 
 
and 
 
(30)  ?Giovanni sa come nuotare. 
(John knows how to swim). 
 
If well-formed at all, (30) seems to conform to Stanley and Williamson‟s semantic 
elucidation for knowing how (There is a special way w of swimming and 
Giovanni knows w). (30) is probably appropriate to situations in which one, out of 
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a several, ways of swimming is suited to the situation (in that a particular goal is 
being pursued). One also has the feeling that (30) allows a continuation as in: 
 
(31)  John knows how to swim (to impress the examiners). 
 
The materials in parentheses are supplied contextually through free enrichment. 
So summing up, one has the impression that „sapere nuotare‟ and „sapere come 
nuotare‟ have different meanings. 
 Stanley and Williamson can reply to Rumfitt that „savoir + infinitive‟, after 
all, is a „know how‟ construction in so far as it is possible to analyse it as having a 
question word as part of pragmatic intrusion (free enrichment, presumably). But 
then the question arises why there should be such a marked difference between 
(29) and (30). A possible answer to this question – an answer which is favorable 
to Stanley and Williamson – is that there is surely a contrast between (29) and 
(30), but that is NOT a matter of semantic entailments, but a matter of explicature. 
Assuming that (29) and (30) have the same semantic/syntactic  structure,  the 
more prolix and more marked (30) triggers some explicatures (M-explicatures, 
according to Horn (2009), Levinson (2000), and Huang (2000)). According to a 
Relevance Theory perspective, given that the more explicit „come‟ would be 
associated with the same semantic readings, it would be more costly to the hearer 
to utter one more word; thus, to make this cost bearable, one would have to offset 
the processing cost with suitable contextual effects. Thus „come‟ triggers a 
conversational inference which aims at completing the sentential structure with a 
purpose clause. 
 
2.3  Inferences in context 
When one examines the cases of knowing how, one may notice some differences 
among the following cases.  
 
(32)  John knows how to drive the car; 
(33)  John knows how to fix the bike; 
(34)  John knows how to drive the bike; 
(35)  John knows how to cook lasagna; 
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(36)  John knows how to persuade the coach to let him play; 
(37)  John knows how to teach a history lesson; 
(38)  John knows how to arrive to the office by the shortest route. 
 
All these cases are similar; yet they involve different shades of meaning. In (32) 
we seem to be confronted with a case of (skill)  know-how. However, if the 
sentence is embedded in a context in which a mother tells her son to ask for 
John‟s help in learning to drive the car, it is conversationally implied that her son 
should be ready to provide verbal instructions. (33) seems to implicate that John 
also knows how to find the tools needed to fix the bike. (34) seems to express a 
skill; however, if the sentence is  situated in a context in which you are asking for 
help on how to use a professional bike, „bike‟ here is interpreted as „professional 
bike‟ and the sentence is promoted from describing a skill to describing 
competence which can be articulated through instructions. (35) may range 
between an interpretation according to which John is being attributed a skill (he 
knows how to cook lasagna by route) and an interpretation according to which he 
is being attributed a source of knowledge (He knows how to cook lasagna; he has 
a cookery book in the kitchen and he resorts to that book when he needs to cook 
lasagna. Here „knows how‟ actually implicates, perhaps due to a loose usage,  that 
one knows „where‟ to find a recipe). (36) implicates that John has worked out a 
strategy on how to persuade his coach to let him play. (37) may implicate that 
John has a special method for teaching a history lesson or that he has rehearsed a 
history lesson. (38) implicates that John is able to calculate the shortest route to 
his office. It is incredible that, in different contexts, „knowing how‟ sentences take 
on different shades of meaning, which are not expressed by semantics alone. 
 
There are other types of pragmatic interpretations with knowing how sentences. 
Consider, for example, scope ambiguities, as in the following: 
 
(39)  John knows how to fix a bike; 
(40)  John knows how to ride a bike; 
(41)  John knows how to calm up the dog; 
(42)  John knows how to fix every bike. 
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In (39) and (40) it is unlikely that the indefinite NP has scope over the verb of 
propositional attitude. Thus we exclude the interpretations: 
 
(43)  There is a bike: John knows how to fix it. 
(44)  There is a bike: John knows how to ride it. 
 
The natural interpretations of (39) and (40) seem to be the following: 
 
(45)  If there is a broken bike, John knows how to fix it. 
(46)  If there is a bike, John knows how to ride it. 
 
In (41), „the dog‟ escapes the scope of the verb of propositional attitude and has 
scope over it. As Jaszczolt (1999) correctly insists, NPs tend to be correlated with 
„de re‟ readings by default. I have argued in Capone (2009) that this story must be 
coupled with a RT explanation. I cannot go into this here. (42) has different 
interpretations. If there is a domain of quantification which is salient, then „every‟ 
will be interpreted as quantifying over elements from that domain (See Stanley 
2007). If there is no such a domain present, then it will have a genuinely universal 
quantification reading. HOWEVER, it will not be understood that John knows 
how to fix every bike (at the same time). What is probably needed is a selection 
function that selects the variables individualy, and NOT cumulatively. 
 
For all x, x a bike, John knows how to fix it(SEL FUNC one by one); 
For all x, x a bike, John knows how to fix them (SEL FUNC all at once). 
 
Presumably bound variables must have formal properties which correlate with 
different selection functions. 
World knowledge is what enables the speaker/hearer to have access to the most 
reasonable or plausible reading. It is implausible that one can fix all bikes at the 
same time. Thus this interpretation is NOT selected. The default interpretation is 
the one that accords with socio-cultural defaults (see Jaszczolt 2005). 
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There are other interpretation problems concerning  „knowing how‟ 
interpretations. Let us assume that part of the story of knowing how utterances is 
that they are interpretable in the following way: 
 
(47)  John knows how to ride the bike 
(48)  John knows that there is a way of driving the bike w and this is a way for 
him/for one  to drive the bike. 
 
The choice between one interpretation or the other is not trivial, and obviously 
depends on the context of utterance. A certain context of utterance will favor an 
interpretation rather than the other. However, one gets the impression that the 
default reading is (49): 
 
(49)  John knows that there is a way of driving the bike  w and this is a way for 
him to drive the bike. 
 
Presumably, the reading which has greater contextual implications (cognitive 
effects) wins. While  in the majority of cases, there is a coincidence between the 
way one drives the bike and the way John drives the bike, we are describing the 
situation from John‟s perspective, not from everyone else‟s perspective; thus it is 
natural that John has developed a way to drive the bike that accords with his 
natural inclinations. This is clearer in the following example: 
 
(50)  Alessandro knows how to drive the car in an Italian speedway. 
 
Italian speedways are such that when there is a car from an incoming road, you 
either need to slow down in order to avoid accidents or you drive in the left lane, 
in order to avoid an accident. Surely this is an idiosyncratic way of driving. But 
Alessandro has developed his personalized way of driving. I assume that the 
natural interpretation of (50) is that Alessandro has his own way of driving in an 
Italian speed way. This is the interpretation which has richer cognitive effects and 
the one which conforms to Alessandro‟s  perspective. 
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One further problem is the interpretation of the deontic modal. 
 
(51)  John knows how to fix the bike  
 
is equivalent to  
(52)  John knows that there is a way w and that is the way to fix the bike. 
(52) Roughly means (53): 
(53)  John knows that there is a way w and w is the way he can fix the bike,  
 
rather than  
 
(54)  John knows that there is a way w and w is the way he must fix the bike. 
 
It is a  matter of pragmatics that „can‟, rather than „must‟ is chosen. „Can‟ involves  
a greater space of freedom than „must‟. One assumes that activities like fixing 
bikes, etc. are done according to free will, and  not under coercion. Again it is 
socio-pragmatic defaults that are at work here. 
 
Another interesting interpretative problem is whether one should have one of the 
following interpretations of say (55). 
 
(55)  John knows how to arrive at Trafalgar Square in 5 minutes. 
(56)  John knows some way w and w is a way he can reach Trafalgar Square in 5 
minutes; 
(57)  John knows all ways w such that John can reach Trafalgar Square through 
w. 
 
It appears philosophers prefer the interpretation (56). Again socio-cultural defaults 
are at work here. It is rarely the case that one knows all ways to do p and to know 
how to do p, it suffices to know one way to do p, rather than all. The most 
stringent interpretation is thus discarded. One settles on „some‟ as a default. 
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There are other inferences to consider. There are implicit restrictions to 
knowing how claims.  Consider, in fact, the following (from Hawley 2003): 
 
(58)  John knows how to drive (American cars); 
(59)  She knows how to drive (European cars); 
 
(60)  She knows how to cook (for an informal dinner); 
 
(61)  She knows how to cook (as a chef in a restaurant). 
 
 
In all these cases, the context of utterance restricts the truth-conditions of the 
utterance, Contextualism can provide an explanation for why there can be so 
much variation in the truth-conditional import of the utterance. In all of the cases 
above, there is a restriction on the truth-conditional claim; this restriction is 
implicit and must be inferred pragmatically. Typical scenarios and situations of 
use can provide the materials for the pragmatic restrictions. Of course, one might 
reply (à la Cappelen and Lepore 2005)  that one must then allow for an unlimited 
number of pragmatic increments. (58) could mean: 
 
(62)  John knows how to drive in  a Sicilian speed way; 
(63)  John knows how to drive in a chaotic traffic; 
(64)  John knows how to drive among drunk people; 
(65)  John knows how to drive a scooter. 
 
I agree with Cappelen and Lepore that there can be many (even too many) 
contextual increments. But this does not make contextualism less appealing, 
provided that we know how to combine the basic sentential meanings with the 
contextual variables that lead to possible increments. 
 
3.  A unified treatment of knowing how: pragmatic intrusion? 
It has been claimed that knowing how utterances are characterized by an 
interpretative ambiguity. They are sometimes understood as describing abilities or 
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skills; they are sometimes taken as describing knowledge of ways one can do p. 
Surely, there are a number of cases in which „knowing how‟ sentences appear to 
describe skills. The blacksmith has mastered a certain skill. He need not be able to 
articulate his knowledge, since many of the operations he executes are automatic. 
However, John who knows how to reach Trafalgar Square in 5 minutes does not 
have a skill. He was able to perform a calculation and to work out the shortest 
routed to Trafalgar Square. He is able to say that w is the way he knows to arrive 
at Trafalgar Square in five minutes. He is also able to say why he chose w rather 
than w‟. This is not a skill or an ability. This is real knowledge. 
Given this clear bifurcation in the uses of knowing how, one can hypothesize that 
the different uses are based on a single logical form
2
: 
 
(66)  John knows … how to p 
 
which is then pragmatically enriched to 
 
(67)  John knows the answer to the question how to p; 
(68)  John knows the technique how to p. 
 
This amounts to claiming that (66) is a fragmentary semantic  schema, to be 
enriched in context. Certain contexts promote skill interpretations; other contexts 
promote  knowing the answer to the question whether p interpretations. 
 
Another solution might be to follow Stanley and Williamson up to a certain point. 
At some point Stanley and Williamson claim that the way in which one can p is 
presented to the speaker/hearer through a practical mode of presentation. But this 
is clearly suitable to skills, not to know-how that is theoretical. Furthermore, we 
should distinguish between a practical and an indexical mode of presentation. The 
indexical mode of presentation is of use in cases like the following: 
 
                                                          
2
 Brogaard (2009) leads us in this direction, although he is not specific about 
pragmatic intrusion and what kind of underdetermined logical form is needed. 
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(69)  John showed me how to fix the bike and I learned it. 
For this example to work, John, rather than explaining how to do things, showed 
the hearer how to fix the bike, presumably saying “This is the way to do it”. This 
is not only a practical mode of presentation, but an indexical mode of 
presentation.  
 Now, I am favorable to having a unitary logical form like: 
 
(70)  John knows the answer to the question how to fix the bike. 
 
One can in fact enrich this logical form by making use of a practical mode of 
presentation. This surely is more compatible with the situation in which both a 
practical and a theoretical mode of presentation is involved. Consider again the 
situation in which one says 
 
(71)  John knows how to drive the car, 
 
implying that, since John is a driving instructor, he has both articulate knowledge 
which he can teach and practical knowledge which he can show. In this case, it is 
not clear given the logical form 
 
(72)  John knows …. how to drive the car 
 
how to arrive at the multiple interpretation (skill and articulate knowledge). Surely 
(73) is a bit far-fetched: 
 
(73)  John knows the answer to the question how to drive and the technique how 
to drive. 
 
However, (74) is not: 
 
(74)  John knows that there is a way w in which he can drive the car. 
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W can be presented through a practical or theoretical mode of presentation; but 
there is nothing to prevent the speaker from using and expecting the hearer to 
infer a double mode of presentation of this way of driving. 
 
 Why is (73) far-fetched and implausible? I assume that a reason why (73) is 
implausible is that it says that John knows two (distinct) things, and this does not 
accord with our understanding of daily use, while (73) can be interpreted as 
meaning that John knows one thing, which may be presented to him in different 
ways, according to the demands of context. 
 
3.1  A comparison between the pragmatics of knowing how and the 
pragmatics of propositional attitude reports. 
Ideally, we would expect the pragmatics of knowing how and the pragmatics of 
propositional attitude reports to behave similarly. Let us remind our readers of my 
treatment of the pragmatics of belief reports in Capone (2008). There I established 
some hidden constituents as a result of free enrichments. In particular, I posited 
some null appositives, attached to the that clause of belief reports. Schematically, 
this amounts to the following: 
 
(75)  John believes that [Mary is in Paris] [Mary is in Paris] APP 
 
The apposition, attached to the sentential constituent of the that-clause,  makes it 
necessary that the semantic referents associated with „Mary‟ and with „Paris‟ in 
the structure of the thought or belief attributed to John should be glued with 
phonetic forms such as „Mary‟ and „Paris‟, which explains why substitution of 
identicals is blocked inside belief reports. In Capone (2008) I exposed a pragmatic 
story according to which the principle of relevance is involved in enriching the 
structure of (75) by adding an apposition clause. Such a story was based on 
cognitive effort, and assumed that, if a speaker bothered to use names in order to 
talk about referents in reporting a thought of John, then he had a reason to do so, 
this reason being that the names figured as parts of John‟s thoughts. Whether this 
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story has to be amended or amplified is another matter, which I will not 
investigate here. 
 The question I am interested in is whether the pragmatics of knowing how 
works in a similar way. And the answer is that it doesn‟t exactly work in the same 
way, attributing to John knowledge of a way of doing an action. In fact, we have 
not said anything  on whether the way of doing the action is outside or inside the 
scope of „know‟. One possibility  is that it is outside the scope of „know‟. We, 
thus, accept the idea  that, on a given interpretation,  an utterance of „John knows 
how to ride the bike‟ amounts to: 
 
(76)  There is a way w, such that John knows how to ride the bike in way w. 
 
Now, this logical form explains why, on some occasions, knowing how utterances 
are interpreted in a transparent way. Of course, the possibility remains open that 
the quantifier in „There is a w…‟ can occur inside the scope of „John knows that‟ 
and, in this case, opacity is created, which justifies the considerations of those 
who posited opacity as part of knowing how structures. But now, if there is an 
ambiguity between a quantifier being outside the scope of „know‟ and a quantifier 
being inside the scope of „know‟, it is clear that my pragmatic story works well 
when the opaque reading is chosen, but NOT so well when the transparent reading 
is chosen. I suggest that we go for a bifurcation. When the opaque reading is 
chosen, then in the same way in which belief reports could be equipped with null 
appositions through pragmatic intrusion (specifically free enrichment), a null 
apposition can be attached to w, and this apposition would amount to a mode of 
presentation of  w. We assume that a practical mode of presentation of w is 
provided by default, given that a practical mode of presentation is often a firmer 
way of teaching one how to execute a procedure, since showing a procedure 
provides all or most of the information which could be provided through a 
linguistic articulation of the way in which something can be done, but things do 
not work all the way round. In other words, it is not the case that a linguistic 
articulation of the way something can be done will be able to express all the 
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information which one can furnish by a practical mode of presentation (by giving 
an example of the action). 
 But if this story works for the opaque reading, this story should also work 
for the de re reading, since even outside the scope of a verb of knowledge, a way 
of doing something can be enriched by free enrichment through an apposition 
structure and a practical mode of presentation can be chosen on the grounds that it 
is necessarily more informative than a linguistically articulated mode of 
presentation. 
 We have seen that the generalized implicature story is only part of the full 
pragmatic story. Generalized implicatures must, in fact, be tailored to specific 
contexts and, therefore, it is not unusal that a certain implicature may be aborted 
in favor of an alternative interpretation. Examples (32) – (38) seem to prove that 
contextual considerations must be accommodated when one enriches the logical 
form of a specific knowing how utterance. 
So we have abandoned the simplistic assumption that generalized 
implicatures are selected  despite the context or regardless of the context of 
utterance. We only retain the weaker view that generalized implicatures are 
triggered by default and are promoted to actual interpretation only if the context 
allows them (in other words if the context filters them in). If the context filters 
them out, then interpretation must follow a procedure in which various steps of 
reasoning are involved in selecting the favored interpretation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Devitt (Forthcoming) argues that epistemology should be divorced from linguistic 
considerations as Stanley and Williamson‟s considerations are mainly based on 
linguistic considerations, but NOT on consideration  of metaphysical issues.  
Now, while surely there are reasons for Devitt‟s assertion, this chapter in the main 
shows that philosophy and pragmalinguistic considerations are deeply entangled.  
When matters of inference are considered, it is also worthwhile considering 
pragmatic intrusion. There are reasons to believe that almost all questions that 
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pertain to knowing how can be analyzed with reference to pragmatic intrusion – 
that being a pervasive feature of human communication. Given what Igor Douven 
says about the pragmatics of belief, we are not surprised that knowledge, as well 
as belief, is strictly connected with the notion of communication and that many of 
the arguments that pertain to the sphere of epistemology can be illuminated by the 
tool of pragmatic intrusion. 
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Chapter 10 
 
The semantics and pragmatics of attitudes ‘de se’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
After reviewing a number of theories of attitudes „de se‟, in particular philosophical and linguistic 
theories, I adopt the theory by Higginbotham and, after showing that there are problems in it, I 
complement it with an theory of pragmatic intrusion, which supplied an Ego concept to the logical 
form of the „de se‟ attitude. I also articulate the internal dimension of attitudes „de se‟ by pragmatic 
intrusion, whether partial or full. 
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It is widely accepted that there is a huge gap between the meaning of a sentence 
and the messages actually conveyed by the uttering of that sentence (Huang 
2007). 
 
But why do we need clear, sharply demarcated boundaries at all, when pragmatics 
is in constant development, so that boundary markers, once placed, will have to be 
moved all the time? Maybe a „pragmatic definition of pragmatics could be found 
that avoids both the Scylla and Charybdis of the above alternative? (Mey 2001, 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Since Mill (1867), there is a convergence in pragmatics on the idea that “What a 
speaker intends to communicate is characteristically far richer than what she directly 
expresses; linguistic meaning radically underdetermines the message conveyed and 
understood. Speaker S tacitly exploits pragmatic principles to bridge this gap and 
counts on hearer H to invoke the same principles for the purposes of utterance 
interpretation” (Horn 2004). In the spirit of Horn‟s programmatic assertion, in this 
chapter I shall deal with utterances reporting attitudes  „de se‟ and I shall suggest that 
pragmatic principles and mechanisms are at play in the recovery of „de se‟ attitudes 
in English (and in Italian), in those cases in which grammatical and semantic 
information does not exclusively determine the „de se‟ interpretation. The examples I 
shall consider are cases like „John believes he is clever‟ or „John remembers walking 
in Oxford‟, where a subject has a thought or a memory about himself/herself (the 
subject of the thought) and these are contrasted with examples like „John believes he 
is clever‟ („He‟ used here  to refer to someone other than John, whom the speaker is 
pointing to), in which the pronominal has a „de re‟ interpretation. In cases like „John 
remembers walking in Oxford‟ I assume, following Higginbotham (2003) that PRO 
(the null subject of the subordinate clause) is associated with a „de se‟ interpretation).  
  I shall argue that „de se‟ attitude  attributions are not completely reducible to 
pragmatic mechanisms that take input from „de re‟ logical forms. I shall point out 
what problems radical pragmatic  analysis has to face. I propose that the pragmatic 
processes at work in those cases where semantics and grammar do not fully 
determine the „de se‟ reading  are cases of free enrichment (John believes he* is 
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clever). In free enrichments, although there does not seem to be either an overt 
indexical or a covert slot in the linguistically decoded logical form of the sentence 
uttered, the logical form nevertheless needs to be conceptually enriched in the 
explicature (Huang 2007, 191). I cast my view in the relevance-theoretic framework, 
according to which the human cognitive system works in such a way as to tend to 
maximise relevance with respect to communication, the principle of relevance being 
responsible for  both the explicit and implicit content of an utterance. However, it 
should also be said that I was greatly influenced by Levinson‟s (2000) ideas about 
pragmatic intrusion. I propose to add another type of intrusive constructions: 
sentences expressing attitudes „de se‟. 
 The chapter has the following structure. I initially present philosophical theories 
of „de se‟ attitudes, starting from Castañeda (1966), distinguishing   propositional 
treatments from property-theoretical positions. I then discuss a linguistic treatment of 
„de se‟ attitudes‟ (Higginbotham 2003) as well as some important objections by Safir 
(2004). In the final sections I discuss pragmatic intrusion and I distinguish cases in 
which „de se‟ inferences are cancellable and those where they are not. I propose that 
PRO is associated with „de se‟ beliefs through semantics alone (pragmatics is not 
involved), but that the internal dimension of PRO is a pragmatic inference. I also 
propose that Higginbotham‟s treatment does not do justice to the fact that „de se‟ 
beliefs involve a mode of presentation that incorporates a mental tokening of  „I‟. 
This component of meaning is on top of Higginbotham‟s semantics for PRO first-
personal readings. (I modify his semantic elucidations to accommodate this 
intuition). As Recanati (2007) says “Indeed, the ability to entertain implicit de se 
thoughts is arguably a necessary condition for anyone to evolve the concept EGO 
(Recanati 2007, 177). Analogously, I propose that there can be no „de se‟ thought 
without a mode of presentation that somehow vocalizes the word „I‟ (albeit in 
thought) or some transformation of it. My proposal is that the content of this word „I‟ 
is mixture of a demonstrative and of a proper name and has to supplement  
Higginbotham‟s treatment of the first-personal reading of PRO. 
 
 To be even more schematic, I claim that „de se‟ interpretations associated with the 
pronominal „he‟ (those cases for which Castañeda uses the asterisk) are pragmatic 
and I explain how pragmatics predicts them. Through pragmatics, I also predict a 
number of „de re‟ interpretations. The external first-personal dimension  of PRO in 
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constructions such as „John remembers going to the cinema‟ is semantically „de se‟, 
following Higginbotham (2003). 
  Hornian, Levinsonian and relevance theories bear on the present analysis in that 
(1) they assume that there is a gap between the sentential meaning and utterance 
meaning, as is also attested in the case of „de se‟ intrusive constructions; 2) they 
provide the principles of the analysis of the pragmatic inferences which in some, but 
not in all cases, are responsible for „de se‟ interpretations. 3) These theories are 
compatible with Jaszczolt‟s (2005) theory of merger representations, representations 
in which semantic, pragmatic and socio-cultural information merge to produce 
propositional forms that are truth-evaluable. 
 In my chapter I consider the following list of factors for the purpose of my 
pragmatic analysis: 
 
 
 
 
 
List of factors in „de se‟ attitude analysis 
 
Expressions  Verbs  „de se‟ 
or „de 
re‟ 
Internal  External  
PRO 
He, him 
His 
himself 
He himself 
Believe 
remember 
imagine 
Expect 
Dream 
Forget 
Know… 
de se 
de re 
Semantic 
or 
Pragmatic 
Semantic 
or 
Pragmatic  
 
 
 
In particular, I argue that „imagine‟, and „expect‟, „dream‟, „know‟  are different from 
„remember‟ in terms of the internal dimension.  
 
1. Philosophical perspectives 
Although my treatment is a linguistic one, in that it mainly deals with interpretations 
of utterances and with a systematic exploration of minimal pairs, there is no denying 
that the topic originated in philosophy. I therefore start this chapter with an orderly 
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presentation of theories of „de se‟ beliefs and other (propositional) attitudes. The 
verbs we are going to analyse are verbs such as „believe‟, „remember‟, „image‟, 
„want‟, etc., which are usually referred to as verbs of propositional attitude. Since „de 
se‟ beliefs specifically raise doubts as to whether propositions are involved in the 
analysis of such verbs,  it is best to use the neutral term „attitudes‟. The theory of „de 
se‟ attitudes is clearly a topic within the philosophy of mind; however, here I shall be 
more narrowly concerned with the linguistic implications of the philosophical 
theories. In other words, I shall be mainly preoccupied with matters of inference and, 
specifically, of linguistic entailment. It is not possible, in this section, to review in 
great detail all the articles or books on „de se‟ beliefs – and I am sure there are 
ramifications we have to explore in the future. However, it is possible to follow the 
ideas on „de se‟ interpretations as triggered by Castañeda‟s seminal article which is 
the basis for my pragmatic interpretation of „de se‟ attitudes, through the 
development by Perry who insists on the causal efficacy of having „de se‟ thoughts. 
The discussion of Millikan and Shoemaker is essential to my claim that „de se‟ 
readings involve the use in thought of an indexical like „I‟. Harcourt explores the 
view that „I‟ could be an implicated component of „de se‟ readings. This too connects 
with my idea that „de se‟ readings involve the concept of „I‟.  I also discuss the 
contributions by Boēr  & Lycan (1980), who oppose the essential indexical story by 
Perry, and I defend  the story by Perry. Finally,  I discuss the property-based view of 
belief, as an alternative to propositional theories of the attitudes. 
 
1.1 Castañeda on ‘de se’ beliefs. 
According to Castañeda (1966), there is a difference between (1) and (2) 
 
(1) The editor of Soul believes that the editor of Soul is a millionaire; 
(2) The editor of Soul believes that he* is a millionaire. 
 
Specifically (1) can be true, without its being the case that (2) is true. Suppose that 
John has been informed of the fact that the Editor of Soul has inherited a huge sum of 
money: then he knows that the editor of Soul is a millionaire. However, he has not 
been informed of a sudden change in the board of Soul and, specifically, he does not 
know that he himself has been appointed editor of Soul. Then he does not know that 
he himself is the editor of Soul, albeit he knows that the editor of Soul is a 
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millionaire. Since the pronominal „he‟ is ambiguous between a „de se‟ and a „de re‟ 
interpretation, Castañeda uses the asterisk to disambiguate. The asterisk will turn the 
pronominal into an essential indexical (presumably it is these asterisks which are the 
topic of our pragmatic analysis, a linguistic fact  neglected or not brought into focus 
by the philosopher and his followers). 
 Presumably essential indexicals complicate theories. Consider what happens to 
the following considerations from the theory of knowledge. If I know (3) 
 
(3) John knows that Paris is not in Great Britain, 
 
I can infer: 
 
(4) Paris is not in Great Britain 
 
and I can assert (4) (The proposition expressed by (4) can be detached from (3)). 
However, things become more complicated when we take sentences such as (5) into 
consideration: 
 
(5) John knows that he* is clever. 
 
We simply  cannot infer  
 
(6) He* is clever, 
 
Albeit we can infer (7) 
 
(7) He is clever. 
 
 If I were to infer (6), I would have to think of myself that I am clever. Of course, it 
should be said (and Castañeda does not say this) that the interpretation (6) is obtained 
by recourse to pragmatic principles and that the inferential step from (5) to (6) needs 
to be mediated by pragmatics – thus it is out of the question that (6) is analytic in (5). 
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1.2 John Perry (1979) on ‘de se’ beliefs. 
Perry‟s story develops the considerations by Castañeda, by linking the „de se‟ notion 
to the theory of action, claiming that the „de se‟ concept is causally active. Perry 
(1979) holds a line of thought similar to Castañeda‟s. His story about the 
supermarket is an impressive attempt to connect the issue of belief  (and, in 
particular, de se beliefs) with the theory of action. John Perry is in a supermarket and 
sees a trail of sugar left by what he thinks is a different shopper. He follows the trail 
of sugar because he wants to tell the unaware shopper about it, until it dawns upon 
him that he (himself) is the messy shopper. He stops following the messy shopper 
when he understands that he himself is that person. The belief that the messy shopper 
is leaving a trail of sugar in the supermarket is not causally relevant to taking action, 
instead the belief that he himself is leaving a trail of sugar will prompt him to take 
action. The mode of presentation involved in the belief state is, thus, causally 
involved in determining a certain action and it is important that a first-personal mode 
of presentation causes an action which would not be caused by a non-first-personal 
mode of presentation. The account presented so far is, in principle, compatible with 
Castañeda‟s considerations. 
 Perry (2000) differs significantly from Castañeda‟s ideas, though.  Perry focuses 
on the pragmatic nature of the inference involved in a sentence such as (8) 
 
(8) Privatus believes that he(*) is rich. 
 
According to him, that „he*‟ is an essential indexical is due to a pragmatic process 
(Perry does not bother to explain the details of this process) – in fact, the inference 
can be cancelled. Suppose that Privatus is acting in a play and that a speaker utters 
(8) meaning that Privatus believes that the character he is acting out is rich. It follows 
that Privatus does not believe himself to be rich. Hence the interpretation of „he*‟  as 
an essential indexical is not a semantic one (and it is optional, as indicated by (*). 
Since the interpretation is due to a pragmatic process, it can be cancelled (in this case 
it is cancelled by contextual assumptions). 
 Furthermore, Perry believes that even (9) is only pragmatically „de se‟: 
 
(9) The dean was surprised to find that he believed himself to be overpaid. 
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Such a sentence can be uttered in a context in which the dean has complained that 
professors who publish less than ten articles per year are overpaid. (It just happens 
that the dean has published less than ten papers per year, but does not remember 
that).  It is clear in this context that (9) does not mean that the dean believes himself 
to be overpaid. Perry reflects on some interesting cases of cancellability, thus paving 
the way for a pragmatic theory of belief reports (the question whether he is simply 
making use of parasitic or etiolated cases of language use is not important for the 
time being; I hope to be able to place the pragmatic theory on a more solid footing). 
 
1.3 Millikan 
Unlike Perry and others, Millikan (1990) proposes that essential indexicals are 
different from ordinary deictic expressions. Millikan, unlike Perry, believes that 
deictic expressions have nothing to do with action. In fact, only in the case in which 
the deictic expression identifies the first person perspective in action, is action 
influenced by the deictic expression, but this is the case in which the deictic 
expression is nothing but a mode of presentation of the ego. The author believes that 
there is a noteworthy difference between ordinary deictic expressions and the 
essential indexical. Ordinary deictic expressions have their referents identified 
through the context of utterance. Instead, an essential indexical is necessarily related 
to the first person perspective, as the thinking subject directly  presents himself to 
conscience. For Millikan it is reasonable to use a mode of presentation (e.g. @RM) 
similar to definite descriptions or proper names except for the fact that its use implies 
the identity I = @RM. This mode of presentation is connected with dispositions to 
act and, in this sense, is causally active. 
 
1.4 Shoemaker (1968). 
Shoemaker‟s considerations intersect with Millikan‟s. On the one hand, in fact, 
Shoemaker ponders on the similarity between „de se‟ concepts and indexicals, on the 
other hand he speculates that even indexicals require some identification through 
perception, and perception can go wrong. Thus, we can find a link between 
Shoemaker‟s notion of immunity to error through midindentification and Millikans‟s 
notion of the essential indexical as a special concept, similar to a proper name.  
Shoemaker, unlike Millikan, finds a similarity between the essential indexical and  
the use of deictic expressions. In fact, he claims that in certain cases (albeit not in all 
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cases) the use of a demonstrative serves to identify an object and it is simply 
impossible not to identify the object demonstrated by the speaker in context. If I say 
„Look at this dog‟, there is no chance that the object is not identified or not identified 
correctly. Of course, Shoemaker is aware of cases in which the use of the 
demonstrative gives rises to misidentification, as when I say „This is a red necktie‟ 
and I identify the necktie because I touch it and identify the colour through tactile 
sensations, being aware that all my silk ties are red. Immunity to error through 
misidentification arises with psychological predicates, as when I say „I am in pain‟, 
albeit not with non-psychological predicates that involve reference to parts of the 
body, as these parts could be easily misidentified. Like Millikan, Shoemaker believes 
that the question of identifying the „I‟ does not arise and that the ego is available to 
consciousness directly, through a mode of presentation. (For a deeper treatment of 
the issue of error through misidentification, dealing with the possibility that a 
memory that belongs to another person is implanted into my mind, see Evans (1969), 
Prior (1998) and Coliva (2006)). 
 
1.5 Harcourt (1999). 
Harcourt too believes that essential indexicals have a first-personal interpretation and 
resorts to a conventional implicature analysis. Harcourt makes use of a Davidsonian 
theory of propositional attitudes and believes that it is useful to analyse e.g. Mario 
believes that Joan is in Paris as (10) 
 
(10) Mario believes that: Joan is in Paris. 
 
The crucial problem for Harcourt is to explain how first-personal modes of 
presentation interact with the theory of action, while preserving semantic innocence. 
In fact, changing the example, and using a „de se‟ case, the problem is how to relate 
 
(10) Mario believes that he* is happy 
(11) Mario believes that: he is happy 
 
in such a way  as to preserve semantic innocence. It is interesting that Harcourt 
discards one move that is available to him, that of conversational implicature, If  he 
resorted to this move, he could explain how, despite the fact that (10) can be 
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analysed in terms of purely extensional semantics, a first-personal perspective is 
conversationally implicated through the usage of a logical form such as (11). 
Harcourt gives up the implicature hypothesis, because, in his opinion, it is not 
possible to test the hypothesis due to the ambiguity of the sentence and because 
according to interpretationism (which is the view he accepts), the interpretation of 
the embedded sentence requires that the first-personal interpretation  be a semantic 
component of the content of the embedded sentence.  However, it should be said that 
all interpretationism requires is that the embedded sentence be semantically 
interpreted as in the original utterance, (11), pragmatic increments being on top of 
that. The question of the ambiguity is easily resolved by resorting to Modified 
Occam‟s razor, which enjoins us not to multiple senses if simpler hypotheses can be 
considered (see Grice 1989, Jaszczolt 1999, Ariel 2008). 
 Harcourt believes that the essential indexical implies an original context of use in 
which the thinking subject presented himself as „I‟ (I take he is invoking the notion 
of conventional implicature) – however, it is difficult to see  how this treatment can 
preserve semantic innocence, given that only the character of the expression „he*‟ in 
(10) can guarantee such an implication. Harcourt‟s theory, instead, works much 
better in case he  is willing to defend a conversational implicature analysis. 
 So far we have seen cases where philosophers invoked a special „de se‟ concept, 
which was said to be causally active. However, not all philosophers agree with this, 
and in the next two sections we shall discusss two groups of authors who defend the 
opposite thesis. 
 
1.6 Boēr & Lycan. 
According to Boēr & Lycan (1980), the notion of belief „de se‟ is reducible to the 
notion of „belief de re‟. According to them a sentence such as (12) 
 
(12) John believes that he himself is in danger 
 
has the following  semantic content: 
 
John1 believes that John1 is in danger. 
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 According to the authors, the usage of a proper name can receive two 
interpretations: 1) attributive; 2) referential. If the interpretation is attributive, then 
the use of a proper name within a belief attribution will  render the belief „de dicto‟. 
Consider 
 
(13) John believes that John is in danger. 
 
John can accept „John believes he is in danger‟ without having to accept (13), in that 
John may have forgotten his name. However, the non-equivalence of (13) and „John 
believes that he is in danger‟ is demonstrated only if one confines oneself to the 
attributive interpretation of the proper name. Instead, if we opt for a „de re‟ 
interpretation of the proper name, there is an equivalence between (13) and (12).  
 The article is interesting because it moves towards a pragmatic theory of „de se‟ 
beliefs, albeit one based on conventional implicature and not one based on 
conversational implicature. According to Böer & Lycan, a speaker who utters (14) 
 
(14) John believes that he himself is in danger 
 
conventionally implicates that John must be willing to use the sentence „I am in 
danger‟ in „foro interno‟ (inside his mind). Although we are not exactly facing a case 
of conversational implicature, we must say, nevertheless, that this article is a step in 
the right direction, as we would like to maintain that pragmatics is largely 
responsible for a number of cases of „de se‟ inferences. (See Davidson 1985 for 
further discussion of Böer & Lycan‟s work). 
 
1.7  Davidson (1985). 
Davidson‟s approach, like the one by Boēr & Lycan (1980), also attempts to reduce 
„de se‟ belief to „de re‟ belief. He does that by saying that for a person X, an 
individual a and a property P, „de se‟ beliefs are exactly those beliefs „de re‟ where 
a= X. In other words, a belief „de se‟ is nothing but a belief „de re‟ about oneself. An 
obstacle to this approach is the kind of considerations invoked by Perry to distinguish 
between „de se‟ and „de re‟ beliefs. Perry claims that „de se‟ beliefs cannot be 
reduced to beliefs in which a definite expression appears instead of the essential 
indexical. To avoid this complication, Davidson discusses an example by Boēr & 
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Lycan. Consider the situation in which Van and Wilfrid are different ways of 
referring to the same person. John, however, believes that Van and Wilfrid are 
different persons (due to the presence of a mirror). He sees a wild animal about to 
pounce on Van. Now consider the following sentences: 
 
(15) John believes of Van that he is in danger; 
(16) John believes of Wilfrid that he  is in danger. 
 
The replacement of one name with another will change the dispositions to act on the 
part of John. John is willing to act to protect Van from the danger, but not to protect 
Wilfrid (as John does not believe that Wilfrid is in danger). So Davidson and Böer & 
Lycan are willing to conclude that there is nothing special about special indexicals, 
since analogous considerations are applicable to „de re‟ beliefs. Hence there is no 
objection to reducing „de se‟ beliefs to „de re‟ beliefs. 
 
What should we make of this type of objections raised by Boēr & Lycan (1980) and 
Davidson (1985)? All that the authors  have shown is that modes of presentationof 
NPs can be causally efficacious. This is hardly surprising. If I were to discover that 
my friend Liz is nothing other than Queen Elisabeth I would treat her more kindly 
and formally than I would be inclined to do under my present state of knowledge. If 
modes of presentation can be causally efficacious, then it is arguable à la John Perry 
that „de se‟ modes of presentations are causally efficacious in ways that „de re‟ 
readings are not. For Davidson‟s story to work, he would have to show that „de se‟ 
readings can be reduced to „de re‟ readings. In other words, he would have to show 
that „de se‟ readings come for free through pragmatics once we have „de re‟ 
interpretations. However, I argue in a later section that even pragmatic „de se‟ 
interpretations require first-personal readings as marked through a syntactic 
construction that contains PRO at the level of the  logical form of the merger 
representation. In other words, it is not possible to reduce in all cases „de se‟ readings 
to „de re‟ readings. Of course, a „de se‟ reading may be compatible with a „de re‟ 
reading, this is why Davidson‟s story seems to work. I may look at a mirror and 
while I think that I am clean and tidy, I also think that he (the person in the mirror)  is 
clean and tidy. However, in case I have to shave to become clean and tidy, I will 
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shave myself and not the person in the mirror, because the „de se‟ thought is causally 
efficacious, while the accompanying (compatible) „de re‟ thought is not. 
 
1.8  Property-theoretical views of belief 
So far we have reviewed philosophical theories on „de se‟ attitudes which were 
mainly propositional. However, it should not be taken for granted that all 
philosophers consider attitudes „attitudes to propositions‟. Some eminent 
philosophers saw some merit in expressing beliefs and other attitudes through 
properties. An important, albeit not uncontroversial view about belief is the one that 
considers belief basically a relation of ascription of properties. Thus, if I believe that 
I am happy, this amounts to ascribing myself the property „being happy‟. A belief to 
the effect that John is happy amounts to a scribing to the believer the property: 
 
Being such that John is happy.  
 
This treatment furnishes the basis for a well-known criticism by Stalnaker (1981), 
who considers that the property theory can only account for the transmission of 
beliefs indirectly, through inference. The property theory of belief started with 
Lewis‟s (1979) well-known Two Gods argument is here briefly summarized. We 
have the case of two gods, who inhabit a certain possible world. They know all the 
propositions true at their world. So they are omniscient. Still they suffer from 
ignorance: neither one knows which of the two he is. One lives on the tallest 
mountain; the other on the coldest mountain. Neither one knows where he lives. We 
have got the following inferential steps: 
 
1. Each of the two gods believes every true proposition, but could have a true belief 
that he does not actually have; 
2. If (1), then there can be beliefs the contents of which are not propositions; 
3. If there can be beliefs the contents of which are not propositions, then the property 
theory is true; 
4. The property theory is true (from 1-3). (See Feit 2008, 35) 
 
The most commonly accepted forms of the property theory are based on Chisholm‟s 
idea that to have a belief x must bear a unique  relation R to an object y and x self-
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ascribes the property bearing R uniquely to something that has F. Thus we can 
analyse „John believes that Ann is clever‟ as „John bears R  uniquely to Ann and he 
attributes to himself the property of bearing R uniquely to something that is clever. 
(See Feit (2008) for developments of this idea). 
 The most crucial objections to this property-theoretic treatment are two. The first 
one is that in transmitting a  thought, one must resort to inference. Thus the thought 
„You are clever‟  is transmitted, say, by an inference from „the speaker is addressing 
a person y to whom he bears R uniquely and ascribes himself the property of 
addressing a y that has property F‟ to „I am being addressed by a speaker who bears 
R uniquely to me and ascribes himself the property of addressing a y that has 
property F‟ , therefore I have F. The second objection has to do with verbs such as 
„want‟, which are also considered verbs of propositional attitude. I may, for example, 
want to cease to exist and, nevertheless want all good people to be happy. On the 
property view, my second want has to be expressed as „I want to be such that all 
good people are happy and I want to be such that I do not exist‟ – contradictory 
wants, it appears. (See Feit 2008 for discussion of these problems. For further 
discussion of objections to the property theory see Tomberlin (1991)). 
 
 It is not possible to review in detail all work on „de se‟ attitudes – there is, for 
example the important work by Corazza (2004) on essential indexicals and 
logophoricity, as well Safir‟s further work on logophoricity (Safir 2004) . We cannot 
do justice in a brief chapter  to all the work undertaken on the subject. 
 
1.9 Philosophical ramifications of the  ‘de se’  issue.  
There is a growing literature on „de se‟ attitudes. It is impossible to summarize it all. 
Suffice it to say that Stalnaker has recently used the debate on „de se‟ attitudes to 
resolve Jackson‟s problem based on a woman who has theoretical knowledge of  
certain aspects of the world, but no experience of it. Despite the fact that this is a 
brilliant philosophical book, I cannot review it here, as it has greater connections 
with philosophical, rather than with my linguistic interests (see my review in Capone 
2009b). 
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2.  Linguistic considerations by Higginbotham (2003). 
So far, we have only considered philosophical treatments of „de se‟ attitudes. At this 
stage,  I propose to discuss Higginbotham‟s views, both because they link with Lewis 
and Shoemaker‟s ideas,  and because they provide an analysis which makes it 
particularly clear and vivid that a  „de se‟ attitude entails a „de re‟ attitude, which is 
what we require for our analysis based on informativeness and pragmatic scales or on 
contextual effects and processing efforts. Higginbotham (2003) considers a range of 
data such as the following: 
 
(17) John expects to win 
(18) John expects that he will win; 
(19) John expects that he himself will win. 
 
Higginbotham considers that (18) does not necessarily have a „de se‟ interpretation, 
while (17) and (19) necessarily have a „de se‟ interpretation. He also says that 
syntactic constructions with PRO (where PRO is anaphoric) are even more first-
personal than constructions such as (19). There is an ambiguity about (18) that 
allows the possibility of a „de re‟ interpretation as well (albeit the „de se‟ 
interpretation is preferred, and this fact demands a pragmatic explanation). 
Higginbotham makes use of Peacocke‟s (1981) idea of a „de se‟ mode of 
presentation: 
 
Suppose that  that there is a special mode of presentation „self‟ that a thinking 
subject x can use in thinking of himself, but not in thinking of people other 
than himself, and that others cannot use in thinking of x. A „de se‟ thought will 
use an occurrence of [selfx] indexed to x. 
 
The constructions that host „de se‟ modes of presentation include verbs such as 
„imagine‟, „remember‟, „dream‟, „pretend‟, „know oneself‟, etc. Higginbotham 
compares the following sentence types: 
 
(20) John remembered [his going to the movie]; 
(21) John remembered [him going to the movie]; 
(22) John remembered [himself going to the movie]; 
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(23) John remembered [PRO going to the movie]. 
 
Unlike the other cases, (22) and (23) report „de se‟ thoughts. 
 
Given these facts, Higginbotham shows that the validity of the following deductive 
argument crucially depends on the presence of PRO, if a pronominal were substituted 
for  PRO, it would become invalid: 
 
Only Churchill gave the speech. 
Churchill remembers [PRO giving his speech]; therefore 
… 
Only Churchill remembers [PRO giving his speech]. 
 
If we replace „Only Churchill remembers giving his speech‟ with „Only Churchill 
remembers his giving his speech‟, the argument is not valid. 
 
An important linguistic fact noted by Higginbotham is that gerundive complements 
of „remember‟ are associated with particular interpretations, according to which the 
remembered event is a perceived event. Thus, there is a difference between 
 
(24) I remember giving a lecture at the University of Messina on 3
rd
 November 1988; 
(25) I remember that I gave a lecture at the University of Messina on 3
rd
 November 
1988. 
 
I remember the event of the lecture through my direct experience of the event, given 
the semantics of (24); instead, I may merely remember that the event as described in 
the complement of „remember‟ in (25)  through someone else‟s assertion , given the 
semantic import of (25). 
 To corroborate the considerations above, Higginbotham uses the example below: 
 
(26) My grandfather died before I was born. I remember that he was called „Rufus‟. 
But I do not remember his being called „Rufus‟. 
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If „remember that‟ and „remember + gerund‟ had the same semantic import (if they 
contributed in the same way to truth conditions), then (26) would have to be a logical 
contradiction. But it is not. Hence the two constructions are associated with different 
truth conditional import. Higginbotham draws our attention to the following minimal 
pair: 
 
(27) I used to remember that I walked to school in the fifth grade, but I no longer 
remember it; 
 
(28) I used to remember walking to school in the fifth grade, but I no longer 
remember it . 
 
Unlike (28), (29) is acceptable for Higginbotham. (28) reminds us of Moore‟s 
paradox (Of course, to see why there is a problem in (28) one needs to stress that 
„remember‟ is factive and that the assertion amounts to something like „I walked to 
school in the fifth grade but I no longer remember it‟. (29) is acceptable, provided 
that we enlarge the scenario to include someone who said „You used to remember 
walking to school in the fifth grade‟. The speaker of (29) says that he no longer 
remember the event in question, while he implicitly attributes responsibility for the 
truth of his remembering the event in the past  to someone else who can report such 
an event of remembering. 
 I was told  this example (which, I want to stress,  belongs to Higginbotham, not to 
me)  has problems, since it is not acceptable. S/he says that, if the utterances is 
acceptable, then one tends to read it (in terms of its internal dimension) as a direct 
experience of someone the memory of which can fade away with time or because of 
his partial election. I quite agree that one can have doubts on the grammaticality of 
(28), and thus propose, to remedy the problem, to consider it a loose usage (see 
Burge 2003 on lose uses of „remember‟). In any case, the possibility „I used to 
remember walking to school in the fifth grade but I no longer remember it well‟ is 
perfectly grammatical. This usage points to the fact that the internal dimension of 
PRO can be more or less fine-grained, a point which will be of use when I 
specifically deal with the internal dimension of PRO in terms of pragmatics. 
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 Another point Higginbotham makes is that „de se‟ constructions seem to involve 
immunity to error through misidentification (see work by Shoemaker). In other 
words, a person who says (29) 
 
(29) I remember walking in Oxford 
 
may be wrong on the place of the walking but not on the fact that it is his own 
walking that he remembers (leaving aside quasi-memories, cases in which someone 
else‟s memories are implanted in a person‟s brain). 
 
 Let us now see how Higginbotham characterises „de se‟ attitudes semantically. He 
does that by making use of theta-roles as well as the Davidsonian‟s idea that verbs 
have a hidden argument for events in logical form. (I assume readers are familiar 
with  such semantics). Basically, Higginbotham‟s idea is to identify the external 
argument of the verb of the complement cause with the external argument of the verb 
of propositional attitude. So the idea is that if I remember walking in Oxford, the 
agent of the walking is identical with the agent of the remembering. There is no such 
identification if the construction does not express a „ de se‟ concept as in „John 
remembers that he walked in Oxford‟. 
 Consider the two cases: 
 
(30) John expects to win; 
(31) John expects that he will win. 
 
Since there is no identification between the external argument of „win‟ and the 
external argument of „expect‟ in (31), we will represent (31) as 
 
(32) (For John = x) ( e) expect [x, e, ^ ( e‟) win (x, e‟)]. 
(The approach considers propositions as sets of possible worlds à la Stalnaker; ^ 
signals intensional abstraction over possible worlds). 
 
Instead, (30) will be represented as (33) 
 
(33) (For John = x) ( e) expect [x, e, ^ ( e‟) win (σ (e)) , e‟)]. 
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(32) represents a Russellian proposition as embedded in the matrix verb; (33) 
represents a mode of presentation that is first-personal in the sense of  Peacock  
(1981). Since the identification of thematic roles has implications for reference as 
well, the Russellian proposition of (32) is expressed as a logical implication of (33) 
(in other words we expect (33) to entail (32)). 
 According to Higginbotham PRO in control structures embedded in verbs such as 
„remember‟ also signals an internal dimension. When I say that I remember that I fell 
downstairs, there is no implication that my memory comes from my experience as 
the person who undergoes the falling downstairs. Someone else may have told me 
that I fell downstairs. However, if I say that I remember falling downstairs, I imply 
that I experienced the event and that I was involved in the event say as patient, the 
person who is affected by the event (we skip the issue of quasi-memories). This is 
the internal dimension of the remembering – I remember the event from the inside, as 
the person who was affected by the event. (So if the event caused me some pain, I 
remember the pain. It is not like remembering the event through the external 
perception of the event, say in case it was possible to connect my perceptual system 
to a camera and annul all other perceptions. In case it was possible to annul all my 
perceptions except for the visual images coming from a connected camera, it would 
not be true to say that I remember falling downstairs, but one could report that by 
saying that I remember that I fell downstairs. I take up this point in a critical 
discussion later on). 
 In order to represent the internal dimension of PRO, Higginbotham represents 
(34) as (35). 
 
(34) John remembers falling downstairs; 
(35) For John = x) ( e) remember  [x, e, ^ ( e‟) fall downstairs  (σ (e) & θ (e‟) ) , 
e‟)]. 
 
In other words, the falling downstairs is remembered as en event undergone by the 
person who remembers as a thematic role affected by the event of falling downstairs. 
 Consider now the case of the mad Heimson who believes to be Hume (Lewis 
1979). We wonder if Heimson and Hume numerically have the same beliefs. 
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Consider „Heimson believes that he is Hume‟ and „Hume believes that he is 
Heimson‟ according to Higginbotham. 
 
(36) (For x = Heimson), (( e) believes  [x, e, ^ ( e‟) be identical   (σ (e) = θ (e‟) ) , 
<<Hume,  e‟)] 
(37) (For x = Hume, (( e) believes  [x, e, ^ ( e‟) be identical   (σ (e) )= θ (e‟) , 
Hume, e‟)] 
 
According to such readings, Heimson and Hume do not have numerically the same 
beliefs (given the identification of the believer and the bearer of the internal 
perspective, it has to be excluded that Heimson can  be both the believer and the 
bearer of the internal perspective of  the person identical with Hume). 
 
2.1 Against Higginbotham (2003). 
Safir (2004) argues that PRO is not necessarily associated with „de se‟ interpretations 
in gerundival complements of verbs like „remember‟. The examples used by Safir are 
the following: 
 
(38) Oedipus tried to PRO commit patricide  (and succeeded) 
(39) Oedipus wanted/hoped to commit incest. 
 
Safir considers that from the point of view of the omniscient narrator it is correct to 
say (38), (39) even if they do not reflect the following situations 
 
(40) Oedipus attempted “I will commit patricide‟ 
(41) Oedipus has a desire/hope “I will commit incest”. 
 
According to Safir, the examples (38), (39) invariably show that PRO is not 
necessarily semantically associated with first-personal interpretations. Safir proposes 
that the association between PRO and a „de se‟ interpretation is the consequence of a 
relation of non distinction between the controller and the event described  in the 
sentence embedded in the verb of propositional attitude. 
 I think that if Safir‟s examples were good, we could find evidence in favour of a 
conversational implicature analysis (a standard implicature) given that in standard 
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cases the implicature gets through, but in some cases it is defeated (contextually 
cancelled). I will take up this issue in my section on conversational implicatures and 
„de se‟ readings. For the time being, I should note that Higginbotham will simply 
reply that the uses above (38), (39) prove nothing, since they are etiolated uses, 
things people say, without however wanting to say what is literally said. (In other 
words, such uses must be ungrammatical according to Higginbotham). I do not 
dissent from Higginbotham‟s view, although I should say that there are other 
examples similar to Safir‟s that deserve discussion (the reader has to wait until the 
section on conversational implicatures and „de se‟ readings). 
 
3. Pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional semantics. 
 Although various authors have written  about the role played by pragmatic 
inference in constructing a propositional form (e.g. Bach (1994), Levinson (2000), 
Recanati (2004), Stainton (1994), Bezuidenhout (1997), Powell (2001)), in this 
chapter  I shall concentrate on the position of Relevance Theory on the 
semantics/pragmatics debate (mainly Carston 2002 and Wilson & Sperber 2002). As 
Horn points out (2004, 18) “taking the lead from work by Atlas (1979), relevance 
theorists have argued that the pragmatic reasoning used to compute implicated 
meaning must also be invoked to flesh out underspecified propositions in which the 
semantic meaning  contributed by the linguistic expression itself is insufficient to 
yield a proper accounting of truth-conditional content”. Carston‟s and Wilson & 
Sperber‟s idea of pragmatic contribution to the proposition expressed has something 
distinctive because, unlike Bach, they believe that pragmatics contributes to what is 
said and, unlike Levinson (2000), they believe  that the inferences that develop 
logical forms into  propositional forms are explicatures, not implicatures
1. Carston‟s 
and Wilson & Sperber‟s  ideas are similar to Stainton‟s and Recanati‟s, but they 
differ as to detail. For a review of intrusionistic perspectives, see Capone (2006, 
2009). 
 
3. 1 Pragmatics,  relevance theory and modularity. 
Gricean pragmatics has been based on the so called Grice‟s maxims: Quantity 
(informativeness), Relation (relevance), Quality (truthfulness), and Manner. 
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According to Grice, the speakers have to provide the right amount of information 
(neither too much nor too little) (Quantity), the information should be relevant 
(Relation), and true (Quality), and the conversational contribution should be as brief 
and clear as possible (Manner). 
 The Gricean program has been inherited by two schools of thought: neo-Griceans 
and Relevance theorists. Although I will not say much about the neo-Gricean 
approach, at least the following must be said to pay respect to this important strand 
of research. Neo-Griceans (Horn 1972, 1989, 2006; Levinson 2000) have decided to 
divide up the Quantity maxim into two, one stating that the speaker should say as 
much as she can (the Q-Principle), the other (R for Horn, I for Levinson) stating that 
she should not state the obvious. Levinson adds the M-principle to this picture, 
saying that  if a speaker uses a marked expression, he wants to deviate from the 
implicatures  associated with the use of the unmarked expression that could have 
been used instead  (it generates the complementary implicatures) (see also Huang 
2007). 
 Relevance theory can be seen as an attempt to elaborate on Grice‟s central idea 
that an essential feature of most human communication is the expression and 
recognition of intentions (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995; Wilson & Sperber 2004; 
Blakemore 2000). The goal of inferential pragmatics is to explain how the hearer 
infers the speaker‟s meaning on the basis of the linguistic evidence provided. An 
utterance provides a linguistically encoded piece of evidence and verbal 
comprehension, thus, involving an element of decoding. However, the decoded 
linguistic meaning is just one of the inputs to a inferential process that yields an 
interpretation of the speaker‟s meaning. Given that the elements of meaning encoded 
linguistically in the sentences used do not exhaust the meanings inferred, and given 
that communication does not proceed by telepathy, the task of pragmatics is to 
explain in detail how comprehension takes place despite the relatively thinness (or 
poverty) of the linguistic input. 
 Relevance theory is not just a linguistic theory, but it is a more general theory of 
cognition. As Wilson & Sperber (2004) say, “relevance is a potential property not 
only of utterance and other observable phenomena, but of thoughts, memories, and 
conclusions of inferences. According to relevance theory, any external stimulus or 
internal representation which provides an input to cognitive processes may be 
relevant to an individual at some time” (p. 608). 
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The basic following  principles are central for Relevance Theory: 
 
Cognitive principle of Relevance 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance. 
 
Relevance of an input to an individual 
a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by 
processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that 
time. 
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the 
relevance of the input to the individual at that time. 
 
Presumption of optimal relevance 
a. The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the auditor‟s processing 
effort. 
b. It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator‟s abilities and 
preferences. 
 
Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure 
a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretative 
hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of 
accessibility. 
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned). 
 
(From Wilson & Sperber 2004). 
 
3.2 Relevance theory and the modularity of the mind. 
Relevance theory  adopts a theory of the mind based on massive modularity. The 
modules that are involved in pragmatics are of course: 
 
The language module, presumably innate; 
The lexicon, a module that is structured and saturated through learning (Carruthers 
2006); 
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The mind-reading module and its sub-module consisting of fast-and-frugal heuristics 
such as the principle of relevance. 
In a series of articles Sperber and Wilson have tied their theory to massive 
modularity (but see also Carston 2002, in her lengthy introduction) (Sperber 1995;  
Sperber & Wilson 2002; Wilson 2005) and have connected their principle of 
Relevance to fast-and-frugal heuristics (see Gigerenzer et al. 1999).  
 The most exhaustive exposition of massive modularity is the one by Carruthers 
(2006).
2
 According to Carruthers, the mind consists of a number of modules, 
functional components which are autonomous as far as their processing mechanisms 
are concerned, and sufficiently isolable and separate to allow the whole mind to 
execute  its work, even if  one of  its components (or modules) has been  damaged 
(say, the case of a person affected by a stroke, who  will lose  some of  the functions 
of her mind (e.g. writing abilities), but not all of them). Modularity is also considered 
in relation to evolution, and the modular mind is considered capable of allowing 
modifications of one of its modules, or of adding  a module as a consequence of 
adaptive changes in response to environmental challenges. 
 In the picture of massive modularity presented by Carruthers, each module is in 
constant dialogue with the other modules, in the sense that it can query a number of 
modules for information. Each module is switched on by a limited type of input (so 
there are heavy restrictions to the type of  input a module can process, but surely a 
module can receive its input from different modules, as in the case of the practical 
reasoning module, which takes as input both desires and beliefs).  Carruthers rules 
out categorically that each module has access to the internal operations of the other 
modules, as this would involve a simulation process  imposing  an excessive burden 
on processing. However, he admits the possibility that each module can search  the 
archives of other modules. 
                                                 
2
 This departs somewhat from Fodor (1983), according to whom  modular processes 
are supposed to be domain-specific, encapsulated, fast, mandatory, inaccessible to 
consciousness, neutrally localizable, and functionally dissociable. The main 
difference lies in the less stringent application of the notion of encapsulation and 
domain-specificity by Carruthers, as well as in the proliferation of modules, and in 
the insistence that central intelligence is nothing but the integration of all the various 
modules, plus some specific predispositions. 
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The same module can be located in more than one area of the brain, but is strictly 
correlated with a certain function. If two functions are structurally different, in that 
they involve different types of operations, then they will correlate with distinct 
modules. A module may consist of a number of sub-modules. For example, the 
mind-reading module consists of a module that deals with automatic inferences, as 
the ones studied by relevance theorists, and a reasoning module that deals with non-
automatic, conscious and relatively slow inferences. 
  Modules may share a number of parts, and it is predicted that modules situated in 
areas of the brain that are sufficiently close will share a greater number of parts  than 
modules  situated at a distance, since the relatively slow propagation of the 
information between modules may offset the advantage of having parts that are 
shared. Carruthers believes that the same packages may underpin distinct  modules. 
(This may be a drawback. After all, the modular architecture  has the advantage of 
insulating one region of the brain from another and of preventing  damage in one 
area from affecting the normal functioning of the remaining modules. If modules 
share parts, then how should we explain the fact that  damage in one module will  not 
affect the functioning of another? By saying that only modules situated in  areas of 
the brain that are in close contact  share parts, Carruthers limits the problem, as 
damage in one area will have consequences ONLY on neighboring areas).  
Carruthers claims that central intelligence is the result of the interaction among 
modules, as integrated by further predispositions. Carruthers believes that central 
intelligence consists of two systems.  In system 1, operations  are highly specialized, 
and this is the reason why its  output is fast. System 2 is responsible for steps in 
reasoning that are conscious. And that is what the global architecture does for us 
when supplemented with mental rehearsal and language.  
 Carruthers believes that there is a module that integrates information coming from 
distinct  modules. He does not believe that this is the mind-reading module, but 
thinks that this is the language module. In fact, the language module is already 
capable of  interfacing with modules using distinct algorithms. This is a reasonable 
hypothesis. Notice what happens in an utterance of „Mary is drawing a triangle‟. 
Here the speaker and the hearer are integrating information from the perceptual 
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module (the reference of „Mary‟) and of the geometry module (a triangle activates 
geometrical information)
3
. 
According to Carruthers, it is the syntax of language, as well as its recursive and 
hierarchical organization, that allows the integration of different types of information 
coming from distinct modules. For example, the fact that we can insert multiple 
modifiers under an NP  node allows us to integrate information  from different 
modules. NPs typically allow us to integrate information coming from perception 
(see also Jaszczolt 1999 on default semantics) with other type of information. 
Another very important part of Carruthers‟ research is constituted by his ideas on 
practical reasoning and mind-reading, namely that human beings, but also certain 
apes, are able to rehearse an action in their minds, broadcasting the result to 
central/conceptual modules, which give further beliefs and motivational states as 
output.  A child who holds a banana in his hand may associate the banana with the 
concept of a telephone and then rehearse in imagination the action of phoning his 
grandmother, which provokes pleasure and thus determines the continuation of the 
action of rehearsing. 
 This book will have fruitful ramifications in due time and it will serve to throw 
further light on pragmatic theories of communication. Especially promising is the 
idea that a module – presumably the language module – is dedicated to integrating 
information coming from distinct modules. Seen in this light, an utterance can be 
seen as a merger representation à la Jaszczolt (2005), in which semantic, pragmatic 
and encyclopedic information merge through slots provided by the syntax present in 
the sentence  or by syntactic constituents that are added at the level of the merger 
representation in order to make a thought plausible and maximally rational. Since 
perceptual, mind-reading, geometrical, etc. modules may be involved in 
communication of information, syntax is what allows the integration of the various 
types of information, and it is possible that syntactic constituents are added in the 
merger representation through the pragmatics of language in order to give room to 
constituents of thought such as modes of presentation  of referents (see Jaszczolt 
1999), thus integrating the theory of mind module with the perceptual module.        
                            
                                                 
3
 This example is my own, not Carruthers‟s. 
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3.3 Relevance theory and the speaker’s meaning 
A number of authors, including Saul (2004) think that the exaggerated emphasis by 
relevance theorists on the hearer‟s interpretation process is a serious limit, as, after 
all, a pragmatic theory ought to be interested primarily in a theory of interpretation of 
the speaker‟s meaning. Now surely there is some truth in this criticism, and I must 
say that some relevance theorists such as Wedgwood (2007) insist that relevance 
theory is a theory about the hearer‟s interpretation of utterances. The question that is 
of real interest, in my view, is not whether RT is a theory of the hearer‟s 
interpretation, but whether it should be. My personal view is that relevance theory 
should be amended to be in line with more typically Gricean theories of the  
speaker‟s meaning. To neutralize possible distortions created by the emphasis on the 
hearer‟s processing of an utterance, I propose to follow Jaszczolt (1999) in requiring  
that interpretation follow the social, and not the individual, path of interpretation. To 
ensure that this obtains, we need some amendment of the principle of Relevance: 
 
Presumption of optimal relevance 
a. The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the auditor‟s processing 
effort. 
b. It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator‟s abilities and 
preferences. 
c. It is the most relevant one compatible with the various clues and cues conducive to 
the speaker‟s intended meaning; 
d. It is the most relevant one compatible with the social path of intentionality. 
 
I think Wedgwood‟s insistence on the hearer‟s perspective does more harm than 
good to RT. If I were challenged to provide arguments for this persuasion, I should 
quote from Capone (2009 forthcoming) on indirect reports. In this chapter I argue 
that the process of interpreting indirect reports usually (albeit not always, as 
interpretation process must adapt to special contexts) prevents the speaker (the 
reporter)  from using an NP (coextensive with the NP actually used in the original 
utterance) that would transform (and distort) the original speech act, as such a move 
would place excessive processing efforts on the hearer. Now, my understanding of 
indirect reports is that pragmatic principles constrain both the speaker‟s behaviour 
and the hearer‟s behaviour. Emphasis on the hearer would surely provide only half of 
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the explanation required, perhaps the half which we need least, as after all it is 
legitimate to try and explain the speaker‟s behaviour as well, and such a behaviour 
clearly incorporates expectations about the hearer‟s behaviour. 
 
Wilson & Sperber write: 
 
The central claim of relevance theory is that the expectations of relevance 
raised by an utterance are precise and predictable enough to guide the hearer 
toward the speaker‟s meaning (p. 607). 
 
Since an utterance creates expectations of relevance, it is licit to deduce that the 
speaker‟s linguistic behaviour is what creates such expectations. Thus, both he 
speaker and the hearer must be taken into account in an explanation of how relevance 
works. After all, when the authors say that human cognition tends to be geared to the 
maximization of relevance, „maximization‟ is best understood as maximization by 
both the speaker and the hearer. 
 
4.  Beliefs ‘de se’ and pragmatic intrusion 
In this section I consider „de se‟ readings of attitude constructions and, in particular, 
constructions like „John remembers walking in Oxford‟, „John remembers he walked 
in Oxford‟, „John remembers his walking in Oxford‟, „John remembers he himself 
walking in Oxford. My analysis starts with control structures like „John remembers 
walking in Oxford‟ and then proceeds with the remaining constructions. Control 
structures in their „de se‟ construals are determined through the semantics (I assume 
the truth of a story like Higginbotham‟s but I then slightly modify it). The remaining 
constructions are discussed in terms of pragmatics. 
 Since this is a rather complex and intricate section, we need sign-posts for readers 
here, to make sure that the analysis is taken for what it is, and not for what it is not. 
What I want to show in this section is that in some cases, but not in all cases, it is 
possible to derive the „de se‟ interpretation though pragmatics 
 As far as constructions with PRO (such as „John remembered going to the cinema) 
are concerned, I accept Higginbotham‟s story and claim that the external 
interpretation of PRO is semantic and first-personal. I want to distinguish however 
the concept of first-personal from the concept of using modes of presentation like „I‟. 
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A thought can be first-personal even if the speaker in talk with himself uses a mode 
of presentation like „You‟, where by „You‟ he, of course, means „I‟.  I present some 
arguments against the semantic analysis of the external interpretation of PRO, but 
conclude that these do not stand. PRO is first-personal. In particular, I use an 
argument by Feit (personal communication)  to show that PRO must be first-personal 
and that Higginbotham‟s semantic analysis probably needs further tightening up. I 
also use a circularity problem, to show that Higginbtoham‟s syntactic analysis is, 
after all, presupposed in my pragmatic analysis. 
 
I argue that  the cases where Castañeda used the asterisk are cases in which a 
pronominal, which is not PRO, are assigned a „de se‟ interpretation (in due time I 
will also claim that this pragmatic process involves using (at the level of a merger 
representation a la Jaszczolt 2005)  a PRO construction like the ones studied by 
Higginbotham in combination with verbs of imagination, remembering, expecting, 
etc.). A pragmatic  story is used for sentences like „John remembered his going to the 
movie‟ – with the difference that here I argue that „his‟ is not assigned an asterisk à 
la Castañeda.  
 
 The internal dimension of PRO is a separate question form the external first-
personal interpretation of PRO. While the implicature analysis has very limited 
effects on the external dimension of PRO, since I have accepted that PRO is first-
personal through semantics, I argue that the internal dimension of PRO is conveyed 
not though semantics, but through implicature (or explicature). 
The pragmatic analysis has the following structure: 
 
a. Analysis of inferential enrichments amounting to „de se‟ interpretations; 
b. Analysis of  pronominals used istead of PRO in control structures; 
c. Analysis of reflexives used in control structures; 
d. Apparently „de se‟ uses of pronominals with attributive construals. 
 
In each of this section I will substantiate the claim that „de se‟ constructions are 
intrusive ones and that pragmatics serves to resolve interpretative ambiguity and to 
determine a full proposition. 
 
355 
 
4. 1 Mode of presentations of first-personal readings: semantics or pragmatics? 
Before we proceed with our pragmatic story, it will be important to characterise „de 
se‟ pragmatic interpretations more fully. What kind of representation must be part of 
the explicature when a „de se‟ thought is involved? Presumably, when the speaker 
says: 
 
(42) Giovanni crede di essere felice  (John believes he is clever)  
 
there is an inference that the speaker has the following mental representation: 
 
“I am clever”. 
 
This is on top of the semantics provided by Higginbotham for controlled clauses of 
attitude verbs
4
. In fact, it would be possible, strictly speaking, for the semantic 
interpretations by Higginbotham to be accessible to the believer without his using a 
mental occurrence of „I‟. Higginbotham‟s story could be true even if the believer 
thought of himself as the believer of his thought, without ever pronouncing (or using 
a mental occurrence) of the word „I‟. However, it is reasonable to suppose, accepting 
the considerations by Millikan, that „de se‟ readings involve a mode of presentation 
that somehow incorporates „I‟. Sentences such as (43) 
 
(43) John thought he was clever 
 
are „de se‟ in the sense of incorporating mental linguistic materials such as „I‟ when 
it is clear in context that the evidence for the thought comes from the believer having 
uttered a statement about his/her belief. 
 But is there a sharp difference between this additional pragmatic component and 
Higginbotham‟s semantics? It is true that Higginbotham does not explicitly consider 
utterances of „believe‟ in connection with PRO, but since in Italian belief-
constructions obligatorily involve PRO (in the „de se‟ interpretation) we must assume 
an extension of Higginbotham‟s story. Higginbotham‟s extended treatment would 
have to amount to including a use of the „believer of  his/her  thought‟ in a belief 
                                                 
4
 One should note that Higginbotham does not extend his analysis of „X remembers 
walking in Oxford‟ to beliefs, but the extension is required for languages like Italian, 
which, unlike English, has control structures embedded by „believe‟.  
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attribution (e.g. John believed that the believer of his thought  was happy) – strictly 
speaking it involves usage of temporal variables as in (44) 
 
(44)  Giovanni credeva  di essere felice (John believed he was happy) 
John believed at t that the believer of this thought at t was happy,
5
 
 
which presupposes that if John believes at t thought x, he cannot believe at t a 
thought y, y distinct from x. (Can one have two distinct thoughts at the same time? 
Presumably not). 
 My own addition to his treatment says that on top of Higginbotham‟s semantics, 
there is an  inference to the effect that the believer makes use of a mental occurrence 
of the word „I‟ – he says „I‟ in his mental sentences (provided that the context is the 
right one). Now, if the mental occurrence of „I‟ were identical with Higginbotham‟s 
contrived solution „The believer of his/her thought at t‟, obviously there would be no 
reason for having this additional pragmatic component.  
 
 A cogent  reason for opting for my own treatment is given by Feit (2009, personal 
communication): 
 
Another reason that I do not think Higginbotham‟s account can handle „de se‟ 
cases adequately is this. It seems possible that somebody could believe 
(correctly or mistakenly, it does not matter) that he is not the only thinker of a 
certain thought, for example he might believe that God is thinking it too. More 
generally, he might think that he is not the only thinker of any of his thoughts. 
But, even with this, it seems he could have a „de se‟ belief. But on 
Higginbotham‟s view – and other similar views – such a belief amounts to “the 
believer of this thought is F.” This cannot be what the belief amounts to 
however, since he does not think there is a unique believer, the believer, of his 
thought. Moreover, if someone else (God perhaps) really is having the same 
thoughts, then all Higginbotham-style beliefs are false, but he could surely 
have some true de se beliefs nonetheless.  
 
                                                 
5
 It might be said that Higginbotham does not particularly discuss this example. Yet, 
it is natural to think that he must accept this semantic analysis of the Italian example 
because of his commitments concerning „John remembers going to the cinema‟. 
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Thus a minimal requirement for making sense of  „de se‟ attitudes is to say that 
the mental occurrence of „I‟ (say in mentalese, see Feit 2008 on this) must be a 
demonstrative along the lines of Gareth Evans (1982) and Perconti (2008). As Evans 
says, the demonstrative identification does not go through the recognition of any 
property
6. But is there something that the word „I‟ can refer to? Evans argues that 
there is substantive content to our „I‟-ideas. While for philosophers such as Strawson 
to the judgement that I am in pain there does not appear to be anything corresponding 
to the identification of something that is in pain (the judgement might as well be 
expressed by „There is pain‟) , for Evans by using „I‟ we must identify with an 
element of the objective order. (See also Grush 2002, for the exegesis of Gareth 
Evans). 
 
Now suppose Higginbotham replies: 
 
All you have shown is that the first-personal interpretation of PRO needs to be 
grafted to the semantics I proposed, and one obvious way to do this is by placing in 
the semantics the further constraint that the mode of presentation of the agent of the 
believing or remembering a certain thought is in the first person. (This move is 
reminiscent of Harcourt and Millikan) 
 
Presumably, we have to modify Higginbotham‟s elucidations for an utterance of, say, 
„John believes he fell downstairs‟ in the following way: 
 
(45) For John = x) ( e) believes  [x, e, ^ ( e‟) fall downstairs  (σ (e) & θ (e‟) & the 
mode of presentation of  σ (e) = „I‟) , e‟)]. 
 
 
After all, this is still a completely semantic meaning elucidation. 
I suspect that such a reply would lead us further in the pragmatic direction. After all, 
suppose that John thinks the following thought: „Why don‟t you go to the cinema?‟7 
                                                 
6
 See p. 170-1,  Evans (1982) on demonstrative identification based on an 
information-link between the subject and object as well as on the ability to locate the 
object relative to egocentric space and to objective space. 
7
 Well, of course we do not ordinarily think this way. But it is not impossibile to 
think this way.  I have before my mind the situation of a person who slaps his face 
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while speaking to himself. Surely, it would not be misleading to report such a 
thought saying: „John considers going to the cinema‟. 
 
This is a first-personal thought, but no first-personal mode of presentation was used 
in thought. 
 Or suppose the thinker says to himself „Oh gosh, you are really smart!‟. It would 
not be misleading, in this case, to report the thought: „John believes that he is really 
smart‟, even if he did not use in his thought the mode of presentation „I‟ (instead he 
used „You‟).  
 Or suppose  John says to himself „Smart, this criminal‟, this being a reflection on 
himself, the rapist whom everybody in his town fears. Surely, it would not be false to 
say that John believes that he is really smart. 
 So, it is not necessary to use „I‟ in thought to express a „de se‟ thought (these are 
all cases in which in Italian one would use PRO instead of the bare pronominal in 
English). Since the inference that the mode of presentation of the believer in a „de se‟ 
thought is „I‟  is quite standard, but it can be cancelled in some cases, it is not 
unreasonable to say that the inference is pragmatic. 
 But this is not like saying that the interpretation of PRO in „de se‟ constructions 
like those utilized by Higginbotham is not first-personal. We have to dissociate the 
concept first-personal from the actual usage of a certain first-person pronominal like 
„I‟. An interpretation can be first-personal even if the speaker thinks of himself as 
„You‟ (say when talking with oneself) or through an epithet („Bastard‟). It is first-
personal if the pronominal used is a devise used by grammar for integrating 
information from the module Theory of Mind, and where the mind in question is the 
thinker‟s. A compromise between my view and that of Higginbotham can be made 
by using the  modularity of mind story I presented before. PRO works as a syntactic 
constituent that allows the integration of information coming from the theory of mind 
module. 
 Summing up, the sentence „John believes he fell down‟ needs to be represented as 
the following: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
saying „Sei proprio stupido‟ (You are really an idiot). This is probably akin to the  
the situations Goffman descrive in „Forms of Talk‟, in which one dissociates from 
his previous conduct (and from his previous self). These uses, anyway, are also 
attested in the literature on the modularity of the mind, albeit circumscribed to 
pathological situations (see Robbins 2007, 310). 
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For John = x) ( e) believes  [x, e, ^ ( e‟) fall downstairs  (σ (e) & θ (e‟) & the mode 
of presentation of  σ (e) =  any pronominal or mode of presentation that is a suitable 
transformation of „I‟ and ultimately reducible to „I‟) , e‟)]. 
 
One further reason for adhering to a semantic story of PRO and for not wanting to 
say that PRO conversationally implicates or is associated via an explicature to its 
first-personal reading is that the explicature triggered by example (50), as I will 
claim later, uses syntactic information, and, in particular, the possibility of 
expressing the „de se‟ reading through PRO. If we say that the „de se‟ reading of 
PRO is conversationally implicated (or alternatively explicated), then we are at a loss 
when we want to explain the „de se‟ reading of (50) through the syntax of e.g. 
„Giovanni crede di essere Italiano‟. We would have to say that „de se‟ concepts are 
completely pragmatic, but such a story would have no points of contact with the 
views on the modularity of mind. It is, on the contrary, plausible that a theory of 
mind module is at work in „de se‟ readings and that this is the reason why „de se‟ 
interpretations should correlated with a special syntactic construction. 
 
 
4.2 Towards pragmatics: Castañeda’s example. 
Let us now consider Castañeda‟s influential example: 
 
(46) The editor of Soul believes that he* is a millionaire 
 
Unlike the philosopher‟s language, ordinary language has no asterisks. I agree that 
the preferred interpretation is one according to which the editor of Soul believes that 
he himself is a millionaire, but this is not a matter of semantics, as there is an 
alternative reading according to which the interpretation is not „de se‟ Suppose, for 
example, that the editor of Soul believes of the person (himself) he sees in the mirror 
that he is a millionaire (while, for some reason he does not recognize his familiar 
face). A sentence such as (47) 
 
(47) The editor of Soul believes that he is a millionaire 
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is suited to expressing the speaker‟s meaning – however, no „de se‟ reading is 
intended in this case (We agree, the example is contrived, and is based on 
philosophical sophistication, however it is not an impossibility). The interpretation in 
(47) where an asterisk is used to signal pragmatic disambiguation must not be taken 
for granted, but is the result of cognitive processes at work. 
 We may also want to explain Perry‟s example: 
 
(48) The dean was surprised to find that he believed himself to be overpaid. 
 
In a situation in which the dean believes that all professors who publish less than ten 
papers per year are overpaid (but forgets that he himself has published less than ten 
papers), a speaker may utter (48).  Linguists may have reservations about such an 
example. They may feel it is contrived or that this is a loose or etiolated language 
use
8
. Whether the use is correct or illegitimate (strictly speaking), we have to explain 
such a use as well by resorting to a pragmatic theory. While in the case of (47) we 
must explain why a „de se‟ reading accrues to the utterance, in the case of (48) we 
have to explain why a sentence/utterance which is typically associated with a „de se‟ 
reading is divested from its ordinary interpretation.  Obviously, while the pragmatic 
process at play in (47) is a case of  a standard conversational implicature, the process 
involved in (48) is a case of a particularized implicature. The implicature overrides 
the usual semantic  interpretation associated with the sentence („de se‟ reading) (see 
Dascal 2003 on the divergence between sentence and  speaker‟s meaning). I assume 
that the world knowledge against which the utterance of (51) is processed promotes 
the non-first personal reading. Given that we assume that the Dean thinks highly of 
himself and would never say of himself that he thinks he is overpaid, we assume that 
the interpretation of (48) is not a „de se‟ one. The utterance comes to be interpreted 
as ironic, because, on the one hand, the speaker says that the dean believes that he 
himself is overpaid, on the other hand we know that the Dean would never think that 
of himself. The utterance is „echoic‟ in that pragmatic interpretation construes it as 
what the Dean would have to say of himself if he were to accept what the other 
people believe of him. The „de se‟ reading is a reading which expresses what the 
                                                 
8
 Recanati (2007, 173) also believes that „himself‟ is less first-personal than PRO. 
His example is: “John imagines himself being elected”. Presumably (I infer this from 
the passage in Recanati‟s text), someone could say this without attributing a „de se‟ 
attitude to John. There is no explanation about why this should be the case, though. 
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Dean would think of himself in a possible world in which he conforms to what other 
people think of him. 
 Anyway, I should say I am puzzled a bit by Perry‟s example. I think that what he 
wants to say requires a different example, such as „The dean would have been 
surprised to find out that he believed himself to be overpaid‟. 
 I guess that what Perry wanted to prove with this example is that „de se‟ readings 
are in all cases pragmatic and not semantic. Could there be a pragmatic interpretation 
that is not founded on a semantic concept? In theory it is possible – as Recanati 
(2004),  Carston (2002) and  Wilson & Sperber say in their articles and books - that 
pragmatics  furnishes new concepts on the basis of existing ones (a phenomenon 
called „modulation‟). So we should not discard a priori the possibility that „de se‟ 
readings are only pragmatic interpretations, which make their way into language 
through grammaticalization (see Ariel 2008). However, it cannot be excluded that 
what started as pragmatics ended up as semantics or grammar (Levinson 2000). We 
shall explore possibilities open-minded. 
 How should a relevance-theoretic treatment of  (47) proceed?  I assume that the 
interpretation according to which the speaker attributes a belief „de se‟ to the subject 
(of belief) is more informative than the „de re‟ interpretation. We can reasonably 
assume that an interpretation that excludes a greater number of states of the world 
(see also Levinson 2000; see also Huang 2007) is more informative. It is reasonable 
to think that on a relevance-theoretic treatment this is true as well. What is to provide 
information, in fact? To provide information is to provide input to inferential 
processes, among which there is the strengthening of existing assumptions or the 
elimination of current assumptions or the creation of cognitive effects that would not 
derive from existing assumptions alone. A proposition that eliminates a greater 
number of states of the world is, ipso facto, more informative than a proposition that 
eliminates a fewer number of states of the world, because it either  eliminates 
existing assumptions or interacts with existing assumptions in such a way as to 
provide a greater number of cognitive effects than the ones that would derive from 
existing assumptions alone. Suppose one knows that all students have arrived, rather 
than that some students have arrived. Suppose one furthermore knows that all 
students who have arrived will receive a present. Then one knows more than if one 
knows that some students have arrived. If all students consist of A, B, C, D, E, one 
derives greater cognitive effects from knowledge that all students arrived, since one 
362 
 
will be able to say that all of A, B, C, D, E will receive a present. Instead, having 
only knowledge that some students have arrived, it will not be possible to say which 
of A, B, C, D, E will receive a present. 
 Now let  us go back to our „de se‟ interpretation in (50). We have to ask ourselves 
which is more informative: the „de se‟ or the „de re‟ interpretation? Matters of 
entailment may decide the issue. Consider again Higginbotham‟s analysis of  the „de 
se‟ reading and of the non-de se reading: 
 
(49) (For John = x) ( e) expect [x, e, ^ ( e‟) win (σ (e)) , e‟)]. 
 
(49) represents the „de se‟ reading of „John expects to win‟. 
 
(50) (For John = x) ( e) expect [x, e, ^ ( e‟) win (x, e‟)]. 
 
(50) represents the non „de se‟ reading (that is, the „de re‟ reading) of „John expects 
that he will win‟. The person who is committed to the logical form (50) is committed 
to logical form (49), but it is not true the other way round. This means that the „de se‟ 
reading entails the „de re‟ reading. Since „de se‟ readings entail „de re‟ readings they 
are more informative. 
 We do not need to go through the entailment (or deduction)  step to argue that the 
„de se‟ reading is promoted by pragmatics to default interpretation, though. All we 
need to show is that the „de se‟ reading has greater cognitive effects than the „de re‟ 
reading, processing efforts being the same. I think we can concoct a philosophical 
story. Suppose that Mary believes she has to take a tablet at 9 in the morning (the 
usual tablet she takes daily). Suppose that such a tablet has an undesired effect m, 
which can be eliminated by taking tablet b (the same person who takes tablet a must 
take tablet b to avoid an unwanted effect m): Then the „de se‟ reading of the sentence 
„Maria believes she must take the tablet b‟ has greater cognitive effects, since only in 
case Maria thinks of herself as herself she is interested in preventing the 
consequences  of taking tablet a. Since the „de se‟ reading has greater cognitive 
effects than the „de re‟ one, which offset the processing costs incurred, it will be 
promoted by the Principle of Relevance. 
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4.3 The pragmatic process in belief sentences involves use of a PRO structure in 
the language of thought. 
 
At this point I would like to make a bolder and more controversial claim. This claim 
comes from studying the Italian translations of the sentence (51): 
 
(51 a) Il direttore di Soul crede che (egli) è un milionario (The editor of soul believes 
he is a millionaire); 
 
(51 b) Il direttore di Soul crede di essere un milionario (literal: The editor of Soul 
believes PRO he be a millionaire). 
 
It is interesting that in Italian the „de se‟ reading cannot be expressed by (51 a), 
which is definitely suitable for the „de re‟ reading. (Thanks to Daniele Gambarara for 
being adamant about this). Italian uses obligatorily (51 b) for the „de se‟ reading. 
Why is it so? Why is it that Italian is so different from English in this respect. But is 
it so different? Suppose we accept Higginbotham‟s story that PRO in „de se‟ 
constructions is more first-personal than both „he‟ and „he himself‟. An immediate 
question arises. Why is this the case? A natural explanation comes from accepting 
Carruthers‟s story that language serves as an integrator of modular information 
(Carruthers 2006). The recursiveness of syntax is taken by Carruthers as  allowing 
the integration between inputs from distinct modules. A devise for integration is 
taken by Carruthers to be the possibility of adding multiple modifiers within an NP 
mode. That some inter-modular connection, or interfacing is required, is also 
independently supported by Robbins (2007) in his important reply to Emma Borg. 
What matters for the purpose of this chapter is that Robbins claims that “there is 
nothing in the modularity story that rules out process-constitutive (or process-
dependent) information flow between modules. The idea of intermodular connection 
is also supported by de Villiers (2007), who, citing St. Augustine,  argues that 
information from the domain of Theory of Mind seeps into the process of simple 
word learning, given that  “the human context  of shared eye gaze and pointing helps 
delimit the possible meanings of a new word” (de Villiers 2007, 1864). 
 Suppose we take Carruthers‟ story one step further and consider PRO (in subject 
control) as a null empty category that allows the integration of information coming 
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from the theory of mind module and from the perception module (we must not forget 
that even PRO must be coindexed with a subject).  Then it follows that PRO is 
different from full pronominals, or from full NPs. Full NPs are referential, by default, 
as Jaszczolt (1999, 2005) says (see also Delfitto 2004). The reason why they are 
referential by default is not a story about informativity, but a story about modularity, 
as full  NPs and pronominals allow the integration of information coming from the 
perception module, and it follows that information coming from the perception 
module must be referential by default. Now a little modular story is in place, which 
explains why English is not so different from Italian, after all. In fact, the 
interpretation of (50) intended as „de se‟ (as in (50 b)),  contains  PRO at logical form 
in the merger representation (Jaszczolt 2005). Following Davidson and 
Higginbotham, we are prepared to accept that at logical form there may be implicit 
elements, such as, for example hidden quantifiers and positions for events as in  
 
(52) John fell 
There is an event e, such that John fell in e. 
 
However, I depart from Higginbotham and Davidson by saying that in the cases I am 
discussing, the logical form that departs from the sentential structure „John believes 
he is clever‟  is a constituent of what Jaszczolt calls the „merger representation‟. By 
analogy, I propose that the „de se‟ interpretation of (50) has a PRO at LF, and, thus, 
is not much different from Italian (50b) (Il direttore di Soul crede di essere un 
miliardario). I propose that the de se reading of (50) should always be represented as 
(53) in the logical form of the merger representation. 
 
(53) The editor of Soul believes  PRO be a millionaire. 
 
I furthermore propose that the syntactic representation involved in this interpretative 
reading is articulated at the level of the merger representation, following K. 
Jaszczolt‟s (2005) idea that compositionality is a characteristic of the merger 
representation. The merger representation of (53) contains the syntactic structure  
[PRO be a millionaire] and thus it is not necessary to strain our intuitions about the 
semantics of (53), as what is needed to obtain the right interpretation takes place at 
the level of the merger representation, including articulating  the syntactic 
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representation containing PRO. Of course, we can retain the intuition that, after all, 
(53) must be considered as expressing two completely different sentences;  however 
shifting the burden of explanation to the level of the merger representation allows us 
to preserve our intuitions about the surface syntax of English which contains no 
representations such as „John believes PRO be a millionaire‟. (Instead notice that the 
sentence „There is an event e such that John fell in e‟ is fine in English and can be 
said to be part of the sentential logical form). What is not licit in the surface syntax is 
licit at the level of the merger representation, as we can assume that the merger 
representation can use a language of thought, which is universal, and which allows 
the translation of Italian sentences into English and vice versa. Suppose that this 
language of thought requires us to use PRO whenever a first-personal „de se‟ reading 
occurs. Such a language of thought coincides with the surface structure of Italian, but 
is also what allows the translatability of an English „de se‟ sentence into  the Italian 
„de se‟ sentence despite the difference in surface structure. This language of thought  
ensures that a language like English which has PRO in „de se‟ constructions in the 
case of „remember‟, „expect‟, „imagine‟ can utilize this construction in the language 
of thought in order to express the „de se‟ interpretation of a sentence which does not 
utilize PRO at surface structure. 
 
The story above encounters a severe objection. Consider Stanley‟s (2007) First 
assumption: 
 
First assumption: 
In semantic interpretation, one may never postulate hidden structure that is 
inconsistent with correct syntactic theory (Stanley 2007, 35). 
 
My treatment seems to run afoul from Stanley‟s certainly reasonable assumption. 
After all, if constituents appear at the level of what Jaszczolt calls the „merger 
representation‟ it is not unreasonable that they should be inserted in nodes that 
belong to syntactic trees and they should themselves have a syntactic articulation. 
 
How can we reply to this objection?  
 
There are two possibilities.  
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One is to say: Well, the language of thought need not follow the same rules of 
grammar as, say, English. I can very well think by using ungrammatical sentences. 
 
The other is to adopt the considerations which I presented in  Capone (2008), where I 
claimed, following Kent Bach, that we can explain opacity in belief sentences by 
using appositives. However, unlike Bach, I did not posit appositives under NP nodes, 
but I postulated a sentential appositive having an internal articulation and allowing 
places for NPs that were associated with modes of presentations, these modes of 
presentations being linked though pragmatics with the NPs in the embedded clause 
of a belief sentence. Now, in adopting that idea  in this chapter  too, I am  not 
postulating anything „ad hoc‟, for the purpose of rescuing the analysis above, 
interesting and problematic thought it is. The treatment is quite general.  
Now suppose that in a sentence such as „She believes she is clever‟ we do not insert 
at random the constituent PRO or, in any case, we do not replace the sentence at the 
level of the merger representation with the ungrammatical „Mary believes PRO to be 
clever‟, but we posit structure in exactly the way I proposed in Capone (2008), but at 
a more abstract level. So we would have the following structure: 
 
Mary believes [that  [she is clever] [ PRO be clever]]  
 
This could not  be analogous to: Mary is ready [to collect the insurance] and thus a 
legitimate question arises as to what is it that selects the [PRO be clever] clause. 
However, following  de Vries (2002), we know that even sentences can have 
appositives, and this suffices to allow us to have the following structure: 
 
[Mary believes  she is clever] [Mary Attitude verb PRO be clever] 
 
The only objection I can envision to the structure above is that we have a sentence 
with lexical NPs and VPs and an appositive having an abstract verb: however, since 
it is well accepted in semantics that there is a class of verbs called verbs of 
propositional attitude, that introduce opacity, and have well known semantic 
characteristics, it is not impossible for the human mind to replace a verb with a 
categorial type. In any case, Stanley‟s constraint is only at the level of syntax, and he 
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does not say anything about having abstract categories at logical form (in any case, 
the fact that grammarians are at ease using abstract verbal categories is a proof that 
the mind is perfectly capable of creating an abstract category and use it in an 
appositive). 
 Now, what is the relationship between PRO and „she‟? It is not a relationship of 
reference, but mainly a relationship such that the mode of presentation „PRO‟ is 
transmitted from the appositive to „she‟, through some kind of linking. 
 
 
4.4 DE re interpretations: the pragmatic interpretations of pronominals, as used 
instead of PRO. 
Let us see what happens if a full pronominal is used instead of PRO. So consider 
again the minimal pair from Higginbotham (2003): 
 
 
(54) John remembered [his going to the movie]; 
(55) John remembered [PRO going to the movie]. 
 
Higginbotham says that PRO is associated with a „de se‟ interpretation, while (54) is 
not. We ask why it should be the case that „John believes he* is clever‟ is typically 
associated with a „de se‟ reading, while (55) is not.  Neo-Griceans (e.g. Huang 2000, 
2007; Levinson 2000) have an easy explanation at hand. Suppose that 
 
<his, PRO>  form a Horn-scale, such that the two forms are from the same semantic 
field. Since PRO is associated with the „de se‟ reading, it is more informative than 
the „de re‟ reading. Thus PRO ends up entailing „his‟. Use of „his‟ at this point will 
implicate that the „de se‟ interpretation does not obtain. (The only problem for this 
analysis is the equal lexicalization constraint: should we say that PRO and „his‟ are 
equally lexicalized? This is a problematic choice). 
 
Alternatively, one can say that the full pronominal is more marked than PRO and 
therefore triggers an M-implicature to the effect that the interpretation 
complementary to that of PRO takes place. (Remember, the M-Principle says that the 
usage of a marked expression instead of an unmarked one will trigger a 
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complementary implicature: the problem here is that PRO, if what Higginbotham 
says about the first-personal reading is correct, is not coextensive with the full 
pronominal – as required by the M-Principle (see Levinson 2000; Huang 2007, and 
references therein). 
 Both routes are not devoid of problems that need to be addressed somehow. Now, 
we want to find a plausible alternative  relevance theory story. Suppose we say that 
the overt pronominal requires greater processing efforts than „PRO‟. Then we require 
additional contextual effects to counterbalance the gratuitous processing efforts. 
There will be compensatory contextual effects if the interpretation is complementary 
to that of PRO (or even if it is distinct from that of PRO. Thus, the „de re‟ 
interpretation, which is complementary to the „de se‟ one, gets through. 
 
4.5 The internal dimension of PRO: ‘remember’ and other verbs. 
 
In this section I shall  discuss verbs such as „remember‟, „imagine‟, „expect‟, 
„dream‟, „forget‟ in terms of the internal dimension of PRO. Since such 
considerations are sparkled by Higginbotham‟s reflections on the internal dimension 
of PRO in connection with „remember‟, I will start with „remember‟, on which there 
is a wealth  of philosophical considerations.  
In particular,  I will discuss what Higginbotham (2003), based on ideas by Martin 
& Deutscher (1966) and Shoemaker (1970) calls „remembering from the inside‟ 
associating it with control structures („John remembers falling down the stairs).  
Following Norman Malcom  (1963), Shoemaker distinguishes between the semantics 
of „John remembers that  Caesar invaded Britain‟ (factual memories) and „John 
remembers falling down the stairs‟, the latter sentence being associated with 
something which one remembers happen, as a result of observation or experience. 
 Shoemaker (1970) discusses only cases like „John remembers walking in Oxford‟ 
and says: 
 
It is a necessary condition of its being true that a person remembers  a given 
past event that he, the same person, should have observed or experienced the 
event, or known of it in some other direct way, at the time of its occurrence. I 
shall refer to this as the „previous awareness condition‟ for remembering” 
(Shoenaker 1970, p. 269). 
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He adds that “When a person remembers a past event there is a correspondence 
between his  present cognitive state and some past cognitive and sensory state of his 
that existed at the time of the remembered event and consisted in his experiencing 
the event or otherwise being aware or its occurrence (p. 271). 
 
I take that the awareness condition and the correspondence condition for 
Shoemaker are entailed semantically by a sentence such as „John remembers falling 
down the stairs‟ and they correspond more or less to what Higignbotham calls the 
internal dimension of PRO. Now, while my aim in this section is to argue that the 
internal dimension of PRO is conversationally implicated by sentences such as „John 
remembers falling down the stairs‟,  I want to do justice to the importance of 
Shoemaker‟s considerations and suggest that the internal dimension of PRO may be 
more or less fine-grained and that conversational implicatures may be responsible for 
the more fine-grained dimension of the internal dimension, while we can assign 
semantics the task of doing justice to the considerations by Shoemaker, which seem 
to me to be not implausible. In particular, I think we can accept that in uttering a 
sentence such as (56): 
 
(56) John remembers falling down the stairs 
 
the awareness condition needs to be satisfied, and John‟s memory needs to be caused 
by a perception of his experience of falling down. Furthermore, the correspondence 
condition, whereby there must be a correspondence between the memory and the 
experience or sensory state that existed at the time of the event, must be satisfied. If 
John remembers falling down, then there must be an experience which has triggered 
his memory – there is a rough correspondence between the experience and the 
memory. However, how fine-grained the correspondence ought to be has not been 
specified by Shoemaker. Is it not possible that only part of the experience has been 
recalled, thus making it possible that there is a correspondence between the sensory 
state of the event and the memory, even if we can admit that the fully articulated 
dimension of the sensory state has been communicated in a more fine-grained way  
through pragmatics? 
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I think it is not unreasonable to propose that the full internal dimension of PRO is 
communicated via pragmatic intrusion. When we say (57) 
 
(57) John remembers falling downstairs 
 
we surely mean that the John is remembering the event from the inside, that he was 
at the same time the perceiver of the event and the participant affected by the event 
(he did not just see the blood on his face, but he also felt the pain and the event of  
remembering the pain could occur only through the experience of the pain (his 
feeling his pain)). However, it is not necessary to place all burden of both first-
personal and the internal dimension of PRO on semantics. The burden can be divided 
between semantics and pragmatics. After all, it is not unnatural to say: 
 
(58) John remembers falling downstairs, but he does in an incomplete way. He does 
not remember the pain he felt. The memory is to him like a film he is watching. 
 
Notice, in this case, both the awareness and the correspondence conditions proposed 
by Shoemaker are satisfied, even if some fine-grained aspects of the internal 
dimension have been lost.  
The statement (58) could be justified, in case John has partial amnesia or has 
(voluntarily or involuntarily) erased parts of his experience, namely those memories 
which are more painful. 
 Also we can think of the case in which a memory is so painful that, although the 
person in question does remember the event (say, an accident), s/he does not want to 
recall it. By failing to recall its most painful parts, the memory will be partial. 
 
 
After all it is not so unreasonable to assume that memories can fade away and that 
parts of  them can be erased. So, the idea that the internal dimension of a memory 
can be erased (removed) is not so outlandish. Psychologists often say that women 
who gave birth to a child remove the pain from their memories – this is why they are 
willing to give birth to a second child, without much thought about it. Furthermore, 
going back to Higginbotham‟s example, partially modified: 
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(61) I  used to remember walking to school in the fifth grade, but I no longer 
remember it very well 
 
this example can also be understood as saying that the speaker had an exhaustive 
memory of the event of walking to school in the fifth grade, but now he no longer 
has this exhaustive memory (he has a partial memory)
9
. Memories can be partial – as 
parts of memories can be removed. However, in the typical case, the internal 
dimension of the memory does not disappear. So, if a person says „I remember 
falling downstairs‟ the full internal dimension is communicated as well, but by 
pragmatics. Through a pragmatic increment, we build up the explicature.   
 
Let us consider how Relevance Theory can deal with similar examples. Consider  
(59): 
 
(59) I remember falling downstairs. 
 
If one falls downstairs, in the prototypical case, one feels pain. It is, therefore, 
reasonable to assume that in addition to visual memories, the speaker has other types 
of memories: tactile memories for example (scratches, pain on his bones, etc). It is, 
therefore, probable that he is remembering the event from the inside. However, it is 
not implausible that the „internal dimension‟ can be (partially)  cancelled, probably 
because the memory can be as painful as the real experience which one is re-living. 
To put things in the words of Carruthers (2006), when one remembers an event, one 
rehearses the event in mind, thus evoking motor-sensory schemata that are broadcast 
to central/conceptual modules and may generate real pain and frustration. 
 At this point, let us follow Cimatti (2008), in the idea that the subject is 
constituted through speech and let us make use of the psychotherapy situation as a 
hypothetical situation.  Suppose that the speaker says (62) in the course of a 
psychotherapy. The patient, who was pushed down the stairs by his mother, removes 
all sensations of pain. The aim of the therapy is to help the patient relive the situation 
and recuperate the important parts of the memory he has removed – say what 
modifying slightly Higginbotham‟s terminology we could call the full internal 
                                                 
9
 The example has the other reading noted by Higginbotham, as well. 
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dimension of the memory. Then this is a case in which the  internal dimension of 
PRO has been partially suppressed and  one tries to recuperate it. Thus, at the end of 
the psychotherapy the same sentence can be uttered having a different meaning 
including the full internal dimension as well. If the same sentence can be uttered at 
different moments by the same patient, thus rehearsing an experience and 
broadcasting motor/sensory schemata to the central/ conceptual systems, and can 
broadcast different schemata at different moments, thus provoking different 
corporeal sensations, this can be taken as proof that the full (or fully articulated) 
internal dimension of PRO is not associated with sentence meaning, but, at most, 
with utterance meaning, and, in particular, with the speaker‟s meaning. 
 The little – not too implausible – story above can show that the full  internal 
dimension of PRO has greater contextual effects. By recuperating the internal 
dimension of PRO, the speaker can recuperate feelings that have consequences on 
parts of his personality. Alternatively, he can recuperate beliefs that, in conjunction 
with other beliefs, can produce further beliefs.  
 
See in fact the following deduction: 
 
John remembers falling downstairs. 
If John remembers the event (fully) from the inside, he remembers feeling pain. 
John remembers the event (fully) from the inside (premise furnished through 
pragmatics) 
If he felt pain, he hated his mother who pushed him. 
…. 
John hated his mother  
 
Since the premises added by pragmatic inferences (in particular, the internal 
dimension of the memory) lead to  further contextual effects through deduction, it is 
reasonable to accept that such inferences are  motivated by the desire to be relevant, 
to create abundant cognitive effects with minimal cognitive processes
10
. As Wilson 
& Sperber (2004) say: 
 
                                                 
10
 On unexpressed premises in enthymemes see Piazza (1995). 
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The most important type of contextual effect is a CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATION, a 
conclusion deducible from input and context together, but from neither input nor 
context alone. For example, on seeing my train arriving, I might look at my watch, 
access my knowledge of the train timetable, and derive the contextual implication 
that my train is late (…). (p. 608). 
 
This topic seems to have intrigued an influential linguist like John Lyons, who 
notices a difference between 
 
(60) I remembered  closing the door 
(61) I remembered myself closing the door. (These examples are numbered as (3) 
and (4) in Lyons‟ paper). 
 
Lyons (1989) writes: 
 
As to the difference between 3) and 4), this is explained, intuitively at least, by 
saying that what is being reported in 3) is the illocutionary agent‟s reliving in 
memory – his or her memorial re-experiencing as the agent – of the act of 
closing the door; and in 4) the quite different mental act of perceiving or 
witnessing this act, as he or she might perceive (i.e. see, hear, etc.) from the 
outside as it were, a situation in which he or she was not, or had not been 
involved as the agent (Lyons 1989, p. 176). 
 
Now, the real point is the contrast between (60) and (61). If my intuitions are correct, 
the contrast is not semantic (as Lyons seems to imply) but pragmatic. It is easy to 
explain the contrast in terms of pragmatics, as the reflexive is more marked than 
PRO, and thus tends to trigger M-implicatures, if one listens to Levinson (2000) and 
Huang (2007). The M-implicature in question is that the perspective from which the 
action is remembered is complementary to that implied in (60). If the (60) was 
associated by implicature to an internal dimension, (61) is associated by implicature 
with an external dimension. In terms of a relevance theory explanation, we can 
reason on why the more marked lexicalised pronominal is preferred to the null 
pronominal PRO. Since the more marked item involves greater processing efforts, it 
needs to be associated with greater contextual effects, such as (I claim) the 
374 
 
complementary interpretation to (61), in particular a not internal dimension (In fact, 
the external one). 
 
Varela Bravo (1993), in a paper that comments on Lyons‟ paper, attempts to 
explain the difference „I remember closing the door‟ and „I remember  that I closed 
the door‟ through conditions of use, as summed up below: 
 
(I remember) closing the door 
 
1. Acknowledgement of the speaker‟s communicative intention: I/somebody did 
something; 
2. Evaluation of the action as true/false. That is true: You/somebody did it. 
3. Acknowledgment of the action from the point of view of the hearer: Yes, 
you/somebody did it. 
4. Positive/negative evaluation in context: You did well/wrongly. 
The utterance would interact with the context and would be functional in the 
conversational exchange. 
 
 
(I remember) that I closed the door 
 
1. Acknowledgment of the speaker‟s communicative intention: something happened: 
2. Evaluation of the fact as true/false. That is true. 
3. Acknowledgement of the fact from the point of view of the hearer: Yes, that 
happened. 
4. Positive/negative evaluation in context: That was fortunate/unfortunate; 
The utterance would interact with the context and would be functional in the 
conversational exchange. 
 
Varela Bravo basically thinks that an utterance of „I remembered that I closed the 
door‟ presents a fact and focuses on a fact, thus in a tag like „I remembered that I 
closed the door. Didn‟t I?‟ the pro-verb is „close‟ and not „remember‟. Instead, „I 
remembered closing the door‟ focuses on an action done and not on a fact, hence in 
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the tag question „I remembered closing the door. Didn‟t I?‟ the pro-verb is NOT 
„close‟ but „remember‟. 
 
Varela Bravo makes it appear (albeit he does not use this term) that a (distinct) 
conventional implicature is triggered by use of each construction. It is easy to see 
that his considerations give independent support to Harcourt (1999), even if it should 
be clear that Harcourt and Varela Bravo are making different claims. Harcourt is 
making a claim about the first-personal mode of presentation, while Varela Bravo is 
making a claim about whether the context of statements such as „John remembers 
that P‟ and „John remembers doing X‟ restricts the kind of replies one such statement 
can obtain as a function of the purpose with which the „remember‟ statement has 
been made.  It is possible that the distinction between a fact being reported and an 
action being reported is what leads to first-personal interpretations of PRO (in „John 
remembers walking in Oxford‟, as, after all, remembering an action requires being 
involved in the action as an actor (or agent) who has direct access to the action (and 
its consequences)  through consciousness. Of course, the thing remembered in „John 
remembered falling down the stairs‟ need not be an action, but merely an event, but 
even in this case the memory is causally connected to the event and, thus, the 
experience of the event is somehow involved in the memory. Now this could be a 
good compromise with Higginbotham‟s semantic view, as after all,  conventional 
implicatures are semantic, and not genuinely pragmatic (non-mononotonic) 
phenomena. At the same time, we can see that certain explicatures are nested in the 
structure available through conventional implicature and these explicatures are a 
matter of accessing certain more or less stereotypical scenarios. 
 Before closing this section, I want to consider, albeit briefly „imagine‟,  „expect‟, 
„dream‟ and „forget‟. For these verbs, I argue that world knowledge is responsible for 
the explicated content. In fact, the interpretation of the internal dimension of PRO, 
and in particular the degree of granularity of this internal perspective, depends on the 
speaker‟s and the hearer‟s knowledge of the world. In fact, as pointed out by a 
number of authors, such as Huang (1991), (1994), Clark & Marshall (1981) and 
Clark & Carlson (1992), Levinson (2000), Blackwell (2000, 2001), Capone (2000, 
2001, 2003, 2006),  implicatures aimed at enriching utterance interpretations are 
often determined by the suppositions that are shared by the speaker and the hearer, 
that is their „common ground‟.  
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 If I say „I imagine falling down the stairs‟ is PRO also associated with an internal 
dimension? And if I say „I expect falling down the stairs (if...)‟, is PRO associated 
with an internal dimension? What made a semantic association between PRO and an 
internal dimension in the case of „remember‟ was what Shoemaker called the 
awareness condition. If John remembers falling down the stairs, then he was aware of 
some experience which caused the memory.  „Remember‟ also involves a 
correspondence condition: there must be a correspondence between the event 
remembered and the event experienced. Now, this compelled me to say that 
„Remember‟ is associated semantically with an internal dimension, but I still 
proposed a partial pragmatic analysis by saying that the full details of the internal 
dimension or, to use a terminology from the theory of propositional attitudes, a fully 
fine-grained internal dimension was provided through explicatures. 
 Now we have to ask the question whether „imagine‟ and „expect‟ also involve an 
awareness condition. If they do not, then the internal dimension of PRO will not be a 
semantic one, but a pragmatically conveyed aspect of communication. „Imagining‟ or 
„expecting‟ seem to be verbs involved in simulating actions or events mentally (to 
use terminology by Goldman (2006), who explicitly discusses „imagining‟ in the 
context of simulation theories of mind-reading).  
 When John imagines falling down the stairs, he is probably using information 
about events happened to someone else in the past. Perhaps he has seen Peter fall 
down the stairs, and he remembers how Peter felt pain. Thus he may use the 
information that Peter experienced pain to form a psychological theory about what it 
feels like to fall down the stairs and concludes that if one falls down the stairs, one 
experiences pain. So when he imagines falling down the stairs, John runs a 
simulation of an experience which he saw happen in the past and he recalls that Peter 
cried, thus evincing pain, and he also has access to a psychology law: if one falls 
down, one feels pain. As a result of the simulation taking as input a pretend state 
„Suppose I fall down the stairs‟ and some general beliefs, he arrives at the conclusion 
that he will feel pain. And this conclusion is what authorises us to conclude that 
when he imagines falling down the stairs, John also imagines feeling pain. The 
internal dimension is grafted on top of the semantics by pragmatic reasoning. (Of 
course imagining the pain  of an experience has consequences on behaviour, thus RT 
predicts that the enriched interpretation has greater contextual effects.) Of course 
John could have run the simulation in a different way. Suppose he is  a scientist and 
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he wants to make some generalizations about the physics of falling down the stairs. 
Then he is not interested in the internal dimension of the experience. John imagines 
falling down the stairs having an ulterior purpose in mind, that of simulating a 
physical experience. Thus the internal dimension is completely missing in this 
simulation. However, unless aspects of the context do not specify that the simulation 
is being run for scientific purposes, John will be attributed a state of mind that 
simulates the internal dimension of one who undergoes that experience, hence pain. 
 Similar considerations are applicable to „John expects falling down the stairs‟. 
The psychological dimension is accentuated, when sorrow rather than pain is 
involved in the internal dimension as in „John expected being sacked‟. If what 
Carruthers (2006) says about mental rehearsal is accepted, John, in expecting to be 
sacked, rehearses the state „being sacked‟ and thus produces an emotive response to 
the situation „being sacked‟ and this is constitutive of the internal dimension of PRO. 
But the internal dimension of PRO in the case of „expect‟ is the result of running a 
simulation of the simulation John may run of another person‟s experience.  However,  
„expect‟, can also be used in a simulation run for scientific purposes, in which focus 
in on physics rather than on  psychology. Admittedly, such a case is rare, but not 
impossible. In any case, the internal dimension of expecting something  is added only 
as a result of running a simulation of what it is like to experience the event expected 
on the part of the person who expects the event, and this is enough to show that  the 
internal dimension of „expecting‟ is a pragmatic phenomenon. 
 Two further verbs ought to be considered: „dream‟ and „forget‟. „Dream‟ is in all 
respects like „remember‟. If I dreamed murdering Mary, it is implicit that I remember 
murdering Mary in a  dream – hence all considerations I applied to „remember‟ are 
applicable to the case at hand. In dreams we usually have sensations in addition to 
visual images, but it is not clear that the internal dimension has something to do with 
semantics. In fact, there is no awareness condition or correspondence condition 
attached to dreaming. It is not the case that if I dream murdering Mary, the dreaming 
was caused by the awareness of murdering Mary or there was a corresponding state 
of (my) murdering Mary. All this militates against the internal dimension being 
incorporated into the semantics. On the contrary, it is reasonable that pragmatics is 
responsible of  the internal dimension. If one dreams murdering Mary, one typically 
has experiences of  fury, sadistic pleasure, contempt for the victim, etc. But this is 
only part of a typical scenario – it is not impossible to have just visual images with 
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no accompanying emotions. It is world knowledge that drives the inference, rather 
than semantics. 
 Concerning „forget‟ one can say sentences like „I forgot to close the door‟, but 
sentences like „I forgot opening the door‟ (meaning I forgot the event: opening the 
door by myself) are weird in English (if we have to follow some comments I found 
through google).  In Italian this type of sentence is fine, but only with a normative 
interpretation („Mi sono dimenticato di chiudere la porta‟ (I forgot closing the door) -
> I had to close the door but I forgot to do so). The internal dimension of PRO, 
therefore, even in Italian where it is more certain that this type of sentence is 
acceptable, is not involved at all. 
 However, consider cases of „forget‟ where no PRO is involved. Consider for 
example the sentence „Mary forgot how she felt during her pregnancy‟. Here the 
speaker may very well include both the internal and external dimension among the 
parts of the event forgotten (There was an internal dimension to the memory of her 
pregnancy but Mary forgot all details of it). Analogously,  if a speaker says „John 
forgot how one feels during an  operation, what is at stake is both the internal and the 
external dimension. However, if one considers the sentence „John forgot how he was 
snoring after the operation‟ on the basis of knowledge that John watched the film of 
the state after the operation, there is no implication of an internal dimension to the 
memory described as forgotten. All these variations seem to prove that the full 
internal dimension of  memories, knowledge, forgetting, etc. is communicated 
pragmatically. Consider now constructions with PRO, such as „John forgot how to 
cycle‟ or „John forgot how to smoke‟. There is no internal dimension implication 
here. (We cannot exclude that one can have corporeal sensations or at least a 
sensation of happiness when one uses a bike, but it does not appear as though the 
utterance focuses on these). However, if we change the scenario a bit, as in „John 
forgot how to put up with torture‟ the internal dimension is implicated 
conversationally. I think we can now say that my considerations are not merely 
tentative, but take into account a range of data. (See Huang 2007 and references 
therein for the treatment of inferences to stereotype based on scenarios – the 
operation scenario is Huang‟s favourite case).  
 As a last case, I want to consider „know‟. The constructions „know that‟ ‟ not 
surprisingly  does not exhibit the internal-dimension implication (as there is no PRO 
here), however the constructions involving „knowledge-how‟ do exhibit the 
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phenomena noted by Higginbotham (see Stanley & Williamson 2001).  Consider 
initially constructions involving „knowledge-how‟ without control, with explicit 
subjects. The sentence „John knew how he felt when he was tortured‟ certainly 
implies an internal dimension, however this is far from certain when the sentence is 
changed a little as in „John knew how he was operated‟. Suppose that John was 
totally anaesthetised during the operation. Then it follows that his „knowledge how‟ 
cannot take into account an internal dimension – it is a contextual implicature that he 
knew how the operation was carried out by having watched the video of the 
operation (I am using a scenario used by Lyons 1989). In the first sentence there is 
no PRO, yet the internal dimension implication is present. It must be a pragmatic 
inference in that case.  Consider now the sentence „John knows how one feels after 
an operation‟. Of course the speaker implicates that John knows both the external 
and the internal dimension of the feeling. (Yet there is no PRO here). However, if 
one changes the verb, saying „John knows how one sleeps after an operation‟ on the 
basis of the fact that John watched a video of his state of sleeping, there is no internal 
dimension at stake.  (Furthermore, John may know how one sleeps after an operation 
on the basis of inductive evidence drawn from his having seen many cases of 
operated patients sleeping after an operation, which would lead him to imagine how 
he would sleep after an operation (and if he can know how one sleeps after an 
operation and the kind of problems which operated patients undergo, he would be 
prepared to pay a private nurse to take care of him, in order to prevent himself from 
doing harm to  his body)). By changing the situation one  can cancel the alleged 
implication  
  
4.6 ‘De se’ and null appositives. 
Before ending this chapter I would like to examine, albeit briefly, an example due to 
Keith Allan (forthcoming)‟s important considerations on reference as a pragmatic 
act. The example was originally „The best architect designed this church‟, but I want 
to transform it somewhat, as (62) 
 
(62) Antoni Gaudí believes that he designed this church 
 
Keith Allan argues that strong contextual inferences due to world knowledge will 
affect the understanding of „The best architect designed this church‟, and not only 
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default semantics (Jaszczolt 2005). Could Allan‟s considerations be transferred to the 
interpretation of  (62)? I would answer this question in the positive, as a pragmatic 
theory would have to explain not only the fact that (62) has a „de se‟ reading, but that 
on top of the „de se‟ reading there is an appositive reading as in (63) 
 
(63) Antoni Gaudí believes that he, who is the best architect, designed this church. 
 
Presumably (63) is obtained for free in an environment in which Gaudí takes for 
granted that everyone takes for granted that Antoni Gaudí is the best architect. 
Furthermore, consider the following utterance: 
 
 (64)  
A: Antoni Gaudí believes that the best architect  designed this church 
B: Yes, that is true. Gaudí believes that he  designed this church. 
 
In this particular context, contextual implications are such that (68b) can be liberated 
from its first personal interpretation and come to acquire an attributive interpretation. 
The fact that speaker B agrees with speaker A is strong evidence that speaker B 
agrees with the speaker‟s meaning of A‟s contribution; hence „he‟ comes to acquire 
an attributive interpretation, contrary to the expectation that „he‟ is simply a device 
for reference. The desire to achieve optimal relevance, in terms of Sperber & Wilson 
(1986, 1995), will compress the attributive interpretation into a pronominal despite 
the fact that it is semantically implausible that a pronominal should be assigned an 
attributive interpretation. The way this can be done is that an attributive 
interpretation can accrue on top of a „de se‟ interpretation  – in fact, in order to 
promote optimal relevance the hearer will first of all assign a „de se‟ interpretation to 
(64b) and then on top of that s/he will assign an appositive with attributive meaning 
as a free enrichment (see Carston (2002), Capone (2008a) and Huang (2007) on free 
enrichments).  
 Some readers may complain that I have left undecided the issue whether the 
inferences associated with „de se‟ readings are only implicatures or are, otherwise, 
explicatures. On an account like Levinson‟s these pragmatic increments are 
conversational implicatures. On the account by Sperber & Wilson and Carston, it is 
tempting to analyse these cases as explicatures. Surely conversational implicatures 
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and explicatures  share the pragmatic derivation. However, I have claimed elsewhere 
that explicatures are more difficult to cancel – in fact, they may be uncancellable. 
Surely we can propose that, in so far as they enrich the logical form of a sentence, the 
inferences associated with „de se‟ interpretations should count as explicatures. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the first-personal character of the implicature/explicature 
is hard to cancel, which supports the idea that we are dealing with explicatures. We 
are curious to know what happens when we embed the explicature in operators 
like,e.g. negation., as in  
 
(65) John did not remember walking in Oxford. 
 
It seems to me that (65) preserves the presupposition/implicature that there was an 
event of walking by himself in Oxford. In other words, the first-personal reading is 
preserved in the presupposition. In other words, pragmatic intrusion resists despite 
negation. Analogous considerations apply to (66) 
 
(66) If John remembers walking in Oxford, then I‟ll be  happy. 
 
As Carston (2002)  says, it is a characteristic of intrusive constructions that their 
explicatures survive embedding in modal operators. If we see that some logical 
operator has an effect on the inferred interpretation, the inference must have 
contributed to the truth-conditions of the proposition, as logical operators have scope 
only on explicitly stated materials (Ariel 2008, 80). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter explores the possibility of deriving „de se‟ interpretations of 
pronominals in attitude contexts through pragmatics. After discussing the 
philosophical literature, by focusing on the tension between a semantic and a 
pragmatic analysis of de se inferences, I found it fruitful to utilize Harcourt‟s idea 
that „de se‟ interpretations may involve a mode of presentation like „I‟ and thus, to 
respond to potential objections like Feit‟s,  I revised Higginbotham‟s considerations 
suggesting that the first-personal dimension of PRO in constructions like „John 
remembers walking in Oxford‟ should  be further characterised by making use of a 
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mode of presentation like „I‟. Then, in the light of  of possible objections, I proposed 
that further shades of meaning could be added by a conversational implicature 
(explicature). In fact, it is possible that the first-personal interpretation need not use 
„I‟ as a mode of presentation of the reference but some transformation that is suitable 
in context. Nevertheless, in stereotypical cases, „I‟ is implicated as being the mode of 
presentation used in „de se‟ attitudes. The more pragmatic part of the chapter 
explains why sentences such as „John believes he went to the cinema‟ are „de se‟ by 
default, given that „de se‟ interpretations entail „de re‟ interpretations and, thus, 
pragmatics promotes the most informative interpretation. The chapter  also explains 
the contrast between „John remembers going to the cinema‟ and „John remembers his 
going to the cinema‟ or between „John remembers going to the cinema‟ and „John 
remembers he himself going to the cinema‟. Perhaps the most important part of the 
paper deals with the internal dimension of „PRO‟ and claims that the internal 
dimension may be the result of a pragmatic, and not of a semantic, inference.  
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Chapter 11 
 
Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM), ‘de se’ and 
pragmatic intrusion): a linguistic treatment. 
 
 
Abstract. 
In this chapter, I defend the idea that pragmatic intrusion is involved in „de se‟ constructions: the ego-
concept being a component of the „de se‟ thought. I defend this idea from a number of objections. I 
explore the related notion of immunity to error through misidentification and I claim that this too 
depends on pragmatic intrusion. I defend this view from obvious objections. I take immunity to error 
through misidentification in „de se‟ thoughts to depend on the fact that the thinking subject makes an 
implicit use of the first-person pronominal and there is no question of attributing a referent to the 
pronominal, since the referent is given in the subject of the thought. In third-person „de se‟ 
attributions, some form of simulation can be used to reconstruct the thinking subject as using a form 
of the first-person pronominal. Immunity to error through misidentification is attributed to the 
thinking subject through simulation. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I try to reduce a philosophical topic to a linguistic one. The 
philosophical topic is „Immunity to error through misidentification‟ (one who thinks 
„I remember walking in Oxford‟ can be mistaken as to whether it was Oxford or 
Cambridge where he walked, but cannot be mistaken as to whether it was him who 
walked (in Oxford or Cambridge)) and the linguistic topic is the first-person pronoun 
(and all its semantico-pragmatic mysteries) in the context of a discussion of 
pragmatic intrusion (the question whether „de se‟ thoughts incorporate semantically 
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or pragmatically the „Ego‟ component is an important one). This chapter explores the 
consequences of accepting certain ideas by Castañeda and after a brief rejection of 
the attempt by Campbell (1999) to expunge linguistic semantics from the issue of 
I.E.M.  (thus confining it to epistemology), I show in detail that the issue benefits 
enormously from the findings on pragmatic intrusion. Detailed arguments are 
provided on why pragmatic intrusion and not merely semantics is involved in 
understanding the topic of IEM. 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 1 
 
 
1.1 Immunity to Error through Misidentification (IEM) 
Instead of summarizing the literature on IEM in detail, I will sketch with broad brush 
strokes the state of the discussion. The positions on IEM are mainly two. There are 
philosophers who claim that the phenomenon of IEM derives from semantic 
considerations, mainly considerations of direct reference (Shoemaker (1968), Evans 
(1982), Strawson (Forthcoming), Peacocke (Forthcoming), Christofidou (2000)) and 
authors like Recanati (2009) who relate the phenomenon of IEM to the ascription of 
mental or physical properties either through introspection or proprio-ception or 
through perception (in the ordinary mode). Shoemaker seems to occupy a unique 
position in the philosophical panorama since his approach to IEM combines both 
epistemology and semantic considerations. I will mainly sum up the position taken 
by Shoemaker and then voice some objections by Wayne Davis (personal 
communication) which might well be seen as deriving from the alternative camp of 
philosophers represented eminently by Recanati. 
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1.2 Shoemaker’s position 
The article by Shoemaker (1968) is clearly indebted both to Wittgenstein and to 
Castañeda. From Wittgenstein he takes the notion of IEM and from Castañeda he 
takes the idea that IEM is linked to use of first-personal pronominals in thought or 
assertion. 
Shoemaker  deals with immunity to error through misidentification and seems to 
imply that this immunity is linked to the first person. Basically, IEM consists in the 
fact that one cannot ascribe oneself a mental property (e.g. I am in pain) and ask 
oneself „Is it me who is in pain?‟. In other words, the possibility of misidentifying the 
subject does not occur. Shoemaker thinks that the first person (the use of the 
pronominal „I‟) has referential uses,  a position which, as we will subsequently see, is 
important for showing where IEM comes from, since  in using the pronominal „I‟ the 
subject cannot but refer to himself and also cannot misidentify himself. Shoemaker 
connects IEM with the pronominal „I‟ but he is careful to stress that IEM is not 
connected with demonstratives in general, as I could say „That is green‟ while I am 
in an hallucinatory state. 
 What is clear in the discussion by Shoemaker is that the person who attributes 
himself some property by using the word „I‟ cannot fail to identify himself, and this 
applies both in cases of corrigible or incorrigible statements (Shoemaker 
distinguishes between incorrigibility and IEM). The subject is available to himself 
through introspection and Shoemaker distinguishes between the ordinary mode of 
perception and perceptions which we would ordinarily express using the verb 
„feeling‟ by saying that in ordinary perception acts we can perceive the perception 
act but we cannot do so with perception acts in which feeling is involved.  This 
concept probably needs deepening, but what Shoemaker is after is, presumably, a 
way to distinguish perception by the senses from introspection, in which the subject 
is immediately aware of himself (the object is presented to the self from the inside).  
  
I would now like to address a problem noted by Wayne Davis (personal 
communication) in the formulation of IEM by Shoemaker. According to Shoemaker, 
at least one aspect of IEM consists in the fact that one cannot ascribe  oneself a 
mental property (e.g. I am in pain) and ask oneself „Is it me who is in pain?‟. The 
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utterance “I am in pain. Is it me who is in pain?‟ would be unquestionably odd, but 
an utterance of  “John is in pain. Is it John who is in pain?” is also odd. The oddity of 
“I am in pain. Is it me who is in pain?” , according to Davis, is not due to the fact that 
„I‟ is first-personal and pain mental. It is due to the fact that the first sentence 
obviously entails the answer to the second. So this cannot be what one means by 
IEM. 
 Of course, Davis is right in noting the entailment relationship, which obviously 
makes such pairs of utterances (in which the preceding utterance entails the 
following utterance) odd. However, an appropriate question would be to ask how the 
entailment works when such utterances are embedded in a verb of propositional 
attitude like „believe‟. The pair (assertion and question): “John believes he is in pain. 
Is it John who is in pain?”  is not odd, after all. On the contrary, the pair „I believe I 
am in pain. But is it me who is in pain‟ is odd. Suppose Davis is right and the oddity 
can be imputed to the entailment (or to a pragmatic implication of uttering the 
preceding utterance, given that now the relationship between the preceding and the 
following utterance no longer seems to be one of entailment). Then one could replace 
the pair of utterances related by entailment or a similar relation with a pair of 
utterances which are no longer related in this way. Suppose I say “I believe I am in 
pain. But if you were me, could you doubt that  it is me who is in pain?”. Now, it is 
no longer clear that the relationship between the preceding utterance and the answer 
to the following utterance is one of entailment. The question now seems to be an 
epistemological/semantic  one. One who has such a belief, regardless of the way she 
herself expresses that belief, cannot reasonably doubt that it is her which is in pain. 
 Wayne Davis, after rejecting the possibility that IEM consists of  the impossibility 
or implausibility of asking a certain kind of question, after one has expressed a 
certain belief, says that if IEM consists in the fact that one cannot be mistaken in 
ascribing  to oneself („de se‟) a mental  property. This is the view that beliefs  
resulting from introspection are infallible. Davis considers cases of people who 
deceive themselves or people whose desires are unconscious as providing evidence 
against the view that introspection guarantees infallibility. 
 However, it should be clear that many of the authors who defend the idea of IEM 
do not equate it with infallibility; and they do well to do so, because, otherwise, their 
views could be attacked on grounds similar to Davis‟.  Immunity to Error through 
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Misidentification seems to be a logical property of certain kinds of beliefs or 
statements, rather than only being a claim on epistemology. It seems to me that IEM 
derives from considerations on what one must accept if one accepts a certain belief 
which is held in a certain way. I propose that IEM is one of those issues  where 
epistemology depends on the semantico/pragmatic apparatus of language. 
 Before proceeding with this chapter, I want to deal with a problem in order to 
restrict its scope. It may appear that  I am assuming that a subject‟s introspective 
beliefs about his or her own „de se‟ mental states  cannot be mistaken. This 
assumption, however, might be questioned on the grounds that  it denies that self-
deception and unconscious mental states ever occur. Since I do not want to deny that 
self-deception or unconscious mental states ever occur, it is obvious that my claim 
concerning IEM must be restricted and qualified in such a way that it does not have 
this undesired consequence. In other words, we shall retain only the part of the claim 
that is compatible with the idea that sometimes self-deception occurs. The cases I 
consider in this paper are clearly not those where self-deception can occur, but those 
that exclude self-deception. Introspection as a safe method of knowledge of internal 
states is here seen as confined to those cases where one cannot be mistaken about 
one‟s own basic identity (I = I). Introspection of the self as self seems to be one case 
in which self-deception has to be excluded. In this paper I want to tie closely IEM to 
a semantic claim and I want to make epistemology subordinated to semantics. 
 Another point I want to make clear from the beginning is that although I assume  
that „I‟ typically refers to the speaker or to the thinker, this need not always be true (a 
referee mentions arguments by Castañeda), nor is this truth indispensible to my claim 
about pragmatic intrusion. If my views were expressed through semantic terminology 
or only through semantic concepts, then this defect could not be easily remedied. But 
since my chapter is about pragmatic intrusion, all I need for my claims to get through 
is that the pronominal „I‟ be interpreted in those cases when IEM is discussed as 
first-personal, that is to say as referring to the thinking subject. Surely pragmatic 
intrusion suffices to guarantee this. 
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1.3  Semantics or epistemology in IEM? (Campbell 1999). 
Since my chapter constitutes a slide from an epistemological to a semantic/pragmatic 
treatment, before proceeding with my pragmatic treatment I want to present and then 
refute the position by Campbell (1999), according to which there are no reasons for 
believing that IEM should rest on a semantic perspective. This section also makes 
clear how linguistic theses  about the first person pronoun could explain  why 
introspective „de se‟ beliefs cannot be mistaken. 
 The paper by Campbell links the notion of IEM to the special processes involved 
in having experiences of mental states, which he takes to be dedicated ways of 
finding out about the world. It appears to me that Campbell is trying to find out 
whether the notion of IEM can be disentangled from the idea that it depends on the 
meaning of the first person. He rather seems to opt for the idea that it depends on the 
nature of the experience of the mental state, on the dedicated process of attributing 
oneself a mental state. The paper starts with an example, in which IEM seems to be 
linked with the meaning of an expression. Then he considers a different example 
invariably showing that IEM can depend on the contingencies of a situation, rather 
than on the meaning of a linguistic expression.  
 Campbell considers the case of a businesswoman who has a secretary  keeping 
track of all her movements. The secretary also travels a great deal, but he never has 
any idea where she is (suppose she herself has a secretary to keep track of her 
movements for her).  We may suppose that the secretary at any moment knows 
where her boss is, but she knows nothing  about where anyone else is, including 
herself. If you call the secretary, she will always be able to tell you where her boss is, 
but she cannot give you any information about where anyone else is. You might 
sometimes get misinformation, but NOT misinformation that will involve  a mistake 
of identification. It cannot happen that the secretary will inform you that her boss is 
in London, when, in fact, she ought to say that Henry (who is not her boss) is in 
London (having mistaken Henry for her boss, somehow). As Campbell says, this 
case of IEM depends on the contingencies of the situation and NOT on the meaning 
of a linguistic expression. 
 This “tortured” example was offered as a contrast to the view that IEM can 
depend on the meaning of the first person pronominal. Unlike other scholars, 
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Campbell opts for the idea that it is the contingency of the situation of  experiencing 
a mental state that explains IEM. Experiencing or possessing a mental state involves, 
according to Campbell, a self-attribution. And a self-attribution is a dedicated 
process: 
In the case of the first person, what is happening is rather that the subject is 
using ways  of finding out about the world that are, as we might say, 
“dedicated” to the properties of one particular object, namely that very person. 
They are not ways of finding out that could equally apply to any of a range of 
objects. It is for this very reason that although the subject using such a way of 
finding out can make a mistake, it could not be a mistake about who is in 
question (Campbell 1999, 95). 
 Campbell points to the asymmetry between the task of finding out the referent of 
„I‟ when „I‟ is uttered by someone different from the hearer and understanding the 
use of the first person by the person who uses „I‟. When you use „I‟ you do not need 
any identification act at all. 
 
I should note that I agree with Campbell on the idea that IRM rests on a dedicated 
process, however I do not agree that this dedicated process is independent of the 
meaning and interpretation of the pronoun „I‟. Campbell writes about self-ascription 
as if it could ever occur without using the word „I‟, something which I tend to 
exclude (And Cambell himself avoids the solution that a thinker can make use of the 
concept „whoever is having these experiences‟, because this would allow in the case 
of „I am hearing trumpets‟  „whoever is having this headache‟ as subject and one 
could not ensure identity between “whoever is having this headache and say the 
person who is experiencing trumpets (see Campbell 1999, p. 94)). 
 In fact, when Campbell expatiates on the difference between interpreting „I‟ 
relative to a context (when „I‟ is not uttered by the interpreter) and interpreting „I‟ by 
the person who uses it, it is clear that matters of interpretation bear on IEM, because 
Campbell  says that the thinker who produces „I‟ cannot be mistaken about the 
identity of „I‟ and I think (and Campbell seems to imply) that IEM is connected with 
the impossibility of mistaken identity. Of course, one needs to show that IEM derives 
from semantic considerations. But this is not impossible.  Consider the process of  
390 
 
producing „I‟ in mental speech? Is it not dedicated too? This process seems to be 
severely constrained. You do not start with the rule: „I‟ refers to the person who 
produces it and then look for the referent. If you did so, then you could end up 
retrieving the wrong referent. When you use „I‟ you do not go from the context of 
utterance to see who produced „I‟ to the referent of „I, but you go the other way 
round, you start with the referent and produce a way of presentation of the referent. 
So, the process is dedicated in the sense that you cannot be mistaken about the 
identity of the person producing „I‟ simply because the deictic „I‟ in silent speech 
involves a dedicated process: Start with the referent and make sure that the same 
referent is what your speech is about when you use several occurrences of „I‟. But 
this looks very much like the description of a semantic phenomenon. 
 
2.1  ‘de se’ in philosophy and linguistics 
Immunity to error through misidentification, we have claimed, stems from  the use of 
„I‟ and from certain basic semantic characteristics of „I‟. It follows logically that any 
treatment of „de se‟ thoughts incorporating the first person inherits immunity to error 
through misidentification for the thought, memory or other attitude described. 
Whether immunity is direct or derived is not really important for us, since our task is 
to describe what thoughts a person has in attributing herself a propositional attitude; 
thus, it goes without saying that if our task is to describe what thoughts are in the 
mind of a person to whom we ascribe a propositional attitude, then we also have the 
task of specifying whether those thoughts have IEM or not. In the following section, 
I discuss both „de se‟ thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification. The 
two issues, in fact,  seem considerably entangled. Of particular importance for us is 
the case of description of a „de se‟ thought, in which we attribute a first personal 
mode of presentation to a thinker/believer and thus we simulate possession of IEM. 
In this section I shall present what I take to be the most influential theories on „de 
se‟.  Higginbotham‟s view is philosophical/linguistic, but I have decided to include it 
in this philosophical section because it is the only one that has the merit of unifying 
the first-personal character of „de se‟, with phenomena such as the internal dimension 
of PRO and immunity to error through misidentification. I will mainly use the 
perspective outlined in Higginbotham (2003), because it is linguistically explicit, in 
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making recourse to anaphoric concepts and to concepts taken from Fillmore‟s theory, 
and I will supplement it with considerations by John Perry (the idea that the essential 
indexical needs to make use of the concept „I‟ at some level of (pragmatic) 
interpretation).  
 
2.2 Higginbotham (2003). 
In his seminal paper, Higginbotham deepens ideas by  Castañeda (1966)  and Perry 
(1979). The basic idea is that  a „de se‟ mode of presentation differs significantly 
from a „de re‟ mode of presentation, having important implications for action and 
decision.  Higginbotham (2003) recognizes that there is something special about 
first-personal uses of pronominals such as those discussed by Castañeda. The merits 
of his discussion lie in his pointing out  that constructions with PRO may even be 
more first-personal than uses  of „he himself‟ and in linking the issue of immunity to 
error through misidentification  to the issue of the internal perspective in connection 
with PRO (in cases of verbs like „remember‟, „imagine‟, etc.). He claims that the 
propositional analysis articulated through the notion of anaphora and thematic roles 
is superior to the property-based  view of Lewis and Chierchia. In fact, according to 
him, the property-based analysis of beliefs and attitudes  „de se‟ does not allow the 
theorist to explain  1) immunity to error  through misidentification; 2) the internal 
dimension of PRO in complements of verbs such as  „remember‟, or „imagine‟.  
 Higginbotham accepts Perry‟s idea that „de se‟ attitudes involve a first-personal 
mode of presentation (involving sometimes the word „I‟ or some related notion) and 
reformulates such a view through considerations based on anaphora and thematic 
relations. 
 Higginbotham also accepts Peacocke‟s (1981) consideration that a „de se‟ thought 
involves the use of a mode of presentation „self‟ which only the thinker can use and 
which nobody else can use in reporting such a thought. 
 Higginbotham considers cases with PRO such as: 
 
(1) John remembers PRO going to Paris 
392 
 
which is contrasted with  (2) and (3) 
 
(2) John remembers that he went to Paris; 
(3) John remembers that he himself went to Paris. 
 
The first-personal nature of (1) is expressed through a notation which involves self-
reflexive thought: 
 
(4) For x = John, e, remember (x, e, ^ e‟: go to Paris (σ (e), e‟)) 
 
(1) is different from (2) because it involves an internal dimension. It is the internal 
dimension which, according to Higginbotham, causes immunity to error through 
misidentification. We can capture this „internal dimension‟ through the expression in 
logical form of a thematic role: the person who undergoes  the action in question. So 
we can reformulate (1) through (5) 
 
(5) For X = John, e, remember (x, e, ^ e‟: go to Paris (σ (e) & θ (e‟), e‟)). 
 
With this elucidation in mind, we can explain the following facts: 
 
Only Churchill gave the speech 
Churchill remembers giving the speech 
: 
Only Churchill remembers giving the speech. 
 
Surely someone who listened to the speech remembers that Churchill gave the 
speech or remembers his giving the speech. But are the speeches which Churchill 
remembers giving and which another person remembers hearing the same kind of 
thought? At some level of abstraction they are. At some deeper level, however, they 
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are not.  What validates the inference in the deduction above is the fact that Churchill 
remembers giving his speech from the inside. So in case he  has forgotten  giving the  
speech and someone else informs him that,  in fact, he gave the speech, Churchill 
cannot (truthfully) say that he remembers giving the speech. Memory involves an 
internal perspective in case PRO is used in the complement  clause. Thus, if one 
remembers falling  downstairs, one must certainly have memories of sensations of 
pain; something which one need not have in case  memory is reconstructed through 
an external narration. 
 Higginbotham discusses an interesting question. He asks whether mad Heimson 
who believes that he is Hume has numerically the same  belief as Hume. The 
question, put crudely, is if the belief Heimson has in believing that he himself is 
Hume is the same which Hume has  in believing that he himself is Hume. The 
answer by Higginbotham is ambivalent. On the one hand, their beliefs  are different, 
so much so that we must say that, in believing he is Hume, Heimson has a false 
belief while in case Hume believes he is Hume, we shall say that he has a true belief. 
This is nicely expressed through Higginbotham‟s anaphoric treatment: 
 
(6) For x = Heimson,  e, believe  (x, e,   ^ e‟ (be Hume  (σ (e) & θ (e‟), e‟)). 
Since σ (e) is anaphorically related to Heimson, there is clearly an external 
component to that thought.  However,  Higginbotham says that at some level of 
generality, we can say that Heimson and Hume have the same thought 
 
Be Hume (σ (e) & θ (e‟), e‟) 
 
Higginbotham illustrates this through an analogy to two collapses of bridges. Of 
course, in one sense  two collapses of bridges cannot be the same event, unless the 
bridges are the same. In another sense, we could say that the collapses of two distinct 
bridges are the same type of event provided that the bridges have similar 
characteristics. 
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PART 2 
PRAGMATIC INTRUSION 
 
 
3.1 Pragmatic treatments 
In this section, I will report  the pragmatic treatments by Capone (2010b), based on 
Relevance Theory considerations.  Here I spell out certain implications of the ideas 
in Capone (2010b). 
 
3.2 Capone (2010b) and the pragmatics of ‘de se’. 
Capone (2010b) is an eclectic treatment mixing  linguistic, cognitive and 
philosophical considerations in order to predict pragmatic results. His approach is 
rather eclectic and is a rethinking of pragmatic scales à la Levinson/Horn/Huang in 
terms of considerations based on Relevance Theory. His ideas, in essentials, are very 
simple. If one accepts Higginbotham‟s considerations on the logical forms of „de se‟ 
and „de re‟ beliefs (to pick up just the most representative of the attitudes), it goes 
without saying that the logical forms of „de se‟ beliefs entail the logical forms of „de 
re‟ beliefs (See also Tascheck 1985). Hence the possibility of pragmatic scales. On a 
Relevance Theory line of thinking, the ranking of  „de se‟, „de re‟ in terms of 
entailment entails a ranking in terms of informativeness. Then it goes without saying 
that a „de se‟ interpretation of a pronominal (in those cases where both interpretations 
are possible) is informationally richer and, following the Principle of Relevance, 
greater Cognitive Effects, with a parity of  cognitive efforts, are predicted. We may 
also concoct stories in which a „de se‟ interpretation leads to some kind of action 
which the „de re‟ interpretation would never cause (See Perry; see also Capone 
2010b, the pill story). If this line of thought is accepted, then we can explain easily 
why 
 
(7) John believes he is clever 
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tends to be associated with a „de se‟ interpretation. As Jaszczolt would say, this 
interpretation tends to be „default‟. Of course, its default status derives from the way 
the mind is predisposed to calculate inferences and also from  the human tendency to 
standardize or short-circuit familiar inferences that are probabilistically high. 
A possible objection to this line of thought may be the following: 
You  have not given any reason for thinking  that the stronger interpretation is as 
easy to process as the weaker one and no method of measuring cognitive effort is 
identified. Furthermore, the fact that one interpretation entails another does not 
ensure that it has greater cognitive effects. 
Answer: 
While the objection is correct in principle, it does not work in practice for the 
following reason. A „de se‟ interpretation  is stronger  not only because of 
entailments, but because of the effects of semantic entailments. A „de se‟ 
interpretation, compared to a „de re‟ interpretation‟ limits considerably the amount of 
objects that need to be taken into consideration for interpretation. If John believes „de 
re‟ that he is happy, then in principle there is no limit to the objects which we can 
consider to establish which person John is thinking about (what the belief is about); 
we surely need a theory of context in order to limit the number of objects that can be 
taken into consideration. Even if the context is severely restricted, there may at least 
be a couple of alternatives, such that they would make the interpretation process 
more costly than in the case of the „de se‟ interpretation, which is only about a single 
object. So it seems to me I have amply shown that processing costs are higher in the 
case of „de re‟ interpretations. I agree that entailments need not be equated with 
positive cognitive effects, but in the case of a „de se‟ interpretation a positive 
cognitive effect which is a consequence of entailments is that the thought has 
consequences on the person thought about. So, If I think I have to go, I will go, and I 
will not refrain from moving paralyzed by the thought that the person I am thinking 
of could be someone else. So, the fact that a „de se‟ interpretation entails a „de re‟ 
interpretation immediately translates into immediate and important positive effects 
(more or less the kind of effects on action Perry was thinking about in his famous 
paper). 
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 According to Capone, one may also investigate scales such as the following: 
 
(8) John wants to go away; 
(9) John wants [him to go away]; 
 
(10) John remembers going away; 
 
(11) John remembers his going away. 
 
The use of the marked pronominal, instead of less marked PRO, tends to invite an 
interpretation which is complementary to that associated with PRO. This can be 
explained in terms of M-scales in the framework of Levinson/Horn/Huang or in 
terms of cognitive efforts, which tend to pick up an interpretation disjoint from the 
one associated with the expression involving least amount of cognitive efforts. 
 Capone also explains certain interesting examples by Perry, which seem to 
illuminate further the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. Readers are 
referred for these to Capone (2010b). 
 
Perhaps the most interesting discussion found in Capone (2010b) concerns the 
internal dimension of PRO, which is connected by Higginbotham to immunity to 
error through misidentification. Capone argues that, in connection with certain verbs, 
such as „remember‟ the internal dimension of PRO is guaranteed by semantic effects 
up to a certain point, and that at least part of the internal dimension associated with 
PRO is due to pragmatic effects driven by typical scenarios. With some other verbs, 
such as „expect‟, Capone argues that it is less likely that the internal dimension of 
PRO is a semantic inference and  opts  for the view that it is a pragmatic increment. 
Other verbs such as, e.g.,  „knows how‟ are examined. 
 The most radical part of Capone‟s ideas is that Higginbotham‟s semantic 
elucidations for verbs such as „remember‟, „imagine‟ etc., refined and important 
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though it is, suffers from a certain weakness, which cannot be remedied semantically, 
but only pragmatically. Leaving aside formal notation, Higginbotham‟s treatment of 
(12) 
 
(12) John remembers walking in Oxford 
 
comes out as „The agent of the remembering/John remembers that the agent of the 
walking  was walking in Oxford‟. But then John should know that he is the agent of 
the remembering, a grammatical expertise which may not be acquired by anyone at 
all (Se also Davis Forthcoming on this problem). My discussion suggests that 
Higginbotham‟s logical form of this sentence could be paraphrased along the lines 
of: There is a REMEMBERING-event e such that (i) the agent of e (intuitively, the 
person who remembers) is John and (ii) the content of e (intuitively, what is 
remembered) is that the agent of e participates in an event of walking in Oxford. The 
main possible argument against Higginbotham‟s view is that Higginbotham‟s logical 
form does not entail that John is aware that he is the agent of the REMEMBERING-
event. Higginbotham‟s logical form thus seems to leave open the possibility, for 
example, that John, believing that he is Mary, envisions in a kind of third-person way 
John walking in Oxford, and in actual fact „John remembers walking in Oxford‟ 
seems to exclude this. This argument might have some force (despite the fact that 
Higginbotham in his paper dismisses this kind of possibility as “pathological”) but 
depends on how we spell out REMEMBER. The possibility I  mentioned appears to 
be pathological because it involves a quasi-memory implanted in somebody else‟ s 
brain. However, a less pathological possibility is that someone (else) remembers the 
walking in Oxford (that specific event) in which he was also an agent of the walking 
(suppose it is also true that he happened to walk in Oxford at the same time when 
Higginbotham was). Then the only way to prevent this from happening is to set up 
REMEMBER so that it applies only to events that are remembered from the inside, 
not from the outside. Now, if this is done through semantics (say a stipulation), full 
generality is lost, because I claimed in Capone (2010b) that for other verbs also 
allowing „de se‟ interpretations the internal dimension of PRO is not to be specified 
semantically (due to exceptions). These are the cases of the verbs „expect‟ or 
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„imagine‟. So, instead of opting for a semantic stipulation, I would go for full 
pragmatic intrusion and also claim that there is a pragmatic presupposition that 
identifies the agent of the thinking/remembering/etc.  event and the agent of the 
embedded event. 
 Furthermore, this analysis presupposes that there is a unique thinker of this 
thought and is incompatible with the possibility that someone else, say God, is 
having the same thought. (This difficulty was raised by Neil Feit (p.c), and is to be 
taken seriously). The third kind of problem is that, despite the fact that Higginbotham 
says that these constructions are first-personal, there is nothing in their logical form 
that makes them first personal, unless one allows as normative the inference „I = the 
believer of this thought‟ (and here endless discussions could arise on how obvious, 
normative or natural this inference is or should be). 
 My own view is that the first personal element EGO must somehow be 
incorporated into the propositional form, NOT at the level of semantics, but at the 
level of pragmatics. We need pragmatic intrusion – and here the theories due to 
Levinson (2000), Carston (2002), Sperber and Wilson (1896) come to our aid. 
Accepting that semantics can be underdetermined, we may incorporate certain 
elements through pragmatic intrusion. Considerations of parsimony may even lead us 
to think that pragmatic intrusion, in this case, is to be preferred to incorporation of 
the component EGO at the level of Higginbotham‟s logical form. 
  
 Now, I want to dwell on the possible replies to Neil Feit‟s objection to 
Higginbotham. First of all, I sum up  Neil Feit‟ opinion: 
 Another reason why  I do not think Higginbotham‟s account can handle „de se‟ 
cases adequately is this. It seems possible that somebody could believe (correctly or 
mistakenly, it does not matter) that he is not the only thinker of a certain thought, for 
example he might believe  that God is thinking it too. More generally, he might think 
that  he is not the only thinker  of any of these thoughts.  But, even with this, it seems 
he could have a „de se‟ belief. But on Higginbotham‟s view  - and other similar 
views – such a belief amounts  to „the believer of this thought is F‟. This cannot be 
what the belief amounts to however, since he does not think there is a unique 
believer, the believer of his thought. Moreover, if someone else (God perhaps) really 
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is having the same thought,  then all Higginbotham-style beliefs are false, but he 
could surely have  some true „de se‟ beliefs (personal communication in Capone 
(2010b)). 
 Now, of course, when I say „John believes he is not crazy‟ I do not have in mind 
other believers of this thought other than John. And, if it is somehow in the 
background that God and I are the only believers of this thought, I do not think I 
thereby express or intend to express that John believes that he and God are not crazy. 
Nor does Higginbotham think so  (I assume). The examples by Higginbotham, such 
as „John remembers walking in Oxford‟, are less vulnerable to Feit‟s objection. 
Higginbotham‟s possible  reply would be that, given the anaphoric properties of 
PRO, it goes without saying that the unique believer of this thought  (the agent of the 
remembering) is John and not God (Is not anaphoric coindexation enough to make 
this clear?).  It is not even necessary to resort to the more complicated story that 
makes the subject of the walking plural: the believers of this thought, assuming a 
kind of metaphysics in which wherever one is, God is there  too. (And I suppose that 
if talk of God is infused into Higginbotham‟s story, then certain metaphysical 
consequences would not be completely  absurd). 
 Of course, the problem raised by Neil Feit becomes more cogent not in the cases 
of constructions dear to Higginbotham, but in cases of interpretative ambiguities 
such as (13):  
 
(13) John thinks he is happy. 
 
Here pragmatics is abundantly involved, as even Higginbotham has to admit, and it 
goes without saying that if  Feit‟s objection has some cogency, this goes up to some 
point, because if, by pragmatic intrusion, we create an anaphoric identity  link 
between the thinker of this thought and John, the uniqueness condition is valid and 
thoughts about God‟s having the same thought are out of the question. (So either we 
assume that some pragmatic linking between „John‟ and „the believer of this thought‟ 
is presupposed, making Feit‟s considerations otiose, or one needs to insert the 
anaphoric link explicitly into the semantics). 
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 Another line of response to Feit could be the following.    Suppose that the 
corresponding analysis of John thinks he is not crazy would wrongly imply that John 
believes that he is the sole individual to have that thought. Even so one could fail  to 
see why this is the case – it would commit one to the existence of a certain thinking 
event with a unique agent, but certainly there could be other thinking events around 
with other agents that involve a similar content, and so the agent of that first thinking 
event could believe that there are.    
It does not seem to me that this line of response can dissolve the problem.  The 
problem is that for the sentence „John thinks he is happy‟, we do not want it to be 
true if  John thinks that God (the thinker of „He is happy‟) is happy. We want to 
exclude this case, and to do so we need to add something on top of Higginbotham‟s 
elucidation, presumably the Ego component, which would transform a „de re‟ 
thought into a „de se‟ thought (also along the lines of Reimer 2009, who admits that a 
„de se‟ mode of presentation in the presupposition of acquaintance of an object  is 
what distinguishes a „de re‟ from „a „de se‟ thought).  
 A „precìs‟ is in order. Despite seeing some problems in Higginbotham‟s semantic 
elucidation, I accept it as the best possible semantic solution to work in tandem with 
pragmatic intrusion. If pragmatic intrusion is granted, Higginbotham‟s semantic 
elucidation provides very well to provide minimal truth-conditions on top of which 
full pragmatic intrusion accrues.  
    
4.1 EGO or not EGO?  
While Castañeda (1966) in his seminal papers disseminated some really original 
ideas about „de se‟ attitudes, and provided the basic examples alimenting the 
theoretical discussion,  he  was clearly at a fork in having to decide whether „he*‟ 
was completely irreducible (a clearly radical and original claim) or whether it could 
be partially reduced, say by making use of the concept EGO, to appear somehow in 
the semantic/pragmatic analysis of uses of the essential indexical. The other horn of 
the dilemma is certainly constituted by Perry‟s ideas that beliefs „de se‟ amount to 
specifications of mental states in which the concept EGO appears somehow (if it 
could not be shown to be semantically present, it could be shown to be indispensable 
for a pragmatic type of analysis). While the considerations by Perry are quite 
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straightforward and presumably presuppose the at least partial reducibility of „de se‟ 
to the EGO concept, Castañeda‟s considerations about the irreducibility of „de se‟ are 
fully articulated and explicitly deny that recourse to the concept EGO, even if 
invoked through pragmatic machinery, could be useful. Now, this is unfortunate 
because there is a clear link between IEM and the EGO component of a „de se‟ 
thought. 
  
4.2 Immunity to error through misidentification is the result of pragmatic 
intrusion 
Immunity to error through misidentification is a property which „de se‟ constructions 
inherit from the property of the „first-person‟. However, if my claim that „de se‟ 
constructions involve use of an implicit EGO component through pragmatic intrusion 
is correct, it cannot be true that immunity to error through misidentification is a 
semantic property of „de se‟ constructions, although we can legitimately say that it is 
a pragmatic property of „de se‟ constructions, being derivative from the EGO 
component incorporated into „de se‟ constructions through pragmatic intrusion. 
For the time being, we must decide whether we should derive immunity to error 
through identification from the internal dimension of PRO (or of a „de se 
„construction) or whether we should derive the internal dimension of PRO (or „de 
se‟) from immunity to error through misidentification. This is not a trivial question. 
We can make this question even more complicated by asking whether the internal 
dimension is derivable from the implicit use of EGO in „de se‟ constructions. After 
all, we could have the following logical chain: 
 
EGO > Internal dimension > immunity to error through misidentification. 
 
If the logical chain above has some validity, and we can establish without doubt that 
EGO is a pragmatically enriched component of the „de se‟ construction, then we 
„ipso facto‟ show that the internal dimension of „de se‟ and immunity to error 
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through misidentification are consequences of pragmatic intrusion and, in particular, 
the incorporation of EGO in „de se‟ constructions. 
 Have we got independent support for such a line of thought? Recanati (2009) has 
insisted that not all „de se‟ constructions involve immunity to error through 
misidentification and that in some cases proprioception is involved in guaranteeing 
immunity to error through misidentification. What is proprioception? While the 
discussion is undoubtedly complicated, Recanati distinguishes between feeling that 
something is the case and seeing that something is the case. For example, I can feel 
that my arm is broken or I can see that my arm is broken. In case I feel that my arm 
is broken, proprioception is involved and there can be no case for error due to 
misidentification (it is proprioception that guarantees immunity to error through 
misidentification). If I see that my arm is broken (say I look at my arm and see an 
arm that is broken, but I mistake your arm for my arm and I make an identification 
mistake, then immunity to error through misidentification is not guaranteed). While 
there is some truth in this discussion, I think it deserves deepening. However, unlike 
Recanati, instead of placing the burden on the distinction between perception and 
proprioception, I want to make immunity to error through misidentification depend 
(at least in basic cases like „John thinks he is clever‟)  on the awareness of the subject 
of the thinking experience. Of course, awareness of the subject of experience 
involves  some kind of self-awareness and not proprioception proper or only 
perception, but the kind of immunity to error through misidentification in cases like 
„John thinks he is clever‟  is different from the cases discussed by Recanati and does 
not concern objects of experience but subjects of experience. (See also the discussion 
by Galen  Strawson). Thus proprioception may not be the right concept in this case, 
because it is not the case that the thinking subject is engaged in proprioception in 
thinking (with some appropriate exceptions, of course: This thought makes me 
nervous; this thought makes me sad; this thought made me tremble; this thought 
made me faint). Thinking is the essential relation necessary for establishing a 
thinking subject. It is the act of thinking that establishes the subject and the identity 
between the subject of thinking and the subject of the thought. While the person who 
thinks (14) 
 
(14) I think I am clever 
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is not particularly engaged in an interpretation process but provides the appropriate 
EGO concept by the act of thinking and this is enough to ensure immunity to error 
through misidentification; something different occurs in (15) 
 
(15) John thinks he is clever. 
 
Here the hearer/reader must simulate (as noted by Igor Douven  Forthcoming) an act 
of thinking and in simulating this act of thinking she supplies an EGO concept 
through inference. Of course, pragmatic inference,  utilizing the principle of 
relevance, independently supports the simulation process and establishes the 
anaphoric link between John and „he‟ and also supplies the EGO concept which is 
incorporated into the thought by pragmatic enrichment. Having established that John 
thinks of himself as Ego and that this is guaranteed by the act of thinking in itself, the 
hearer can simulate John‟s mental state and, in particular, the internal dimension of 
the thought (he thinks he is clever or happy because he experiences cleverness or 
happiness). 
 In the above, I have proposed that  the first-personal dimension of „de se‟, as 
pragmatically implicated, is logically responsible for immunity to error through 
misidentification (we could also see this case as a case of immunity of error through 
misidentification being supervenient (in the sense of Chalmers 1996) on the ego-
component of „de se‟). 
If, as I proposed, the EGO component of a „de se‟ thought, is due to pragmatic 
intrusion,  immunity to error through misidentification is a consequence of a 
pragmatic attribution in reports of „de se‟ thoughts. In naturally occurring „de se‟ 
thoughts which are not reported, it is the act of thinking and the identity between 
consequential acts of thinking that guarantees the EGO component, and, 
consequently immunity to error through misidentification. 
According to Wayne Davis (p.c.) my thesis is that the semantics together with the 
pragmatics of first-person pronoun explains why certain beliefs about ourselves are 
404 
 
immune to error through misidentification. This seems incorrect for Davis, as being 
first-personal is not what makes a belief special; it is being the product of 
introspection that makes it special. Moreover, it is hard to understand  how any fact 
about the words we use to express  beliefs   can explain why those beliefs cannot be 
mistaken. How can facts about the English word „I‟ – a mere letter or speech sound 
with a meaning and use – explain why  a certain propositional attitude has a special 
epistemological status? Propositional sentences are not  sentences or strings of letters 
or speech sounds. (Notice, however, that I am not claiming that IEM is ONLY a 
semantic phenomenon but that it is an epistemological/semantic/pragmatic 
phenomenon). 
Ok. Suppose that introspection is, as Wayne Davis proposes, the essence of IEM. Is 
there a way to argue that introspection is not really possible (everyone should accept 
at least that it is facilitated by the use of the first-personal pronominal) unless a 
predicate is assigned to a subject and that introspection specifically necessitates 
assigning a predicate to a first-personal subject? The role played by semantics is 
evident. But this does not amount to saying that the first-personal pronominal is 
essential in self-attribution of an introspective  thought; surely the fact that the 
thinker and the attributor are the same makes it possible that no mistake is made in 
the attribution even if no first-personal pronominal is used; however, in expressing 
that thought to others it is necessary to use the first-personal pronominal.  
 A related question is whether  all beliefs and thoughts have to be expressed in 
words. As Davis (p.c.) says,  a belief or thought about  ourselves is distinct from any 
words we use to express it. The belief that I myself am in pain is very different from 
the sentence „I am in pain‟; the belief does not contain four words, is not a sentence 
of English, cannot be seen, heard, written or uttered, and so on. The sentence may 
occur in inner speech, but inner speech is not belief or thought. An I-thought does not 
contain the word „I‟. 
 Ok. Let us grant that at least sometimes one need not use language to form a 
thought, in particular a thought about oneself. Let us suppose that this thought is not 
very different from a sensation (pain). The fact that pain occurs in myself is 
sufficient to make the case that a mistaken identification cannot occur. Suppose then 
that it is the object (my body) which prevents me from making a mistaken 
identification. Yet I suppose that the body is at least part of myself and, thus, the 
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thought, if it has to be expressed, requires the logical subject „I‟ and only this, 
because a definite expression could not preclude a mistaken identification. So, the 
argument is not that a first-personal thought requires the word „I‟, but that it requires 
it if it has to be expressed. The question of misidentification, in a thought which is 
sufficiently similar to the attribution of a sensation, cannot occur; but it can occur 
when the thought is expressed. This is all we need. So I may concede that Wayne 
Davis is partially right about belief – even if I should say that the kind of belief he 
has in mind is more similar to sensation that to the propositional attitudes we 
normally discuss. 
 
4.3 Why immunity to error through misidentification is logically 
INDEPENDENT of the internal dimension of PRO/’de se’. 
Admittedly, the reasons which I furnish in this section against making a logical 
connection between the internal dimension of PRO/„de se‟ and immunity to error 
through misidentification depend on some previous considerations of the inferential 
behavior of de se/PRO, presented in Capone (2010b). There I wanted to make the 
provision/expression of the internal dimension of PRO/‟de se‟ a pragmatic 
constituent of the thought. However, after some discussion I moved towards the 
more balanced view that, in general, especially with verbs such as „remember‟, the 
internal  dimension of PRO is semantically associated with the specific construction 
(PRO, in our case) (See Ninan 2009 for an important paper on imagining from the 
inside, which amounts to imagining  a scenario from the point of view of one of its 
participants, in a centred world). Then I have speculated that the internal dimension  
(constituent) supplied through the semantics is only partial or gappy (in line with 
views by Carston (2002) on semantic underdetermination) and that pragmatics is 
responsible in part for supplying a partial internal dimension. For certain other verbs, 
such as „expect‟, „know how‟, etc. I have speculated that the internal dimension 
constituent is fully provided through pragmatics. 
Now, what are the consequences of the acceptance of the views above for the 
plausibility of the view that immunity to error through misidentification depends on 
the internal dimension of PRO/de se? The most immediate consequence would be 
that, in the most straightforward cases, like ‘expect’, or „imagine’ „de se‟ 
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constructions (he* or she*) should not be associated with immunity to error through 
misidentification, if IEM depends on the properties of the internal dimension through 
semantics. Thus, someone who expects to leave for Rome tomorrow may 
legitimately have  some doubts as to whether he himself is involved in the thought 
that he will leave for Rome tomorrow. But this is absurd. Immunity to error through 
misidentification must be granted for cases such as „expect‟ and „imagine‟ as well 
and this shows that immunity is not logically dependent on the internal dimension 
(which is implicated in these cases, if my view in Capone (2010b) is correct). 
 What other consequences follow from the fact that the internal dimension of 
PRO/‟de se‟ is only partially semantically expressed and partially pragmatically 
articulated in cases such as „remember‟? If we grant the logical dependence between 
immunity to error through misidentification and the internal dimension of PRO, we 
paradoxically arrive at the result that the greater the pragmatic enrichment in 
connection with the internal dimension of PRO/„de se‟, the greater the immunity to 
error through misidentification. However, nobody says or is willing to accept that 
immunity to error through misidentification is a gradable notion. 
 My initial idea that the internal dimension of PRO/‟de se‟ may serve to support 
immunity to error through misidentification and not to establish it is not implausible; 
however, the immediate consequence of having such a view is that the internal 
dimension of PRO is useful in establishing immunity to error through 
misidentification only in those cases where there can be some doubt because a 
sentence is ambiguous. Consider, again an  ambiguous sentence similar to one 
example  by Recanati: 
 
(16) He thought his legs were crossed. 
 
Depending on whether he was only seeing his legs crossed or was also feeling them 
(proprioception being involved), (37) presents (or does not) a case of immunity to 
error through misidentification. The internal dimension  of the pronominal „his‟ is 
clearly projected through a pragmatic enrichment and, thus, proprioception is 
responsible for promoting immunity to error through misidentification through the 
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intermediation of a first-personal pronoun. The pragmatically enriched internal 
dimension and proprioception go hand in hand and serve to reinforce immunity to 
error to misidentification in the sense of disambiguating a sentence which is 
interpretatively ambiguous.  
 
4.4  Wayne Davis (Forthcoming), ‘de se’ and indexicals. 
In this short section, I make connections between IEM and Davis‟ view that „de se‟ is 
linked  with deixis. Davis thinks (in essentials) that „de se‟ attitudes are to be 
explained by reference to deictic concepts. The thinking subject thinks of himself 
through a deictic. This is similar to what I have claimed myself, although Davis is 
more detailed. I was content with an „I‟ concept, while Davis distinguishes between a 
deictic, a demonstrative and an anaphoric use of „I‟. The deictic use of „I‟ is probably 
what is involved in „de se‟ thoughts, deictic uses being licensed by what  Davis calls 
„presentations‟. The thinker thinks of himself and has a presentation of himself that 
gives interpretation to his use (whether mental or verbal) of „I‟.  
I depart from Davis in recognizing a dichotomy between the thinker‟s use of „I‟ in 
thought, and the hearer‟s interpretation of „I‟ or „he*‟ in an ascription of thought. 
The thinker‟s use of „I‟ in thought  needs no special act of interpretation and involves 
immunity to error through misidentification in that no identity is needed or 
established, as there is no interpretation problem from the point of view of the 
thinker, who surely has a presentation of himself which is perhaps tacit and who 
keeps track of himself and his identity through the act of thinking, rather than 
through the act of interpretation. Instead, the ascription of „de se‟ attitudes (to 
someone else) involves an interpretation problem and keeping track of the referent 
and mode of presentation used by the thinker either through a simulation or through a 
pragmatic act of interpretation guided through the Principle of Relevance or both. 
The two perspectives are different and surely the use of „I‟ in ascription of „de se‟ 
attitudes involves both an internal  and an external dimension. The deictic use  
discussed by Davis may be suitable to both dimensions, provided that we are clear 
that a „presentation‟ or „self-presentation‟ is involved in the thinker‟s awareness of 
EGO, while a simulation or pragmatic interpretation is involved in understanding the 
presentation which the thinking subject experiences. Perhaps it would not even be 
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incorrect to say that we can speak of a deictic use when referring to the hearer‟s 
interpretation problem, while from the point of view of the thinker there is no 
interpretation problem and thus it is not a matter of establishing the content of the 
deictic thanks to contextual coordinates. All that is required is the thinking act and 
the thinking act is its own context and also its own content. 
 Before closing this section, should we be content with Davis‟s exposition? While 
surely Davis‟ story resolves the problems he himself raised in connection with 
Higginbotham‟s theory (along the lines of the problems I myself discussed), he does 
so in an ambiguous way. Is the use of the deictic a semantic or a pragmatic 
component? I was clear that pragmatics was involved in establishing the EGO 
concept in „de se‟ attitudes – even in cases of PRO, which are particularly 
problematic for Davis since PRO does not receive content from a context and thus is 
not easily assimilable to a first-personal concept). If we accept the considerations by 
Davis, we should have a double interpretation process. The provision of an EGO 
concept and, then, the interpretation relevant to a context of use (but this I admitted 
through lavish use of anaphora). From the point of view of the thinking subject, 
however, there is no pragmatics, since he has direct introspective access to his/her 
own thoughts. Pragmatics is involved only from a third person perspective, that of a 
hearer who tries to reconstruct the speaker‟s thoughts and self-awareness. 
 
5.1. ‘De se’ and modularity of mind: cancellability? 
Finally it is time to examine the issue of the cancellability or non-cancellability of 
the „de se‟ inferences I have discussed at length. Non-cancellability per se, as Grice 
was well aware, does not militate against the pragmatic nature of an inference. I have 
claimed elsewhere that explicatures are non-cancellable and the motivation I gave for 
this is that explicatures tend to be motivated by problems in the logical form, when a 
sentence is perceived to be blatantly false or a logical absurdity and pragmatics is 
there to help and remedy the problem. Since the explicature is the Deus ex machina 
of the semantics, I have claimed in a number of publications that it is and should be 
non-cancellable. This seems to fit in with a modular view of pragmatic processes, as 
argued in a number of publications. (See Capone 2010b, Capone 2011 for detailed 
arguments).  
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 We saw that the incorporation of the Ego concept was the Deus-ex-Machina of the 
semantic treatment à la Higginbotham, protecting this treatment from all the 
objections raised by e.g. Davis (Fortchoming).  
One further reason for opting for a pragmatic treatment of „de se‟ is, of course, the 
parsimony of levels that it affords us, as one can eliminate at least an important 
meaning component from the semantics, obtaining it for free from pragmatics.  
 One last reason for opting for a pragmatic level of meaning in „de se‟ attributions 
is the differential mechanisms of „de se‟ thoughts in view of what happens in the 
mental processes of the thinker and of what happens in the mental processes of the 
hearer. The hearer is in a different position, both with respect to calculation of the 
Ego component and of the anaphoric links within the „de se‟ ascription and with 
respect to the attribution of Immunity to Error through Misidentification. The 
disparity between the position of the thinker and the position of the speaker/hearer in 
connection with pragmatic inferences was noted in an article by Jeff Speaks (2006). 
The disparity between the thinker and the speaker/hearers‟ stance to the inference is 
due to the fact that luminosity is available in thought, introspection being a guide to 
one‟s intended meanings, while the meanings projected by the speaker and 
understood by the hearer in conversation do not rely on luminosity but on an explicit 
effort to get intentions across through contextual clues and cues. 
 While immunity to error through misidentification is presupposed for the thinker 
in virtue of the continuity afforded by the act of thinking (thus immunity seems to be 
an „a priori‟ category of first-personal thought, something similar to a pragmatic 
presupposition along the lines of Maier 2009) and by the fact that in thinking the 
question of misidentification cannot arise; for the hearer, immunity is a logical 
consequence of the pragmatic inference involved in assigning an ego component to 
the „de se‟ thought. Simulation and, also pragmatic interpretation flowing from the 
Principle of relevance are clearly involved. 
 The disparity between the speaker‟s perception of himself as himself and the 
hearer‟s ascription of „ego‟ to the thinker has interesting consequences  concerning 
cancellability. The speaker‟s perception of himself as himself is clearly  non-
cancellable; the hearer‟s ascription of EGO to the thinker of the „de se‟ thought is 
driven by contextual clues which lead the interpretation process in a certain direction, 
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from which it is impossible to go back. So both from the speaker‟s and the hearer‟s 
perspectives it is impossible to cancel the EGO component of the thought. 
 Implicitly, I have replied to some qualms by Coliva (2003) about the idea that 
Immunity to Error through Misidentification depends on the ego concept 
incorporated in „de se‟ attitudes. Her main objection to this idea is that the use of „I‟ 
in „de se‟ thoughts (whether explicit or implicit) is not enough to guarantee a first-
personal thought. Coliva speaks of the split between speaker‟s reference and 
semantic reference (see also Jaszczolt Forthcoming for a similar argument). Given 
this split (which has emerged especially in the discussions of Donnellan‟s  
attributive/referential distinction), it may not be correct to say that immunity to error 
through misidentification  depends on the presence of a pronominal like „I‟ in logical 
form. The case discussed by Bezuidenhout (1997) (Bill Clinton: The Founding 
Fathers invested me with the power to appoint Supreme Court justices) does justice 
to the ideas and doubts exposed by Coliva. In the example by Bezuidenhout „me‟ is 
used attributively, and not referentially. Of course Coliva does well to address the 
issue of the pragmatic nature of  the incorporation of the EGO-component  in „de se‟ 
attitudes. However, we get the impression that her skepticism on the idea of deriving 
immunity to error through misidentification is not completely justified, given the 
heavy presence of pragmatic intrusion in propositional forms. Given the non-
cancellable character of the pragmatic inference which I posited in „de se‟ thoughts, 
the fact that  „I‟ can be interpreted attributively, rather than referentially is not a 
problem. Of course, my claim that immunity to error through misidentification 
follows from the Ego-like nature of „de se‟ should be confined to cases where Ego is 
interpreted referentially. But this is, of course, presupposed by the „de se‟ 
semantic/pragmatic analysis. Again, we should distinguish between the interpretation 
of the construction  (e.g. I believe I am happy) on the part of the speaker, which 
heavily relies on Mentalese (the speaker has direct access to his own thoughts, and, 
thus, ego as used in „de se‟ constructions is clearly and directly referential) and the 
interpretation on the part of the hearer. When we examine the dimension of the 
hearer, we see that the interpretative problem of „de se‟ constructions consists in 
assigning, through pragmatics, an inferential increment making the logical form 
more plausible than it would otherwise be. The pragmatic enrichment, thus, could not 
make use of an uninterpreted  EGO component, but has to make use of an interpreted 
EGO component, a component that is referential and not attributive (as in the 
411 
 
example by Bezuidenhout). Of course, if we accepted a view in which the EGO 
component were assigned at the level of the semantics (say by identifying PRO with 
„I‟ or an EGO-concept), then Coliva‟s objections could be certainly and dramatically 
applicable. But this is one more reason for opting for a semantico/pragmatic 
treatment, rather than for opting for a semantic treatment only. In a sense, we owe to 
Coliva the intuition that pragmatic intrusion resolves problems that would otherwise 
be insuperable. 
Before bringing this chapter to conclusion, I want to point out that my 
considerations have something in common with Maier (2009). Maier essentially 
distinguishes between „de re‟ and „de dicto‟ attitudes deriving „de re‟ cases by 
accommodating presuppositions at top level in the DR. „De se‟ cases are clearly 
cases in which the object one is acquainted with is a centred object. Only the 
presuppositions of discourse can establish whether the object one is acquainted with 
is a centred object. Now, in my discussion I have made an effort to disentangle cases 
where the presuppositions of discourse are responsible for IEM and the cases where 
the hearer needs to undertake an inferential process to simulate the mental processes 
of the person whose thoughts are being described in an assertion. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has been loaded with theoretical considerations and their consequences. 
Presumably we have reached a stage in which, pragmatics, which originated in 
philosophy and was propagated outside philosophy giving impetus to 
communication-oriented linguistic views, can serve to throw light on philosophical 
topics. I cannot exaggerate the importance of seeing  the phenomenon of immunity to 
error through misidentification as a consequence of pragmatic intrusion. It is true; I 
have reached a stage in which the theory has become loaded with various 
consequences of previously accepted views. However, it is the nature of 
interconnected considerations and interlocking ideas one finds in this chapter, that 
makes it rich, by provoking novel and perhaps radical discussions of a phenomenon 
of which we knew little, before putting some thought to pragmatic intrusion. 
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Chapter 12 
 
The pragmatics of quotation,  explicatures and modularity of mind. 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter presents a purely pragmatic account of quotation and argues that it is able to 
accommodate all relevant linguistic phenomena. Given that it is more parsimonious to 
explain the data only by reference to pragmatic principles than to explain them by reference 
to both pragmatic and semantic principles, as is common in the literature, I conclude that the 
account of quotation I  present is to be preferred to the more standard accounts. Alternative 
theories of quotation are treated in an intellectually honest way. 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter presents a purely pragmatic account of quotation and argues that it is 
able to accommodate all relevant linguistic phenomena
1
. Given that it is more 
                                                 
1
 I assume that this chapter, which is an exercise in radical pragmatics, draws much 
from Recanati‟s ideas and pushes them to extreme consequences (I have no idea 
whether Recanati would approve of what I have done; but I am committed to the idea 
that this is an off-shoot of his theory of quotation). I also assume that this paper is in 
line with the idea by Recanati (2004) according to which the main role of pragmatics 
is to boost semantics by amplifying the expressive potential of human languages. 
This amplification power results from the fact that pragmatics can use already 
existing linguistic resources to create new ones on the basis of a limited set of 
pragmatic principles. Like Saka (2005) I will focus on the role played by the 
speaker‟s intentions in quotation practices and I will reject the idea that  a pragmatic 
treatment of quotation is to be equated with  Humpty-Dumptyism, given that 
intentions  depend on expectations based on internalized norms and on general 
language-transcendent principles of cognition (Saka 2005, 5). My view of quotation 
will be compared with my views of  pragmatic intrusion and explicatures (to 
anticipate, I consider the effects of quotation as products of pragmatic intrusion into 
truth-conditional content). I will argue that the features of my theory of quotation and 
the features of my theory of explicatures  fit  like plugs in sockets and such a fit 
serves to render both theories stronger. I take  the interlocking nature of two modules 
of the same theory (or of a wider theory) to provide greater confirmation for the 
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parsimonious to explain the data only by reference to pragmatic principles than to 
explain them by reference to both pragmatic and semantic principles, as is common 
in the literature, I conclude that the account of quotation I  present is to be preferred 
to the more standard accounts. Alternative theories of quotation are discussed in a 
critical way.  
 This chapter  has the following structure. In section 1, I address in a general way  
the problems which a pragmatic theory of quotation must tackle: the asymmetry 
between written and oral language; the possibility of quoting a sentence originally 
uttered in a different language; the fact that in the oral language there is nothing that 
can be demonstrated through a demonstrative pronominal; the fact that we can  
master the practice of quotation in languages different from our own; and the fact 
that we can learn the quotation practice without formal instruction. 
 In section 2, I discuss the standard  theories of quotation (including some old ones 
like the demonstrative theory) and after discussion of the disadvantages of these 
theories, I focus on Recanati‟s theory, which opens the way to a radical pragmatic 
perspective. I also consider mixed quotation and propose that pragmatic intrusion can 
happily deal with it. In section 3.1, I connect the discussion of quotation with the 
discussion of cancellability of explicatures. In section 3.2, I discuss certain 
differences between Saka‟s view and my own view, which depend on my focus on  
interpretation problems. In section 3.3, I deal with camouflaged quotations and I 
argue that they can be dealt with in terms of pragmatic intrusion.  In section 3.4,  I 
address a crucial problem posed by Predelli (2003) to a radical pragmatic theory of 
quotation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
validity of the two modules  in question. If we can show that there are other modules  
(of the same theory) that have interlocking capacities, we  will be able to provide  
greater confirmation for each module individually. So far my considerations on 
explicatures tie in with my considerations on Grice‟s circle, with those of modularity 
of mind, with those on the attributive/referential distinction and with those  on 
quotation.  
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1. On Quotation. 
  Quotation is an important practice, because it allows one to separate someone‟s 
voice from the reporter‟s voice in a direct or indirect report (where mixed quotation 
occurs). In fact, in direct quotation, we attribute words  as well as thoughts  to other 
people. Given that in quotation what is most important is to separate one‟s voice 
from another, we predict  that that quotation is not merely  a semantic phenomenon, 
given the availability of pragmatic resources that suggest the speaker‟s 
differentiation between one‟s voice and another. Consider a sentence like (1), where 
English words are ascribed to a non-English speaker: 
(1) Galileo said, 'The earth moves!' 
Such uses, accepted by  Sperber & Wilson (1986,  228) and by Recanati (2010,  
223), argue in favor of a radical pragmatic view of quotation. In fact, given that the 
hearer can infer that the quoted item was uttered in a language different from 
English, it is evident that  pragmatic resources must be involved in quotation. From 
the very beginning, I should point out that although quotation is standardly taken to 
involve quotation marks, this must be regarded as the result of a focus on the written 
language; in fact, there can be more than one way of signaling quotation, and in the 
spoken language one can use certain devices that distinguish between voices for 
example by showing the different qualities of the voices. This is one of the many 
resources available which can indicate that a speaker is quoting an expression or an 
utterance or a portion of an utterance. 
This practice of quotation, in written English, consists in putting a phrase or a 
sentence within quotation marks. However, it is accepted practice  not to use any 
symbols for quotations in logic textbooks (for those cases in which it is clear that one 
is discussing  the forms of words, and not their extension). What happens in spoken 
language is even more liberal (Washington 1992). It may happen that a philosopher 
who reads aloud  a passage from his article will be at pains to say „Quote‟, then the 
quoted words, then „Unquote‟; and it may happen that sometimes we signal through 
finger dancing that quotation marks are to be perceived somehow. However, in the 
remaining cases, most people fail to use quotation marks in the spoken language, 
since it is clear in context what the intended meaning is, whether one is talking about 
words or about a word‟s extension. 
415 
 
Probably the most thorny cases for philosophical theories of quotation are 
quotational devices such as italics. If one assumes that a demonstrative element is 
present in the sentence, then surely the italicized part cannot count as the 
demonstrative element (the demonstrative element is perfectly explicit in Davidson‟s 
analysis) in, e.g. Davidson‟s analysis of quotation. (I suppose that one reason for 
objecting to the view that italics can be used as a demonstrative element is that a 
demonstrative is normally an entity which can be distinguished from the thing 
demonstrated; in the case of italics it is not easy to distinguish a demonstrative 
element, as  the words mentioned and the demonstrative element should be fused 
together, which is like using a road sign that points to itself say in virtue of changing 
the color of the sign. Why is it that a road sign like this does not exist? It does not 
exist because we take the road sign to point to something external to it and not to 
something inside itself
2
. This is presumably what is behind the idea of demonstrating 
something. Surely we could use a road sign in this way, by relying on some marked 
characteristics to point to the fact that the authority who made use of the road sign 
wanted it to point to itself; but this would make the use of the road sign difficult to 
understand, because the point of a road sign is to demonstrate something outside 
itself; once we become used to the demonstrative practice, it would be difficult to 
modify it by adding peculiarities to it. To return to italics, italics can show that an 
expression is being mentioned but it is not a way of pointing to the expression). At 
this point, it may be convenient to distinguish between using a demonstrative and 
demonstrating (as Reimer 1996 does). While it could be argued, somehow, that even 
                                                 
2
 Paolo Leonardi (personal communication) has got a different but similar example: 
you arrive close to Rome and at the entrance of the city there is a road sign with the 
written string: ROME. Here the road sign indicates the border between Rome and the 
rest of the territory. A reviewer also point out that we must compare the P with an 
arrow on streets in cities. Horizontal arrow tells us to take P as quoting ('There is a 
parking there'). A vertical arrow tells us that P is an injunction /prohibition 
/limitation, not a quote. In Finnish we use case forms like the following: Nominative 
metsä vs. Partitive metsää ('forest') e.g. „Valtion metsä‟, with straight arrow, means: 
"There is a State Forest there" (in direction of arrow). „Valtion metsää‟ with no arrow 
means"This is all a State Forest". This is used to express a definition, no quotation  is 
involved here.  
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the use of italics is a way of demonstrating an object (say, a word), surely it cannot 
be granted that italics amounts to usage of a demonstrative pronominal, as such a 
pronominal would have to be external to the object demonstrated. I take it to be a 
universal of language use that a demonstrative can be used to point to anything but to 
itself; of course there may be apparent difficulties with this, such as cases like “This 
sentence is blue”. Here the demonstrative  refers to itself (as well as to three other 
words). Things are not so easy though. I can say “This sentence is blue” by inviting 
the hearer to look at the way the sentence is written (a written token of the sentence, 
actually) and I am inviting the hearer to consider the whole sentence and not just the 
demonstrative; it happens that the demonstrative is part of the sentence, but it cannot 
be used to demonstrate itself in isolation from the sentence in which it occurs; this is 
a clear limitation to the idea that a demonstrative can demonstrate itself. Paolo 
Leonardi (personal communication) considers that there are  more complicated cases 
like „This utterance is false‟ in which „this‟ stands for the entire utterance; or there is 
the case in which you ask me to point to an Italian demonstrative and I answer 
„This‟. As to the second case, I would be happy to consider it a compressed use; what 
the speaker means is: This is it: „this‟. As to the former case, I would like to notice 
that at least with some demonstratives the self-referential use is not possible, as in 
„That utterance is false‟, which means that it may be legitimate to claim that „This 
utterance is false‟ is not a real demonstrative but is a use that is parasitic on 
demonstratives. „This utterance is false‟ means „The utterance I have just proffered is 
false‟; but now it is clear that „This‟ in this case is nothing more than a definite 
article in combination with an implicit description. 
Now, even if we concede that italics could be used (pragmatically?) to 
demonstrate an object, its demonstrative power can never amount to the full power of 
a full pronominal, given that it would necessarily have to point to a demonstrated 
object but it could not point to an italicized object. However, Saka (personal 
communication) says that this seems to be false. Consider: “Blue is in italics”. But 
Saka‟s example makes explicit use of the word „italics‟ and it is this word which 
helps italics to demonstrate the expression in italics, italics being part of the 
mentioned token. Without the exlicit use of the words „in italics‟ the hearer would be 
in the dark as to whether the speaker intends italics to be part of the quotation or not. 
It appears that, when no explicit words accompany such uses, it is the speaker‟s 
intentions which make matters clear. 
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  Suppose one accepts that quotation marks are a grammatical device, one that is 
used in virtue of knowing a convention about language (and about a particular 
language). How does it come about that we are mostly able to understand how 
quotation works in languages which are not related to ours? We can interpret 
quotation even if we are not fully aware or have never been formally instructed that a 
certain grammatical operation is needed to obtain quotation. This seems to point to 
pragmatic theories of quotation. 
 Wayne Davis (personal communication) insists that  some linguistic conventions 
are common to many languages, especially written language conventions. One group 
of examples are the conventions governing punctuation marks  like „?‟ and the 
period; quotation marks falling  in this very group. Another are Arabic numerals and 
mathematical function symbols like „+‟. Second, the interpretation of quotation 
marks is such that they can be used to refer to the words of any language;  there is no 
reason why speakers of all written languages cannot use quotation marks with the 
same interpretation. I do not quarrel with this idea that there are some constant ways 
of expressing quotations in the world languages. My point is merely that if quotation 
marks were expressed through a minimally different usage in a different language,  
second language users could be capable of grasping the quotational meaning without 
formal instruction
3
. If conventions are, usually, of an arbitrary kind, a point which 
even Davis must grant, then we would expect that a second language user, faced with 
an expression such as „das auto‟ („das auto‟ being a foreign word for him), would 
pause to ask himself if  „…..‟ is a quotation in the new language, for, for all he 
knows, given that every language has its own conventions, „…‟ could be used for a 
different purpose. But, in fact, second language users do not hesitate like this in using 
quotation, which strongly points to a pragmatic, rather than to a semantic, 
conventional, mechanism. 
 Another quibble may derive from my use of „formal instruction‟. Quotation may 
be a conventional mechanism, even if it is not acquired by formal instruction. At this 
point, we may hesitate. Was it a formal instruction or not, when our teacher corrected 
                                                 
3
 I was told in conversation that German and French have  different conventions 
about quotation. Of course, I do not exclude that  conversational inferences can get 
grammaticalized in a language and I admit it is possible that they get 
grammaticalized in a different way. However, the pragmatic principles underlying 
such inferences may be the same. 
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our language use, when we forgot to use quotation devices? The stress by 
Chomskyan linguistics on language emerging naturally has made us forget how 
much work  our (old) teachers made in correcting our copybooks and marking them 
in red. I assume that was part of a formal instruction, attesting to the fact that many 
things about language use were learned in a social context. But now my opponent 
may want to argue that, in fact, quotation devices are conventions learned through 
formal instruction. My answer is: not necessarily. The teacher may well reinforce 
some principles of language use. In fact, he may never say that this is a convention of 
Italian or of English. It is possible, in theory, that the quotation mechanism was 
learned as a convention, one of those tacit conventions which one never bothers to 
explain through formal instruction, belonging to those things which are too obvious 
to be explained or learned through a formal instruction. In this case, it could be like 
one of the many grammar rules which we learn without anyone having to point to 
them. But then in this case, we would have to have a rule for the oral language and a 
rule for the written language. And for foreign languages? The fact that we have 
internalized a rule or a set of rules for our own language makes us ready for the 
expectation that a different language may have different mechanisms for quotation. 
And yet, when encountering a foreign utterance, we have no such expectation, but on 
the contrary we go on behaving as if a universal language were available. Is not this a 
reason to suspect that such a universal of language use must come from pragmatics? 
(Alternatively, we must explore the possibility of a grammatical principle like 
binding Principle A or B or C). 
Suppose there was no convention in the language for signaling quotation. Suppose 
nothing was really available to point to quotational uses. Nevertheless, it is a 
universal of human languages that a language must be able to express somehow the 
cognitive operation „quotation‟ and if there are no explicit resources, then it must use 
resources which are not conventional
4
. Presumably, there is a tendency in human 
languages to develop grammatical resources that make the quotation operation 
                                                 
4
 I received the following comment: “Perhaps it is, as a matter of fact, universally 
true that languages are able to express that operation. It is not so clear to me why 
they *must* have it. Is there a principled reason to think that paraphrase could not 
serve the same cognitive purposes that quotation is thought to serve?”.  This involves 
acceptance  that quotation and paraphrase  might be  functionally equivalent. 
However, without quotation it is hard to explain what a lexical item means;  it is at 
least reasonable to accept that every language must have devices for teaching and 
learning lexical items, quotation being one of them.   
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available on the basis of pragmatic resources. The clear-cut asymmetry between 
formal quotation operations in the written language and pragmatic quotation 
operations in oral languages attests that pragmatics is somehow responsible for 
quotation and that pragmatic intrusion  is necessary. (For additional arguments that 
pragmatic quotation precedes formal quotation, see Saka 2006, section IV.2.) 
 Wayne Davis (personal communication) opposes this view: 
“If by „explicit resources‟ you mean morphological or punctuation 
conventions, then I think your claim is clearly false. In particular, I believe 
there are conventions  in relation to intonation and phrasing that function like 
quotation in speech. Contrast the way  we say  John said a word (meaning that 
John uttered at least one word) with the way we say John said ‘a word’. 
 Now, I quite agree with Davis that, in the oral language, we find resources allowing 
us to point to a self-referential function.  However, one must explain  cases like John 
is ‘very happy’, where there can be no colons parasitic on the written language and 
where one must find some implicit resources to signal that the speaker is mimicking 
John‟s utterance (or voice). Would Davis say that conventions of language use are 
available in such cases? It is a pity, for such a view, that one has many ways of 
marking John‟s utterance as belonging to John: one can use a voice that mimics 
John‟s voice, one can use facial expression to dissociate oneself from that portion of 
the utterance, one can use different quality of voice to separate various portions of 
the utterance, etc. Is there a limit to what one can do to contrast the two portions of 
the utterance? Provided that the contrast is made clear, one can choose whatever is 
more congenial to oneself. 
 It can be argued that it is convenient  to say that the cognitive operation 
„quotation‟ is, after all, always pragmatic, and that written language has 
grammaticalized resources otherwise available through pragmatics. It is not 
impossible  to argue that quotation, even in the case of written languages, is a 
pragmatically effected operation. If there is such a possibility, then the asymmetry 
between written and oral uses is eliminated in one stroke. Everything else being the 
same, one would tend to choose a theory that is more parsimonious and tends to 
reduce levels of meaning (following Modified Occam‟s Razor). Of course, it is 
possible that the simplest theory will not suffice to explain most details and data; in 
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which case, this possibility ought to be reconsidered. I hope this will not happen in 
this case. 
Before launching such a reductive and „radical‟ enterprise, I want to ponder in a 
preliminary way on  whether a theory of explicature can assist our understanding of 
quotation. If we take Recanati‟s words,  a theory of explicature can explain many of 
the subtleties of quotation. What we should be clear about, however, is not whether 
some feature of the theory of explicature can help our understanding of quotation, 
but whether the theory of explicatures can be applied  completely to quotation. 
Explicatures deal with intuitions about truth. Is truth at stake when quotation is 
concerned? Surely, if one utters (2) 
(2) „Time‟ has four letters 
The utterance can be said to be true if one attributes the predication „has four letters‟ 
to a particular  expression type. It can be said to be false if, despite quotation marks, 
it is interpreted as attributing the predication to the metaphysical entity Time. 
So, in a preliminary way, we have established that questions of truth and falsity are at 
stake in the case of quotations and, thus, explicature is a potentially relevant notion 
that offers us a promise to tame the mysterious offshoots of quotation theory. I 
should also say, in a preliminary way, that I will try to resolve some puzzles which 
beset Recanati‟s application of the notion of explicature to the issue of quotation.  
 
2. Overview of theories of quotation. 
In this section, I shall succinctly discuss the major theories on quotation. After 
discussing the defects of the old theories, I focus on Recanati‟s view, which opens 
the way to a radical pragmatic treatment of quotation practice. 
 
2.1 Quotations are names.  
This view, attributed to Tarski (1933) and  Quine  (1940), considers quotations 
names. To make an example, if  we consider the sentence „„three‟ has five letters‟, 
we could replace „three‟ by stipulation (we can replace it with a and then go on to say 
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that a has five letters
5
).  The internal structure of the quotation is not considered 
important, and in fact the quotation is taken to consist of a simple expression. While 
surely this is the first step towards explaining  opacity or lack of substitutivity (we 
cannot replace „three‟ with a synonymous expression, if it existed,  salva veritate), 
there are problems that militate against this theory. This theory obscures the 
grammatical and recursive operation through which quotation works (Davidson 
1984). Furthermore, it does not fit in well with those cases of quotation in which we 
quote from an unknown language (in this case we are not sure what letters to use to 
express certain sounds). It does not fit in well with the one of the functions of 
quotation, which is to invent new words or coin new definitions, which are possibly 
infinite. 
 
2.2 Quotations are descriptions. On this view, by Tarski (1933) and Quine  (1960), 
a quotation is a description obtained by concatenating each successive letter of the 
materials quoted. One of the disadvantages of this is that we cannot quote from 
unknown languages (presumably because we are not sufficiently familiar either with 
their phonetics or written symbols) and that the quotations are largely unstructured.  
Thus this view does not do justice to the systematicity of language. (Surely an 
utterance is not only a concatenation of words but has a grammatical structure 
deriving from more general principles that are connected in a systematic way. This 
has been well known since the work by Chomsky; concatenations of words are not 
the only elements involved  in quotation. When we quote a syntactically well-formed 
expression,  we usually want to show what a person said and what he said usually 
includes the intention of forming a well-formed syntactic object). A further problem 
is that in  many cases, quotations work both at the level of use and of mention, for 
such cases, this is not a suitable theory (John said that „Mary is crazy‟(see also 
example (4)). 
 To amend some of the problems of this theory, Geach (1950) proposes that we 
should consider the quoted materials as concatenations of words. However, even if 
some structure is being introduced, this will not be enough, since we also need to 
                                                 
5
 Someone took issue with this.  However, since I am not going to defend   the view 
of quotation as names, I will not reply to this objection.    
422 
 
know more about syntactic structure („John went to the cinema‟ is a sentence of 
English). 
 
2.3 The identity theory of quotation. 
It has sometimes been claimed that in quotations, expressions refer to themselves or 
are identical with themselves. This view can be credited to Frege (1892) but also 
(exactly one century later) to Washington (1992). While this theory can in principle 
explain the asymmetry between written and spoken language, it is probably biased 
towards oral language. It considers quotational devices as not being indispensable. 
Nevertheless, the quotation operation is determined by a semantic rule: identify the 
expression with itself. This view has evident problems since, after all, we have 
multiple ambiguities showing up in quotation. Sometimes the expression is a 
phonetic form, sometimes a phonological form, sometimes a syntactic form, 
sometimes a lexeme or a string of lexemes, etc. (a point denied by Cappelen & 
Lepore 1999 and 2007, section 7.1.3, but pressed by Capone 2009a and Saka 1998, 
123; 1999; 2005, 191; and 2011, section 6). So „identity with the expression‟ does 
not really shed light on the multiple uses of quotation and it is clear that quotation 
does not consist of a simple rule such as „establish identity with the expression‟. (See 
also Reimer 1996, who explicitly expresses her reservations concerning the identity 
theory based on her idea that an expression does not really refer to itself, but in most 
cases of quotation refers to a type and in many cases one must establish what type is 
involved through  pragmatic resources that mobilize contextual clues). 
Another scholar who opts for the identity theory of quotation is Garcia-Carpintero 
(1994). This scholar considers the possibility of a pragmatic theory of quotation, but 
then he opts for the identity theory. I would like to answer the pessimistic view by 
Garcia-Carpintero on conversational explicature (actually he uses the term 
„conversational implicature'). Garcia-Carpintero is aware that in various cases we 
could replace or supplement  the demonstrative theory of quotation through 
pragmatic considerations.  He considers a vocal utterance of „Barcelona has 9 
letters‟. Since accepting that the city Barcelona has 9 letters will commit us to a 
falsity, we interpret the sentence as meaning that the expression Barcelona has 9 
letters. 
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Carpintero‟s worry, however, is that once we accept a pragmatic view totally 
unconstrained by semantics, we are forced by theoretical parsimony to accept the 
identity theory of quotation. I would resist this theoretical step. The identity theory of 
quotation cannot work unless we supplement it with a pragmatic theory, and if we 
supplement it with a pragmatic theory, we shall have both a semantic principle and a 
pragmatic theory – which is less parsimonious than if we only had a pragmatic 
principle. The identity theory cannot work on its own due to the multiple 
(interpretative) ambiguities of the expression quoted. 
 
2.4 Demonstrative theories. 
The theory of quotation by Davidson is called the „demonstrative theory‟ (the 
demonstrative theory has been renounced by its most prominent advocates, C&L).  
Davidson takes the quotation marks as the referring expression. The thing between 
quotation marks is the expression being mentioned or demonstrated. Davidson‟s 
theory is based on both the notion of demonstration and on demonstratives.  An 
expression such as „„Cat‟ has three letters‟ comes out as „The expression of which 
this is a token has three letters. Cat‟. One of the original merits of Davidson‟s 
analysis is to have separated the quoted expression from the sentence in which 
quotation occurs. This is presumably useful in coining new definitions. (In coining 
new definitions, we need to keep the definiens and the definiendum separate; in a 
definition we invest a word with a meaning (or with a more exact meaning); when 
we say we shall use the term „intentions‟ to refer to what the speaker intends to 
communicate, we are taking a word (or a term) and we are attributing to it a 
circumscribed meaning: thus it is convenient to separate the word we want to explain 
from the explanation, which is what happens when we use the demonstrative „this‟ in 
the explanation and the term to be explained within quotation marks).  There are, 
nevertheless, some shortcomings in this type of theory. It is not clear how one can 
account for recursive quotation as „„the‟‟6. Cappelen & Lepore 1999 claim that one 
                                                 
6
 One way to resolve Davidson‟s problem with respect to iterated quotation is 
tentatively something like the following, in connection with the example: „‟the‟‟. 
One could embed a second occurrence of a demonstrative through syntactic 
embedding in virtue of a relative clause and add subscripts to the various distinct 
occurrences of the demonstrative  „this‟: The expression of which this1 is a token 
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should do without recursive quotation. However, it is clear that there is an 
asymmetry between the written language, in which recursive quotation clearly has a 
point and the oral language, where it is not obviously clear what its function would 
be. Given the fact that no  quotation marks are actually used in the oral language, it is 
not clear how recursiveness can obtain. (It would also be difficult to keep in mind 
long iterated quotations in the oral language). (However, recursiveness should be 
explained with reference to the written language) Another problem of the 
demonstrative theory is that the quotation marks actually work as a subject. Thus, it 
would be possible in principle to have a sentence such as (3) in the written language: 
(3) „ ‟ has three letters. 
But this is an impossibility. I suppose Davidson has to bite the bullet and say that (2) 
despite appearances is well-formed, albeit false. (What about „ ‟ has zero letters‟?  
For more on empty quotation, see Sorensen 2008 and Saka 2011.) 
 
2.5 Mixed quotation. 
A problem of great interest, raised by Davidson and taken up by Cappelen & Lepore 
(1997b), concerns „mixed quotation. It is clear that sentences such as (4) are 
meaningful and grammatical: 
(4) John said that Mary is „a lioness‟. 
Cappelen and Lepore dismiss the view according to which one can append to the  
indirect quotation a phrase like „and the words which John really used are is „a 
lioness‟‟: 
 
John said that Mary is a lioness; 
And by the way, he used the words „a lioness‟ in uttering what he said. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
containing the expression of which this2 is a token). (See also Gomez-Torrente 2001, 
133). 
425 
 
Instead, Cappelen & Lepore capitalize on the fact that mixed quotation shows 
features of both direct and indirect quotation. Thus, what they do is combine 
Davidson‟s analysis for indirect and direct quotation. (However, notice that the 
analysis based on the parenthetical „And by the way…‟ was dismissed because it 
multiplied entities. It is not clear that the double Davidsonian analysis is more 
reductive than the parenthetical analysis). Basically, in simple terms, Cappelen & 
Lepore‟s analysis says that (4) can be elucidated in terms of (5): 
(5) There is an utterance u such that the speaker same-said the content of u and that is 
u and there is an utterance u‟ such that the speaker same-tokened the utterance u‟ and 
that is u‟. 
As far as I can understand,  the virtues of the Davidsonian approach is that 
semantics and pragmatics are impossible to untangle, since the hearer must recover 
the referent of „that‟. While things might be easier in the written language, this would 
surely be a rather complex pragmatic task in the oral language. An approach along 
the lines of Geurts & Maier (2005) might be preferable. Geurts & Maier resort to 
pragmatic intrusion and account for cases of mixed quotation by accepting that there 
is more structure than is visible. Thus an utterance such as „When in Santa Cruz, 
John orders „[ei]pricots‟ at the local market‟ is analyzed as  „When in Santa Cruz, 
John orders what he calls „[ei]pricots‟ at the local market‟. This method cannot be 
directly applied to all cases of open quotation. See what happens in „John said that 
Mary „is a lioness‟‟. I propose we  can make use of an apposition structure, as in  
„John said of Mary that she is a lioness, which  he said by uttering the words „a 
lioness‟‟; anyway,  a free enrichment view of  mixed quotation looks preferable in 
the light of the fact that the convoluted double layer meaning à la Cappelen & Lepore 
is avoided. One could  propose that we can paraphrase  „John said that Mary  „is a 
lioness‟‟ with 'John said that Mary is what he calls „a lioness‟‟. These considerations, 
however,  presuppose disambiguation, since a possible interpretation of this  
paraphrase is that John said that Mary is a lioness (the lioness is called „Mary‟). 
 The explicature account of open quotation along the lines of Geurts and Maier 
appeared substantially flawed to an author like Saka (2011). I think Saka‟s 
considerations are not implausible, but they can be seen in a new light, taking into 
account  Douven (2010)  on the pragmatics of belief. Basically, Saka doubts that an 
utterance such as „When in Santa Cruz, John orders „[ei]pricots‟ at the local market‟ 
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can be truth-conditionally equivalent  to „When in Santa Cruz, John orders what he 
calls „[ei]pricots‟ at the local market‟.  The reason for that is that what John calls 
„eipricots‟ in Santa cruz is equivalent to what he calls „aepricots‟ in a different place. 
Geurts‟ and Maier‟s insertion of the materials „what he calls‟ serves to create 
transparency, instead of opacity. However, the result of substituting coreferential 
expressions can be avoided if one follows, as is reasonable, Igor Douven‟s (2010) 
 Epistemic Hygienics (EH): Do not accept sentences that could mislead your future 
selves. 
It is possible to argue that Igor Douven‟s Epistemic Hygienics, which is a pretty 
plausible principle,  may be related to Sperber & Wilson‟s principle of Relevance. 
Since, after all, the explicature  through which pragmatic intrusion is constructed is a 
pragmatic process, the Epistemic Hygienics is clearly relevant and applicable and it 
furnishes  the right results in the case considered. In fact, by replacing „[ei]pricots‟ 
with „[ae]pricots‟ in an explicature, one obtains a result which is likely to mislead 
one‟s future self. Replacing „[ei]pricots‟ with „[ae]pricots‟ has the immediate result 
that in the future the speaker can no longer remember which word(s)  John used 
when buying apricots in the local market in Santa Cruz. 
  
2.6 Decisive objection to demonstrative theories. 
We have already seen the shortcomings of demonstrative theories of quotation. The 
recursion  problem noted and dismissed by Cappelen & Lepore is a serious 
shortcoming.  But the most thorny shortcoming of all is that demonstratives and 
demonstrations work well in the case of the written language, where we have 
quotation marks and inscriptions between quotation marks, but much less well in the 
case of the oral language. Demonstrations and demonstratives require pointers but it 
is not clear that spoken words can be used in this way. First of all, because of the 
lack of pointers. Second, because it is not clear what and where the pointers should 
point to. If this was not enough, in the same way in which the identity theory of 
quotation is jeopardized by the ambiguous uses of quotation, the demonstrative 
theory has a parallel problem. Even if pointers were available, and one could point 
towards a location, it is not clear that semantics is responsible for identifying the  
metalinguistic level required by this particular quotation. Even if we accepted the 
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machinery of Davidson‟s ingenious semantic treatment, we would have to amplify it 
by means of pragmatics. Pragmatics would have to do three things in the oral 
language: 
 
Provide pointers; 
Point at something physical; 
In virtue of pointing at something physical, point to a particular linguistic object.
7
 
(This point recursively involves pragmatics as one needs to explain  how one can 
refer to a type by referring to a token). 
                                                 
7
 Nunberg  (1993) says that whenever one points  to something, a distinction must be 
made between  the thing which is pointed to and that which is referred to through the 
pointing. Recanati (2010) takes advantage of this distinction to show that by 
quotation a speaker can, in virtue of demonstrating a certain token, point to a certain 
type (an expression type). However, it is  clear that adoption and exploitation of 
Nunberg‟s distinction simply serves to add levels to the analysis of quotation. An 
analysis in which demonstrating something is not indispensible must be preferred, 
since invariably the notion of demonstration requires the meaning transfer implicit in 
Nunberg‟s analysis and a shift from a token to a type in virtue of some pragmatic 
mechanism. An analysis that gets rid of these two steps is surely preferable. Reimer  
(1996, 139) who  argues that the demonstrative account is empty, like Nunberg 
argues that contextual clues help effect a transition from a token to a type:   
There is no need, for instance, to actually point to a particular copy of Word and 
Object when I come out with my utterance of (4) [That was published in 1960] – if, 
for instance, it is the only book on the bookshelf that my audience and I are viewing. 
The context, even without ostension, is sufficient to „demonstrate‟ (to display) the 
book in question. And it seems quite plausible to suppose that, in cases of spoken 
quotation, something similar is going on: features of the context other than 
demonstration effectively „demonstrate‟ the uttered token, the latter of which is used, 
in a process of deferred reference, to refer to the corresponding utterance type.  
I think that the flaws in this type of analysis are evident. Due to the discrepancy 
between written and oral language, Reimer is compelled to say that it is not the 
demonstration that does the job of demonstrating. Nevertheless, she accepts some 
mysterious notion of  demonstrating something in virtue of contextual clues, and this 
something is a token. Her analysis, as is clearly visible, involves at least an 
unnecessary step: reference to a token. My pragmatic analysis, instead, would 
dispense with the notion of referring to a token in order to refer to a type, and 
immediately provide the level of meaning required through explicature and the 
contextual resources which explicature mobilizes. In particular, there is no need to 
use the logical step of referring to a token in order to refer to a type, in the same way 
in which, in the case of metaphorical expressions, nobody (in pragmatics circles) 
really accepts that one moves from a level of literal meaning to a level of intended 
meaning. 
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It is clear from this analysis that the pragmatic tasks have been unnecessarily 
multiplied. 
 The pragmatics of quotation can avoid the first two steps. The third step also 
needs drastic reformulation, since one needs to get rid of the notion of „pointing at‟, 
which seems to require the use of demonstratives. All we need is to recover the 
speaker‟s intentions and this can be done by resorting to the multiple clues and cues 
used by the speaker 
So, in a sense I am not only arguing against theories of quotation that make use of 
demonstratives, but also against Recanati‟s theory of quotation, since this involves 
demonstrations that exhibit a certain type. My view is that singling out the 
metalinguistic type involved in a particular quotation does not require pointing or 
demonstrating. Functional applications of a predicate are much more efficient than 
pointing, since it is the fact that a certain predicate applies to a certain type that gives 
us for free the thing which, for other theorists, is being pointed at. 
 
2.7 Recanati’s theory of quotation: towards a pure  pragmatic view of   
quotation. 
At this point I can very well conclude my short summary of theories of quotation by 
briefly discussing Recanati‟s ideas. Recanati‟s theory is clearly most indebted to 
pragmatics. He still uses terms like „demonstrating‟ but, in fact, he abandons the 
Davidsonian theory by giving it a more pragmatic dimension. 
The key point in Recanati‟s analysis is that  an expression is being demonstrated 
by being quoted through the device of conventional implicature. But this view is 
immediately tainted by the ambiguity problem. What is being demonstrated 
(assuming that it is being demonstrated) is not just an expression, but what Bennett 
(1988) calls a feature associated with an expression. A conventional implicature 
analysis  would work well if one could show that the thing demonstrated is an 
expression. But this is not the case in many cases. Sometimes it is just a phonetic 
string, which is not an expression in the full sense of a linguistic string  having a 
form and an extension. Sometimes it is a lexeme. Sometimes it is a sentence. The 
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things capable of being „demonstrated‟ are too disparate to  allow one to hope that 
they can be unified. And if they cannot be unified, it cannot make sense to say that a 
quotation singles out an expression by conventional implicature. The conventional 
implicature analysis would necessarily require complementing by a conversational 
implicature analysis. And this will immediately lead to unnecessary multiplication of 
levels. Furthermore, one problem with this view is that conventional implicatures, 
according to Grice at least, require a linguistic trigger. Words such as „but‟ and 
„therefore‟ are cases of triggers of conventional implicatures. But these are words 
associated by conventions with certain meanings (even if they operate at a level of 
procedural meaning). It is not clear which words would have to carry the same 
semantico-pragmatic task in the case of the conventional implicature involved 
(somehow) in quotation. While Davidson‟s analysis has an element which carries out 
the task of selecting the quoted expression, namely punctuation marks that function 
as a demonstrative, there is no equivalent word in Recanati‟s account.  The fact that 
quotation marks are used in the written language surely does not prove much, since 
they could be replaced by italics
8
, and then in this case it is not clear which elements 
would convey the alleged conventional implicature. But the most crucial problem is 
that, in the  oral language, there are no quotation marks at all; in fact, it is even 
possible not to have quotation marks in the written  language. So, it is not clear that 
there is a suitable  candidate for  a suitable trigger at the level  of words for the 
operation of quotation. 
 Wayne Davis (personal communication) has one objection to my view: “I did not 
understand the problem you see with the ambiguity of quotation. Whenever anyone 
uses a demonstrative pronoun like „this‟, there are many possible referents 
compatible with the meaning of „this‟ even when supplemented with a pointing. So 
why is the fact that there are several possible referents  in any case a problem with 
the claim that quotation involves demonstrating an expression?" My answer is 
                                                 
8
 Why does a conventional implicature have to be conveyed by a word rather than a 
feature like italics?  Suppose that italics is used to express the conventional 
implicature associated with quotation. Then suppose I say or write: This is what John 
wrote today: I am not happy. Then italics would have to be associated with 
quotation, but in this case italics could not quote an italicized item. And in my 
utterance the purpose of my quotation was to quote what John wrote, including his 
use of italics. I do not see how the conventional implicature analysis can solve this 
problem. The pragmatic hypothesis faces no such problem, since italics could just be 
used to show how John wrote the utterance, by citing the font he used. That the 
teacher intends to quote the font as well could be fixed by intentions. 
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simple. Demonstration is canonically used in contexts where, by demonstrating an 
object or an individual, one provides an answer to a question (whether voiced or not). 
So, if you ask me, who is John, and I answer „That is John‟ (only John and Mary are 
visible), I use the demonstration informatively, because my act of demonstrating an 
object has unambiguously picked up the right individual. In case there are a hundred 
boys concentrated in the same courtyard, and I say „That is John‟, pointing my finger 
at the group, there are not many chances that my demonstration act will  successfully 
demonstrate anything. I will probably have to call: „John!‟ and when he replies, I 
could then demonstrate „That is John‟. But at this point the demonstration is quite 
superfluous. My argument for quotation is the same. Demonstrating is superfluous 
and we need alternative pragmatic means for establishing what the quoted item is. (In 
support of the conventionality of quotation, however, one could say  that whether or 
not demonstration is superfluous, quotation marks succeed in establishing what the 
quoted item is.  But I am not too sure that this  is right. Take the following case. 
„This is what John said: „ ‟. Which is the quoted item? Could it be John‟s silence? 
Could it be the lack of an item to be quoted? This is a terrain where pragmatics has 
certain advantages). 
 
3. Towards a pragmatic view of quotation 
 Furthermore, a pragmatic theory which accepts that quotation is done through 
conventional implicature, but must admit the shortcomings of this hypothesis, by 
remedying them through a reparative conversational implicature is surely not on the 
right track, since it comes short of parsimony and Modified Occam‟s Razor. (The 
pragmatic view alone suffices). 
 We need a level of implicature, also to exclude unintentional features of the 
reported message, as Bennett (1988) says. Consider the written language only: if 
Sally writes (6) 
 
(6) John wrote:  MARY must NOT come 
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then she will probably implicate that there is a reason why she is reporting some of 
the words in boldface and the reason must be that this is the way the original 
message was printed. Following Sperber & Wilson (1986), the cognitive effort 
involved in forcing the reader to distinguish  boldface must  be offset by appropriate 
cognitive rewards, and the easiest way to make sense of the additional efforts to 
which the reader is put is to convey that the reporter wants the reader to  know how 
the words were originally printed to start with. 
 Wayne Davis (personal communication) does not agree with my explanation. It is 
possible that the extra effort is balanced by the intention to convey the words 
highlighted were of particular importance to the reporter or that the reporter wants to 
highlight a contrast with what Jane said (Mary will come). Or perhaps the reporter is 
merely trying to highlight words that were nearly illegible when Mary wrote them. It 
is true that it is not impossible to have other interpretations than the one which 
immediately came to my mind. However, it should be possible to order 
interpretations according to their relevance. Since the font used in the report is of 
immediate relevance to the question of how John wrote the sentence, I think this 
intention has priority over the others, which probably require a greater amount of 
contextual clues to reinforce them (or to promote them to intended interpretation). 
 Perhaps the most problematic point of pragmatic theories is the controversial 
claim that (5) displays English words, that the words were not originally printed in 
Latin. However, once we abandon  the tenet that quotation is a semantical device and 
that it always consists of  quotation marks (whether explicit or implicit) that point to 
tokens, we can make sense of this apparently bold pragmatic   claim. The fact that a 
quoted text may have originated in a different language is a challenge to semantic 
theories of quotation because it shows that the objects which quotation may point to 
may be multiple and can be more abstract than the tokens quoted, thus requiring 
principles of pragmatic interpretation, rather than semantic rules. In order to explain 
why the canonical interpretation of quotation is to select a fragment of text in the 
same language in which the reporter utters it, we need to invoke  Relevance Theory 
again with its insistence on Relevance as the balance of cognitive effects and 
processing efforts. Since the reporter did not quote the words uttered in a different 
language, the cognitive effects are large enough if  the  linguistic expression 
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originally used is  English. Placing greater  cognitive efforts on the hearer by using a 
different language, would have to be offset by greater contextual effects.  
 A problem which Recanati faces in responding to considerations about mixed 
quotation in Recanati (2008) is that, in fact, the implicatures associated with mixed 
quotations are not cancellable. Consider (7): 
(7) John said that Mary is „a bore‟. 
 
If one tries to cancel the interpretation that John uttered the words „a bore‟, one fails 
to do so, according to Cappelen & Lepore (2005b).  One could try to rescue 
Recanati‟s pragmatic analysis by saying that, after all, „a bore‟ need not have been 
uttered by John. It is possible that the reporter  was echoing someone else and that 
the reporter is stressing this echoic relationship. This is not implausible. However, at 
the end of a chain of inference, we will end up with someone who actually uttered 
the words „is a bore‟ and we will also have to admit that there is an echoic 
relationship between Mary‟s words and that echoed person9. But this in practice 
means that  Cappelen & Lepore are right in insisting that the explicature (as the level 
of meaning  resorted to in quotation is an explicature) cannot be cancelled. But this is 
not  something undesirable
10
 These data fit in well with the picture of non-
cancellable explicatures which I traced in Capone (2009a). What I pointed out in that 
paper, in its essentials, is fundamentally that the speakers‟ intentions, once they are 
manifested, can no longer be cancelled. The reason for this is that a speaker uses 
many contextual clues in getting an intention across, and once these clues are 
disseminated or made available through a text, it is impossible to go back and 
                                                 
9
 Saka (2005, section 3.3) rejects the echoic account on the grounds that it does not 
strike him as plausible  that the word choice signaled by (echoic) quotation must 
reflect someone‟s thoughts in order for the quotation marks to make sense. The 
example Saka addresses is quite cogent. If  John says „The „debate‟  resulted in three 
cracked heads‟, there need not be someone who described  the event as a „debate‟, 
but John may plausibly mean that the event in question started as a debate and then 
degenerated into a violent discussion. I agree with Saka that speaker‟s intentions are 
even more pervasive than Recanati allows. However, my point remains unchanged:  
speaker‟s intentions, once manifested, cannot be abrogated, resulting in an 
explicature that cannot be cancelled. 
10
 Recanati‟s reply to Cappelen & Lepore is that „Cancellability  is a necessary 
condition  for a meaning component to count as  pragmatic; it is not a sufficient 
condition.' So cancellability per se does  not establish the pragmatic  nature of the 
meaning component' (Recanati 2010, 208). 
433 
 
withdraw an intention. The intention can be retracted, but never cancelled. I have 
shown in my paper on the attributive/referential distinction that referential or 
attributive interpretations cannot be cancelled; and this is due to the richness of the 
clues disseminated in a text. Since intentions can only be fixed pragmatically, literal 
meaning being essentially inadequate in fixing intentions without the help of 
pragmatics, what was manifested as intended cannot be undone
11
. It can be retracted, 
but this does not mean that an explicature disappears. Consider the following 
example from quotation: 
 
(8) „Red‟ has three letters 
 
In interpreting (8), what we clearly do NOT do is to establish an identity between an 
expression and the expression quoted, because there is not such a simple rule as this 
and we have already said that the word „expression‟ is ambiguous. By „red‟ we do 
not pick out a word, but we pick out a written form. In other words, we need to 
subtract the meaning level from the lexeme before arriving at the intended linguistic 
unit. First of all, we establish that the unit „red‟ is semantically inert, in other words 
that we are focusing on something different from its extension. But we do so not 
through Washington‟s  identity rule, but through pragmatics. We exclude that the 
extension of „red‟ is being intended because the statement „red has three letters‟, 
interpreted as being one about the red color, is blatantly false. Once we exclude that a 
referential entity is intended, we need to find out which feature of the expression is 
being focused on. Since „three letters‟ immediately activates encyclopedic 
knowledge (that the things which can have letters are written strings), we will select 
a written string. Notice that in the complex cases succinctly described through 
pragmatics, we do not demonstrate anything at all, nor do we use implicit 
demonstratives. This does not amount to excluding demonstratives from playing a 
role in quotation, as one can clearly have things like: 
 
(9) Look at the way this is written, 
                                                 
11
 Wayne Davis (personal communication) argues that in the case of  „John said that 
Mary is „a bore‟‟ the implicature that John  used the words „a bore‟ is cancellable. In 
fact, he may have used the Italian equivalent of those words. But look at what 
happens if we know that John does not speak Italian or any other foreign language. 
In this case, it becomes very difficult to cancel the explicature. 
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where one demonstrates an inscription or a shape by pointing at a sample of writing . 
Of course this possibility exists, but it is more naturally confined to the written 
language and to particular types of inscriptions. 
 The things I said about the non-cancellability of explicatures seem to reinforce the 
picture of pragmatics and modularity which I presented in Capone (2010c) and in 
Capone (2011). In Capone (2011) I replied to Cummings (2009) and I said that  
pragmatic processes of the non-reflective type are non-cancellable, are driven by 
fast-and-frugal heuristics and by mandatory operations which are bounded by the 
principle of Relevance, which operates by throwing a net on information that can be 
processed and which could direct or orient the pragmatic interpretation process. Of 
course, I granted that parts of pragmatic processes need not be mandatory or 
encapsulated, especially if we focus on reflective inferences. I doubt that reflective 
inferences are involved in quotation. It appears that inferences involved in quotation 
are fast, mandatory, automatic and encapsulated. This is the way the mind works in 
whatever language. We could make an experiment to test for encapsulation. Suppose 
you stipulate that quotation marks, in a certain fragment of the language, mean „Start 
looking for an expression which is located two meters away‟. Present the subject to 
be tested with an example such as „„Cat‟ has three letters‟. Then you need to guess 
whether quotation will be interpreted along cognitive routines dictated by universal 
cognitive principles or whether quotation marks will be interpreted in a procedural 
way by following the explicit stipulation. My guess is that the interpretation of 
quotation follows a different path of interpretation from stipulated interpretative 
routines. Paolo Leonardi (personal communication) is not persuaded by this thought 
experiment. He says: “The experiment does not persuade me at all, because we do 
not see any expression two meters away and because to stipulate something out of 
the blue and find that it is unnatural, when there is a usage that is established by a 
linguistic “convention” is predictable whatever the experiment” (translation mine). 
There are two things which do not persuade me about Leonardi‟s line of thought. 
First of all, if I see a certain bus at a distance and I see that it is the bus number 8, I 
have seen an expression at a distance (of course I have seen a token of that 
expression; but it is not impossible for me to say that expression is a number, in 
which case I am not pointing to the token, but to the type). Second, Leonardi 
assumes that the meaning of quotation is provided by a convention (a linguistic 
convention, in fact), which explains why the experiment of stipulating a certain 
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meaning for the quotation marks is not a happy one; the conventional meaning is 
always to be preferred to the arbitrarily stipulated meaning. However, if one does not 
assume that quotation  is regulated by a linguistic convention (as I do), the 
experiment makes sense. Let us accept the experiment only conditionally, as 
indicated by Leonardi. If the view that quotation is expressed by pragmatic means is 
accepted, then it will follow that the pragmatic inference will be mandatory. 
 I anticipate the objection that I have not (yet) said how quotation is to be 
interpreted in written cases. My answer is simple. Quotation works like all cases of 
marked expressions, where the use of a marked expression signals a deviation from 
an ordinary pattern of usage.  (It is tempting to see analogies with cases of anaphora 
by Levinson (2000) and Huang (2007)) Cognitive efforts must be offset by cognitive 
rewards, if we accept the theory by Sperber & Wilson. Thus one way to make sense 
of the marked pattern is to guess that it correlates pragmatically with an 
interpretation that is alternative to the interpretation that normally occurs in ordinary 
uses – an alternative to the extensional use of an expression. This alternative 
obviously has a metalinguistic character. 
 Of course, this is not the end of the story. I quite agree with Wayne Davis 
(personal communication) that, if this was the end of the story, then we would have 
to account for why in, e.g. „„red‟ has three letters‟ we do not choose an interpretation 
according to which  the sentence means  that any word with the same meaning as the 
word quoted has three letters, or that the word in quotes read backwards („der‟) has 
three letters, etc. It is clear that pragmatic considerations of the contextual sort play a 
role here. In particular, encyclopedic knowledge plays a role in enriching the 
explicature.  
 Could we explain quotation by resorting to default semantics (Jazczolt 2005) ? 
Here I am not sure that I have a definitive answer. I have argued in Capone (2011) 
that items of the lexicon that are associated with certain default pragmatic 
interpretations are stored in a default semantics archive. However, in this case, we 
have no word since the quotation marks are interpreted (see Saka 1998 and 
Washington 1992) as punctuation marks. They exhibit structure, and they are treated 
on a par with subscripts used in syntactic notation to signal phrase markers. It is 
therefore difficult to assimilate quotation marks to  items that can be characterized 
through default semantics. Although I do not admit many contextual elements in my 
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view of quotation, I predict the interpretation of quotation entirely through pragmatic 
principles. I assume a certain systematicity in the way pragmatic effects are obtained. 
 
3.1 Quotation and cancellability 
Now, before getting into the details of quotation, I  want to establish the particular 
notions by reference to which I will discuss my views of quotation. For years, I have 
voiced an unorthodox view of explicatures saying that this view has the immediate 
advantage of solving Grice‟s circle12, a problem noted by Levinson (2000). In short 
this view is that explicatures are not cancellable. I have usually defended the weaker 
version of this view, distinguishing between potential and actual explicatures, and 
saying that only actual explicatures are not cancellable. While I will not rehearse all 
the arguments used to persuade readers of Capone (2009a) on non-cancellable 
explicatures, suffice it to say that explicatures, on my theoretical view, arise 
especially in those cases in which the semanticist is forced to say that literal 
meanings lead to contradiction or patent falsity. To rescue an apparently plausible  
and well-formed sentence from accusations of falsity or contradiction, one needs to 
posit an explicature. This view is  more parsimonious than those that are around, in 
line with my idea that one should try to adhere to a classical semantic picture 
whenever it is possible, preferably by using the armory of implicit indexicals or 
variables. To keep this story short, I believe that, in general,  semantics provides the 
guidelines for the use of a linguistic expression and tells us or instructs us on how to 
use it and how to interpret it. I believe that  sentential meanings are not necessarily 
gappy (that is, they cannot serve to express a truth-evaluable proposition), even if 
sometimes they happen to be gappy, in which case  it is our task to show that 
pragmatics is necessary to explain the phenomenon of pragmatic intrusion, how what 
is said is said despite a shortfall of the semantics of the sentence. 
 I have tried to connect my ideas about the non-cancellability of explicatures with 
views on modularity of mind and their intersections with the pragmatics of language. 
Unlike some orthodox views in pragmatics (e.g. Kasher 1991 or Cummings 2009), 
but like other eminent pragmatics scholars (Sperber & Wilson 2002, Wilson 2005, 
                                                 
12
 Conversational implicatures take input from truth-conditional meaning but truth-
conditional meaning depends on pragmatic intrusion; thus, we have a double 
application of pragmatic principles. 
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Carston 1996) I accept that at least part of pragmatic interpretation is modular in 
nature and I respond to the standard objections to the modularity of pragmatics, by 
expatiating on the virtues of my view according to which explicatures are not 
cancellable. I showed elsewhere that  fast-and-frugal pragmatic heuristics determine 
interpretation of a linguistic expression on the spot, without the necessity of re-
opening the interpretation case whenever a piece of information that is potentially in 
conflict presents itself. The reason for this is that interpretation processes are 
bounded by the Principle of Relevance, which is like a net-throwing principle (it 
filters away information that does not interact in a fruitful way with assumptions 
being considered) and determines the availability only of information relevant to the 
interpretation process. The fact that in my view  explicatures are not cancellable, 
seems to conflict with the idea by Kasher that pragmatic inferences are not 
encapsulated because their defeasible nature  means that every piece of information 
drawn from encyclopedias can interact with existing interpretations leading to re-
interpretations (or modified interpretations). Non-cancellability and encapsulation 
seem to go hand-in-hand on my view. It may be thought that my views on pragmatic 
intrusion are in conflict with Recanati‟s view about truth-conditional pragmatics; 
however, there are various points in Recanati (2010) which seem to indicate that 
pragmatic intrusion cannot be easily cancelled; he is at pains in explaining these 
cases away, while if one were to accept my view that intrusive explicatures cannot be 
cancelled, one would not be at pains in explaining the points that are in conflict with 
the assumption that pragmatic increments are cancellable. My views about 
pragmatics are best exemplified in Capone (2009a), where I did my best to explain  
that a theory of pragmatics should be a theory of (communicative) intentions and that 
intentions are fixed in context through a number of clues and cues disseminated by 
the speaker and utilized by the hearer. Once intentions are fixed and messaged are 
implicated, they cannot be un-implicated (as Burton-Roberts (personal 
communication) would say). 
 In this section I will show why  my considerations on the pragmatics of quotation 
important from the point of view of the general theory of pragmatics. I want to show 
that  understanding the issue of quotation will have a bearing on the way we 
understand pragmatics and, in particular, the issue of cancellability of explicatures. 
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 I will keep this section short on purpose, because, otherwise,  I run the risk of 
developing a separate paper. However, this section contains all the essentials of my 
proposal. I mainly want to address a reply by Carston (2010) to Burton-Roberts 
(2005) on non-cancellability  of explicatures. Since my treatment of explicatures and 
my discussion of cancellability intersect with considerations by Burton-Roberts, I 
take Carston‟s objections as applying, mutatis mutandis, to my own views. First of 
all, Burton-Roberts considers the possibility of cancelling an explicature a logical 
impossibility. Why should this be so? Let us remember that the need for an 
explicature is dictated by the fact that a sentential meaning is often gappy. Thus, we 
predict, on logical assumptions, that cancelling an explicature from the utterance of a 
sentence whose meaning  was originally gappy (to start with) cannot result in 
contradiction. This is a process quite unlike implicature cancellation, which usually 
results in an utterance which is not apparently contradictory, but where the 
possibility of contradiction is real. There is no way to disprove the theory, if we start 
with the assumption that a sentential meaning is gappy or underdetermined
13
.  
Carston opposes this sophisticated reasoning, by saying that her students normally 
cancel implicatures/explicatures as in „She‟s ready, but Karen isn‟t ready to leave for 
the airport‟ and find the following „She‟s ready but she isn‟t ready‟ contradictory, 
despite the fact that the sentential meaning is gappy. So, Carston‟s point is that 
people can and do, quite confidently, assess examples like the ones just given for 
contradictoriness and can express judgements of non-contradictoriness or 
contradictoriness. 
 Readers, at this point, will realize that it is not easy to make a theoretical choice. 
We are at an impasse: theoretical  considerations vs. intuitive judgments by normal 
speakers. I propose to suspend our judgments for the time being, even because 
Burton-Roberts claims that in many cases explicatures cannot be cancelled without  
conveying a sense of contradiction (as Carston says, his position is even stronger, 
since he also takes cases of particularized implicatures not to be cancellable, on the 
                                                 
13
 In other words, contradiction is a property of statements, not of sentences and thus 
the cancellability test cannot be applied to sentences; an explicature is usually added 
to a sentence to transform it into a full proposition; but then we cannot apply 
cancellability to return to the original sentence. To apply cancellability, we would 
have to show that the sentence and the actual explicatures are not contradictory; but 
to show they are  contradictory we need to compare statements, not a sentence and a 
proposition (the explicature)). A priori, we predict that cancelling the pragmatically 
derived elements of an explicature will not result in contradiction. 
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grounds that once intentions have been fixed, they cannot be revoked). At this point, 
Carston admits that there are problems. However, she insists that cancellability for 
Grice was only a diagnostic for the notion of conversational implicature (and not 
even the most important one, given the decisive role played by calculability) and was 
based on two main ideas: conversational implicatures can be either explicitly 
cancelled or contextually cancelled. Burton-Roberts has only shown that explicatures 
cannot be explicitly cancelled. (Anyway, he has pointed out cases in which it is 
difficult to cancel an explicature). However, he has not demonstrated that 
explicatures cannot be contextually cancelled. 
 Things are not that easy. For instance in Capone (2003b, 2006 and 2009a) I have 
argued that explicatures cannot be cancelled on various theoretical grounds. Part of 
the evidence comes from accepting that explicatures are often a tool for resolving a 
theoretical problem and for showing that an utterance which otherwise has the 
appearance of a falsehood or contradiction, is not false or contradictory. If the 
explicature is a tool for rescuing a particular utterance by resolving a potential 
contradiction or logical absurdity, it is clear that cancelling the explicature turns out 
to be very problematic. 
 Carston, however, insists that Burton-Roberts and I are misguided as we consider 
utterance processing  to be an online process, while the notion of cancellability has 
more to do with its being a (theoretical) diagnostic, a test that must be passed by 
simply considering potential rather than actual explicatures. 
 Now, in my 2009a paper I was prepared to grant that one has to make a distinction 
between potential and actual explicatures and that my notion of non-cancellability of 
explicatures was limited to actual explicatures and, presumably, did not affect 
potential explicatures. However, my current perspective on quotation compels me to 
consider or reconsider whether what Carston says about the cancellability of 
explicatures on the basis of contextual cancellation has full generality. And my reply 
is not positive. Consider what happens when we have explicatures relating to vocal 
utterances such as „Bold has four  letters‟.  Given what Carston says, it would be 
possible to cancel this explicature if we changed the context (this is what contextual 
cancellation amounts to). But it is not clear how we should change the context in this 
case. Presumably, we need a context in which our assumptions of normality are 
suspended. Consider John, the madman. Is he so mad to be able to attribute the 
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predicate „has four  letters‟ to the person who is bold (assuming an interpretation of 
the somehow defective utterance „The bold has four  letters‟ which we may be 
inclined to attribute to him)? Seeking a context that legitimates the cancellation of 
the explicature leads us to a situation where we have to suspend judgments of 
rationality and if we have to suspend such judgments, then we probably had better 
give up our attempts to build a theory of rational interpretation of communication. 
After all, our theoretical assumptions are based on rationality (even Relevance 
Theory, which is less reflective than Grice‟s pragmatics involves principles of 
rationality such as judging the amounts of cognitive efforts as compared to the 
amount of cognitive effects). So, such a drastic departure from rationality will not do 
our theory any good. In my view, searching for contexts in which quotational 
readings can be cancelled is not easy. As I said, even in the cases of open quotation, 
where a portion of the utterance is cited (hence attributed to another person) one 
mobilizes resources that lead the hearer to understand the explicature and, thus, 
undoing the explicature is irrational in that it will annul the systematic and intended 
effects of  mobilizing  resources, a process which has  both a production and a 
comprehension cognitive cost. The very idea that cognitive costs are decisive in 
interpreting utterances and in determining explicatures runs counter to the  
theoretical option of having cancellable explicatures. This is an extremely costly 
move, as Jaszczolt (2005) admits. 
 
3.2 Compatibility with Saka’s view. 
Before closing my discussion of explicatures, it will be important to consider if and 
to what extent my treatment of explicatures is compatible with Saka‟s view of 
quotation. Saka (1998) may well accept my explicature account (or part of my 
explicature account), but insist that a minimal semantics for quotation must be 
provided, and that is what is supplied by the identity principle and its rule that an 
expression is identical with its nonce referent. Saka may very well insist that we can 
minimally differentiate use and mention and that mention involves identity of an 
expression with its nonce referent. Saka minimally characterizes use and mention in 
the following way: 
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(u) 
Speaker S uses an expression X iff: 
(i)            S exhibits a token of X; 
(ii) (ii) S thereby ostends the multiple items associated with X (including X‟s 
extension); 
(iii) S intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to the extension of X. 
 
(m) 
Speaker S mentions an expression X iff: 
(i)             S exhibits a token of X; 
(ii) (ii) S thereby ostends the multiple items associated with X; 
(iii) S intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to some item associated   
with X other than its extension. 
 
Now, while I do not doubt that this is a laudable definition of the distinction between 
mention and use, one that is interesting from a philosophical point of view, I doubt 
that this is a semantic distinction adopted by the speakers of a language like English 
or Italian. In fact, if, as I assume, the pragmatic process has as its aim the attainment 
of the most specific interpretation possible, it will be clear that on all possible uses of 
mentioned expressions a speaker commits herself  to (m) in virtue of the logical 
implications of the explicature. Consider what happens when one hears the utterance  
„„shhhh‟ is a pleasant sound‟. One clearly concentrates on the phonetic string and 
thus by explicature it can be assumed that (m) obtains. To have a pragmatic process 
that starts with (m) and then is enriched by the ulterior inference that we are talking 
about a phonetic string and not about the normal extension of a word involves an 
extra step. Furthermore, adopting (m) as a basic semantics involves knowing whether 
one is faced with the task of first disambiguating pragmatically whether rule u or m 
is applicable and then adding further pragmatic increments. One, in other words, 
needs at least two pragmatic steps, plus a semantic step, while a single pragmatic 
step is preferable. (Saka's work is not presented as a theory of interpretation. 
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However, in this chapter we face the task of providing a theory of intetrpretation 
based on the speaker‟s intentions). 
 
3.3 Camouflaged direct quotations. 
People occasionally say things like: 
(10) I „almost killed her‟ 
Using some contextual clue to indicate that some portion of the utterance does not 
belong to them. One can, for example, use the device of mimicking somebody else‟s 
voice (as pointed out by Recanati 2010) to mark a segment of one‟s utterance as 
representing somebody else‟s voice or point of view. 
 In written cases, one can use orthographic devices to impute certain segments of  
one‟s utterance to somebody else (see the examples by Dickens quoted by Recanati 
(2010) which involve extensive mimicking). 
 If we want to opt for a unified treatment which handles these examples just 
mentioned in the same way as the cases of explicit direct quotations (to be more 
precise, where the verb „say‟ or a similar verb is used), we need some way of 
marking off a segment from the remaining part of the utterance and conversationally 
implicate by stylistic marking that the segment is marked for special interpretation, a 
case of  mention  rather than a  case of use. Stylistic marking is important and does 
not necessarily involve mimicking or closely imitating the model of the voice to be 
reproduced. All that is required is that one uses a different style. So, one could 
differentiate some serious portions of the utterance from some segments uttered in a 
style that is evidently, blatantly, intentionally different from the rest: say a joking 
tone of voice, laughter, etc. Stylistic marking is important and suffices to trigger an 
implicature through the heuristics we are used to.  What is marked is not used in a 
normal way and carries messages concerning the point of the usage. 
 The gist of Recanati‟s treatment of ironic distancing from certain portions of the 
utterance or assuming an authoritative voice by imitating or representing an 
authoritative voice, is that one implicates the reason for the departure from ordinary 
usage (what he calls the „quotational point‟): in other words, one implicates what 
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intended effect one wants to achieve (or the purpose of the quotation). Consider 
again (10) (I „almost killed her‟). How should we interpret this?  One natural way to 
interpret this is to make use of Geurt‟s treatment of mixed quotation and to allow for 
pragmatic intrusion. In other words, we could render an utterance of (10) as (11) 
(11) I did something which she described/would describe as almost killing her.  
I would like to call (10) a case of camouflaged quotation because the ascribee is 
hidden and because part of the intended meaning must be reconstructed somehow by 
inserting some materials. Clearly in (11) contextual considerations are responsible 
for someone‟s opting for the past tense or the conditional.  In this case, we can 
clearly see that there is a division of labor between default inferences (the triggering 
of a departure from normal usage through the usage of a stylistically marked portion 
of the utterance) and contextualized or particularized inferences. We need to know 
what the speaker has in mind, who uttered that segment of utterance in the past, and 
other relevant pieces of information allowing us to recover the purpose of the 
quotation and its intended source. In this case, the speaker probably wants to play 
down the gravity of what he has done by implicating that the source is in the habit of 
exaggerating things, of amplifying them in a disproportionate manner. I have no 
objection to Recanati‟s wish to retain the source and the purpose of the quotation as 
particularized implicatures, rather than generalized ones, provided that it is made 
clear that the full interpretation of the quotation requires 1) a segment of the 
utterance which is sufficiently marked to produce M-implicatures (implicatures due 
to the use of a marked expression, an expression which deviates from the unmarked 
form in that it is more prolix or less frequently used); and 2) an explicature which 
reconstructs at least partially  the speaker‟s communicative intention in connection 
with the explicated articulation of the utterance. This would normally insert words 
such as  „I did what X (the source) would be prepared to describe/described as Y‟. 
A remaining and not negligible question is whether it is possible in all cases of 
implicitly quoted sources to articulate the implicit portion of the utterance through an 
explicature along the lines of Geurts and Maier. Consider the utterance „Einstein 
arrived‟. Suppose this utterance is prompted by a situation in which a person is under 
the delusion of being Einstein. Then this utterance could mean that the person who 
believes himself to be „Einstein‟ arrived. This could be taken as the 
implicature/explicature of the utterance. The implicature/explicature of the utterance 
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would involve reconstruction of the agent through an objective description and then 
attribution of some mode of presentation of the referent which uses the words likely 
to be uttered by the source.  It is a question of time and patience to see whether all 
examples can be dealt with in terms of explicatures; but it should be said that if 
things were this way, an important aspect of the theory would involve emphasis on 
the explicature which would partly be due to generalized implicatures and to 
contextualized inferences. 
We may very well wonder if camouflaged quotations are cases of cancellable or, 
otherwise, non-cancellable explicatures. I have said that the explicature involves two 
stages: spotting a segment that is stylistically marked; attributing a source on the 
basis of contextual information. The two tasks are probably connected, depending on 
how closely the marked portion of the utterance mimics the source. We have no 
doubt, here, that there are enough contextual clues to set the interpretative enterprise 
on a non-return trip. If a segment of the utterance is stylistically marked, there must 
be a reason for that, which invariably triggers the implicature. If a portion of the 
utterance is labeled by  common knowledge  as belonging to a certain person, who is 
the source in that he always used those words in the past, then there are enough 
contextual clues to identify the source. The explicature thus obtained is clearly non-
cancellable. Lack of cancellability does not have to do with conventionality 
(conventionality may play some role  but not a decisive one), but with the fact that if 
one mobilizes the semiotic resources towards a pragmatic inference, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to go back and pretend that those resources were never mobilized, 
that there was no reason in disseminating the text with abundant interpretative clues. 
The theory of relevance predicts that it would be uneconomical to cancel an 
explicature obtained by mobilizing  contextual clues, because the cognitive efforts 
involved would have to be expended in vain in case an explicature has been 
cancelled. 
 
3.4  A possible objection from Predelli (2003a). 
Predelli (2003a) examines a limited amount of uses of quotation (mainly cases of 
mixed quotation) and stresses the analogy between quotation and conventional 
implicature. The structure of his paper follows closely the structure of  the work by 
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Recanati on quotation: on the one hand, he assumes that quotation requires an 
analysis in terms of conventional implicature; on the other hand, he allows that 
quotation involves some elements of interpretation that are of a deep contextual 
nature (presumably the point of the quotation). What is really of interest in Predelli‟s 
proposal is that, in the same way in which conventional implicatures are cases of a 
doubled layered meaning, quotation too, for him,  involves a double layered meaning 
structure. To make things clear from the start, consider (12): 
(12) Mary is rich but generous. 
This statement has a truth-conditional layer of meaning,  which can be paraphrased 
as  „Mary is both rich and generous‟ in addition to having a secondary attached 
meaning, such as „There is a contrast between being rich and being generous‟. The 
two layers of meaning need not be of equal importance, and Predelli, in line with an 
authoritative tradition on conventional implicature, accepts that the truth-conditional 
content, but NOT the attached conventional implicature, can be the target of 
negation. Thus, if you say „That is false!‟ in reply to (12), you are apparently 
negating that Mary is both rich and generous. (You are not denying that there is a 
contrast between being rich and being generous). I have no particular complaints 
concerning the validity of these considerations in connection with conventional 
implicature. However, I am not completely persuaded that these considerations apply 
to quotation fully. At this point, I have to note that the examples used by Predelly to 
support his ideas are admittedly limited, as he just uses some cases in which the 
quoted item is also used. Quotation, on the other hand, in its most general 
significance, may also include cases in which the quoted item is mentioned but not 
used. To start with, however, we can very well check whether the data considered by 
Predelli really support his view of quotation as conventional implicature. Consider: 
(13) These are the „proofs‟ of the illustrations. 
Predelli considers a metalinguistic usage of „proofs‟. This usage is not correct (as it is 
not standard) and the speaker knows that well, and so it  is  marked as deviant 
through the use of  quotation marks. (But of course, when the quotation marks are 
added, the utterance is not deviant at all, but somehow indicates that the utterance 
without quotation marks would be deviant). According to Predelli, if speaker B 
replies „That‟s false‟, he cannot target the quotational use by negation, but only the 
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truth-conditional content of the utterance. Predelli must be wrong, because after all, 
the quotation marks  rescue the statement from a potential problem (its falsity) and 
thus it would be silly to say that the statement is false meaning that these are not 
proofs. If pragmatic intrusion serves to rescue statement (13), then it procures 
immunity against a use of „That is false‟ as a claim that these are not proofs. 
However, see what happens if truth-conditional pragmatic intrusion occurs and (13) 
is interpreted as (14): 
(14) These are what John would call (or normally calls) „proofs‟ of the 
illustrations. 
If such a pragmatic intrusion is accepted, then it would be possible to reply: 
(15) That‟s false. John never used the word „proofs‟. 
 
Of course, this may well require a bit of stage setting. Suppose there are endless 
discussions in the office concerning John‟s using the word „proofs‟ in the past and 
that one or two employees often say things such „These are the proofs‟ or „Send me 
the proofs‟ and by using these expressions they allude to the fact that John used this 
expression. John, however, knows that it was not him, but Bill, that started using this 
expression in the office, but, for whatever reason, his colleagues started to circulate 
the information that it was John who did so. After noting that by the utterance „These 
are the proofs of the illustrations‟, his colleagues actually allude to the information 
that John (and not Bill) used the term „proofs‟, he may very well say: „It‟s false. I 
never used the word „proofs‟‟. And by saying this, he would presumably reply to the 
proposition „This is what John would call „proofs‟.' Suppose now John is not sure 
whether his colleagues are actually alluding to him or, rather to Bill. Then he could 
say, Look if you are saying that this is what I would call „proofs‟ you are wrong. This 
is what Bill would call „proofs‟. 
 
Consider now, another example by Predelli, like (16): 
 
(16) Life  is „what happens  while you are making other plans‟. 
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Suppose that it is assumed by the speaker and the hearer that it was John Lennon 
who uttered „what happens while you are making other plans‟. Then a pragmatically 
enriched utterance of (16) could be  
(17) „Life is what Lennon would describe as „what happens while you are making 
other plans‟‟. 
Now, if (17) is so blatantly a quotation, I believe that it is not unnatural to correct this 
statement saying: „That‟s not correct, nobody really said this before‟. Furthermore, 
one could take issue with some of the words used. The hearer may well suggest a 
replacement for „you‟ such as „people‟ and if (17) is recognized as a quotation, then 
the hearer may very well say something like „This is false; Lennon used the word 
„people‟ not the word „you‟. 
At this point the discussion has become very theoretical and very much depends on 
whether or not we are inclined to accept that these quotations have a truth-
conditional import such as (17). 
 However, we do not only have examples such as the ones above to account for. 
Those examples are probably not the most central ones. We also have  examples such 
as: 
(18) „House‟ has five letters; 
(19) He said „Go to hell‟. 
(20) ) He said that I „almost killed her‟ 
to account for. In examples such as (18) and (19), (20)  falsehood is obtained as a 
result of replacing the words quoted with coreferential expressions. In fact, in a 
previous section on the applicability of the notion of explicature, I have already 
tested the idea that pragmatic intrusion is relevant to cases of quotation. It is amazing 
that the central cases are NOT discussed by Predelli, while he is more keen on 
discussing cases of free quotation where the locutionary verb is missing. However, 
even in these cases, if pragmatics is seen as reconstructing the missing locutionary 
verb, then quotation has a bearing on truth-conditional import. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, contrary to the received view of quotation, I have gone for a 
thoroughly pragmatic process and I have dispensed with Recanati‟s view that 
quotation is partially due to conventional implicature, and partially due to 
conversational implicature (especially open quotations seem to be cases where 
pragmatic interpretations abound). I am persuaded that a radical pragmatic view is 
more parsimonious. 
I am persuaded that quotation, in virtue of its pragmatic mechanisms, can be 
compared to a language game. It is a practice – a social practice – which very closely 
resembles the phenomenon which Goffman called „framing‟. Framing activities very 
often operate on the basis of stylistic information. Consider for instance a film, with 
many flash-backs. It is indispensable that we should be able to distinguish a series of 
events which unfold in chronological order from another. Marking the differences in 
terms of style is what allows viewers to recognize the framing activities. In the same 
way, a university lecturer may insert some windows in his lecture, connecting  the 
lecture to the present time and the present occasion (the location, the type of 
audience) and of course, she faces the same problem that one faces in quotation: 
having to mark stylistically a temporary break of frame (the lecturer may mark such 
breaks of frame by assuming a more amusing tone of voice). Similarly, talk at work 
is marked by stylistic signals, such as, for example, using a dialect as opposed to 
using the standard language, which is reserved for the most institutional parts of the 
proceedings. Many examples of this type can be offered to readers to  characterize 
the connection with quotation. Quotation is a social practice, which means that you 
need to be embedded in societal activities to see how the practice works and how to 
practice the practice. Very often, it is the specific language game one is involved in 
that serves to frame the quotational part of one‟s discourse. Definitions – which may 
occur at an early stage in a book, in a lecture or in an academic chapter –  are part of 
a societal practice, in which speakers and the audience take their time to reflect on 
and define the terms that are being used more frequently and systematically. In the 
context of this definitional language game, it is clear that words lose their 
extensional value and that we need to mark certain portions of the utterance as 
referring to words or expressions. Quoting other people‟s words verbatim is also an 
important practice, which usually also involves reporting the context in which the 
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words occurred, as, deprived of their contexts, words are like orphans and are 
deprived of most of their force, which is acquired in the context of specific language 
games. Consider, for example, what happens if a certain headmistress, in the course 
of a meeting says: suppose I say „teacher Buccheri is an idiot‟. This fragment of 
reported speech cannot be reported in isolation from its context, because otherwise 
one does not know the kind of embeddings which the words undertook. A first 
framing activity is the one of supposition; a second framing activity is one of 
exemplification. Suppositions are speech acts which involve a marked departure 
from normal assumptions; exemplification is also an activity requiring a different 
frame (you make an example while assuming that the event exemplified is not real). 
Granting that the example, despite the various types of embeddings, does not lose 
much of its aggressive force and that a real complaint can be reasonably issued, 
nevertheless, in the course of a legal controversy, if one deletes the context in which 
the example was made, one could very well think that the headmistress was crazy. 
The practice of reporting must at least include the competence required in reporting 
the parts of context which could reveal the depth of the embedding or, so to say, the 
various levels of framing.  
 Can  the notion that quotation is a language game lead us away from the idea that 
pragmatics is involved in understanding what game one is faced with? Not 
necessarily. On the one hand, one must learn the practice of citing context as well as 
words, when one reports an utterance. On the other hand, citing context can lead to 
various meaning augmentations. Since the point of the quotation must be inferred, it 
is clear that the point of the quotation is variable and is tied to what the reporters 
have in mind at the moment of the utterance. A pragmatic reconstruction is certainly 
required. Facts about the stylistic nature of the quotational language game, 
furthermore, need not be learned piecemeal, but may well be integrated in a  general 
pragmatic competence which involves resorting to the pragmatic principle of  
Relevance to infer an M-implicature.  
 
